A container for radioactive material found in Georgia.

Radioactive Waste Developments

For more information on trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials in the former Soviet Union, see the NIS Trafficking Database.

7 July 2005: Georgia Reports Four New Cases of HEU Seizures
On 7 July 2005, the head of the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service of the Georgian Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources, Soso Kakushadze, told the Reuters news agency that in the past two years Georgian law enforcement and security services thwarted four attempts to smuggle highly-enriched uranium (HEU) through Georgia.[1] [Editor’s Note: According to the Associated Press version of Kakushadze’s revelations, the four HEU seizures took place in Georgia over the span of three to four years.][2] In particular, Kakushadze stated, “In all these cases, Georgian security officials prevented attempts to smuggle HEU through Georgia to other countries. The HEU had been brought to Georgia from abroad.”[1] However, Kakushadze provided no details on the enrichment level or the origin of the seized HEU.[1] In his comments to the Associated Press, however, Kakushadze mentioned that there were reasons to believe that some of the HEU came from South Ossetia, a secessionist region of Georgia landlocked in the middle of the country and bordering on the Russian Federation.[2] Kakushadze added that none of the HEU was weapons grade, and that the seized HEU was not enriched highly enough even to be used as a core for a radiological dispersal device (RDD), one type of which is popularly known as a “dirty bomb.”[2] [Editor’s Note: Because HEU is weakly radioactive, the seized material could not fuel a potent RDD.]

IAEA spokesman Mark Gwozdecky, commenting on Kakushadze’s statements, pointed out that Georgia had reported the last of the four incidents but declined to go into details. A diplomat close to the IAEA, however, said that the Georgian report submitted to the IAEA did not specify the enrichment level of the seized HEU.[2]

Editor's Note: The IAEA database of illicit trafficking incidents lists an 19 April 2000 seizure of 0.9 kg of HEU fuel pellets (30% U-235 enrichment) in Batumi, Georgia. The CNS illicit trafficking database also reports this HEU seizure, as well as three incidents involving low-enriched uranium in Georgia in the past five years. Most likely these are the same incidents as mentioned by Kakushadze. However, it is possible that Georgia indeed reported new cases to the IAEA recently.
Sources: [1] Margarita Antidze, “Georgia reports 4 new nuclear smuggling attempts,” Reuters, 8 July 2005. [2] George Jahn, “U.N. Nuclear Agency Expands Treaty,” Associated Press; in The Guardian online edition, 9 July 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,1280,-5128514,00.html.

8 November 2004: Two Containers with Cobalt-60 Sources Found in Tbilisi (Georgia) Suburb
On 8 November 2004, operatives of the Georgian State Security Service for the Isani-Samgori district of Tbilisi discovered two containers with devices containing the radioactive isotope cobalt-60 in Lilo, a suburb of Tbilisi.[1,2,3] The transportation containers were found slightly covered with earth on the bottom of a ravine.[1]

According to officials at the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources who were dispatched to examine the discovery, the containers held gamma-ray defect detection devices used for quality control purposes in pipeline welding; the devices use cobalt-60 for generating the gamma rays.[2,3] None of the media reports available indicated what the radiation level of the containers was or how many defect detection devices were discovered in each of the containers. According to a Georgian official from the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service of the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, the radioactivity emitted by each of these devices is very low, less than 1 millicurie. This finding means that with their covers closed, the radioactivity level on the surface of the containers is even lower.[4] On the day the containers were discovered, officials from the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources took the cobalt-60 sources to an undisclosed location for safe storage.[1,5]

Editor’s Note: Devices of this type, used for industrial radiography, normally contain relatively powerful radioactive sources, which are shielded by lead or other dense metals in the walls of the device to protect workers and the public. Thus, while the abandoned devices did not pose an immediate public health threat, it is quite possible that they could have provided the material for a radiological dispersal device, or “dirty bomb” if they had fallen into the wrong hands. Also, a report on the incident by Agence France-Press stating that each of the containers held 225 kg (495 pounds) of cobalt-60 appears to be erroneous, since this would be far larger than the small quantities of intensively radioactive cobalt usually found in industrial radiography devices. The article may be referring to the weight of the devices themselves, or, possibly, to the combined weight of the devices and their containers.[5]
Sources: [1] “Gruziya: v prigorode Tbilisi obnaruzheny dva konteynera s radioaktivnym veshchestvom” [Georgia: two containers with a radioactive substance found in Tbilisi suburb], REGNUM news agency, 8 November 2004; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>. [2] “Na okraine Tbilisi nashli radioaktivnyye materialy” [Radioactive materials found in a Tbilisi suburb], Russian NTV television channel, November 8, 2004; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>. [3] Eka Mekhuzla, “V prigorode Tbilisi obnaruzheny konteynery s radioaktivnym veshchestvom” [Containers with radioactive substance found in Tbilisi suburb], ITAR-TASS, 8 November 2004; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>. [4] CNS e-mail communication with Mr. Giorgi Nabakhtiani, Head of Division, Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service, Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources of Republic of Georgia, 20 November 2004. [5] “Containers with radioactive cobalt found in Georgian village,” Agence France-Presse, 9 November 2004.

