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25 January 2007: Story of 2006 HEU Seizure Made Public
On 25 January 2007, a story about the seizure of 100 grams of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in Georgia hit the media. The actual incident took place nearly a year earlier. In February 2006, some brief media reports referred to a seizure of 80 grams of enriched uranium in Georgia involving a Russian national. The reports were dismissed by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov. (For details, see abstract 200600140 in the NIS Nuclear Trafficking database.) No additional information was made public in the ensuing year.
The information about the case released more recently indicates that the material involved is highly enriched uranium. According to the New York Times, the analysis of the material carried out by the U.S. Department of Energy's Pacific Northwest National Laboratory determined that the U-235 content of the material was 89.451 percent.[1] This level of enrichment—nearly 90-percent enriched U-235—makes it ideal material for the construction of a nuclear weapon. Uranium enriched to at least 90 percent U-235 is considered weapons-grade. In skilled hands, as little as 25 kilograms (kg) of this material is needed to produce a nuclear weapon. Many nuclear scientists and nonproliferation experts acknowledge that terrorist organizations, if they obtain HEU, could fabricate such a crude device without state assistance.[2] In addition to nuclear weapons, HEU is used in many civilian applications, including as nuclear fuel for research reactors and naval propulsion, as well as in the production of medical isotopes. This material is available in more than 40 countries around the world. (For more information on the risk of nuclear terrorism and HEU, see the Civilian HEU Reduction and Elimination database.)
According to the New York Times report, the HEU seizure in Georgia was the result of a sting operation by the Georgian secret services, who became aware of a Russian national from Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia (a region of the Russian Federation that borders South Ossetia, a separatist region in Georgia), looking for a buyer for 2-3 kg of enriched uranium. A Turkish-speaking Georgian undercover agent, posing as the representative of a Muslim man from a "serious organization," was able to convince the would-be seller to bring a sample of the material to Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia. Oleg Khintsagov, the main perpetrator, and three accomplices from Georgia were arrested with 100 grams of the material on February 1, 2006.[3]
For more information, see the CNS story of the week.
Sources:
[1] Lawrence Scott Sheets and William J. Broad, "Smuggler's Plot Highlights Fear Over Uranium," The New York Times, 25 January 2007.
[2] Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, "Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism," Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2002, pp. 40, 45.
[3] "Smuggler's Plot..."
11 December 2005: GEORGIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS DISCOVER MISSILE CACHE AND MANPADS
On 11 December 2005, Georgian border guards discovered a large arms cache in the forest close to the village of Barisakho (Dusheti district, Mtskheta-Mtianeti region) in the mountainous northeastern part of Georgia. Agents from Barisakho’s border guards regional unit were on a foot patrol when they found the buried cache containing 38 unguided NURS-type missiles and 13 handmade missile launchers. [Editor’s Note: The Russian military abbreviation NURS stands for ‘neupravlyaemiye reaktivniye snariyady’, which means “unguided self-propelled missiles.” The flight trajectory of these missiles cannot be changed once they are launched. No information on the missiles’ flight range was available through open sources at the time of publication.][1,2,3,4]
According to Badri Bitsadze, the head of Georgian State Border Guards Department, the seized weapons were transported to Tbilisi on December 12, 2005, for further examination and placement in permanent storage at an ammunition depot.[1,2] According to reports, not yet confirmed by Georgian authorities, it is suspected that the arsenal had been buried by Chechen rebels before they returned to Chechnya from Georgia.[1] Barisakho is located close to the Chechen section of the Georgian-Russian border and in recent years it has witnessed frequent cross-border incursions by groups of Chechen rebels. The Pankisi Gorge, which was once used by the Chechen rebels, is located east of the village of Barisakho .[1,2,3,4]
Editor’s Note: The security situation in the Pankisi Gorge has been a recurring strain on Georgian-Russian relations. In 2000-2001, several thousand Chechen refugees, along with between 400 and 800 Chechen rebels, crossed into Georgia from Russia and settled in the Pankisi Gorge. The Chechens chose this area because it is mainly populated by the Kistin ethnic minority who shares a common language root— Vainakh—with the Chechens and have always been supportive of their ethnic kin across the border. The Pankisi Gorge is a remote and isolated area and at the time the Georgian government exercised little control over this rugged terrain. From Russia’s point of view the isolated area represented a “safe haven” for Chechen rebels, who could regroup in the gorge by blending in with the local population and Chechen refugees. Moscow mounted a vigorous political campaign urging Tbilisi to reestablish law and order in the Pankisi Gorge and even threatening preventive strikes against alleged facilities of Chechen rebels there. The Georgian government responded by launching a series of comprehensive security operations in the gorge beginning in August 2002. Since then, Georgian law enforcement and special operations forces have succeeded in fully restoring law and order in the Pankisi Gorge, while the Chechen rebels have either returned to Chechnya or surrendered their weapons and gone abroad. Those returning to Chechnya often buried stockpiles of weapons and ammunition in and around the Pankisi Gorge. The find near Barisako may be one of these abandoned stockpiles.[1]
In another development, on February 2, 2006, an unidentified fisherman discovered an Igla-type man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) in a river in the Kareli district, a central part of Georgia that borders on the secessionist province of South Ossetia.[5,6] [Editor’s Note: The U.S. equivalent of the Russian-made Igla MANPADS is the Stinger missile.][5] The fisherman immediately notified the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, who dispatched officers to the scene. After examining and photographing the recovered surface-to-air shoulder-launched missile, the Georgian law enforcement officials destroyed it in a controlled explosion. The launcher was found fully operational directly beneath one of Georgia’s central air routes used by both civilian and military aircraft. Georgian Minister of Internal Affairs Vano Merabishvili stated that he believed that the terrorists, who he accuses of having links to South Ossetian separatists, decided to discard the launcher because of the poor visibility or inclement weather conditions.[5,6] [Editor’s Note: Typically, MANPADS equipped with infrared sensors have a range of approximately a 4-mile radius from where aircraft take off or land and up to about 20,000 feet in altitude. Thus commercial airliners using this route over Georgia that fly at altitudes of less than 20,000 feet could be vulnerable to the Igla system, although many such aircraft fly well above this level. Commercial aircraft are considered at greatest risk from MANPADS during take-off and landing.]
