This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

16 February 2000
Michael Hardin, former CIA Senior Analyst on missile proliferation, identifies the Condor's termination as the foremost missile nonproliferation success to date, and offers a technical overview of the program. His public address before the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC, was reviewed and approved by the CIA's Publication Review Board. Hardin says, "the most successful and significant case study of missile nonproliferation is that of the Condor II SRBM (a.k.a. Vector and Badr 2000). This multibillion dollar program was a direct derivative of the US Pershing 2 and was in development in Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq but had never reached the flight-test phase of development." Hardin notes that, "although the Condor II was designed with a solid-propellant first stage similar to that of the US Pershing 2, a liquid-propellant second-stage was designed based on an upper stage of an Ariane SLV engine. This original Condor II solid/liquid configuration had many of the same problems as the Indian Agni I MRBM and a solid-propellant second stage was also designed for the Condor II. The new solid-propellant second-stage approach significantly increased the overall system cost and development time as different staging and thrust termination technology had also to be designed or obtained and flight tested—a phase never reached." Hardin adds, "the Condor II/Badr 2000 was designed as a mobile two-stage missile with a separating unitary or submunitions dispensing, re-entry vehicle that would have been more difficult to detect and intercept than the several Scud variants actually used by Iraq. The Condor II was also the basis for even larger MRBM, ICBM and SLV designs. History shows that the most economical way to defend against a missile attack is to ensure that the offensive missile system never reaches the production/deployment phase." [Note: A source interviewed by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) refutes Hardin's assertion that the Condor II was a derivative of the Pershing 2, stating that the only similarities were "shared ideas on guidance and hardware."]
—Michael Hardin, "Missile Defense and Missile Non-Proliferation: The Interactions," remarks before the Proliferation Roundtable at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 16 February 2000, <http://www.ceip.org/files/events/Roundtable21600Hardin.asp?>, 23 August 2002; CNS interview with missile engineer familiar with technical dimensions of Argentine missile program. Source wishes to remain anonymous.

23 February 2000
Jane's Defence Weekly reports that US and Israeli intelligence sources have said that Egyptian government-owned companies have obtained Western technology that is being sent to North Korea. The North Koreans reportedly adapt this technology and return it to Egypt in the form of advanced missile components for Egypt's medium-range ballistic missile program. Israeli sources reportedly claim that Egypt has Scud-C medium-range ballistic missiles with a range of 500km. A US defense analyst reportedly said that Egypt has cooperated with North Korea on missile development and is reportedly able to manufacture a version of the Scud-B ballistic missile.

US defense officials also believe that Egypt might have transferred technology from the Condor missile program, which ended in the late 1980s, to North Korea. The Condor had a range of 800km to 1,000km. In return, Egypt reportedly received advanced missile components for its medium-range ballistic missile program from North Korea's Nodong and the Taepodong missiles.
—Steve Rodan, "Israel, USA Claim Egyptian Missile Links with North Korea," Jane's Defence Weekly, 23 February 2000, p. 18.

28 March 2000
Middle East Newsline reports that, "Egypt is importing engines for missiles without any US interference, and government sources warn Washington may be the next exporter of the system.... Egypt is importing missile engines for its ballistic missile program."
—"Egypt Iran Import Engines for Missiles," Middle East Newsline, 28 March 2000, <http://www.menewsline.com>.

24 May 2000
Jane's Defence Weekly reports that Egypt is receiving expertise from North Korea in ballistic missile development.
—Steve Rodan, "Israeli General Voices Concerns Over Egypt," Jane's Defence Weekly, 24 May 2000 p. 3.

29 May 2000
Haaretz reports that North Korea is negotiating with Egypt for the sale of new longer-range Scud ballistic missiles. The longer range Scud-D has an approximate range of 700 km. Haaretz also reports that "Some believe that Syria is producing Scud parts and selling them to Egypt."
—Ze'ev Schiff, "Syria adds new long-range Scuds to arsenal," Haaretz, May 29 2000, <http://www3.haaretz.co.il>.

7 June 2000
Defense Daily reports Egypt is buying 21 percent of a Harpoon weapon system production requirement consisting of two All Up Round (AUR) cans, four AUR containers, five sustainer sections, three sustainer section containers, one rocket motor assembly, four guidance sections with government-furnished equipment seeker, one control section, one control section container, four guidance control units, two AUR Tartars, one exercise section, 13 Tartar launch kits, eight Tartar AUR containers, eight Tartar booster assembly kits, 11 seekers, 34 canister firing kits, 15 capsule canister launch kits, five missile booster kit assemblies, five section container, five sustainer containers, five rocket motor booster container, and five seeker assembly containers. The report also says Egypt is receiving an award for the modification of Phase III of the Harpoon Sustaining Engineering, Seeker Life Extension Program and incorporation of a flight-control electronics ring for guidance control unit-equipped all-up-round missiles.
—"Defense Contract," Defense Daily, 7 June 2000.