13 March 2004: Georgian Border Guards Detain Smuggler of Radioactive Material on Armenian Border
On 13 March 2004, Shalva Londaridze, spokesman for the Georgian State Border Guard Department, told the Kavkasia-Press news agency that the Georgian border guards detained an Armenian citizen, who tried to smuggle radioactive material into Georgia through the Sadakhlo border crossing at the Armenian-Georgian border. Georgian authorities revealed neither the exact time and date of detention nor the precise amount and nature of the radioactive material. According to Londaridze, the Border Guard Department has launched an official investigation into the incident.[1] An official from the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service of the Georgian Ministry of Environment contacted by CNS stated that he was not aware of this incident.[2]
Source: [1] “Radioactive Material Seized on Georgian-Armenian Border,” Kavkasia-Press news agency (Georgia), 13 March 2004; BBC Monitoring International Reports; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe Database, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>. [2] CNS communication with official from the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service of the Ministry of Environment of Georgia, 21 May 2004.

12 February 2004: Cesium at Georgian Gas Stations Causes Concern
On 12 February 2004, a Georgian official revealed that disused gauges containing cesium-137 are stored at more than 30 gas stations in Georgia. According to Levan Gogua, deputy head of the Georgian Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service (NRSS), the gauges were once used to measure the gasoline level in tanks but are no longer needed.

Gogua commented on the cesium-filled gauges after operators of a gas station in the western city of Kutaisi requested that the NRSS remove containers holding such gauges from the station’s premises. According to Georgian press reports, the gas station held five containers, three of which were open. Because the two existing radioactive waste sites in Georgia are filling up, the containers will be moved to a basement at the gas station, according to Gogua. Publicly available reports did not reveal the amount of cesium-137 in the disused gauges.[1,2]

This latest incident involving highly radioactive materials in Georgia follows on the heels of several such cases in 2003. In February, Georgian officials announced that three containers holding radiation measuring devices powered by cesium-137 were missing from a military base.[3] In May, officers from the Ministry of Internal Affairs searched the trunk of a taxicab and found two metal boxes filled with cesium-137 and strontium-90 and a third box filled with liquid mustard gas agent.[4] In September, two radiation sources identified as cesium-137 were discovered at a gas station in Marneuli district and two radiation sources identified as military dosimeters containing cesium-137 were found in a former radioactive waste dump in the village of Saakadze.[5]

Editor’s Note: Cesium-137 is used in a wide variety of industrial instruments, such as level and thickness gauges and moisture density gauges. Cesium sources have been used to measure the level of liquids in a variety of applications, including gasoline in gas tanks and beer in beer cans. It is also commonly used in the food processing industry for food irradiation purposes as well as in healthcare in various diagnostic procedures, sterilization of medical instruments and equipment, and blood irradiation. Because the material is so potent, even a small amount of cesium-137 can pose a considerable danger to the public if used in a radiation dispersal device, or a “dirty bomb.”
Sources: [1] “Radioactive materials at Georgia gas stations cause concern,” Associated Press, 12 February 2004; in Lexis Nexis Academic Universe, <http://lexis-nexis.com>. [2] “Radioactive containers found in western Georgia,” Prime News news agency, 12 February 2004, BBC Worldwide Monitoring; in Lexis Nexis Academic Universe, <http://lexis-nexis.com>. [3] “Radioactive Materials Lost at a Georgian Military Base,” NIS Export Control Observer, No. 3, March 2003, pp. 12-13, <http://cns.miis.edu/nis-excon>. [4] “Two Radioactive Smuggling Cases Occur in Georgia within Weeks,” NIS Export Control Observer, No. 7, July 2003, pp. 11-12, <http://cns.miis.edu/nis-excon>. [5] “Cesium-137 Sources Discovered in Georgia,” NIS Export Control Observer, No. 10, October 2003, pp. 11-12, http://cns.miis.edu/nis-excon.

18 September 2003: Cesium-137 Sources Discovered in Georgia
On 18 September 2003, the Georgian Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service (NRSS) discovered radiation sources at two sites in Gardabani and Marneuli districts, southeastern Georgia.[1] According to the ITAR-TASS news agency, two sources of radiation identified as cesium-137 were found at the site of a former gas station in Marneuli district.[1] The other two radiation sources were found in the village of Saakadze, Gardabani district, in a container at a former radioactive waste dump, which has been shut down and sealed off since 1987.[1,2,3,4] It is unknown how the radioactive sources appeared at the gas station in Marneuli district. However, considering that the former owners of the gas station were planning to sell all gas station equipment as scrap metal, the discovery appears to be fortunate.[1]

The discovery of radioactive sources in the Gardabani district took place in the course of a search operation conducted by NRSS officials in the Bolnisi and Gardabani districts.[3] The closed radioactive waste storage site in the village of Saakadze was inspected by Georgian authorities in 2001, and no sources were found at the time.[2] However, this time the NRSS found the container with radioactive sources there, which, according to an NRSS official, led the NRSS to believe that somebody must have left it there after gaining unauthorized access to the storage site.[4] According to Levan Gogua, deputy head of the NRSS, the radioactive sources discovered in the Gardabani district were identified as military dosimeters containing cesium-137. In his interview with Kavkasia-Press news agency on September 18, 2003, Gogua did not rule out the possibility that the devices could have been stolen from a military unit.[3] The Counterterrorist Department of the Georgian Ministry of State Security has launched an investigation into this case, to determine whether the sources discovered in the Gardabani district are the ones that were reported stolen from the Vaziani military base in spring of 2003.[3,5]