Georgian law enforcement officials launched a criminal investigation to determine the origin of the Igla missile launcher and what its intended target may have been. The investigators have already ruled out the possibility that the missile launcher was stolen from the Georgian armed forces, because, as the Georgian Defense Minister, Irakli Okruashvili explained, “We do not have this kind of weapon in our arsenal. It is a Russian-made weapon.”[5] Although the serial numbers and other manufacturing markings on the seized launcher had been crudely scratched off, the close-up photos taken prior to its destruction will allow experts to determine the origin of the weapon, Merabishvili said. In his comments to the media, Mr. Merabishvili directly appealed to the intelligence services in foreign countries to assist Georgia in investigating this incident.[5,6] In particular, on February 3, 2006, Mr. Merabishvili stated: “I address all our partners—Russia, the United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Turkey—to jointly find out how this system ended up in the Kareli region, close to a conflict zone.”[5]
In response to the incident and the claims by the Georgian officials, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an official statement on February 4, 2006, reminding Georgia that Moscow “repeatedly invited Georgia to cooperate on issues of illegal trafficking in MANPADS within the CIS space,” but these proposals never raised any interest in Tbilisi.[7] Moreover, the statement accused Georgia of taking no action to implement the CIS Council of Heads of State decision on measures to control the Igla- and Strela-type MANPADS, which was adopted on September 29, 2003.[5,7] The Russian statement also highlighted the fact that Tbilisi failed to respond to the multilateral CIS draft agreement on procedures for the exchange of information on sold and purchased MANPADS, and that Georgian representatives did not attend the “traditional consultations on export controls and nonproliferation held in Moscow in December 2005.” During that meeting, participants discussed controls over sensitive goods and technologies, including proposals to strengthen control over circulation and storage of MANPADS under the Wassenaar Arrangement.[7] In conclusion, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed hope that “after preventing a possible terrorist act involving an Igla [missile launcher], Tbilisi will take more seriously the invitations to join multilateral efforts in the CIS space for eliminating the threat posed by such weapons.”[7]
The separatist leaders of South Ossetia, in turn, issued statements denouncing the discovery of the Igla MANPADS in the Kareli district as a staged event aimed at raising public support for Georgian President Mikheil Saakhashvili.[5]
Editor’s Note: After a brief and bloody war in 1992, the region of South Ossetia declared independence from Georgia. Although unrecognized by the international community, the separatist authorities of South Ossetia enjoy de facto independence and the central government of Georgia does not control the territory of this secessionist province.[6]
Sources:
[1] “V lesu na granitse Gruzii i Rossii naydeny NURSy i ustanovki dlya ikh zapuskov” (NURS-type unguided missiles and missile launchers found in forest on the border between Georgia and Russia), NEWSru.com, December 12, 2005, <http://www.newsru.com>.
[2] “Georgian Troops Find Weapons Stash Near Chechen Border,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 12, 2005, <http://www.rferl.org>.
[3] “Anti-Aircraft Missiles Found in Mountainous Georgia,” Prime-News, December 12, 2005, <http://eng.primenewsonline.com>.
[4] “Pogranichniki obnaruzhili taynik snaryadov” (Border guards find missile cache), Civil Georgia, December 12, 2005, <http://www.civil.ge>.
[5] “In Mystery, Missile Launcher Found along Air Route,” The Messenger, February 6, 2006, <http://www.messenger.com.ge>.
[6] “Georgia Says it Foils Terrorist Plot to Down Plane,” Reuters, February 4, 2006.
[7] “Russian MFA Information and Press Department Commentary Regarding Reports of an Igla MANPAD
Found Near the Zone of Georgian-Ossetian Conflict,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Information and Press Department, Press Release 143-04-02-2006, February 4, 2006, <www.mid.ru>.
This item originally appeared in the International Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/index.htm>.
6 December 2005: GEORGIA AND UNITED STATES SIGN ANTI-SMUGGLING AGREEMENT
On 6 December 2005, Georgia and the United States signed a cooperation agreement to prevent smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials. Under the agreement, the United States will equip Georgian border checkpoints with special radiation detection equipment and train Georgian personnel in its use. The border checkpoints in Sadakhlo (on the border with Armenia), Kazbegi (on the border with Russia), and seaports in Poti and Batumi will be the first facilities to be equipped with the aforementioned equipment.
Source:
“Gruziya podpisala soglasheniye o sotrudnichestve s SShA s tselyu presecheniya kontrabandy yadernykh materialov” (Georgia Signed a Cooperation Agreement with the United States Aimed to Prevent the Smuggling of Nuclear Materials), Gruziya Online website, 6 December 2005, <http://www.apsny.ge/>.
This item originally appeared in the International Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/index.htm>.
30 August 2005: LITHUANIAN BORDER GUARDS TO ASSIST GEORGIAN COUNTERPARTS
On 30 August 2005, the Lithuanian government approved the country’s participation in the European Union’s (EU) mission in Georgia aimed at assisting the Georgian State Border Guard Department. According to this decision, two officers from the Lithuanian State Border Protection Service—Major Jan Baranovski and Captain Sergey Makarov—joined the EU mission, which will last from 1 September 2005 to 28 February 2006. The Lithuanian officers are responsible for analyzing the security situation on the Georgian borders, evaluating border management activities of the Georgian State Border Guard Department, observing patrol work by local border guards, and estimating the need for relevant training and equipment.[1]
Source:
[1] “Litovskiye pogranichniki primut uchastiye v missii ES v Gruzii” [Lithuanian Border Guards Will Participate in the EU Mission in Georgia], Baltic News Service, 30 August 2005; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
This item originally appeared in International Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/index.htm>. {Entered 10 May 2006 SR}
11 July 2005: OSCE CARRIES OUT TRAINING PROGRAM FOR BORDER GUARDS IN GEORGIA
On 11 July 2005, the first group of 77 Georgian border guards graduated from a month-long training course carried out by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to Georgia, as part of the OSCE’s Training Assistance Program (TAP).[1,2] The head of the OSCE Mission to Georgia, Ambassador Roy Reeve, who attended the graduation ceremony held at the training center in the mountainous Kazbegi district in northern Georgia, lauded the TAP program and expressed OSCE’s confidence that the “Georgian Border Guard service will be feeling the benefit of their new capacities.”[1,2] At the ceremony the graduates demonstrated their newly acquired skills in mountain rescue to Western diplomats, Georgian government officials, and dignitaries, as well as to the second group of TAP trainees.[2]
In accordance with the TAP objectives, an international team of OSCE experts in border monitoring will train a total of 850 Georgian border guards at the four mountainous training centers in Georgia—Kazbegi, Lagodekhi, Lilo, and Omalo.[1,2] [Editor’s Note: Except for Lilo, which is located close to the capital Tbilisi, the training sites are in northern Georgia bordering on the Russian Federation.] The training course curriculum includes the following theoretical and practical components:
• rescue operations in mountainous areas and security rules, including helicopter operations and pilot practical training;
• planning and management of border units;
• training in patrolling, reporting, observation, and recording techniques;
• maintenance rules of special equipment;
• legal aspects of border protection;
• map reading;
• communications;
• first aid.[1,2,3]
The training course will be held continuously throughout the year at the four training centers, and, as of the end of summer 2005, about 400 border guards were scheduled for training. In addition, the training program has a “train the trainers” component. During these seminars, OSCE instructors selected from among the trainees individuals who would later become trainers.[1,2]
In his comments to the online magazine Civil Georgia, the Deputy Commander of the Georgian Border Guard Department General Korneli Salia emphasized that this was the first-ever OSCE border assistance program carried out in Georgia. In particular, he noted, “This is something new for us. Georgian border guards have never undergone training like this, especially in rescue operations in mountainous areas.”[1] While expressing his gratitude to the OSCE for TAP training, General Salia also pointed out that such training should be complemented by technical assistance and, in particular, equipment upgrades, which the Georgian border guard service sorely needs.[1]
Editor’s Notes: OSCE approved the TAP program on 14 April 2005 (OSCE Permanent Council Decision No.668), and the program was officially launched by the OSCE Mission to Georgia in Tbilisi on 18 April 2005. With a budget of € 2.6 million (US$3,175,640), the TAP program employs 50 people, including 30 international experts in border monitoring, who carry out the training. The main contributors to the TAP program are Germany, Turkey, and the United States. [3,4]
The budget of the Georgian Border Guard Department for 2005 is estimated at 19 million Lari (approximately US$10.4 million).[1]
Sources:
[1] “First Group of Border Guards Graduate OSCE-led Training,” Civil Georgia [Georgian on-line magazine], 11 July 2005, <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=10333>.
