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Updated October 2003
Missile Chronology
1989-1990
This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.
Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.
1989
Egypt turns to North Korea for assistance in upgrading its arsenal of Soviet-supplied Scud missiles, according to retired Israeli Brigadier General Aharon Levran, now an independent military analyst. The nature of the assistance is not known but may consist of providing spare parts or installing improved components, as well as providing guidance. Levran also says that North Korea is helping Iran develop ballistic missiles. [Note: It has been five years since the Egypt-North Korea deals of the early 1980s. It is unclear what brought on the five-year lapse in the relationship].
— Korea Times, 30 December 1989, p. 4, in "Missile Cooperation with North Korea Alleged," JPRS-TND-90-002, 17 January 1990, p. 12.
8 February 1989
US officials say the West German aerospace firm Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB) has assisted the Argentine-Egyptian-Iraqi missile program since the early 1980s. Officials also say that the subsidiary of the giant Italian firm Fiat, SNIA-BPD (National Industrial Applications Company-Defense Division) has assisted the missile program. Officials have said that there are indications that West German and Italian assistance continues for the Condor II/Badr-2000 missile project.
— Robert Gillette, "3rd world missiles linked to German, Italian firms," Los Angeles Times, 8 February 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
10 February 1989
A spokesman for Fiat subsidiary SNIA-BPD (National Industrial Applications Company-Defense Division) says the company has not given missile technology to Egypt, Libya, nor Iraq. The spokesman says Fiat has not had anything to do with the Condor II missile and ended its cooperation with Argentina's rocket program in 1985. Some analysts expect the Condor II missile to have its first test launch within two to three months.
— Robert Gillette, "CIA chief cites firms' weapons aid to 3rd world," Los Angeles Times, 10 February 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
3 March 1989
Argentina successfully test launches the Condor II rocket, sending it 504km in Patagonia, according to a Pagina 12 newspaper report.
— "Argentina newspaper says Condor project with Egypt cancelled for sake of Israel deal," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6 April 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
9 March 1989
The Times of London reports that APV Chemical Machinery Inc. of Saginaw, Michigan, a subsidiary of British company APV, sold parts that were used in the Condor I rocket. According to the report, APV sold vertical mixers for propellant compounds to SNIA-BPD (National Industrial Applications Company-Defense Division), a subsidiary of Italian firm Fiat. SNIA then sold the equipment to Argentina between 1981 and 1985. The technology is now being used in development of the Condor II.
— Nicholas Beeston, "Argentine rocket aided by UK firm's equipment; Missile threat to the Falklands," The Times (London), 9 March 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
13 March 1989
According to Israeli experts, Egypt has the capability of putting chemical warheads on surface-to-surface missiles.
— Menachem Shalev and Kenneth Kaplan, "Foreign Ministry mum on Egyptian chemical weapons," Jerusalem Post, 13 March 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
30 March 1989
The Jerusalem Post reports that the Badr-2000 missile, under construction by Iraq and Egypt and based on the Condor II missile, will have a range of 1000km and a payload of 1500kg.
— David Horovitz, "Jane's: Arab Missiles Threaten Israel," Jerusalem Post, 30 March 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
30 March 1989
According to "well-placed Israeli sources," the Condor II missile's high cost— $8 million— and payload of 1,100 pounds signify that it is probably intended to deliver non-conventional weapons. The missile is almost finished and Iraq has a crash program to make nuclear warheads to be used with the Condor II, according to the sources.
— Glenn Frankel, "Iraq said developing A-weapons; missile project also under way, Israelis say," Washington Post, 31 March 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
30 March 1989
In a symposium, W. Seth Carus of the Washington Institute addresses concerns about the Condor II being used for delivering chemical weapons: "The small size of the payload of the missile lends some credence to this particular possibility."
— "The danger of chemical and biological weapons in the Middle East," Federal News Service, 30 March 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
31 March 1989
Israeli military sources say that Iraq, Egypt, and Argentina have been developing the Condor II missile for five years.
— Ruth Sinai, "Bush won't give Iraq missile report credibility, State Department expresses 'grave concern'," Associated Press, 31 March 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
31 March 1989
At the White House press briefing concerning the upcoming visit of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, a reporter asks if the United States is asking Egypt to withdraw from the Condor II program. A "senior administration official" responds that "the Condor is an old story," and that "I think the Egyptians are aware of our position."
— "White House briefing on the visit to the United States of Egyptian President Mubarak by a senior administration official," Federal News Service, 31 March 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
1 April 1989
The Associated Press reports that the range of the Badr-2000 missile is 620 miles and it can deliver nuclear or chemical weapons.
— Ed Blanche, "Alarm over missile buildup in Mideast," Associated Press, 1 April 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
1 April 1989
The Independent reports that the range of the Condor II missile is 500 miles.
— Peter Pringle, "Israel accuses Iraq of developing nuclear warheads," The Independent, 1 April; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
2 April 1989
Maj. Gen Ehud Barak, deputy chief of staff for the Israeli armed forces, says Iraq is involved in the Condor II missile project. The range of the Condor II missile is between 500 and 620 miles (between 800 and 1000km).