In a related development, an examination of the closed radioactive waste dump in the village of Saakadze also revealed a radiation leak from the ventilation system. According to Gogua, the radiation level in the area of the dump site is nearly twice the allowed limit and reaches 100 microroentgens per hour. Gogua expressed concern and stated that the dump must be covered with a fresh layer of concrete in order to avoid any incidents in the future.[3]

All sources discovered in the Marneuli and Gardabani districts have been taken by NRSS officials to an undisclosed location for safe and secure storage.[1]

Editor’s Note: Lack of information on the radioactive sources found in the Gardabani district does not allow us to correctly assess the danger posed by them. However, distinguishing between two general types of dosimeters is necessary. Pocket dosimeters are one type, which are designed to be worn by people to measure their exposure to ionizing radiation. Calibration sources containing cesium-137 can be used to check periodically that pocket dosimeters are working properly, but the sources themselves would not be attached to the pocket dosimeter when worn by people in order to preclude even very small exposure. Another type or class of radiation meters includes portable survey devices, usually designed to be carried by hand. Traditionally known as Geiger counters, these devices may also be called “dosimeters.” There are radiation survey meters, or dosimeters, especially those that are used by the armed forces in different countries that contain very small amounts of cesium-137. In these dosimeters, the cesium-137 source is used as a calibration device intended for periodic tests of the performance of the dosimeters. As a rule, the calibration devices in these dosimeters contain such small amounts of cesium-137 that it would not pose significant risks, unless the protective cover were destroyed and the source extracted and ingested or if the calibration device were fastened to reproductive organs for extended periods of time.
Sources: [1] Eka Mekhuzla, "V dvukh rayonakh Gruzii obnaruzheny i obezvrezheny istochniki radiatsii" [Radioactive sources discovered in two regions of Georgia], ITAR-TASS, September 18, 2003; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>. [2] Rustavi-2 Television, 18 September 2003; in "Program Summary: Rustavi-2 Television ‘Kurieri’ News," FBIS Document CEP20030918000305. [3] Kavkasia-Press, 18 September 2003; in "Radiation Sources, Leak Discovered in Eastern Georgia," FBIS Document CEP20030918000113. [4] CNS e-mail communication with Mr. Giorgi Nabakhtiani, Head of Division, Nuclear Radiation and Safety Service, Ministry of Environment of Republic of Georgia, 20 October 2003. [5] See: “Radioactive Materials Lost at a Georgian Military Base,” NIS Export Control Observer, No. 3, March 2003, pp. 12-13, http://cns.miis.edu/nis-excon.

May-June 2003: Two Radioactive Smuggling Cases Occur in Georgia within Weeks
In the past two months, Georgian authorities have foiled two attempts to smuggle radioactive materials into and out of the country. The first episode occurred in late May. On 31 May 2003, while conducting patrols in downtown Tbilisi after the escape of inmates from a local prison, officers of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs criminal investigation department found three metal boxes containing dangerous material in the trunk of a taxicab en route to Tbilisi’s central railway station. Two of the boxes contained Cesium-137 and Strontium-90, two potent radioactive substances.[1,2] The third container held a dark brown liquid that was later identified as mustard agent.[3,4]

The seized materials were transported to the former nuclear reactor facility at Mtskheta, near Tbilisi.[1] Analysis revealed that the radioactivity level of the Strontium-90 was about 500 microroentgens per hour, which exceeds the legal maximum of 30 microroentgens per hour.[1] However, according to Georgian Environment Minister, Nino Chkhobadze, no environmental contamination resulted from this incident.[4]

Strontium-90 and Cesium-137 are byproducts of nuclear fission and are the most likely ingredients for a radiological dispersal device (RDD), or a “dirty bomb,” which combines conventional explosives with radioactive materials with the purpose of spreading radioactivity across populated areas to cause panic and inflict economic damage. Mustard agent, often referred to as a “gas,” is in fact a persistent liquid with a strong odor of garlic. Skin exposure results in painful chemical burns and fluid-filled blisters after a delay of one to six hours. Mustard gas can also cause temporary or permanent blindness and, if inhaled, severe and sometimes fatal lung damage. In the great majority of cases, however, mustard exposure results in injury (including a number of chronic illnesses) rather than death.