1 July- 31 December 2000
According to the CIA, North Korea obtains raw materials and components for ballistic missiles from "various foreign sources, especially through North Korean firms based in China." Chinese firms are also said to provide "dual-use missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to North Korea." As a supplier, North Korea provides "significant ballistic missile-related equipment, components, materials, and technical expertise to countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa." North Korea is said to "maintain a missile relationship" with Egypt, and provide assistance and equipment for Syria's liquid-propellant missile program. North Korea is also reportedly a supplier of "missile-related equipment, materials, technology, and expertise to Libya and Iran."
—"Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000," CIA, 7 September 2001, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_sep_2001.htm#5>; "Russia, N. Korea, China Give Iran Missile Aid -- CIA," Joongang Ilbo, 11 September 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; Bill Gertz, "CIA Uncovers Missile Moves by China," Washington Times, 8 September 2001, <http://www.washtimes.com>; "CIA Says Iran Got New Missile Aid," Washington Post, 8 September 2001, p. 9.

11 August 2000
The CIA releases a report that says Egypt continues to develop and build ballistic missiles with North Korean help. An Egyptian source denies the report, calling the report "biased and selective."
—Khalid Mahmud, "Cairo surprised by CIA charges on missiles," Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), 12 August 2000; in FBIS Document GMP20000812000020, 12 August 2000.

November 2000
Egypt completes the first phase of its intermediate-range ballistic missile, which consists of producing 10 missiles and receiving North Korean missile engines, according to US congressional sources.
—"Egypt's missile program stuck in second phase," Middle East Newsline, Vol. 3 No. 286, 23 July 2001.

6 February 2001
Al-Akhbar reports that the Arab Organization for Industrialization, which represents Egypt's military industry, has increased the range of the Sakr-36 missile to 43km while retaining the 122mm caliber launcher. The Sakr-36 is designed to shell targets such as mechanized infantry and air defense, and can penetrate 70mm of armor, the report says.
—Faruq al-Shadhuli, "Development of Egyptian Sakr missile range to 43 km," Al-Akhbar (Cairo), 6 February 2001; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

March 2001
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon visits the US Congress and tells an informal group of House and Senate members that Egypt is trying to procure "advanced" Scud missiles from North Korea.
—Eli J. Lake and Richard Sale, "Egypt Buys Missiles from North Korea," United Press International, 18 June 2001.

9 March 2001
Middle East Newsline reports that Egypt continues cooperation with North Korea to develop missiles, including parts, material, and expertise. Egypt has rejected warnings from the United States on the matter, according to US officials.
—"Egypt continues to obtain N. Korean missile help," Middle East Newsline, 9 March 2001, <http://www.menewsline.com>.

9 March 2001
Middle East Newsline reports that the latest CIA report on proliferation states, "Egypt continues its effort to develop and produce ballistic missiles with the assistance of North Korea. This activity is part of a long-running program of ballistic missile cooperation between these two countries."
—"Egypt continues to obtain N. Korean missile help," Middle East Newsline, 9 March 2001, <http://www.menewsline.com>.

15 March 2001
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace publishes a report on ballistic missiles in the Middle East that says Egypt fields Frog-7 and Scud-B missiles. The report says Egypt can probably also field the Scud-C missile with a range of 500km, or a close variant of it, with North Korean help.
—Justin Anderson, "Ballistic Missile Arsenals in the Middle East," Proliferation Brief, Vol. IV, No. 3, 15 March 2001, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://www.ceip.org/npp>.

5 April 2001
At a luncheon in Washington, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak denies Egypt is cooperating with North Korea on ballistic missiles.
—Middle East Newsline, Vol. 3, No. 136, 5 April 2001.

27-30 April 2001
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Russian President Vladimir Putin meet in Moscow. Among other things, they are expected to discuss the sale of Russian missiles to Egypt. Russian and Egyptian sources say Mubarak is interested in medium-range missiles and wants to discuss the possibility of Egypt manufacturing them. Mubarak reportedly cuts his trip short and skips a visit to a missile factory, but Russian Foreign Minister Ivan Ivanov says Mubarak left on schedule.
—"Egypt, Russia prepare to sign nuke accord," Middle East Newsline, 27 April 2001, <http://www.menewsline.com>; "Egypt, Russia agree on nuclear cooperation," Middle East Newsline, 30 April 2001, <http://www.menewsline.com>.