— "Israeli general says Iraq may be rebuilding nuclear plant," Associated Press, 2 April 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
4 April 1989
Experts say the range of the "Condor-3" is 800km and that it should be in service by next year. [Note: The report may refer to the Condor II missile.]
— Kenneth Kaplan, "Argentina still wants to purchase Kfirs," The Jerusalem Post, 4 April 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
6 April 1989
Noticias Argentinas reports that Argentine Defense Minister Horacio Jaunarena, who is in Israel, says Argentina will end its cooperation with Egypt on the Condor II in exchange for Israel delivering to the Argentine Navy 12 A-4Q planes that have been on hold since the Falklands War. The newspaper also reports that breaking the deal with Egypt will allow Israel to join the Condor II project. In return for the agreement, countries may lift their objections to Argentina receiving the A-4Q planes, the newspaper reports.
— "Argentina newspaper says Condor project with Egypt cancelled for sake of Israel deal," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6 April 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
7 April 1989
Argentine military sources confirm that Israel pressed Argentine Defense Minister Horacio Jaunarena to end Argentina's collaboration with Egypt and Iraq on the Condor II missile. But one official said the Condor deal is "too difficult to get out of at this stage."
— "Argentina: Looking to Pretoria," Latin American Markets, 7 April 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
8-9 April 1989
West German investigators raid the offices of Transtechnica, a subsidiary of Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB), in connection with its involvement with the Condor II project. Major General Ehud Barak, deputy chief of staff of the Israeli armed forces, says MBB was in charge of directing the project, while others suggest that a division of MBB may have controlled the project without MBB's knowledge. [Note: Stern magazine previously reported that Consen (Group) may have been overseeing the project on behalf of MBB. See 25 August 1988. See 13 April 1989 for more explanation on Consen. See also 8 February 1989 for a report on MBB's involvement.]
— Mark Urban, "German firm accused over 'missile risk' to Falklands," The Independent, 10 April 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
10 April 1989
The Condor II project was developed in Argentina with Iraqi money that was transferred through Egypt. In return, Egypt and Iraq may produce the missile after it is developed.
— Mark Urban, "German firm accused over 'missile risk' to Falklands," The Independent, 10 April 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
12 April 1989
West German Defense Minister Rupert Scholz promises an investigation of the alleged involvement of Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB) in the Condor II project. But he says the government "lacks sufficient information." An Israeli foreign ministry official says some German officials must have known about the involvement of Germany's largest aerospace firm.
— Menachem Shalev, "Minister: Bonn doesn't know 'enough' about Condor missile," The Jerusalem Post, 12 April 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
13 April 1989
Aerospace Daily reports that the West German firm Transtechnica of Munich, which is under investigation for its involvement in the Condor II project, is part of the Consen Group, a group of 16 companies working on the Condor II. Transtechnica is a subsidiary of Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm. MBB has said it is not involved with Condor II but was involved with Condor I. [Note: Note: Stern magazine previously reported that Consen may have been overseeing the Condor II project on behalf of MBB. See 25 August 1988. See also 8-9 April 1989.]
— "MBB subsidiary under investigation for possible export violation," Aerospace Daily, 13 April 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
14 April 1989
Brigadier General Ernesto Crespo, Argentine Air Force chief of staff, denies that Argentina has agreed to forgo its missile cooperation with Egypt and Iraq in exchange for military equipment from Israel. [Note: See 6 and 7 April 1989.]
— "Other Argentine news," Facts on File World News Digest, 23 June 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
15 April 1989
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak removes and replaces Defense Minister Abdul-Halim Abu Ghazala amid allegations that he was involved in an alleged scheme to transfer restricted missile technology from the United States. [Note: See 20 August 1988 for the first allegations of his involvement. See 24 June 1988 for the first report of the alleged scheme.]
— Patrick E. Tyler, "Mubarak reassigns key depute; move said face-off with defense chief," Washington Post, 16 April 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
17 April 1989
MidEast Markets reports that the Condor II missile has two stages, a range of 1000km and payload of 700kg. [Note: See 2 April 1989.]
— "Condor II: an issue to test US-Egypt ties," MidEast Markets, 17 April 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
17 April 1989
MidEast Markets reports that IFAT Corporation, a company in the Consen Group, financed an attempt to buy restricted US missile technology in 1988 [Note: See 24 June 1988.] Desintec, another Consen company, tried in 1984 to buy rocket nozzles from a California company to be used for the Condor II. Consen has used West German rocket scientists to help with the project.
— "Condor II: an issue to test US-Egypt ties," MidEast Markets, 17 April 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
17 April 1989
MidEast Markets reports that Abdel Kader Helmy, the Egyptian-born US citizen awaiting trial for involvement in the alleged scheme to smuggle US missile technology to Egpyt, is a childhood friend of former Egyptian Defense Minister Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala. [Note: See 24 June and 20 August 1988.]