Even though the seizure of the containers from the Tbilisi taxi and the first arrest occurred on May 31, 2003, the details of the investigation were made public only during a press conference held on June 16, 2003. During the press conference, the deputy head of the criminal investigation division of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Givi Mgebrishvili, indicated that the taxi driver, Tamaz Tsatsunashvili, was unaware of the danger posed by his cargo and was released after being questioned.[1,3,6] The investigation revealed that the three boxes belonged to Tedo Mokeriya, a resident of Kobuleti, a town located in the Autonomous Republic of Adzharia, on the border with Turkey.[1,5] After his arrest, Mokeriya stated that he was en route to Kobuleti to deliver the boxes to his father-in-law, Amiran Khakhuteishvili, but he did not know what the boxes contained.[1,5] Georgian police later arrested Khakhuteishvili, who admitted that he intended to sell the radioactive material in Turkey.[1,5] Both Tedo Mokeriya and Amiran Khakhuteishvili were released on condition that they do not leave their places of residence.[1] A full criminal investigation is under way and the suspects were charged with illegal storage and transportation of radioactive substances.[1,7]

In a similar case, on 27 June 2003, an Armenian citizen was detained at the Armenian-Georgian border, while trying to smuggle containers of radioactive powder in the trunk of his car.[8,9] According to the Armenian news agency Arminfo, the powder was purchased in Vladikavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia-Alania, Russia.[8] Although as of late July, the material had not been identified, Georgian Environment Minister Nino Chkhobadze speculated that it might be uranium.[8,9] It is not known why the Armenian citizen was bringing the material into Georgia, or what the ultimate destination of the material was.
Sources: [1] “Osobo opasnyye radioaktivnyye veshchestva, primenyayushchiesya dlya izgotovleniya ‘gryaznykh bomb’ obnaruzheny v Tbilisi” [Especially dangerous radioactive substances that could be used for creating ‘dirty bombs’ are discovered in Tbilisi], Agency Prime-News (Tbilisi), June 16, 2003; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com/english>. [2] David Filipov, “Georgia seizes ‘dirty bomb’ materials,” Boston Globe, June 17, 2003, A4. [3] “Georgia Finds Dirty Bomb Material in Taxi,” Reuters, June 16, 2003. [4] Misha Dzhindzhikhashvili, “ ‘Dirty Bomb’ Materials Seized in Georgia,” Associated Press, June 16, 2003. [5] “Radioaktivnyye veshchestva prednaznachalis dlya prodazhy v Turtsii” [Radioactive materials were intended for sale in Turkey], Information Agency Prima, June 17, 2003; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com/english>. [6] “Dirty Bomb,” The Moscow Times, June 17, 2003, p. 4, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com>. [7] Anatoliy Gordiyenko, “Na Tbilisskom vokzale torguyut radiatsiyey. Gruzinskiye politseyskiye izyali u chastnogo taksista konteyneri s tseziyem i strontsiyem,” [Radiation is sold at the Tbilisi railway station. Georgian policemen seized containers with cesium and strontium from a private taxicab driver], Nezavisimaya gazeta, June 18, 2003; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.ru>. [8] Independent Armenian News Agency Arminfo, June 27, 2003; in “Armenian Citizen Carrying Radioactive Substance Detained on Georgian Border,” FBIS Document CEP20030627000203. [9] “Gruzinskiye pogranichniki zaderzhali radioaktivniy gruz” [Georgian Border Guards Seize Radioactive Cargo], News Agency Rosbalt (St Petersburg), June 27, 2003; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.ru>.

6/26/2003: BORDER GUARDS ARREST MAN TRANSPORTING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS ACROSS ARMENIAN BORDER
Georgian border guards arrested a man trying to transport radioactive material across the Georgian-Armenian border on 26 June 2003, Rosbalt reported.[1]  The man, Armenian citizen Sergo Mikoyan, said he got the material in Vladikavkaz, Russia.[2]  According to the Environmental Protection and Natural Resources Ministry of Georgia, the substance in question was "well-isolated uranium."[1] [This may have been a poorly phrased attempt to characterize the level of enrichment of the uranium involved, although no other description of the material was given.]  Another source said the contraband consisted of several boxes containing a radioactive powder thought to be uranium.[2]  The boxes were turned over to the radiation safety department of the Environmental Protection Ministry and were due to undergo further analysis.[2]
Sources:
[1] "Gruzinskiye pogranichniki zaderzhali radioaktivnyy gruz," Rosbalt, 27 June 2003; in Integrum Techno,
[2] "Gruzinskiye pogranichniki zaderzhali armyanina s poroshkom urana," Lenta.ru, 28 June 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru. {Entered 12/12/2003 CC}

3/2003: "RAD RANGERS" IN GEORGIA SEARCH FOR LOST RADIOACTIVE DEVICES
As of March 2003, officials from Georgia's Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service were searching in cooperation with the IAEA for radioactive objects, such as abandoned military and agricultural equipment, which remain in the country after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  The technicians, called "rad rangers," search urban areas and abandoned military bases and have succeeded in gathering over 220 abandoned radioactive objects.  Objects range from rifle scopes that contain small amounts of radium, to radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) powered by strontium-90 that emit over 40,000 curies of radiation each.[1] The search also looks for agricultural devices used in the secret Soviet research project code named "Gamma Kolos," in which tractors used containers of cesium-137 to irradiate seeds in order to examine the results of radiation exposure on wheat harvests.[2]  Authorities fear that these radioactive materials could be used by terrorists, as the strontium-90 canisters could be used in constructing a "dirty bomb," while cesium-137 is most commonly found in a powdery form which could be easily spread without detection in an urban area, possibly sickening or killing hundreds of people due to unwitting radiation exposure.[1]  The recovered strontium canisters and Gamma Kolos cesium containers are being stored in concrete chambers in a secret location in Georgia, assisted by funding from the US Department of Energy.[1,2]
Sources:
[1] Richard Stone, "The Hunt for Hot Stuff," Smithsonian, March 2003.
[2] Joby Warrick, "Hunting a Deadly Soviet Legacy," Washington Post, 11 November 2002, p. A1; in "Search for Orphan Sources in Georgia and Moldova Yields Cesium-137," NIS Export Control Observer, January 2003, p. 10.{Entered 5/20/2003 AE}

