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Updated October 2003
Missile Chronology
1980-1984
This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.
Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.
1980s
Egypt signs a licensing agreement with North Korea to produce Scud-C missiles with a range of approximately 310 miles. Missiles with this range fired from Egypt are capable of striking all points in Israel.
— Bill Gertz, "Defector Eyed for Missile Data," Washington Times, 27 August 1997.
1980
North Korea and Egypt sign an agreement to jointly develop missiles. The agreement stipulates that Egypt will supply North Korea with Soviet-made Scud-B missiles and MAZ-543 transporter-erector launchers (TELs). According to Lee Jŏng Hun, a South Korean journalist, North Korea and Egypt finalize this bilateral agreement following Vice President Hosni Mubarak's meeting with the North Korean leader Kim Il Sung in January 1980 in Pyongyang. According to Chang Chun Ik, a retired lieutenant general and former National Assembly member, by signing this agreement North Korea commits both to expanding its missile development facilities in the Pyongyang area and to establishing missile testing facilities at Hwadae-kun in North Hamgyŏng Province. Egypt's willingness to provide the missiles to North Korea violates an Egyptian agreement with the USSR.
— Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 249, 266; Lee Jŏng Hun, "FROGesŏ Taepodong Kkaji: Pukhan Missile Game," Shindonga, August 1999, p. 202.
Early 1980s
Citing a "CIA report that was leaked to the press in 1996," the Joongang Ilbo reports that China, Egypt, and North Korea begin their cooperative efforts to produce ballistic missiles. The report claims that Egypt acquires advanced US technology and components, transfers them to China, which then transfers them to North Korea. It is reported that North Korea in turn produces Scud missiles at armament factories in Chagang Province near the Chinese border then ships the missiles to Egypt. This report suggests that the North Koreans are merely a subcontractor for the Chinese.
— Ch'oe Wŏn Ki, "Shilche Tŭronaen Pukhan Missile Connection," Joongang Ilbo, 24 June 1996, p. 4; in KINDS, <http://http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
18 August 1980
Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamal Hasan Ali denies the presence of US Pershing missiles in Egypt.
— "Egyptian denial of presence of US Pershing missiles," 18 August 1980; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
1981
North Korea and Egypt agree to cooperate in the development of ballistic missiles. Egypt transfers two Soviet-built Scud-B missiles and MAZ 543 transporter-erector launchers (TELs) to North Korea.
— Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 April 1993, pp. 20, 22; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 249-250, 257, 266; Lee Jŏng Hun, "FROGesŏ Taepodong Kkaji: Pukhan Missile Game," Shindonga, August 1999, p. 202; Hajime Ozu, Missile 2000: Reference Guide to World Missile Systems (Tokyo: Shinkigensha, 2000), p. 95; "Ballistic Missile Threat Evolves," International Defense Review, Vol. 33, No. 10, 1 October 2000; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
2 April 1981
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat says during a speech, "When the Soviet Union imposed a total arms embargo on us, including one of the most powerful weapons on which we depended, namely, the surface-to-surface Luna missile, I found it in Iraq. Iraq sent us these missiles free of charge."
— "Sadat's Journalists Day Speech," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 April 1981; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
6 May 1981
The Arab Organization for Industrialization launches surface-to-surface missiles that were produced in its factories as part of a demonstration exercise.
— "Missile launching exercise held in Egypt," Xinhua News Agency, 6 May 1981; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
21 August 1981
Egypt and North Korea sign an agreement that provides for technological cooperation and exchange through 1983. Some of the technology covered by this agreement may be missile-related.
— Korean Central News Agency, 21 August 1981, in "Other Reports, N. Korean Scientific Agreement with Egypt," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 August 1981, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "International Relations, Egypt— Scientific Technical Co-operation," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 September 1981, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Missile Development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 October 1992, pp. 452-458.