— "Condor II: an issue to test US-Egypt ties," MidEast Markets, 17 April 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
17 April 1989
MidEast Markets reports that Egypt is readying production facilities for the Condor II at Military Factory 90 in Abu Zabaal, near where Egypt reportedly makes chemical weapons.
— "Condor II: an issue to test US-Egypt ties," MidEast Markets, 17 April 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
21 April 1989
Latin American Markets reports that the Condor II was to be tested in Argentina last year but has still not flown. [Note: A 3 March 1989 report says the missile was tested.]
— "Argentina: Will Condor II fly?" Latin American Markets, 21 April 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
21 April 1989
Latin American Markets reports that work began on the Condor II in 1984; and it will have a range of 1000km and a 700kg payload. The report says that, according to an April 1984 letter of intent between Consen Group company Desintec and a US company, the Argentine Air Force was to receive rocket nozzles for the Condor II. US authorities intervened to stop the contract, the report says.
— "Argentina: Will Condor II fly?" Latin American Markets, 21 April 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
23 April 1989
NBC reports that, according to US intelligence sources, Egypt got money from Iraq to fund the Condor II. Iraqi Lt. Gen. Amer Saadi, undersecretary of the ministry of industry and military industrialization, denies that Iraq, Egypt, and Argentina are cooperating on a surface-to-surface missile.
— "Iraq denies working on missile able to hit targets in Israel," Reuters, 23 April 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
28 April 1989
Husayn Kamil Hasan, Iraqi minister of industry and military industrialization, denies Iraq is cooperating with Egypt and Argentina to make missiles.
— "Development of Iraq's military industries minister's news conferences," Al-Thawrah (Baghdad), 28 April 1989; in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 May 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
1 May 1989
MidEast Markets reports that Egypt is working on a sub-munition warhead for its version of the Condor II.
— "Sa'ad 16: Iraq's military 'business park,'" MidEast Markets, 1 May 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
1 May 1989
MidEast Markets reports that representatives of a Swiss company working on the Condor II recently visited China.
— "Sa'ad 16: Iraq's military 'business park,'" MidEast Markets, 1 May 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
1 May 1989
MidEast Markets reports that Israeli pressure on the United States to halt Egypt's weapons programs, including the Condor II, led to the removal of Egypt's defense minister, Field Marshal Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala. [Note: See 15 April 1989.]
— "Uncertainty in Egypt after removal of Abu Ghazala," MidEast Markets, 1 May 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
2 May 1989
Allen Holmes, US assistant secretary of state, tells a Senate hearing that the Condor II is "far behind schedule and we believe this can be traced to problems in acquiring technology." Another US official says the Condor II is several years from testing.
— Carl Hartman, "Increased threat from Third World missiles," Associated Press, 2 May 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
15 May 1989
According to a report by MidEast Markets, Egypt's Condor II project is led by Dr. Toufik of the Ministry of Defense. Col. Essam Ayoub runs the program, which suffers from "bad workmanship and skimping on materials." The fuel is stored at Abu Zabaal, northeast of Cairo, which will also be the testing area. The missile will be produced at Helwan, south of Cairo. The defense minister was fired in April because of problems with the program.
— "Iraq goes it alone on Condor II," MidEast Markets, 15 May 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
18 May 1989
US Undersecretary of State Reginald Bartholomew tells a Senate panel that the Condor II is behind schedule because of implementation of the Missile Technology Control Regime.
— David B. Ottaway, "Egypt drops out of missile project; State Department official offers no details on Iraqi program," Washington Post, 20 September 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
27 May 1989
The Economist reports that Egypt has Frog-7 missiles, 70km range; Sakr-80 missiles, 80km range; Scud-B, 300km range; and Badr-2000, 800km range.
— "Third-world missiles; look what I found in my backyard," The Economist, 27 May 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
9 June 1989
In a plea bargain, Abdelkader Helmy pleads guilty to exporting restricted munitions in exchange for cooperating with the investigation of Egypt's alleged attempt to smuggle restricted missile technology from the United States. According to a court document, Helmy's smuggling ring exported missile nose cones made by Nucermet and Greenleaf Technical Ceramics, microwave antennas from Vega Precision Products Inc., and carbon-carbon from Kaiser Aerotech. According to charges, Helmy had James Huffman buy ablative carbon phenolic, which is used to make missile nozzles, nosecones, and reentry vehicles, from Fiberite Corp. of Winona, MN, then send it to Harmon, MD, where it was loaded onto an Egyptian plane before US customs agents intervened. [Note: See 24 June 1988.]
— Ken Hoover, "Scientist pleads guilty in Egyptian missile plot," United Press International, 9 June 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
12 June 1989
According to Western officials, a secret military agreement known as Badr-2000 has collapsed because of disagreements over the Condor II missile. Badr-2000 is the codename for the military cooperation agreement between Iraq and Egypt, and is not the name for the Egyptian version of the Condor II missile, which is called Vector or Delta. Iraq was unhappy with financing the Egyptian project and felt it was paying twice for development of the missile. According to an engineer who worked at the Condor facilities in Iraq and Egypt, Iraq felt the Egyptian work and safety standards were much lower than Iraq's, leading to the danger of missile fuel exploding. Egypt is reexamining its long-range missile project, which is now under the oversight of General Mustafa, along with Dr. Toufik and Col. Essam Ayoub. The report adds that Western officials do not know what projects, besides the Condor II, come under the Badr-2000 agreement.