14 May 2001
US and European intelligence sources report that Egypt is pursuing its missile program. The sources report that Egypt has obtained components from Germany via North Korea to develop the 450km Project-T missile, the 900km Al Bader [Badr 2000], and the 1200km Vector missile.
—Steve Rodan, [no title], Middle East Newsline, 14 May 2001, <http://www.menewsline.com>; 23 August 2002 <http://www.menewsline.com>.

June 2001
The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs publishes a report by Gerald Steinberg that states, "Following the Iranian model, Egypt appears to be seeking the technological capabilities to produce its own missiles. These activities have reportedly led to tension between Washington and Cairo."
—"Israel doesn't fear Egypt's Nodong missile," Middle East Newsline, Vol. 3 No. 276, 16 July 2001.

June 2001
The Arms Control Association publishes a report on missile proliferation that says Egypt has the following operational missiles: Scud-B (range 300km, 1000kg payload) from the Soviet Union; Project-T (range 450km, payload 985kg) made domestically with help from North Korea; the Scud-C (range 550km, payload 600kg) from North Korea. In addition, Egypt is developing Vector missiles (range 685km, payload 450kg) with help from North Korea.
—"Global Missile Proliferation," Arms Control Association Fact File,<http://www.armcontrol.org/ACT/factfilejun01.htm>.

18 June 2001
Middle East Newsline reports that, according to US government sources, Egypt is negotiating with North Korea to buy 50 Nodong missile engines, the most major component Egypt has bought in its 20 years of missile cooperation with North Korea. The United States wants to stop the sale and has raised the issue with Egyptian officials. According to the report, the story was first reported in the Maariv daily newspaper in Israel.
—"U.S. tries to stop No-Dong sale to Egypt," Middle East Newsline, Vol. 3, No. 236, 18 June 2001.

21 June 2001
Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher meets with Secretary of State Colin Powell. The Bush administration is concerned about Egypt's missile cooperation with North Korea, which is said to include the purchase of 50 Nodong engines. However, Maher says that Egypt's missile cooperation with North Korea has ended.
—"Cooperation," Middle East Newsline, Vol. 3, No. 244, 22 June 2001.

21 June 2001
Coinciding with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Maher's arrival for his first official visit in Washington, Middle East Newsline reports that as many as 300 North Koreans work in Egypt on its missile program. In the last two years, the number of North Koreans working on missile programs in Libya and Egypt has risen, and Egypt may be developing missiles in Libya. US officials say the issue of North Korean participation will not be raised with Maher because he is not the appropriate person, according to the report. Some members of Congress are considering cutting aid to Egypt if the sale of Nodong engines is not curtailed. Novosti Nedeli reports that the North Koreans in Egypt are working to increase of the range of Egypt's Scud missiles and that according to sources at the Israeli embassy in Washington, Israeli "special services" and the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee were involved in leaking the news concerning Egypt and North Korean missile cooperation on the eve of Maher's visit to the United States.
—"Up to 300 N. Koreans aid Egypt's missile program," Middle East Newsline, Vol. 3, No. 242, 21 June 2001; Mikhail Falkov, "Jerusalem attacks Cairo via Washington," Novosti Nedeli (Tel Aviv), 21 June 2001; in FBIS Document GMP20010625000058, 21 June 2001.

24 June 2001
Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher in Washington rejects reports that Egypt is developing medium- or intermediate-range ballistic missiles.
—"Maher rejects US criticism of Egyptian rights record," Middle East Newsline, Vol.3, No.245, 23 June 2001.

Second half of 2001
According to Middle East Newsline, Egypt receives a shipment of 24 North Korean Nodong missiles, range 1200km. The missiles do not have engines, but Egypt reportedly also receives a shipment of 50 North Korean engines through Libya. [See 19 November 2001 entry.]
—"Evidence emerges of Egypt Nodong purchase," Middle East Newsline, Vol. 4, No. 208, 5 June 2002.

5 July 2001
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak denies reports that Egypt is attempting to produce intermediate-range ballistic missiles. He says Egypt does need such a missile because it does not have any hostile intentions.
—"Mubarak Denies Nodong Missile Program," Middle East Newsline, Vol. 3 No. 262, 5 July 2001.