[2] “First Group of Georgian Border Guards Graduate from OSCE Mission’s Intensive Training Program,” OSCE press release, 12 July 2005, <http://www.osce.org/georgia/ item_1_15637.html>.
[3] Giorgi Sepashvili, “OSCE Approves Georgian Borderguard Training,” Civil Georgia [Georgian on-line magazine], 14 April 2005, <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=9604>.
[4] OSCE Secretariat, Conflict Prevention Center, “Survey of OSCE Long-Term Missions and other OSCE Field Activities,” 26 August 2005, <http://www.osce.org/documents/sg/2004/05/3242_en.pdf>
This item originally appeared in International Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/index.htm>. {Entered 10 May 2006 SR}
April 2005: DOE ORGANIZES EXPORT CONTROL SEMINARS IN GEORGIA
A team of INECP and Georgian technical export control specialists conducted a Nuclear Commodity Identification Training workshop in Tbilisi, Georgia, on 20-22 April 2005, and a second workshop at the Red Bridge border guard and customs facility on the Georgian-Azerbaijani border on 25-27 April 2005. The workshops aimed to familiarize customs and border guard officers with items subject to export control regulations and included in the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s trigger and dual-use lists.
Source:
"DOE Organizes Export Control Seminars in Russia and Georgia," NIS Export Control Observer, May 2005, CNS website, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
11 October 2004: HEAD OF GEORGIAN DEPARTMENT OF CUSTOMS SUBMITS RESIGNATION, CONTINUES TO PERFORM DUTIES
On 11 October 2004, Georgiy Godabrelidze, head of the Georgian Department of Customs, submitted his resignation to the government.[1,2,3] It was not immediately known what the reason for resignation was or whether the resignation was accepted by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. In a televised interview with journalists, which was broadcast on the same day by the Rustavi-2 TV channel, Saakashvili confirmed the resignation and noted that he was not satisfied with Godabrelidze’s performance because of the latter’s inability to curb corruption in the Department of Customs.[1,2,4]
Speculation about Godabrelidze’s likely resignation began circulating in the Georgian media after Saakashvili harshly criticized him at an October 8, 2004 cabinet meeting.[1,4,5] The president warned the customs chief that if the state budget did not receive 15-20 million Georgian lari (approximately $8.2 million-$10.9 million as of October 2004) from the Department of Customs—presumably monies from excise duties—he would be sacked.[1,2,5] In addition to this, the president’s ire was drawn by the fact that Godabrelidze’s recent departure on a business trip abroad was preceded by a lavish farewell party organized by his deputies at the Tbilisi airport in the early morning hours.[1,2,3] Commenting on this incident, Saakashvili remarked, “The popularly elected government ought not to behave in such a manner. We are the government for the people and our officials should learn how to live in the interests of the people.”[2] At the conclusion of the cabinet meeting, the president vowed to continue to pursue a policy of frequent reshuffling and rotation of government officials, which is intended to ensure the efficient functioning of the new government.[1,2,3]
However, as of late October 2004, it appeared that Godabrelidze continued to serve as the head of the Department of Customs. A survey of open media sources yielded no information about his possible replacement. In fact, on 27 October 2004, Godabrelidze met with European Commission representative Adriana Longon to discuss the implementation of the second part of an assistance project aimed at reforming the Georgian customs system.[6,7]
Editor’s Note: The European Commission’s first assistance project for reforming the Georgian customs system began in the spring of 2002 and ended in October 2003. In the course of this project, with the assistance of experts from Austrian and Dutch customs services, the initial draft of the new Customs Code of Georgia was developed and recommendations for improving the management of the customs system were made. The first assistance project cost €850,000 ($1,095,055), which was paid through the EU’s TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) technical assistance program. The second assistance project entails development of implementing legislation and other regulatory documents that are necessary for improving secondary customs legislation of Georgia. The duration of this assistance project is 10 months and its total cost is €700,000 ($901,810), which will be provided by the European Commission.[6,7]
Sources:
[1] “Glava tamozhennogo departamenta Gruzii Georgiy Godabrelidze podal v otstavku” [Head of the customs department of Georgia Georgiy Godabrelidze resigned], RIA Novosti, 11 October 2004, <http://www.rian.ru/rian/intro.cfm?nws_id=704273>.
[2] Novosti-Gruziya news agency; in “Glava tamozhennogo departamenta Gruzii Georgiy Godabrelidze podal v otstavku” [Head of the customs department of Georgia Georgiy Godabrelidze resigned], Azerbaijani on-line information channel Day.AZ, 12 October 2004, <http://www.day.az/news/georgia/14169.html>.
[3] Melsida Akopyan, “Glava tamozhennogo departamenta Gruzii Georgiy Godabrelidze podal v otstavku” [Head of the customs department of Georgia Georgiy Godabrelidze resigned], Information Agency Novosti-Gruzia, 11 October 2004; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[4] “Saakashvili Criticizes Customs Chief Again,” United Nations Association of Georgia’s (UNA-Georgia) online magazine Civil.GE, 11 October 2004, <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=8036>.