— "Secret Egypt-Iraq accord collapses," MidEast Markets, 12 June 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
23 June 1989
James Huffman pleads guilty to conspiring to illegally export restricted munitions. The plea agreement does not require Huffman to cooperate with investigators, as did the plea agreement for Abdelkader Helmy. Helmy gave Huffman the specifications for material to be shipped to Maryland. Huffman admits to shipping 430 pounds of ablative carbon phenolic fabric, 35,500 pounds of military-grade hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene, which is used in rocket fuel, and two UHF-band parabolic antennas. [Note: See 24 June 1988 and 9 June 1989.]
— Ken Hoover, "Second defendant pleads guilty in Egyptian missile case," United Press International, 23 June 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
27 June 1989
The Washington Post reports that the United States has supplied Egyptian-made Sakr missiles to the Afghan mujaheddin guerillas. [Note: See 4 September 1989]
— James Rupert, "Kabul residents blame U.S. for deaths from mujaheddin missiles," Washington Post, 27 June 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
July 1989
According to the CIA, international pressures, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and technical difficulties bring the Condor II program virtually to a halt in Argentina and Egypt. In particular, technical setbacks in guidance and control have prevented Argentina from conducting an initial flight test of the missile. [Note: See September 1989.]
— US Central Intelligence Agency, Iraqi Ballistic Missile Developments: An Intelligence Assessment (Washington, DC: Directorate of Intelligence, 30 June 1990), classified "Top Secret," declassified excerpts released 5 March 1998, <http://www.foia.ucia.gov>, 23 August 2002. p. 9; Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 130.
27 July 1989
US Representative Howard Berman says technology from the US Pershing missile was transferred to the Condor II project by scientists who worked on both missiles.
— Melissa Healy, "Bill proposed to curb missile technology spread," Los Angeles Times, 27 July 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
31 July 1989
The Financial Times reports that nine former employees of Fiat subsidiary SNIA-BPD (National Industrial Applications Company-Defense Division) are under investigation by Italian authorities for possibly working on the Condor II missile.
— John Wyles, "Fiat link suspected in Condor missile probe," Financial Times, 31 July 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
8 August 1989
At a press conference with US Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney, Egyptian Yusuf abu Talib is asked about the Condor II missile. He replies, "We are against all mass destruction weapons— nuclear, chemical, long-range missiles. We are ready to discuss anything in the coming months."
— "U.S.-Egypt Coproduction programs on schedule," Aerospace Daily, 8 August 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
14 August 1989
The Italian government brings charges against the nine former employees of the National Industrial Applications Company (SNIA), BPD (Defense Division), for the sale of medium-range ballistic missile components to Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq. Other individuals are charged as a result of the investigation, but not taken into custody.
— "Charges Filed in Missile Parts Sales to Argentina," L'Unita (Milan), 30 June 1989, p. 6; cited in Nuclear Developments, 14 August 1989, p. 41.
17 August 1989
An explosion at a possible Iraqi missile facility at Al Hillah, 40 miles south of Baghdad, kills 700. The casualties include Egyptian engineers who may have been working on Iraqi missile projects, including an enhanced Scud-B and the Badr-2000. The explosion may have been the result of an accident involving a technique developed by Egyptian and North Korean experts to take apart the warhead of the Condor II to adjust the explosive. [Note: See 6, 7, 8 and 18 September 1989.]
— Harvey Morris, Adel Darwish, Tim Kelsey, "Huge explosion at secret Iraqi missile plant: Egyptian technicians among about 700 killed in disaster near Baghdad," The Independent, 6 September 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
28 August 1989
According to the 1988 annual report of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency report, Egypt has Soviet Frog-7 solid-fueled missiles with a range of 40 miles, a payload of 1,000 pounds, and a CEP (circular error probable) of 440 yards. Egypt also has standard Scud-B missiles. Egypt is developing enhanced Scud-B missiles, possibly with North Korea, with a payload of 2,200 pounds and storable liquid fuel. Egypt is developing the two-stage solid-fueled Sakr-80 missile, possibly with North Korea and Iraq, with a range of 50 miles and a payload of 450 pounds. Egypt is developing the Vector solid-fuel missile with Argentina, with a range of 500 to 600 miles and an unknown CEP. [Note: The attributes reported for the Vector missile match those listed for the Iraqi Condor II missile, which is being developed jointly with Egypt and Argentina.]
— "World weapons sales top $1 trillion, paced by South Asia market," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 28 August 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
September 1989
The Egyptian government terminates the Badr-2000 missile project and ends its involvement with the Condor.
— Daniel Santoro, Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 42.