2/11/2003: GEORGIA NEEDS NEW RADIOACTIVE WASTE STORAGE
According to Iosif Kakushadze, head of the Radiation Safety Service at the Georgian Ministry of Environmental Protection, Georgia needs a new radioactive waste storage facility. Kakushadze noted that lack of funds and opposition from local leaders has thus far prevented the construction of such a facility. At this stage, Georgian authorities are considering construction of a temporary storage facility calculated for 50-year use, and expect that the International Atomic Energy Agency will partially cover construction-related expenses. According to Interfax, Kakushadze refused to name the current radioactive waste storage facilities.
["Khraneniye otkhodov radioaktivnykh veshchestv v Gruzii stanovitsya opasnym-ekspert," Interfax, 11 February 2003.] {Entered 4/1/2003 AD}

2/2003: RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS LOST AT GEORGIAN MILITARY BASE
On 17 February 2003, Mamuka Tsaava, the military prosecutor of the Kvemo-Kartli region in central Georgia, announced in a public statement that three containers with the radioactive material cesium-137 were missing from the Vaziani military base, which is located 30km east of Tbilisi. According to RIA-Novosti, Georgian Minister of Defense David Tevzadze stated that the radioactive sources originally had been found on the military base when the Georgian military forces "were preparing for international exercises and were surveying the territory of the base."[1,2,3,4] The Agence France Presse reported that these radioactive devices were discovered at the Vaziani base in 2000.[5] According to Mr. Tsaava, a total of four containers were stored at the Vaziani base, three of which are now missing. It is not clear when the containers disappeared or what the exact quantity of the missing radioactive material was.[1,2,3,4] However, according to a Rustavi-2 TV report, the three containers with cesium-137 had been missing from the Vaziani base since summer 2002, while the criminal investigation in connection with the suspected theft was initiated by the Military Prosecutor’s Office only on 3 February 2003.[6]

The head of the Radiation Security Department of the Georgian Ministry of Environment, Soso Kakushadze, stated that his office was notified about the suspected theft of the cesium-137 containers on 17 February 2003. Mr. Kakushadze dispatched a group of experts to gather evidence at the site, but they were denied access to the Vaziani base. Mr. Kakushadze stated that the containers held calibrated radiation measuring devices powered by cesium.[1]

On 19 February 2003, Rustavi-2 TV quoted several classified documents, one of which indicated that in October 2002 the Ministry of Defense had asked the Ministry of Environment to transfer the containers with cesium-137 from Vaziani base and to assume responsibility for their safe storage. The transfer apparently did not take place. According to another classified document cited by Rustavi-2, high-ranking Georgian military officials reported that radioactive sources had been found on the territory of an army detachment in Dedoplis-Tskaro (eastern Georgia), the Akhaltsikhe tank battalion (southern Georgia) and the Khashuri fuel storage facility (central Georgia).[2,3,4]
Sources:
[1] Misha Dzhindzhikhashvili, Associated Press, 17 February 2003; in “Radioactive materials go missing from Georgian base,” Anchorage Daily News, http://www.adn.com/24hour/world/v-printer/story/768825p-5534609c.html.
[2] “S voyennoy bazy v Gruzii propali tri konteynera s ‘tseziyem-137,’” Newsru.com, 17 February 2003, http://www.newsru.com/world/17feb2003/cesium_print.html.
[3] “V Gruzii pokhishcheny radioaktivnyye konteynery,” Vesti.ru, 17 February 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://afnet.integrum.ru.
[4] Eka Mekhuzla, “S odnoy iz voyennykh baz Gruzii propali tri konteynera s radioaktivnimi veshchestvami,” ITAR-TASS, 17 February 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://afnet.integrum.ru.
[5] “Nuclear containers lost off Georgia’s military base,” Agence France Presse, 18 February 2003; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://www.lexis-nexis.com.
[6] Rustavi-2 TV, 19 February 2003; in “Program summary: Georgian Rustavi-2 TV ‘Kurieri’ News,” FBIS Document ID CEP20030219000497.{Entered 4/17/2003 KB}