[5] “Saakashvili Slams Customs Chief,” Civil.GE, 8 October 2004, <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=8020>.
[6] “Yevrokomissiya nachnet realizatsiu vtorogo proyekta reformirovaniya tamozhennoy sistemy Gruzii” [European Commission will begin implementing a second project aimed at reforming the customs system of Georgia], RIA Novosti, 27 October 2004, <http://www.rian.ru/rian/intro.cfm?nws_id=717992>.
[7] Lela Iremashvili, “Yevrokomissiya pristupit k realizatsii vtorogo proyekta po sodeystviyu reformirovaniya tamozhennoy sistemy Gruzii” [European Commission will begin implementing a second project aimed at providing assistance for reforming the customs system of Georgia], Novosti-Gruziya news agency, 27 October 2004; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
4 October 2004: GEORGIAN MILITARY OFFICERS ARRESTED FOR LOSS OF MANPADS MISSILES
On 4 October 2004, the NIS mass media reported the arrest by the Georgian Military Prosecutor’s Office of two senior Georgian military officers accused of losing several missiles from a Strela-2 man-portable air defense system (MANPADS). The arrests were made following an internal investigation conducted by the Main Military Inspectorate of the Georgian Ministry of Defense (MOD). Colonel Aleksandr Diasamidze, head of the Department of Strategic Research and Planning at the MOD General Staff, who previously served as a commander of military unit 16435 where the loss was discovered, and Major Archil Gegelashvili, former head of this unit’s financial service, were charged with neglect of duty and abuse of power. They face four-years’ imprisonment under Section 1, Article 332 of the Criminal Code of Georgia.[1,2,3,4] According to MOD spokesperson Natiya Chikovani, the loss took place when Diasamidze and Gegelashvili served at military unit 16435.[3] Both officers are now being held in pre-trial detention while the Military and General Prosecutors’ Offices investigate the case. The MOD press service refused to make further comments while the investigation is underway.[1,2,3,4]
According to reports in the Russian newspapers Krasnaya zvezda and Vremya novostey, military unit 16435 had 10 Strela-2 systems. Regular inventory checks conducted since 1999 confirmed their presence. But the latest check, conducted in May 2004, revealed that eight MANPADS had no missiles: one missile container had a fake missile, three were empty, and four others were filled with sand. The newspapers reported that Georgia inherited those MANDPADS from the Soviet Union.[4,5] Another Russian newspaper, Komsomolskaya pravda, claimed that Georgia inherited several hundred Soviet MANPADS, and that the theft of MANPADS is the most often encountered crime in the Georgian army. The newspaper also alleged that Georgian MANPADS are often found in the possession of Chechen militants, who have used them to shoot down several Russian aircraft and helicopters.[6] However, Georgian military expert Koba Liklikadze told RIA Novosti that the Georgian army has up to 15 MANPADS; in 2000-2001, Georgia bought several Strela MANPADS to counter possible air attacks on the Pankisi Gorge, while some MANPADS were seized in May 2004 from the personal depot of former Ajarian leader Aslan Abashidze. According to Liklikadze, the current incident is the first known case in which MANPADS have gone missing.[2] More than two years ago, on 27 July 2002, the police in Senaki, western Georgia, detained Major Georgiy Mamardashvili from the Vaziani military base who was transporting four Strela-2 MANPADS in the trunk of his car. Georgian officials then announced that the MANPADS were not from the Georgian military stocks and were purchased in Abkhazia, possibly from the Russian peacekeeping forces located there.[7,8]
Sources:
[1] Kavkasia-Press news agency, 4 October 2004; in “Senior Georgian Officers Arrested Over Disappearance of Anti-Aircraft Missiles,” FBIS Document CEP20041004000174.
[2] Marina Kvaratskheliya, “V Gruzii arestovan vysokopostavlennyy ofitser Minoborony” [High-ranking Ministry of Defense officer arrested in Georgia], RIA Novosti, 4 October 2004; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[3] Interfax; in “Gruzinskiy ofitser arestovan v svyazi s propazhey PZRK ‘Strela-2’” [Georgian officer arrested in connection to the loss of the ‘Strela-2’ MANPADS], Gazeta.Ru, 4 October 2004; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[4] Mikhail Vignanskiy, “Rakety prevratilis v pesok” [Missiles turned into sand], Vremya novostey, 5 October 2004, No. 181 (1099); in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[5] Roman Streshnev, “Pesok i kamni vmesto boyepripasov” [Sand and stones instead of munitions], Krasnaya zvezda, 12 October 2004, No. 191; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[6] Viktor Baranets, “Kto voroval ‘Strely’?” [Who was stealing ‘Strelas?’], Komsomolskaya pravda, 5 October 2004, No. 187; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[7] Anatoliy Gordienko, “Gruzinskiye spetssluzhby demonstriruyut svoyu deystvennost” [Georgian special services demonstrate their effectiveness], Nezavisimaya gazeta online edition, 29 July 2002, No. 153 (2707), <http://www.ng.ru/cis/2002-07-29/6_georgia.html>.
[8] “Zaderzhannyy po obvineniyu v torgovle oruzhiyem Georgiy Mamardashvili nazval familii lits, u kogo priobrel oruzhiye” [Georgiy Mamardashvili detained on arms trafficking charges named those he bought weapons from], Prime-News agency, 1 August 2002; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
September 2004: EXPORT CONTROL TRAINING SEMINARS HELD IN GEORGIA
A team of NNSA technical export control experts from the Argonne and Los Alamos national laboratories and Georgian technical export control specialists from the E. Andronikashvili Institute of Physics (IP) conducted two multi-day Nuclear Commodity Identification Training (CIT) courses in Grigoleti and Bakuriani, Georgia, on 15-17 and 19-22 September 2004. The workshops, sponsored by the NNSA’s International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP), were designed to familiarize customs and border guard officers with controlled items from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) control lists that are part of Georgia’s new export control law. Forty-one Georgian customs, border guard, and coast guard officers from five border posts attended. The courses included presentations on international nonproliferation regimes, nuclear commodities subject to export controls, practical exercises, and Georgian export control legislation. Georgian presenters were drawn from the IP, Department of Customs, State Border Guard Department, and the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources.
As with all partner countries, NNSA’s goal in Georgia is to eventually hand over responsibility for continued updating and presentation of the training modules to Georgian technical experts. A multiple choice test administered at the end of each of the workshops showed that the material presented by Georgian presenters was more readily absorbed than material presented by the U.S. team. The U.S. team members believe that this validates the need for the majority of the training to be done by Georgian export control technical experts.