4 September 1989
The Independent reports that the United Status has provided the Egyptian-made Sakr-30 missile to the Afghan mujaheddin guerrillas. The Sakr-30, according to the report, is 122mm, has a range of 18 miles, and has a cluster warhead of 35 bomblets.
— Ahmed Rashid, "Mujahedin expands killing zone," The Independent, 4 September 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
6 September 1989
The Independent reports that Egyptian experts have been in Iraq for two years to help improve the range of Iraqi missiles, including the Scud-B missile, by adding a North Korean fuel tank and reducing the warhead. Egyptians in Iraq have also helped to increase the range of the Condor II beyond 500 miles but it has been very inaccurate, as much as 20 miles off target. An explosion at a possible Iraqi missile facility in mid-August may have been the result of an accident involving technique developed by Egyptian and North Korean experts to take apart the warhead of the Condor II to adjust the explosive. [Note: See 17 August; 7, 8 and 18 September 1989.]
— Harvey Morris, Adel Darwish, Tim Kelsey, "Huge explosion at secret Iraqi missile plant: Egyptian technicians among about 700 killed in disaster near Baghdad," The Independent, 6 September 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
7 September 1989
An Egyptian military spokesman denies that Egyptians are working in Iraq on military projects. [Note: See 17 August; 6 and 8 September 1989.]
— Carol Berger, "Blast reveals joint military projects continue after Gulf War," The Independent, 7 September 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
8 September 1989
In response to reports of a huge explosion at a possible Iraqi missile production plant in mid-August, the Iraqi embassy in London says that an explosion at a petroleum products depot killed 19. The statement says, "We would like to confirm that there is no missile technology for Condore [sic] version being developed between Iraq and any other country including Argentina. The motives behind mentioning a link with Argentina in the report published by the Independent could be the paper's intention to create an anti-Iraq public opinion at a time when relations between Britain and Argentina remain so tense." [Note: See 17 August; 6 and 7 September 1989.]
— Harvey Morris, "Baghdad admits to blast at 'oil depot'," The Independent, 8 September 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
9 September 1989
Major General Khamis Ibn-Hamed bin Salim al-Kalbani, the commander of Oman's ground forces, along with the technicians accompanying him on a visit to Cairo, are briefed on a wide range of weapons systems produced by Egypt, such as the surface-to-surface missile Sakr-80, its launch system, and the Swingfire anti-tank missiles.
— Oman Looks at Egyptian Weapons," Middle East Defense News, 16 October 1989.
16 September 1989
The Times (London) reports that Egypt may be working with North Korea on a secret missile project.
— Christopher Walker, "Reports of missile launch heighten arms race fears," The Times (London), 16 September 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
18 September 1989
MidEast Markets reports that the big explosion in Iraq in mid-August occurred at Latifiya, near Isfandiya. Iraq is building a facility there to make the Condor II rocket motor but there is also a munitions factory nearby, and the explosion was not directly related to the Condor II. [Note: See 17 August and 6-8 September 1989.]
— "Big explosion in Iraq, but was it important?" MidEast Markets, 18 September 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
19 September 1989
A classified Defense Intelligence Agency document says US Customs has been investigating for more than a year an Egyptian-Iraqi plot to get restricted technology "to support the production of a ballistic missile."
— "Canadians helped supply weapons to Saddam Hussein; Federal officials seemed unaware of deals while other Western intelligence agencies increased surveillance," Ottawa Citizen, 26 November 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
19 September 1989
Assistant Secretary of State John H. Kelly tells a US House of Representatives panel that Egypt has terminated its cooperation with Iraq on the Condor II, but does not comment on why Egypt withdrew from the project.
— David B. Ottaway, "Egypt Drops Out of Missile Project; State Department Official Offers No Details on Iraqi Program," Washington Post, 20 September 1989, p. A32.
20 September 1989
The Jerusalem Post reports that Otto Skorzeny, the notorious Nazi commando leader, was hired by Mossad agents in 1963 to persuade former Nazis to abandon work on Egyptian missiles.
— "Ex-SS man worked for Mossad against Egyptian rocket project," Jerusalem Post, 20 September 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
20 September 1989
US Assistant Secretary of State John H. Kelly tells a Congressional panel that "my understanding is that Egypt has terminated its cooperation" with Iraq and Argentina on the Condor II. [Note: See 5 October 1989.]
— David B. Ottaway, "Egypt drops out of missile project; State Department official offers no details on Iraqi program," The Washington Post, 20 September 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
October 1989
Five US senators formally request that the US Secretary of Defense investigate whether the German firm MBB (Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm) provided fuel-air explosive (FAE) technology to Iraq in the course of its participation in the Egyptian-Iraqi Condor II project. In addition, they express concern that FAE technology may have been transferred to Iraq illegally from the United States.
— "FAEs for Iraq," Jane's Defence Weekly, 20 October 1990, p. 739.
5 October 1989
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak has confirmed that Egypt dropped out of the Condor II project in 1988. [Note: See 20 September 1989.]