3 October 1981
Lt. Gen. Muhammad Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala, chief of staff of the Egyptian armed forces, says Egypt makes anti-tank missiles in cooperation with Britain (probably referring to the Swingfire missile) and TOW anti-tank missiles in cooperation with the United States.
— "Egyptian Defence Minister on Sudan and on Military Strategy," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 October 1981; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
1982-83
North Korean engineers continue to reverse-engineer the Soviet-made R17Es (Scud-Bs) received from Egypt.
— Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Proliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 10.
4 January 1982
Aviation Week & Space Technology reports that Egypt's Abo-Zaabal Factory 18 produces propellants, explosives and rocket motors.
— Clarence A. Robinson., "Nation Seeks Larger Production Base," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 4 January 1982; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
24 January 1982
The New York Times reports that there are a total of 220 surface-to-surface missile launchers in Israel, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Jordan. This is an increase from 65 in 1977 and 30 in 1973.
— Leslie H. Gelb, "The Mideast Arms Race: New Weapons, Old Fears," New York Times, 24 January 1982; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
8 March 1982
Aviation Week & Space Technology reports that the US TOW anti-tank missile may be produced under license in Egypt.
— Robert R. Ropelewski, "U.S. Tactical Weapons Receive System Updates," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 8 March 1982; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
1983-1988
Several Western countries, including Germany, France, and Italy, transfer missile technology to Argentina. These sales bolster Argentina's cooperative development of the Condor II missile project with Egypt and Iraq.
— Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Beijing), 13 July 1990, No. 3, pp. 29-36; in "Journal Discusses Spread Of Missile Technology," Nuclear Developments, 25 October 1990, pp. 4-11.
April 1983
Defense & Foreign Affairs reports that Egypt is supplying Egyptian-made Swingfire anti-tank missiles to Iraq.
— "The Rumor Mill," Defense & Foreign Affairs, April 1983; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
5 April 1983
In Pyongyang, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak discusses arms purchases and signs an agreement to extend the 1981 technological exchange agreement between Egypt and North Korea. The agreement contains several references to "other fields as to be agreed upon by the governments of the two countries."
— Korean Central News Agency, 5 April 1983; in "Text of General Agreement," FBIS-APA-83-067, 6 April 1983, pp. D11-D13.
17 August 1983
Muhammad Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala, the Egyptian minister of defense and war production, says Egypt has made its own SA-7 missiles and will begin producing them in the coming year. He says this is the first step towards making guided missiles in Egypt.
— "Egyptian Defense Minister's Speech: Tank and Missile Production," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 August 1983; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
6 September 1983
Muhammad Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala, the Egyptian minister of defense and war production, arrives in Pyongyang with a military delegation.
— Korean Central News Agency, 6 September 1983, in "Egyptian Military Delegation Arrives for Visit," FBIS-APA-83-174, 7 September 1983, p. D11; KCNA (Pyongyang), 7 September 1983, in "Further Reportage on Visit of Egyptian Defense Minister," FBIS-APA-83-175, 8 September 1983, pp. D11-D15.
15 September 1983
The US Department of Defense tells Congress of its plans to sell 16 Harpoon missiles, two training missiles and parts, to Egypt for $40 million.
— "Arms Sale to Egypt," Reuters, 14 September 1983; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
5 October 1983
Egypt test-fires its domestically produced SA-7 missiles and two types of Sakr surface-to-surface missiles.
— "1973 October War marked in Egypt," Xinhua News Agency, 5 October 1983; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
December 1983
Defense & Foreign Affairs reports that in the last quarter the United States has sold 16 Harpoon missiles to Egypt for $40 million.
— "Significant International Transfers of Arms and Related Military Equipment in the Past Quarter," Defense & Foreign Affairs, December 1983; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
1984
Iraqi financial backing enables Egypt to join the Argentine Condor II missile project.