Source:
Richard Talley, "Export Control Training Seminars in Latvia, Georgia, and Lithuania," NIS Export Control Observer, October 2004, CNS website, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
13 September 2004: UNITED STATES DONATES ADVANCED BORDER CONTROL SYSTEM TO GEORGIA
On 13 September 2004, U.S. Ambassador to Georgia Richard Miles and Georgian Minister of Internal Affairs Irakliy Okruashvili signed a Memorandum of Intent, which provides for the implementation of the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) in Georgia.[1,2,3] This fully automated computer network will be installed at border points of entry and exit, and will link border posts to each other and to the central headquarters of the State Border Guard Department in Tbilisi. PISCES will strengthen border control in Georgia by allowing Georgian border control officials to input, retrieve, and archive passport data on travelers crossing the country’s borders. The United States will provide the technology and the training necessary to support this system.[1,2,4]
According to Ambassador Miles, PISCES will enable Georgian border authorities to identify terrorists and known criminals and prevent them from entering Georgia, as well as aid in the detection of stolen cars attempting to enter Georgia. PISCES may also help reduce opportunities for corruption at the border.[2,3]
Editor’s Note: PISCES is a software application, tailored to each country’s specific needs, and provides border control officials at transit points with information that allows them to identify and detain or track individuals of interest. Officials can also use PISCES to quickly retrieve information on persons who may be trying to hastily depart a country after a terrorist incident. The Terrorist Interdiction Program run by the U.S. Department of State Office of Counterterrorism trains border control officials to use PISCES to collect, compare, and analyze data that can be utilized to arrest and investigate suspects.[5]
Sources:
[1] “Ambassador Miles Signs PISCES Agreement, Comments on Pankisi Gorge,” U.S. Embassy in Georgia website, <http://georgia.usembassy.gov/events/event20040913pisces.htm>.
[2] “PISCES Memorandum of Intent to Be Signed,” U.S. Embassy in Georgia press release, 13 September 2004, U.S. Embassy in Georgia website, <http://georgia.usembassy.gov/releases/release20040913pisces.htm>.
[3] Inga Gvilava, “SShA vnedryat na granitsakh Gruzii kompyuternuyu sistemu dlya identifikatsii i vyyavleniya kriminalov i terroristov” [United States will install a computer system at Georgian borders to identify and detect criminals and terrorists], Novosti – Gruziya news agency, 13 September 2004; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[4] “SShA peredadut Gruzii sistemu kontrolya granits” [United States will donates a border control system to Georgia], United Nations Association of Georgia’s (UNA-Georgia) online magazine Civil.GE, 14 September 2004, <http://www.civil.ge/rus/article.php?id=6032>.
[5] “Terrorist Interdiction Program,” U.S. Department of State Office of Counterterrorism fact sheet, 19 July 2002, U.S. Department of State website, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/12676.htm#pisces>.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
April 2004: END-USE/END-USER WORKSHOP HELD IN TBILISI, GEORGIA
A team of nuclear export control specialists from U.S. Department of Energy national laboratories led an end-use/end-user workshop in Tbilisi, Georgia on April 22-23, 2004. Twenty-four representatives from the Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Justice, Customs Department of the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, State Border Guard Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs attended the two-day workshop. In addition, three representatives from the Georgian Institute of Physics participated. The National Nuclear Security Administration’s International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP) organized the workshop, with funding from the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement assistance program.
During the workshop, U.S. experts gave presentations on multilateral nuclear export controls and U.S. end-use/end-user methodology for export license reviews, including an overview of proliferation methods, questions to ask during a license review, and available resources to use during a review. The majority of the workshop was devoted to case studies in which participants evaluated fictitious proposed exports and identified concerns related to the end-user or the stated end-use using the methodology provided during the training. Mr. Vilen Alavidze of the Ministry of Economy contributed to the opening remarks on behalf of the government of Georgia and made a presentation on the Georgian licensing system at the conclusion of the training course. Representatives from the Georgian Institute of Physics, who participated in earlier INECP workshops, provided input on technical issues and answered questions throughout the workshop. INECP is planning two nuclear Commodity Identification Training workshops in July and two more CIT workshops in September. These workshops will be geared to address the training needs of enforcement officers located on the Georgian border.
Source:
Richard Talley, "End-Use/End-User Workshop Held in Tbilisi, Georgia," NIS Export Control Observer, May 2004, CNS website, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
22 March 2004: GEORGIAN CUSTOMS CHIEF REPLACED ON CHARGES OF FINANCIAL ABUSE
On 22 March 2004, Georgian Minister of Finance Zurab Nogaideli issued an order replacing Levan Kistauri, chairman of the Georgian Department of Customs, with Kistauri’s deputy, Georgiy Godabrelidze. This order followed the initiation of a criminal case against Kistauri by the Georgian General Prosecutor’s Office for financial fraud involving the production and use of fictitious excise duty stamps. Before assuming the position of head of customs on 5 December 2003, Kistauri was head of the Excise Service of the Ministry of Finance. The General Prosecutor’s Office announced that the fraud resulted in losses amounting to 900,000 lari (about $450,000 as of March 2004). Kistauri was arrested and is now being held in pre-trial detention for three months along with three other former Ministry of Finance officials thought to be his accomplices: the chairman of the Tax Department, Iase Zautashvili; his deputy, Levan Kalandadze; and the deputy head of the Excise Service, Georgiy Berozashvili.[1,2,3,4]
Kistauri’s petition for release with a written promise not to leave Tbilisi before trial was declined.[5] Some reports speculated that Kistauri and other officials could be placed under house arrest if they return money derived from their illegal activities. After his election, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili launched a nationwide anticrime campaign that has led to the detention of many allegedly corrupt officials linked to former President Shevardnadze’s administration. Georgia’s new authorities announced that officials suspected of corruption and financial abuse might be released pending their trials provided “they return the money they had stolen.”[6,7,8] Some detainees, such as Akaki Chkhaidze, former chairman of the Department of Railways, Vakhtang Chakhnashvili, former deputy chairman of the Tax Department, and Iosif Natroshvili, former deputy director general of the Georgian Wholesale Electricity Market, have already benefited from this provision. They were released after they returned $3.7 million, $1.3 million, and $1.25 million, respectively.[6,7,9]
Commenting on the appointment of Georgiy Godabrelidze at a 22 March press conference, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvaniya said, “despite the fact that Georgiy Godabrelidze is a good friend, additional personnel changes will be undertaken in this agency [Customs Department] if no real improvement happens in the work of customs.”[4]
Sources:
[1] Marina Kvaratskheliya, “Ministr finansov Gruzii osvobodil ot zanimayemoy dolzhnosti glavu tamozhennogo departamenta Minfina Levana Kistauri” [Georgian minister of finance dismissed Levan Kistauri, head of the Customs Department of the Ministry of Finance], RIA Novosti, 22 March 2004; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[2] “V Gruzii prodolzhayetsya sledstviye po delu o finansovykh makhinatsiyakh v Minfine” [Investigation into financial fraud at the Ministry of Finance continues in Georgia], RIA Novosti, 24 March 2004; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[3] “V Gruzii zaderzhan byvshyy predsedatel nalogovogo departamenta Minfina, obvinyayemyy v finansovykh makhinatsiyakh” [Former chairman of the tax department of the Ministry of Finance accused of financial fraud detained in Georgia], RIA Novosti, 31 March 2004; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[4] Inga Gvilava, “Predsedatelem tamozhennogo departamenta Minfina Gruzii naznachen Georgiy Godabrelidze” [Georgiy Godabrelidze has been appointed head of the Customs Department of the Georgian Ministry of Finance], Novosti-Gruziya, 22 March 2004; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[5] Tinatin Zhvaniya, “Byvshemu predsedatelyu tamozhennogo departamenta Minfina Gruzii otkazali v osvobozhdenii iz predvaritelnogo zaklyucheniya pod podpisku o nevyyezde” [Former head of the Customs Department of the Georgian Ministry of Finance was refused release under a written undertaking not to leave his place of residence], Novosti-Gruziya, 31 March 2004; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[6] Vladimir Novikov, “Dollar protiv korruptsii” [Dollar against corruption], Kommersant, No. 53, 25 March 2004; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[7] “Provorovavshikhsya chinovnikov v Gruzii otpuskayut v obmen na ukradennoye” [Corrupt officials in Georgia are released in return for the money they stole], Rosbalt news agency, 31 March 2004; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[8] Jean-Christophe Peuch, “Georgia: Vote Set To Begin Amid Queries On President’s Tactics, Tensions In Adjaria,” RFE/RL, 26 March 2004, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/03/7124703d-19c8-467d-987f-e9f341b232e5.html>.