9-13 July 2001
A secret Egyptian Defense Ministry delegation in Washington discusses its ballistic missile cooperation with North Korea. The team gives "satisfactory" replies to US inquiries regarding Egypt-North Korea missile dealings.
—Natan Guttman, "Egypt gives US 'satisfactory replies' on missile deal with North Korea," Haaretz (Tel Aviv),15 July 2001; in FBIS Document GMP20010715000115, 15 July 2001.

11 July 2001
Middle East Newsline reports that Egypt is discussing the resumption of military cooperation with China, which in the past has contributed to Egypt's missile program.
—"China, Egypt discuss weapons cooperation," Middle East Newsline, Vol. 3, No. 270, 10 July 2001.

16 July 2001
Middle East Newsline reports that Egypt has suspended plans to buy 50 North Korean missile engines because of US concerns. The report says that starting in 1999, Egypt stepped up its intermediate-range missile program, termed Al-Fatah by a US defense source. The program includes the participation of Libya and has employed parts and technology from Iraq and China.
—"Israel doesn't fear Egypt's No-Dong missile," Middle East Newsline, Vol. 3 No. 276, 16 July 2001.

23 July 2001
Middle East Newsline reports that progress on Egypt's intermediate-range missile program has been halted at the second phase because of US pressure to block Egypt's purchase of 50 missile engines from North Korea. The second phase was to include the production of tubes, guidance systems and North Korean engines, and was to have been completed this year. The third phase involved assembling the missile. Egypt has not developed technologies as planned for the missile and has turned to German and French companies for the necessary technologies, such as guidance systems. US officials believe Egypt is not close to finishing a Nodong variant, but congressional sources say that in November Egypt completed the program's first phase, which consisted of making 10 missiles and receiving North Korean engines.
—"Egypt's missile program stuck in second phase," Middle East Newsline, Vol. 3 No. 286, 23 July 2001.

26 July 2001
At a US congressional hearing, Congressman Brad Sherman asks Assistant Secretary of State William Burns about Egypt's alleged acquisition of the 800-mile Nodong missile. Burns does not deny Egypt's acquisition of the missile, but asks for the matter to be discussed in closed session. Middle East Newsline interprets this as a public acknowledgement of the deal.
—"US acknowledges concern over Egypt's Nodong," Middle East Newsline, Vol. 3, No. 296, 30 July 2001.

9 August 2001
Middle East Newsline reports that Egypt has assured US officials that its missile program remains within "acceptable limits," and does not include developing a variant of the North Korean Nodong missile. The United States believes Egypt's cooperation with North Korea is limited to Scud missiles, and does not pose a short-term threat to Israel or the Middle East, according to State Department officials. US officials have said a panel will be created to talk to Egypt about its missile program, but a State Department spokesman refused to confirm this.
—"State Dept. believes Egypt remains within missile limits," Middle East Newsline, Vol. 3, No. 312, 9 August 2001.

7 September 2001
The CIA releases its "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000." The report says that, in the period covered by the report, Egypt continued to cooperate with North Korea on ballistic missiles and maintained an inventory of Scud missiles.
—"Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000," Central Intelligence Agency, <www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_sep_2001.htm>.

10-12 September 2001
A US military delegation in Cairo, led by Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman, raises the issue of Egypt's missile cooperation with North Korea.
—"Egypt and US hold strategic dialogue," Middle East Newsline, Vol. 3, No. 359, 12 September 2001.

2 October 2001
Egyptian Minister of Industry and Technological Development Dr. Mostafa al-Refai announces that Egypt has discovered the mineral Tantalam in the eastern desert in the Abu Diab area. The reserve is 50 million tons, making Egypt the world's fourth largest holder of the mineral, which is used in missile and aircraft engine production.
—"Rare mineral Tantalam found in eastern desert," MENA (Cairo), 2 October 2001; in FBIS Document GMP20011002000124, 2 October 2001.

17 October 2001
Kuwait signs an agreement to buy Egyptian Amun air defense missiles.
—"Kuwait, Egypt sign agreement on purchasing Amun air defense missile system," MENA (Cairo), 17 October 2001; in FBIS Document GMP20011017000272, 17 October 2001.