— Michael G. Wilson, "America's stake in Argentina," Heritage Foundation Reports, 6 December 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
1984
Iraq agrees to participate in the Condor II project, provided that the resulting missile product is able to travel at least five times farther than the Condor I's 150km-range capability. In this pursuit, it is calculated that the Condor I may be transformed into the second stage of a larger rocket with a liquid-fueled booster to extend the range, but doing so will require technology that will attract the attention of the United States and Great Britain. To avoid this scrutiny, the Iraqis suggest using Egypt as a go-between. In turn, Iraq agrees to transmit its funding for the Argentine Condor II program through Egypt, probably in exchange for some portion of the eventual Argentine production stockpile and attainment of a domestic missile production capability. Saudi Arabia, while appearing to be ambivalent about the project, secretly deposits $1 billion for the project into Swiss bank accounts. The Saudis are eager to support a missile capable of reaching Israel and/or "revivalists" in Iran. Consequently, the German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) makes lavish expenditures using the Arab money, giving its employees extravagant bonuses and paying well above market value for missile elements. [Note: Although some characterize spending on the project as excessive, the notably high prices paid for many items may have instead reflected a desire to maintain good relations with companies that supplied missile parts. This appears especially true of MBB, which allegedly allowed Consen Group representatives to operate out of its offices for weeks at a time.]
— Kenneth Timmerman, The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq, (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), pp. 154-155; US Central Intelligence Agency, Iraqi Ballistic Missile Developments: An Intelligence Assessment (Washington, DC: Directorate of Intelligence, 30 June 1990), classified "Top Secret," declassified excerpts released 5 March 1998, <http://www.foia.ucia.gov>, p. 9; William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 469-470; "Waffengeschaefte – Gegeim-projekt Condor," Stern, 25 August 1988, translated by US Defense Intelligence Agency, 15 September 1988.
1984
Honeywell's British subsidiary, Honeywell Control Systems, contracts the Swiss Institute for Advanced Technology (IFAT) to produce a study for the Egyptian Ministry of Defense concerning the development of fuel-air explosives (FAEs) for ballistic missiles. It is reported that IFAT is already involved with Egypt in the Condor II project when contracted to undertake this study. [Note: See October 1989 and 3 September 1990 entries for more on FAEs.]
— "Honeywell implicated in FAE work," Flight International, 12 December 1990; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
1984
The Egyptian Ministry of Defense attempts to buy 9,000 FAEs from the United States, according to court records. The Egyptians say they want the bombs to clear minefields, but, according to a Justice Department report, they are intended for Condor II production. The Egyptian procurement request is denied. [Note: See October 1989 and 3 September 1990 entries for more on FAEs.]
— Douglas Frantz, "Honeywell factor in Iraq bomb," Los Angeles Times, 26 December 1990; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
15 February 1984
The Egyptian Ministry of Defense signs a contract with Switzerland's Consen Group that involves the planning and delivery of a projection plant for the manufacture of rocket engines, as well as for the design and development of a conventional missile system.
— United States v Abdelkader Helmy, et al., S 88 201 RAR (1989), p. 4; William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 468.
March 1984
Honeywell Control Systems signs a $200,000 contract [Note: Burrows and Windrem report a $100,000 contract] with IFAT to conduct a study of FAEs for Egypt's defense ministry. Ken Smith, a British aerospace consultant to both IFAT and Honeywell Control Systems, negotiates the deal and supplies specifications to Honeywell on 9 October 1985 and 4 November 1984. The specifications state that the weapon should weigh 400kg and have a volume of 0.5 cubic meters. Egypt originally attempts to obtain FAEs from the US State Department under the guise of using such munitions to clear mines in the Egyptian desert, but the request is rejected.
— "A Bigger Blast," Middle East, January 1991, pp. 15-16; "Honeywell Implicated in FAE Work," Flight International, 12 December 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>; United States v. Abdelkader Helmy, et al., S 88 201 RAR (1989), p. 4; William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 200.
April 1984
Latin American Markets reports that it obtained a letter of intent in regards to missile nozzle production that was exchanged between a US company and Desintec, a Consen Group company. According to the letter dated April 1984, the nozzles are intended for the Argentine air force and the Condor II missile project. [Note: According to this source, the United States intervenes to stop the contract.]