[9] “V Gruzii rastet kolichestvo byvshikh vysokopostavlennykh chinovnikov, vynuzhdennykh ‘pokupat’ sobstvennuyu svobodu” [The number of former high-ranking officials forced to ‘buy’ their own freedom is growing in Georgia], RIA Novosti, 1 April 2004; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>..
January 2004: NEW GEORGIAN CUSTOMS CHIEF SLASHES PERSONNEL, COSTS
In late January 2004, the newly appointed head of the Georgian Department of Customs implemented the first phase of a department-wide reorganization intended to reduce costs and the number of personnel.
At a 30 January 2004, press conference, Levan Kistauri, who assumed the position of head of customs on 5 December 2003, announced the termination of 16 regional customs managers, including the following:
• the head of the Western Regional Customs Office and two of his three deputies;
• all three deputy directors of the Eastern Regional Customs Office;
• the head of the Southern Regional Customs Office and one of his two deputies;
• three of four deputy directors of the Railway Regional Customs Office; and
• several personnel from the Department of Customs’ Criminal Service.
According to Kistauri, the personnel changes are due both to the structural reorganization occurring in the department and, in several cases, because of neglect of duty on the part of those terminated. In addition to the aforementioned terminations, Kistauri did not extend the contracts of 110 temporary customs personnel, who work in headquarters and as non-staff personnel at customs check points, for savings to the department of approximately 15,000 lari ($7,500 as of January 2004).
This first phase of cuts will be followed by extensive personnel changes in the coming months, according to Kistauri, including changes in management at all 26 customs check points in Georgia and further termination of personnel at headquarters.[1,2]
Sources:
[1] Kavkasia-Press, 5 December 2003; in “New Tax, Customs Department Heads Appointed,” FBIS Document CEP20031205000100.
[2] Lera Iremashvili, “Shestnadtsat rukovodyashchikh lits regionalnykh tamozhennykh upravleniy osvobozhdeny ot zanimeyemykh dolzhnostey” [Sixteen management personnel from regional customs departments terminated], Novosti-Gruziya, 30 January 2004; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
September 2003: GEORGIA TO ADOPT REGULATION ON IMPORT/EXPORT OF BIOLOGICAL MATERIAL
The Department of Biosafety and Threat Reduction of the National Center for Disease Control and Medical Statistics (NCDC) of Tbilisi, Georgia, has developed new guidelines to regulate work with dangerous pathogens and their import and export. The Guidelines for Import to Georgia, Export from the Country, Transfer, Containment, and Work with Causative Agents of Infectious Diseases, Cultures of Mycoplasma, and Genetically Modified Materials, Toxins, and Poisons of Biological Origin were issued under authority provided by the law On Health Care of 10 December 1997 and the law On Export Control of Armament, Military Technology, and Dual-use Products of 29 April 1998, and are based on the World Health Organization Guidelines for Safe Transport of Infectious Substances and Diagnostic Specimens (WHO/EMC/97.3).
The new guidelines consist of 10 chapters, covering the following issues: risk assessment; biosafety levels 1 and 2 laboratories; high containment laboratories – bio-safety level 3; maximum containment laboratories – biosafety level 4; good laboratory practice and technique; biosafety and recombinant DNA technologies; emergency planning and procedures; disinfection and sterilization; and safety procedures for the transport of infectious materials and diagnostic specimens.
Chapter 10 of the new guidelines – Safe Transportation of Infectious Materials and Diagnostic Specimens – defines the terms “infectious materials” and “diagnostic specimens” and provides instructions for proper packing, with a description of basic triple packaging requirements for transportation of infectious materials and diagnostic specimens by air, mail, and surface transportation. Chapter 10 also defines the respective responsibilities of the sender, carrier, and addressee.
The new guidelines also clarify the licensing mechanism for the import and export of dangerous pathogens. According to article 77 of the law On Health Care, “import to or export from the country of microorganisms causing infectious diseases, their containment and transfer, as well as work with these pathogens can be authorized only by the Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs of Georgia.” In order to receive a license, applicants must apply for a certificate at the National Center for Disease Control and Medical Statistics of Georgia (NCDC), which became Georgia’s National Registry of Pathogens by a 21 February 2003 presidential decree. After registering the pathogens, the NCDC issues a certificate that will allow the Department of Public Health of the Ministry of Labor, Health, and Social Affairs of Georgia to issue a license. Previously, applicants for pathogen export or import licenses were asked to provide such NCDC certificates, but these were not required by law. The new guidelines close this loophole by specifically listing the NCDC certificate as one of the documents required by law in the license application files.
In early September 2003, the Ministry of Health submitted the new regulation for review to all government agencies involved in the licensing process. These include the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Economics, Trade and Industry, State Security, Transport and Communications, and Justice. After approval by these agencies, the regulations will enter into force by order of the Minister of Labor, Health, and Social Affairs. It is expected that the approval process will take approximately two months.