— "Mubarak poses mystery over status of Argentina's Condor II missile," Latin American Weekly Report, 5 October 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
21 November 1989
US and Israeli officials believe Iraq has a contract to sell 200 Condor II missiles to Egypt for $8 million per missile.
— Alan Friedman, "The flight of the Condor," Financial Times, 21 November 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
27 November 1989
Egypt's Vice Admiral Muhammed Sharif al-Sadiq said that Egypt's submarines would be equipped with a wide variety of advanced missiles, including US-built Harpoons.
— "Egypt's Barakat: More F-16s," Middle East Defense News, 27 November 1989.
December 1989
Experts report that the al-Abid, Iraq's three-stage, 48-ton satellite-launch missile, is not (as had been previously alleged) a Condor II missile. According to experts who viewed a videotape of the 7 December 1989 launch of the al-Abid, the faint smoke plume emanating from the rocket was indicative of a liquid-fuel motor, while the Condor II has a solid-fueled engine. Further, the Condor has only two stages, whereas three stages can be seen on the tape of the al-Abid launch. According to Gary Milhollin of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, five motors can be seen in the first stage, which he suggests are either Scuds or elongated Scuds welded together. This would suggest that the al-Abid is not wholly indigenously produced, but rather an adaptation of Soviet missiles similar to the al-Abbas and al-Hussein missiles. Argentine and Egyptian engineers are reportedly present for the launch.
— "Iraq Heavy Missile Launch Definitely Not Cóndor II," Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly, January 1990-4 February 1990, p. 1; US Department of Defense, "IIR [Excised] Condor II Missile," Intelligence report declassified and partially released, available through the Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com>, 23 August 2002.
6 December 1989
Adbelkader Helmy is sentenced to 46 months in prison for trying to send restricted US missile technology to Egypt. James Huffman is sentenced to 41 months. [Note: See 24 June 1988.]
— John Howard, "Four year sentence for weapons tech plot to Egypt, Iraq," Associated Press, 6 December 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
27 December 1989
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak denies that the United States has intervened regarding Egypt's cooperation with Argentina and Iraq in the field of missile manufacturing.
— "Mubarak Addresses Missiles in Interview With Qatari Papers," MENA (Cairo), 27 December 1989.
29 December 1989
Yonhap reports that "Egypt requested North Korean help to improve its Scuds."
— "North Korea Missile Aid Reportedly Sought," Yonhap News Agency Seoul Domestic Service, 29 December 1989.
29 December 1989
The Associated Press reports that Egypt and North Korea are collaborating on developing missiles based on the Scud. Military analyst Aharon Levran says Egypt asked North Korea's help last year to enhance its aging arsenal of Scud missiles.
— Nicolas B. Tatro, "North Korean missile help sought by Syria, Egypt," Associated Press, 29 December 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
Early 1990s
Egypt begins work on "Project-T" to develop a medium-range ballistic missile, an improved Scud-B, range 450km. The propulsion, guidance, and targeting of the Scud-B has been improved in the new missile. As of 1999, the missile forms the backbone of Egypt's missile deterrent.
— "A dangerous race in a multi-axial world: The missiles club in the Middle East: The century of mass destruction," Al-Wasat (London) 30 August 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990903000290, 30 August 1999.
1990
China and Egypt agree to upgrade Egypt's Sakr plant to make new Scud-B missiles and three types of Egyptian surface-to-surface missiles.
— "Country reports: Egypt," Middle East Defense News, 5 April 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
1990-1991
North Korea assists Egypt in establishing a Scud-C production facility near Cairo. The facility belongs to the consortium Arab-British Dynamics Co, owned by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Britain.
— "The Postwar Scud Boom," Wall Street Journal, 10 July 1991.
19 January 1990
Middle East Defense News (Mednews) reports that the materials confiscated by US officials from an Egyptian smuggling ring in June 1988 were intended for Iraq. [Note: See 24 June and 5 September 1988.]
— "U.S. connection for Iraqi missiles?," Middle East Defense News, 19 January 1990, Vol. 3, No.7, 8; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
29 January 1990
Aviation Week & Space Technology reports that the Pentagon has proposed giving Egypt 29 Harpoon missiles worth $69 million, including training and support.
— "The Pentagon has notified," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 29 January 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
3 March 1990
The Independent reports that Iraq's ballistic missile program has been hindered by the withdrawal of Egyptian experts.
— Adel Darwish, "UK missile men aid Iraq," The Independent (London), 3 March 1990; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
7 March 1990
Flight International reports that Egypt will begin making the "Saker 80" surface-to-surface rocket next year to replace the Frog-7. [Note: Saker is more often spelled Sakr or Saqr.] It will have a CEP of 1200m, high-explosive and cluster warheads, and a mobile launcher, the report says.
— "Saker 80s 1991 debut," Flight International, 7 March 1990; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
25 March 1990
According to Al-Akhbar, Egypt tests its new missile, Amun-2, which can reportedly simultaneously engage more than one airborne target. The system can also distinguish between two targets and give precedence to the more dangerous one. The system was completely Egyptian-developed.