6/28/2002:  IAEA SEARCH FOR MISSING RADIOACTIVE GENERATORS IN GEORGIA FAILED
About 50 specialists from the Georgian government and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have failed to find two missing highly radioactive thermoelectric generators in western Georgia. The search, which lasted for two weeks, concluded on June 21. The generators, weighing one ton each, contain a radioactive element, strontium-90, which can be used in a so-called "dirty bomb."[1] Eight generators were brought to Georgia from Narva in the early 1980s to power communications devices during the construction of hydropower plants in the region.  Six of these generators were later found and neutralized, but two remain missing.[2]  According to Sergey Kakushadze, the head of Georgia's Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service, a renewed search is planned for September and will focus on the areas close to Abkhazia.
Sources:
[1] Ken Stier, "Missing Radioactive Generators in Georgia Raise 'Dirty Bomb' Concerns," 28 June 2002, Eurasianet Web Site, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav062802.shtml
eav062802.shtml.
[2] "Int'l Experts Start Search for Lost Radioactive Batteries in Georgia," Interfax, 11 June 2002.{Entered 7/22/2002 YP}
 
4/2002:  IAEA PLANS TO RECOVER RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN GEORGIA
At an International Atomic Energy Agency-sponsored meeting in Paris in April 2002, France, India, Japan, Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States agreed on a plan to find and recover two high-power strontium sources and an unknown number of other radioactive sources in Georgia. In the first phase, to begin June 1, 30 Georgians will be trained in radiological protection and use of donated detection equipment to locate the two strontium sources believed to be in northwestern Georgia. The "Helinuc" helicopter-borne detection system developed by the CEA's Bruyeres-le-Chatel center will likely be used in the second phase of the program. 
["IAEA Group Plans to Recover Radioactive Sources in Georgia," Nucleonics Week, Vol. 43, No. 16, 18 April 2002.]{Entered 4/22/2002 YP}
 
2/5/2002:  MINISTER WARNS: RADIOACTIVE DEVICES REMAIN
After the discovery of two containers filled with radioactive material near the border of Abkhazia in December 2001, Georgian Minister of the Environment Nino Chkhobadze said that other radioactive objects with similar radioactivity exist in the country. The efforts to find those objects will initially focus on former Soviet military sites. [See the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database entry for more information on this incident.]
["Georgia Warns of Other Nuclear Devices in Country," Reuters, 5 February 2002; in RANSAC Nuclear News, RANSAC Web Site, http://www.ransac.org, 8 February 2002.]{Entered 3/1/2002 YP}
 
5/19/2000: IAEA SEARCHES FOR DISCARDED RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN GEORGIA
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced on 19 May 2000 that it was launching an aerial reconnaissance effort to track down discarded radiation sources in the Republic of Georgia. At the request of the Georgian Ministry of the Environment, a six-member IAEA team will survey a selected area of Georgia in an attempt to find discarded radiation sources or other areas contaminated with radiation that could pose a health hazard. The team will use a helicopter equipped with a gamma radiation detection system provided by the Commisariat a l'Energie Atomique of France. Since Georgia became independent in 1991, nearly 300 discarded radiation sources have been found in the country. Accidental encounters with improperly discarded radiation sources have sometimes had serious health consequences, as in 1997 when a number of Georgian border guards were hospitalized after being exposed to radiation from such a source (see abstract for October 1997 below). The aim of the IAEA mission will be to provide reasonable assurance that there is no risk from discarded radiation sources to the population of Georgia.  The mission is planned to last from 23 May to 16 June 2000, and will make two two-hour flights per day during the survey period.  The team will work closely with Georgian authorities and provide findings to the IAEA Director-General, who will be responsible for passing them on to the Georgian government.
["IAEA Searches for Discarded Radioactive Sources in Republic of Georgia," IAEA Press Release PR2000/12, 19 May 2000]{entered 6/5/00 SDP}
  
3/99: RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCE FOUND AT LILO
Containers of radioactive material were found on the former Russian military base near Lilo Fair. The material is well preserved and safe, provided the containers remain unopened. (Please see the 10/97 entry below for more information on the previous radiation incident at Lilo.)
["Radioactive Substance Found," Georgian Times, No 35, 4 March 1999, p. 3.]{Entered 12/9/99 IPZ}
 
11/10/98: RADIATION SOURCES FOUND IN TSAISHI
Two radiation sources were detected in the village Tsaishi in the Mestia region. The sources were "destroyed" and the Institute of Physics prepared special lead containers for disposition of the destroyed sources.
["Radiation Sources in Tsaishi are Destroyed," Georgian Times, No 134 (336), 12 November 1998, p. 5.]{Entered 12/9/99 IPZ}
 
9/98: IAEA PUBLISHES REPORTS ON RADIATION IN GEORGIA
In September 1998, the International Atomic Energy Agency published a document, IAEA-TECDOC-1045: Safety of radiation sources and security of radioactive materials, that contains two reports on radiation in Georgia.  The first report, "The Radiological Accident in Tbilisi," summarizes and examines the radiological situation at the Lilo Training Center.  The second report, "Radiation Sources and Materials Safety and Security in Georgia," outlines the problems of safety and security in Georgia, the most important incidents and accidents, their consequences (including severe injuries and deaths) and governmental actions for prevention and mitigation.
[International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA-TECDOC-1045: Safety of radiation sources and security of radioactive materials (September 1998).]{Entered 6/22/2001 KB}
 