2 November 2001
The Bush administration sends a classified memorandum to Congress informing it that it intends to provide 53 Harpoon Block II missiles to Egypt.
—John Lancaster, "US-Egypt arms deal questioned," Washington Post, 27 November 2001; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 November 2001
A Bush administration official says North Korea is trying sell missiles to three or four countries in the Middle East, though the unnamed official does not name the countries. North Korea and Egypt have reportedly agreed on a missile sale, the report says, though this is not confirmed. [Note: It is not clear whether the US official is the source of this aspect of the report.]
—George Gedda, "North Korea said to be trying to sell missiles in Mideast," Associated Press, 9 November 2001; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 November 2001
Chungang Ilbo reports that according to a diplomatic source in Seoul, "North Korea already clinched a deal that promised to provide its counterpart [Egypt] with Rodong [Nodong] missiles early this year." A researcher for the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses says that North Korea has sold 10 to 24 missiles to Egypt. [Note: The report is unclear as to when or what type of missile.]
—"ROK Daily analyzes possible missile deal between North Korea, Egypt," Chungang Ilbo (Seoul); in FBIS Document KPP20011119000096, 19 November 2001.

27 November 2001
Referring to reports that Egypt has agreed to buy North Korean Nodong missiles, a US State Department official says, "We believe we should hear what Egypt has to say regarding the latest report on armament transactions with the North and confirm the fact." [Note: See 19 and 28 November 2001 entries.]
—"US out to confirm reports of Egypt's missile purchase," JoongAng Ilbo, 28 November 2001; North Korea Net <http://.joins.com/nk/article.asp?aid=20011127140816&sid=E00>.

27 November 2001
US congressional sources say Congress has begun an investigation into whether Egypt has bought North Korean Nodong missiles.
—"ROK's Yonhap: US Congress to investigate reports of N.K.-Egypt missile trade," Yonhap (Seoul), 28 November 2001; in FBIS Document KPP20011128000008, 28 November 2001.

28 November 2001
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak denies that Egypt is buying North Korean Nodong missiles. "Had there been such a deal, we would have announced it," he says. [Note: See 19 and 27 November 2001 entries.]
—"Mubarak denies Egypt has bought weapons from North Korea," Agence France Presse, 28 November 2001; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

14-22 January 2002
US Congressional delegations to the Middle East question Egypt about its missile cooperation with North Korea and say the United States will not tolerate it. A delegation of five members led by House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt meets with Egyptian Defense Minister Husein Tantawi. Rep. Henry Waxman says, "We made it clear that we weren't supportive of any effort to go to North Korea for missiles. They said they weren't interested." Congressional leaders are concerned about a recent classified CIA report that said Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak lied in his denials of missile cooperation with North Korea.
—"Congress discusses N. Korean missiles with Egypt," Middle East Newsline, Vol. 4, No. 29, 22 January 2002.

6 February 2002
CIA director George Tenet testifies before the US Senate Intelligence Committee that North Korea continues its exports of ballistic missiles and parts, and Egypt is a major recipient. In a closed session, officials say Egypt has tried to buy the Nodong missile. [Note: See 28 November 2001 entry.]
—"Report: N. Korea preparing new long-range missile test," World Tribune, 7 February 2002, <http://www.worldtribune/breaking_4.html>; "CIA: Egypt continues missile projects with N. Korea," Middle East Newsline, 12 February 2002, <http://www.menewsline.com>.

19 February 2002
JoongAng Ilbo reports that since the 1980s, North Korea has sold 250 missiles worth $580 million to the Middle East, including Egypt.
—Brent (Won-ki) Choi, JoongAng Ilbo (Seoul), 19 February 2002, <http://english.joins.com/nk/article.asp?aid_20020219003843&sid=E00.>.

4-8 March 2002
During his trip to the United States, US officials question Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak about Egypt's dealings with North Korea on ballistic missiles.
—"Egyptian ambassador refutes allegations of missile cooperation," Korea Herald, 9 March 2002; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 March 2002
Egypt's ambassador to South Korea, Amr Helmy, denies that Egypt is cooperating with North Korea on missiles.
—"Egyptian ambassador refutes allegations of missile cooperation," Korea Herald, 9 March 2002; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 April 2002
Middle East Newsline reports that, according to the CIA, Egypt is one of the four largest missile clients of North Korea. North Korea plans to offer new parts and missiles to Egypt this year, including the Taepodong-1, according to US officials.
—"CIA: Egypt is key missile customer of N. Korea," Middle East Newsline, 1 April 2002, <http://www.menewsline.com>.

25 April 2002
Middle East Newsline reports that some countries, such as Japan and South Korea, believe North Korea has had trouble shipping missiles to countries in the Middle East, including Egypt, because of international pressure. But the United States believes that North Korean missile shipments continue via Pakistan and China.
—"Dispute rages over N. Korean missile exports," Middle East Newsline, 25 April 2002, <http://www.menewsline.com>.