Source:
Lela Bakanidze, "Georgia to Adopt Regulation on Import/Export of Biological Material," NIS Export Control Observer, September 2003, CNS website, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
2003: GEORGIA OPENS 10 NEW POSTS ON BORDER WITH RUSSIA
According to the Georgian State Border Guard Department, from March to July 2003, Georgia opened 10 new posts on its border with Russia. Most of the new posts are in regions of tension, such as border areas with Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Ossetia. During the same period, the border department also reinforced five existing posts on the Russian border. Representatives of the border service noted that these measures are aimed at preventing the illegal crossings of armed groups or individuals.[1]
Source:
“Za posledniye pyat mesyatsev Gruziya otkryla 10 novykh pogranzastav na granitse s Rossiyey” [Georgia opens 10 new border posts with Russia in past five months], ITAR-TASS, 29 July 2003; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
June-July 2003: OSCE PROVIDES EQUIPMENT TO GEORGIAN BORDER GUARDS
In June and July 2003, Georgian border guards received two donations of equipment through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) with funding from the European Union and the United States.[1,2,3] The first donation, made on June 28, 2003, consisted of radios, uniforms, mountaineering equipment, boots, ponchos, binoculars, and other items worth a total of 100,000 Euros ($114,350 as of 28 June 2003), purchased by the OSCE through a grant from the EU.[1,2] The second donation, consisting of $800,000 worth of 4-wheel drive patrol vehicles, medical evacuation stretchers, boots, stoves, torches, binoculars, and first aid kits purchased through U.S. government funding, was received a month later, on 29 July 2003 by Lieutenant General Valeriy Chkheidze, chairman of the Georgian State Border Guard Department.[3]
The OSCE Border Monitoring Operation was launched in Georgia in December 1999 to monitor the Chechen segment of the Georgian-Russian border. The OSCE’s mandate was subsequently expanded to cover the Ingushetian and Daghestani sections of the Georgian border in December 2001 and December 2002 respectively.[1,2,3] Personnel from the OSCE are unarmed, and rely on the Georgian border guards for protection and security.[2]
Sources:
[1] Interfax, June 28, 2003; in “OSCE Donates 100,000 Euros Worth of Tools to Georgian Border Guards,” FBIS Document CEP20030628000019.
[2] “OSCE helps Georgian Border Guards to better patrol the border,” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Mission to Georgia, June 27, 2003, <http://www.osce.org>.
[3] “US grant helps Georgian Border Guards and OSCE to enhance cooperation in border monitoring,” Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Georgia, 29 July 2003, <http://www.osce.org>.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
June 2003: PRESIDENT SHEVARDNADZE DENIES INVOLVEMENT OF GEORGIAN SPECIALISTS IN IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROJECT
At a news briefing held at the State Chancellery in Tbilisi on 2 June 2003, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze denied that Georgian nuclear physicists are involved in the Iranian nuclear weapons program.[1,2] In a previous declaration made on 13 January 2003, President Shevardnadze stated that a group of former employees of the Sukhumi Institute of Physics and Technology (SIPT) [3] were working in Iran, raising suspicions that they might be involved in the Iranian nuclear program.[2,4,5] However, information obtained by the Georgian government through various channels, including reports provided by “Western special services,” [2] clearly indicated that the Georgian nuclear physicists are involved in “innocent work” in Iran that has nothing to do with the development of Iranian nuclear capabilities.[5,6] With regards to the sale of SU-25 fighter planes assembled at the Tbilaviamsheni 31st Aircraft Assembly Plant to Iran, President Shevardnadze confirmed that Tbilaviamsheni sold SU-25s to Iran in the past and described those business deals as “ordinary commercial transactions.”[1,5] However, President Shevardnadze noted, “As far as I know, the factory has recently found a more profitable partner to whom it will sell SU-25 fighter aircraft, and contracts with Iran have been suspended.”[2]
Sources:
[1] For the background of this story, see “Georgian Nuclear Physicists and Aircraft Engineers Working in Iran,” NIS Export Control Observer, <http://cns.miis.edu/nis-excon>, February 2003, pp. 11-12.
[2] “Georgian president rules out expert involvement in Iran nuclear project,” Kavkasia-Press News Agency (Tbilisi), June 2, 2003; BBC Monitoring International Reports; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
[3] For more information on the Sukhumi Institute of Physics and Technology, see the NIS Nuclear and Missile Database, <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/georgia/vekua.htm>.
[4] Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, June 2, 2003, in “Shevardnadze Says Georgia Maintaining Normal Relations With Iran,” FBIS Document ID CEP20030602000179.
[5] “Shevardnadze denies Georgians help Iran work on nuclear arms,” Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), <http://www.irna.ir/en/>, June 2, 2003.