8/98: RADIATION SOURCES FOUND NEAR GODOGANI AND MATKHODZHI
The Georgian state commission in charge of detecting and liquidating radiation sources examined a 60-square-meter plot of land that was contaminated by radiation and included 30 spots at which radiation levels reached 6 roentgen (R). [The time period over which this dose was registered is not indicated in the original source.  Presumably, it is six roentgen per hour.] The plot of land is on the territory of a former Soviet military site near Godogani, Terjola, in western Georgia. According to Georgian Minister for the Environment Nino Chkhobadze, the radiation sources have already been removed, and the radiation level in the area is within the permissible range.[1] Another radiation source emitting 230R [time period unspecified] and contaminating a 300m radius, was found on the territory of a former Soviet civil defense unit near Matkhodzi, in the Khoni region in Western Georgia.[1,2] Georgian experts are working on isolating and disposing of the radioactive objects, Chkobadze said.[1]  Experts have checked only 60 out of 300 facilities formerly belonging to the Soviet army and found radioactive substances at four of them. The Georgian authorities have appealed to the IAEA for assistance in cleanup operations.[2]
Sources:
[1] ITAR-TASS, 1 August 1998; in "Radioactive sources found in Georgia," Inquisit Agent Report, http://www.inquisit.com/.
[2]"Segodnya" newscast, NTV, 2 August 1998; in "Russian TV Reports on Radiation Problems in Georgia," FBIS-TEN-98-219. {Entered 12/9/99 IPZ}
 
12/4/97: COMMISSION ANNOUNCES DISCOVERY OF RADIATION IN VAZIANI
On 4 December 1997, the presidential commission for investigating radioactive contamination at military bases in Georgia held a press conference to reveal that its members had found a source of radiation at the Vaziani military base on 23 November 1997.[1,2]  The commission discovered one source of cesium-137 in one portion of the base and later encountered seven more sources of cesium in metal containers there. The cesium at Vaziani, once a former Soviet missile base and now under the jurisdiction of the Georgian Ministry of Defense, has radioactivity comparable to that detected at the Lilo base.[2,3]  The 17-hectare (42.5-acre) base at Vaziani is located approximately 30 km (18 miles) from Tbilisi.[4]  No soldiers are stationed there, and no one has contracted radiation sickness from the materials.  Minister of Environmental Protection Nino Chkhobadze noted that the commission does not possess the equipment needed to contain these radioactive materials.[2,3]
Sources:
[1] "Radiation in the Former Units of Russian Military Deployment," The Georgian Times, online edition, 9 December 1997, p. 1.
[2] "There is a Radiation Source at Vasiani Military Base," Shvidi Dge, 3-4 December 1997.
[3] "Cesium Containers are in Search," Shvidi Dge, 5-7 December 1997.
[4] "More ex-Soviet nuclear waste found at Georgian base," Agence France-Presse, 4 December 1997; in Inquisit Agent Report, http://www.inquisit.com/.{Entered 7/8/98 TR}
 
12/97: IAEA PROVIDES TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO RADIATION COMMISSION
IAEA experts have offered technical assistance to the presidential commission established in October 1997 to detect radiation at former Soviet military bases in Georgia.  The commission has until April 1998 to finish their study and to contain any radiation and chemical sources they find.[1,2,6]  With the help of $50,000 from the IAEA, the commission will examine 100 of the 300 military bases on Georgian territory.[5,6]  The Ministry of Environmental Protection has jurisdiction over the commission and has provided a large portion of its funding.  Resources are also expected from the Ministry of Defense and the Department of Border Defense.[6] Georgian officials are to present their preliminary findings to the IAEA in Vienna in January 1998.[1,2]  IAEA specialists visited the Lilo military base in October 1997, when news broke that 11 soldiers were suffering from radiation sickness due to exposure to cesium-137 abandoned at Lilo.[3]  France and Germany have also provided help by treating some of the ill soldiers.  France's nuclear protection and safety institute IPSN sent a medical team to Georgia to examine the other soldiers.[4]
Sources:
[1] "Byvshiye rossiyskiye bazy obsleduyut eksperty MAGATE," Segodnya, online edition, 17 December 1997.
[2] "MAGATE Assists In Overcoming Radiation Problems," The Georgian Times, online edition, 16 December 1997, p. 1.
[3] "UN Experts Visit Lilo Military Base," The Georgian Times, online edition, 17 October 1997, p. 1.
[4] "Radiation victims treated," Nuclear Engineering International, December 1997, p. 6.
[5] "Three of Eleven Soldiers Who Suffered from Radiation Will Return to Georgia," Shvidi Dge, 19-20 November 1997.
[6] "There is a Radiation Source at Vasiani Military Base," Shvidi Dge, 3-4 December 1997. {Entered 7/8/98 TR}
 