5 June 2002
Middle East Newsline reports that North Korea delivered 24 Nodong intermediate-range missiles to Egypt in the last half of 2001, according to US intelligence sources. The missiles purportedly did not include engines, but Egypt received 50 North Korean engines via Libya. "It's a slap in the face to all those who have been working to stop the Egyptian-North Korean missile cooperation program," says a US intelligence source. "Egypt pledged that it wasn't seeking the Nodong or its engine and then acquired both." [Note: See 19 November 2001 entry.]
—"Evidence emerges of Egypt Nodong purchase," Middle East Newsline, Vol. 4, No. 208, 5 June 2002.

7 June 2002
Maariv reports that Egypt is buying 50 Harpoon Block II missiles from the United States in a $400 million deal, but that the land attack feature of these missiles has been eliminated because of Israeli objections. The report says Egypt has 24 Scud launchers.
—Jackie Hugi, "A large and smart army," Maariv (Tel Aviv), 7 June 2002; in FBIS Document GMP20020607000177, 7 June 2002.

27 June 2002
Asked in a congressional hearing about Egypt's alleged acquisition of North Korean Nodong missiles, Lt. Gen. Ronald Kaddish does not deny the acquisition, but asks that the matter be discussed in closed session. A congressional staffer says the general's response indicates that Egypt did buy the missiles: "He could have said 'Egypt is an ally' and that's it."
—"Pentagon acknowledges Nodongs to Egypt," Middle East Newsline, Vol. 4, No. 246, 2 July 2002.

9 July 2002
According to Middle East Newsline, coincident with a panel presentation to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on missile proliferation, Egyptian envoy Ahmed Abul Gheit declares that, "Egypt believes that the dangers ensuing from the weapons of mass destruction, mainly nuclear weapons, should have been firstly addressed before dealing with the missile issue."
—"Egypt opposes missile proliferation control," Middle East Newsline, Vol. 4, No. 256, 11 July 2002.

14 August 2002
Middle East Newsline reports that a North Korean delegation met with Egypt's parliamentary budget committee, possibly to discuss missile sales. Western diplomatic sources say that this is doubtful however, because Egypt's parliament does not have oversight over military spending. US officials suggest the meeting may be a prelude to a large payment to North Korea for military equipment and missiles; one official states: "Any meeting on cooperation with North Korea involves military. It's as simple as that."
—"Cairo, Pyongyang talks reportedly dealt with new North Korea missile sales," Middle East Newsline, 14 August 2002; in FBIS Document GMP20020814000089, 14 August 2002.

10 September 2002
The Associated Press reports that Egypt is among 16 nations, aside from the major nuclear powers, with missile technology capable of carrying nuclear weapons.
—William J. Kole, "Proliferation of weaponry has some wondering: Why single out Iraq," Associated Press, 10 September 2002.

17 September 2002
Middle East Newsline reports that according to US officials, North Korea has tested components of its Nodong missile in Egypt. The tests were to see if North Korean missile parts and technology could be used in Egypt's missile programs, as well as that of other countries in the region. The tests have mostly failed, according to the officials, a setback for Egypt's intermediate-range missile program. North Korea sent missile experts to Egypt in 2001 for the tests. Egypt has bought some parts, but not enough to make its own missiles. A US official says, "North Korea is making a major effort to sell its Nodong and Taepodong intermediate-range missiles. Several Middle East countries, such as Egypt, Iran, and Libya, are highly interested but they don't want complete missiles, rather technology and key components. What these countries want is North Korean help to establish indigenous missiles based on the Nodong." Assistant Secretary of State John Bolton has pushed a tougher line against Egypt on proliferation. This may have led to the administration's rejection of an Egyptian request for $130 million for counterinsurgency, perhaps the first time the United States has increased aid for Israel without increasing aid for Egypt.
—"US confirms Egypt tests of N. Korean missiles," Middle East Newsline, Vol. 4, No. 349, 17 September 2002.

October 2002
The US General Accounting Office releases a report on nonproliferation strategies that says the Missile Technology Control Regime "helped stop or delay development of missile programs in Argentina, Brazil, and Egypt. However, because national governments use a variety of other policy tools to combat proliferation, it is not possible to attribute these accomplishments exclusively to the regimes."
—"Nonproliferation: Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export Regimes," United States General Accounting Office, October 2002.

	Updated October 2003