— "Argentina: Will Condor II fly?" Latin American Markets, 21 April 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
4 April 1984
A Honeywell internal memo outlines the company's discussion with Kevin Smith, a consultant to the Swiss IFAT and the British Honeywell Control Systems, regarding obtaining a FAE study for Egypt. The memo includes notations that "[t]he Egyptians are developing a ballistic missile with the technical efforts being funded by the Saudi Arabians." It is also stated in the memo that Egypt is developing the missile "to attack high value, fixed targets such as cities, ports, oil refineries, and air bases." Further notations assert that the missile is "to have an accuracy of 0.1% of its range" and "would probably never be fired in anger." In addition, Smith reports the Saudis have provided $1 billion to IFAT, and this money is "currently being deposited in Swiss banks." Smith assures Honeywell that by the time the report is passed from IFAT to the Egyptians, all Honeywell logos and corporate symbols would be removed.
— "A Bigger Blast," Middle East, January 1991, pp. 15-16; "Honeywell implicated in FAE work," Flight International, 12 December 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
24 April 1984
The Middle East News Agency reports that Egyptian military factories have produced the Hawkeye missile and are beginning to produce long-range missiles.
— "Egyptian Defence Minister on Sinai Handover Anniversary," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 April 1984; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
October 1984
According to US News & World Report, an Egyptian delegation representing Iraq signs an agreement in Buenos Aires to begin development of the $3.2 billion Condor II project. Iraq funds much of the project, which is dubbed the Badr-2000 by Iraq and Egypt. The German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) is the most prominent supplier for the project, providing design and planning assistance, as well as laboratory simulation and missile-control equipment. Egypt and Iraq are each to receive 200 missiles as well as missile production facilities in which they will be able to produce further units. Egypt's interest is reportedly spurred by Israel's deployment of the Jericho-II ballistic missile, which has a range of at least 750km.
— Mel Elfin, "Behind the Condor Carbon-Carbon Smuggling Scam," US News & World Report, 25 July 1988, p. 38, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>; Tony Walker, Andrew Gowers and David Buchan, "Egypt and Argentina in Long-Range Missile Plan," Financial Times, 21 December 1987, p. 28, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.
25 October 1984
Vice Admiral Ali Tawfiq Jad, head of the Egyptian Navy, announces that Egypt has received its first shipment of Harpoon missiles.
— "Arrival of New Naval Units," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 October 1984; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
4 November 1984
A memo from J.D. Beckmann of Minneapolis-Honeywell reveals that the Egyptians are developing a ballistic missile designed to have an accuracy of 0.1 percent of its range, and that the technical efforts are being funded by Saudi Arabia.
— "A Bigger Blast," Middle East, January 1991, pp. 15- 16.
5 November 1984
Muhammad Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala, the Egyptian minister of defense and war production, says production will begin on the Egyptian-made Ayn al-Saqr (Hawkeye) missile in March 1985. The Ayn al-Saqr is the Egyptian variant of the Soviet SA-7 shoulder-launched SAM.
— "Egyptian military production," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 7 November 1984; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
20 November 1984
Egypt demonstrates the Saqr-30 missile capability at 30km ranges.
— "Egyptian Defence Minister at Demonstration of Weapons," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 November 1984; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
14 December 1984
Egyptian and Argentine officials sign contracts that advance the Condor project. [Note: Argentine President Alfonsín officially authorizes this deal in April 1985. See 9 April 1985 entry.]
— Anabella Busso, Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 33; Mario Baizan, "Iraq's Involvement in Condor II Project Viewed," Somos, 28 January 1991, 1-4, cited in FBIS JPRS-TND-91-003, 25 February 1991, 13-15; Daniel Santoro, Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 24; Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 28; Martin Granovsky, Misión cumplida: La presión norteamericana sobre la Argentina, de Braden a Todman (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 194.
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2008
by MIIS.