— "New Amun-2 Missile System Tested 25 March," Al-Akhbar (Cairo), 26 March 1990, p.4; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-90-060, 28 March 1990.
1 April 1990
According to a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Intelligence Assessment, "[a]ll the solid propellant missile production projects in Egypt, Argentina, and Iraq are highly dependent on the influx of Western technology obtained from the Consen Group. Similarly these Consen companies need these overseas markets to keep afloat financially. Because of the creation of the Missile Techonology Control Regime (MTCR) in April 1987, covert cooperation took on added importance."
— US Defense Intelligence Agency, "The Grey Arms Market: Methods of Maintaining Covert Business Relationships," Intelligence Assessment declassified and partially released, available through the Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com>, 23 August 2002.
26 April 1990
Nucleonics Week reports that Argentina has resumed joint cooperation with Egypt and Iraq to build the Condor II. Argentina curbed its participation in the project in 1989 because of pressure by the Bush administration. [Note: See July 1989 for more on Argentina pulling out of the project.] The Argentine government has denied that construction of the Condor II with Egypt has begun. The article does not mention Iraq as a partner in the project.
— "Argentina Denies Reports of Nuclear Commerce with Iraq," Nucleonics Week, 26 April 1990, Vol.31, No.17, p.13; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
May 1990
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak visits Pyongyang. He is believed to have visited the 125 Factory, where the Hwasŏng-6 is assembled.
— Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 19.
Early June 1990
Chinese Defense Minister Qin Jiwei meets Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Cairo, perhaps to promote weapons sales, such as the DF-3 (CSS-2) missile.
— Liat Collins, "China's 'East Wind' missile blows through the Middle East," The Jerusalem Post, 13 June 1990; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
14 June 1990
The Independent reports China will help Egypt upgrade its production of surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles in exchange for payment equivalent to millions of pounds sterling. The upgrade will focus on Egypt's Sakr factory to help it produce newer versions of Soviet anti-aircraft missiles, the surface-to-surface Scud-B and Silkworm, and the three types of Egyptian Sakr rockets. The Independent reports that after this upgrade, Egypt will double the production of the Silkworm DF-4 and increase its range to 90 miles; the missile's current range is 50 miles with a 1,000-pound warhead,. Egypt is also expected to start the production of Silkworm DF-5 with a range of 170 miles. In addition, China will provide Egypt with frigates equipped with French Ottomat and Chinese Styx missiles, as well as Chinese-built Jainghu-class frigates equipped with the C801 Ying-ji, a Chinese version of the Exocet missiles.
— Adel Darwish, "China to Update Chinese Egypt's Missiles," The Independent (London), 14 June 1990; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
30 June 1990
The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assesses Iraq's ballistic missile program efforts, including those based on the Condor program. At this time, Iraq is developing five distinct missile programs. Although the more ambitious Condor II will take longer to develop than the Iraqi-produced Al-Husayn and Al-Abbas missiles, it will be "easier to handle, require less preparation time before launch, offer more payload options, and provide better accuracy and range." The CIA estimates that the solid-fuel Condor II missile system will have a range of 750-1,000km, carry a payload of approximately 500kg, and employ a submunition warhead design. When Iraq begins to produce the system, it will likely modify the warhead submunition design to enable it to deliver chemical and/or biological weapon agents.
Judging that it will be "difficult, if not impossible, to stop" Iraqi ballistic missile projects, the CIA estimates that with continued foreign assistance, Iraq will commence production of the Condor II by the early 1990s; however, halting external aid could delay production to the mid-to-late 1990s. Iraq will likely face technical challenges in "guidance and control, second-stage configuration, and flight-testing," which could be surmounted through external assistance. Through its work on the Condor, Iraq may gain experience applicable to its other missile programs, e.g., in such areas as stage separation. Regardless of the status of the Argentine and Egyptian Condor II projects, the CIA anticipates that Iraq will continue to seek technical assistance from both countries with its Condor project. While Egypt had been Iraq's main contact in the past, the CIA expects closer ties with Argentina in the future. The agency reports, "Our growing concern is that Argentina and Egypt — despite claims of withdrawing from the program — will continue development of the Condor II through Iraq. Argentine and Egyptian engineers may train at Iraqi production facilities, which are similar to these in Argentina and almost identical to ones in Egypt. Argentina and Egypt could begin indigenous production with little or no notice shortly after its [sic] engineers return from Iraq. We believe Iraq will be the first of the three to produce the Condor II."
This CIA assessment is based on information available as of 29 May 1990, and is largely based on analysis of Iraqi foreign procurement efforts. The CIA also declares, "Although we have not identified a formal, coordinated nuclear weapons program, we believe Iraq's activities, especially its covert nuclear procurement, strongly suggest a weapons program exists."
— US Central Intelligence Agency, Iraqi Ballistic Missile Developments: An Intelligence Assessment (Washington, DC: Directorate of Intelligence, 30 June 1990), classified "Top Secret," declassified excerpts released 5 March 1998, <http://www.foia.ucia.gov>, pp. 4-6, 10, 12, 20-21, 29, accessed 23 August 2002.