10/97: RADIATION SICKNESS STRIKES SOLDIERS IN GEORGIA
In February 1997, soldiers at the Lilo military base, near Tbilisi, began to exhibit symptoms from an unknown disease, including open sores on their bodies.[1] After six months, in October 1997, doctors diagnosed nine hospitalized soldiers with radiation sickness, accompanied by third degree radiation burns.[1,2] By the end of October 1997, a total of 11 soldiers had been hospitalized with the same malady.[6]  After examining the 60-acre area of the Lilo military base, experts from the Institute of Physics, Ministry of Defense, and border guards discovered and unearthed 15 radioactive capsules, similar to one found in a coat pocket in a pile of a winter gear[2] belonging to the soldier who suffered the most severe radiation burns.[1] The capsules, half an inch long and a quarter inch wide, contained cesium-137 and initially belonged in radiation detection devices used to train troops.  Although the capsules were originally stored in shielded boxes, four had reportedly been removed from their protective casings.[2] Three of the capsules were allegedly open due to corrosion.[1] Specialists calculated that the capsules will remain dangerous for 300 years[2] and are studying when the capsules might have been left on the base.[1]  Experts found most of the capsules in holes up to 15 inches deep in smoking areas, near restrooms, and on the football grounds, but discovered five outside of the territory of the base.[2] The radiation level at the base was 1,300 milliroentgen per hour, [1] which is one thousand times standard radiation levels.[2] It returned to normal after the completion of liquidation work.[3]
 
According to the head of the Georgian border guards, Valeri Chkheidze, Russian authorities abandoned the nuclear material without notifying the Georgian government when Russian troops withdrew from the base (used for civil defense training) in 1992.  Chkheidze claims the event is equal to "criminal nonchalance." Shukri Abramidze, a nuclear expert with the Institute of Physics, was also shocked at how the canisters were abandoned and stated he had never seen anything like it in his 40 years as a nuclear specialist.[4] Experts are especially concerned that the capsules found at the military base in Lilo might be just the tip of the iceberg and that there might be similar incidents on other former Russian military bases, or even nonmilitary sites.[2]
 
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze set up a commission to inspect Georgia's other military bases [2] and to eliminate any sources of radioactive contamination found.[8]  In addition, the Office of the Chief Military Prosecutor of Georgia started an investigation of the Lilo case and plans to bring charges in accordance with Article 215(5) of the Georgian Criminal Code "On Storage, Accounting, Transfer and Usage of Radioactive Materials."[5] The investigation involves law enforcement officials, security agencies, and scientific and medical facilities.[7]  Some Georgians believe that the radioactive materials were deliberately left behind and called for a lawsuit against the Russian government.[6]  On 23 October 1997, the Russian Ministry of Defense reportedly denied that Russian troops had left the radioactive materials behind, and stated that the capsules originated from laboratory equipment at the base.[12]
 
Georgian authorities invited Russian specialists to relate their experiences in handling radiation sickness.  Mikhail Kolchanovskiy of the Institute of Biophysics traveled to Georgia and reported that three soldiers with the severest burns will need several years to recover completely.[9,10]  Kolchanovskiy also noted that the Institute of Biophysics in Moscow is ready to admit the soldiers for treatment and free surgery.[7]  However, the soldiers expressed hesitation about going to Russia, fearing inadequate treatment by the same country that left the radioactive waste in the first place.[2]  Because Georgian hospitals are unable to treat the soldiers, authorities waited for an offer from abroad.[11] Seventeen countries offered assistance,[10] and in late October 1997, four soldiers traveled to France and seven to Germany for treatment.[6]  Other sources note that only two soldiers went to Germany.[13,14]
Sources:
[1] Information on Incident on Lilo Military Base - Released by the Political-Military Department of the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 October 1997.
[2] Los Angeles Times, 11 October 1997.
[3] "Radiation Sickness of Soldiers" Shvidi Dge, 6-7 October 1997 p. 2.
[4] "Radiation Sickness Hits 10 Georgian Border Guards" Russia Today, online edition  http://www.russiatoday.com/, 6 October 1997
[5] "The Office of the Military Prosecutor of Georgia Brings Charges" Shvidi Dge, 3-6 October 1997 p. 2.
[6] "Radiation Exposed Soldiers Treated Abroad" The Georgian Times, online edition, 31 October 1997.
[7] ITAR-TASS, 4 October 1997; in "Ten Georgian Troops Hospitalized With Radiation Sickness," FBIS-SOV-97-278.
[8] Interfax, 12 October 1997; in "Suspected Radiation Sickness Hits Georgian Border Guard," FBIS-TEN-97-285.
[9] Boris Glebov, "Gruzinskiye pogranichniki postradali ot radiatsii," Delovoy mir, 8 October 1997, p. 1.
[10] Mikhail Vignanskiy, "Obluchennyye gruzinskiye pogranichniki proydut kurs lecheniya v Germanii," Segodnya, online edition, 15 October 1997.
[11] Nanette Van Der Laan, "Russia's nuclear shame is neighbour's excruciating pain," The Telegraph, 17 October 1997; in the Sydney Morning Herald, online edition, http://www.shm.com.au/, 17 October 1997.
[12] "Defense Ministry Denies Leaving Radioactive Substances in Georgia," RFE/RL Newsline, vol. I, no. 146, 24 October 1997.
[13] "Radiation victims treated," Nuclear Engineering International, December 1997, p. 6.
[14] "More ex-Soviet nuclear waste found at Georgian base," Agence France-Presse, 4 December 1997; in Inquisit Agent Report, http://www.inquisit.com/. {Entered 12/97 SS}{Updated 7/8/98 TR}

	Updated August 2005