July 1990
According to diplomatic sources in Cairo, China has agreed to help modernize Egypt's Scud-B missiles.
— "China Agrees to modernize Egyptian Scud-Bs," Arms Control Reporter, July 1990, p. 706, B.36.
3 August 1990
The Independent reports that Iraq criticized Egypt during the Condor II collaboration for not meeting its commitments in developing the missile.
— Carol Berger, "The invasion of Kuwait: Mediator Mubarak offers little consolation as ministers meet," The Independent (London), 3 August 1990; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
3 September 1990
The BBC reports that Iraq received warhead and fuel-air explosives (FAE) technology tested by Germany's MBB (Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm) because the country was involved in a joint missile project with Egypt and West Germany. [Note: See "1984," October 1989, 3 September 1990, and 12 December 1990 entries for more on fuel-air explosives.]
— "Saddam's 'Secret' Arms Ring Reported," Panorama London BBC, 3 September 1990; in Nuclear Developments, 14 September 1990, p.19-24.
October 1990
An unattributed report asserts that Project Betreuungs GmbH (PBG) of Germany assisted in arming Iraq. Senior Public Prosecutor Friedrich Bethke states that PBG conveyed sensitive technologies to Iraq via Argentina and Egypt. PBG allegedly delivered German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm's (MBB) blueprints for fuel-air bombs to Iraq through Egypt, as well as parts of MBB's Condor missile system through Buenos Aires to Iraq. The German government could not confirm whether PBG had helped establish an R&D center for missile construction in Iraq. [Note: See 1984, October 1989, and October 1990 entries.]
— "Firm Probed for Sending Arms Technology to Iraq," Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 22 October 1990, p. 15; cited in Nuclear Developments, 15 November 1990, p. 25.
5 November 1990
McDonnell Douglas Corp. receives a contract from Naval Air Systems Command for 133 Harpoon missiles, two of which are designated for Egypt. [Note: See 10 July 1991 and 30 August 1994 entries.]
— "McDonnell Douglas Corp," Aerospace Daily, 6 November 1990, Vol. 156, No. 26, p. 237; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
4 November 1990
Flight International reports that the Consen Group of Switzerland, which coordinated development of the Condor II, is shrinking and that many of its companies are liquidating. The Consen company office in Zug has liquidated, IFAT (Institute for Advanced Technology) is liquidating, Delta Consult and Delta System have closed, and Tema in France has released most of its staff, the report says. Consen was created by missile experts who previously worked for Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm. [Note: The Consen Group disbands in January 1991.]
— "Consen faces close-down as Iraq's Condor project falters," Flight International, 14 November 1990; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
6 December 1990
Hans Heino Kopietz, an analyst with the firm Control Risks, says it is possible that Argentina and Egypt have not really given up on the Condor II project. He says he recently saw Argentine engineers and technicians in Egypt.
— "How dead is the Condor II; hints surface of 'freelance' continuation," Latin American Weekly Report, 6 December 1990; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
12 December 1990
Flight International reports that Honeywell has appointed an outside law firm to investigate its own actions in helping Egypt and Iraq develop fuel-air explosives (FAEs) for ballistic missiles. According to the report, a British subsidiary, Honeywell Control Systems, signed a contract with IFAT (Institute for Advanced Technology) of Switzerland in 1984 to produce a study for the Egyptian Ministry of Defense on developing FAEs for ballistic missiles; the study was completed in 1985. IFAT was already working with Egypt on the Condor II when the contract was signed. On 4 April 1984, a Honeywell executive wrote a memorandum affirming that the Egyptian missile was to have an accuracy of 0.1 percent of its range and was "intended to attack high value, fixed targets such as cities, ports, oil refineries, and air bases." [Note: See "1984," October 1989, 3 September 1990, October 1990, and 26 December 1990 entries for more on FAEs.]
— "Honeywell implicated in FAE work," Flight International, 12 December 1990; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
26 December 1990
According to court records, the Egyptian Ministry of Defense tried to buy 9,000 fuel-air explosives from the United States in 1984. The Egyptians said they wanted the bombs to clear minefields, but according to the Justice Department they were for the Condor II and the request was denied. [Note: See "1984," October 1989, 3 September 1990, October 1990, and 12 December 1990 entries for more on fuel-air explosives.]
— Douglas Frantz, "Honeywell factor in Iraq bomb," Los Angeles Times; 26 December 1990; in Lexis-Nexis,<http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
26 December 1990
According to court records, IFAT (Institute for Advanced Technology) Corporation of Switzerland was created by the Egyptian Ministry of Defense to procure technology for the Condor II project. [Note: IFAT is or was part of the Consen Group. See 4 November 1989 and 12 December 1989 entries.]
— Douglas Frantz, "Honeywell factor in Iraq bomb," Los Angeles Times; 26 December 1990; in Lexis-Nexis,<http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
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