[6] “Eduard Shevardnadze – fiziki-yadershchiki iz Sukhumskogo instituta veli v Irane ‘bezobidnuyu rabotu’ ” [Eduard Shevardnadze – nuclear physicists from Sukhumi institute performed “harmless work” in Iran], Agency Prime-News (Tbilisi), June 2, 2003; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
21 March 2003: NEW BORDER GUARD FACILITY AT GEORGIAN-AZERBAIJANI BORDER OPENS WITH U.S. ASSISTANCE
On 21 March 2003, U.S. Ambassador to Georgia Richard Miles and Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze participated in a ceremony marking the opening of the new border checkpoint at Red Bridge on the Georgian-Azerbaijani border.[1,2]
According to a 20 March 2003 press release from the U.S. Embassy in Georgia, the newly built border guard station is a fully fenced-in compound designed to accommodate 65 people and comprised of administrative and command buildings, single and joint housing, a kitchen-dining facility, laundry, warehouses, an ammunition storage area, a vehicle maintenance area, dog kennels, and a recreation area for physical training of checkpoint personnel.[1] In addition, the new border guard station comes with two helipads for the deployment of Georgian Border Guard aircraft.[1]
At the ceremony, Chairman of the Georgian State Border Guard Department Lieutenant General Valeriy Chkheidze noted that the new border guard station fully meets international standards and has no analogies in the entire expanse of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).[3] Chkheidze also emphasized that the Red Bridge border checkpoint is equipped with monitoring systems that allow control of the entire perimeter of the Azerbaijani-Georgian border.[3] The new border guard station also constitutes a significant improvement in the working and living conditions of the Georgian Border Guards deployed at the border with Azerbaijan. Since 1997 the Georgian Border Guards had been living in tents in the Khrami River plain, which is regularly flooded and where the temperatures fluctuate from -15◦ C in winter to 45◦ C in summer.[1]
The construction of the Red Bridge border checkpoint, a $3.5 million project, [3,4] is part of the Georgian Border Security and Law Enforcement (GBSLE) assistance program funded by the U.S. government. The Georgian State Border Guard Department initially approached the GBSLE program for assistance in 1999. In 2001, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers began project site planning and construction oversight. The Red Bridge border checkpoint was built by the Zafer Construction Company (Turkey), which won an international tender and began construction in March 2002.[1]
On 25 March 2003, Chkheidze told the Georgian news agency Prime-News that during a visit to the United States planned for summer 2003, he intends to discuss with his American counterparts the modernization of the border posts along the Chechen sector of the Georgian-Russian border.[3] In particular, a new border guard command post is planned for the mountain village of Shatili. It is envisioned that the border guard duties on the Chechen sector of the Georgian-Russian border will be assumed by soldiers who have received special military training in the U.S. Department of Defense “Train and Equip” program.[3] Head of Command Headquarters of the Georgian State Border Guard Department Colonel Korneli Salia also indicated to Prime-News that total U.S. assistance to Georgian border guards in 2003 will amount to $14 million.[4]
Past examples of GBSLE assistance to the Georgian border guards include the $3.2 million renovation of an aircraft maintenance facility at the Alekseyevka airbase, which is essential for the upkeep of the Mi-8 and Mi-2 helicopters employed by the Georgian border guards.[5] The Alekseyevka airbase is located adjacent to Tbilisi’s commercial airport and supports the aircraft assets of the Georgian Border Guard forces, including a rapid reaction group positioned in Tbilisi. The renovation of the aircraft maintenance facility was completed in August 2002 by the Morrison Construction Company, Ltd. (UK), which began the project on April 6, 2001.[5]
The GBSLE program also provides assistance to the Georgian Customs Department. On March 20, 2003, Acting Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia Tom C. Adams (U.S. Department of State) met with Chairman of the Georgian Customs Department Aleksander Aslanikashvili. The U.S. and Georgian officials met to discuss progress in implementing the GBSLE assistance program and to resolve questions of continued financing.[6] According to the press service of the Georgian Customs Department, the U.S. government started to provide technical assistance to Georgian customs under the auspices of the GBSLE program in 2002. This includes the installation of the “Asycuda” computerized customs management system and the planned construction of new border checkpoints.[6] In particular, the U.S. government will provide assistance in building border checkpoints at Sadakhlo (on the Georgian-Azerbaijani border), Kazbegi (on the Georgian-Russian border), and Vale (on the Georgian-Turkish border). In addition, U.S. assistance will include the modernization of the border checkpoint at the Tbilisi airport.[6]
[The Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement (GBSLE) assistance program was launched in 1998 to support Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity by enabling the Georgian government to control the movement of people and goods across its land borders, coastline, and ports of entry, to reduce weapons smuggling and other illicit trafficking, and to increase the Georgian government’s ability to collect customs revenues.[5] The GBSLE program is funded by the U.S. government, administered by the U.S. State Department and coordinated by the U.S. Customs Service through GBSLE program country director James Kelly. Under the auspices of the GBSLE program, the U.S. government has provided Georgian border guards, Georgian customs officials and the Georgian Ministry of Defense with communications equipment, vehicles and helicopters, spares parts for transport and patrol, surveillance and detection equipment, computers for automation of application, licensing and regulatory systems, and forensics laboratory assistance.[5] Since its launch in 1998, the GBSLE program has provided $70 million in assistance to the Georgian border protection, law enforcement, defense and customs agencies.[6]]
Sources:
[1] “American and Georgian Authorities Inaugurate New Border Guard Facility at Red Bridge,” U.S. Embassy in Georgia, Official Press Release, 20 March 2003, <http://web.sanet.ge/usembassy/releases/mar20_03.htm>.
[2] “US-Funded Border Guard Checkpoint Opened at Border with Azerbaijan,” Civil Georgia, 21March 2003, <http://www.civil.ge>.
[3] “SShA profinansirovali sooruzheniye sovremennoy pogranzastavy v Gruzii, vydeliv 3,5 milliona dollarov” (The U.S. financed construction of modern border checkpoint in Georgia, providing $3.5 million), Prime-News News Agency (Georgia), 21 March 2003; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[4] “Na chechenskom uchastke granitsy s Rossiyey, pri finansovoy podderzhke SShA, sozdayetsya novaya komendatura” (A new border post is being created on the Chechen section of Georgia’s border with Russia with U.S. financial support), Prime-News News Agency (Georgia), March 25, 2003; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[5] Grant Sattler, “Europe District rebuilds Russian hanger,” Engineer Update, August 2002, Vol.26, No. 8; [Engineer Update is an unofficial publication published monthly for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers], <http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/cepa/pubs/aug02/story7.htm>.
[6] “Predsedatel tamozhennogo departamenta i predstavitel Gosdepartamenta SShA obsudili khod sovmestnoy programmy” (Customs department chairman and U.S. State Department representative of the discussed progress of joint program), Prime-News News Agency (Georgia), 20 March 2003; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
10-14 February 2003: TRANSIT AGREEMENT REVIEWED IN TBILISI
On 10-14 February 2003, government representatives from Central Asian and Caucasus countries met in Tbilisi, Georgia to review the draft Multilateral Agreement on Transit of Goods Subject to Export Controls and Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The meeting was organized with the support of the U.S. Departments of Commerce and State and was attended by representatives of Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan were not represented. During the meeting, the delegates finalized the text and title of the agreement, now officially named the “Agreement on Cooperation in Transit of Goods Subject to Export Controls and Information Exchange.” The delegates agreed to submit the modified agreement to their respective governments for review and signature.
Source:
Nikolay A. Ryaguzov, Chief Specialist Export Control and Licensing Department of the Directorate for Military Technical Cooperation,
Ministry of Defense, Kyrgyzstan, NIS Export Control Observer, March 2003, CNS website, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/nisexcon/index.htm>.
17 February 2003: RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS LOST AT A GEORGIAN MILITARY BASE
On 17 February 2003, Mamuka Tsaava, the military prosecutor of the Kvemo-Kartli region in central Georgia announced in a public statement that three containers with the radioactive material cesium-137 were missing from the Vaziani military base, which is located 30 kilometers east of Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia. According to RIA-Novosti, Georgian Minister of Defense David Tevzadze stated that the radioactive sources originally had been found on the military base when the Georgian military forces “were preparing for international exercises and were surveying the territory of the base.”[1,2] The Agence France Presse reported that these radioactive devices were discovered at the Vaziani base in 2000.[3] According to Mr. Tsaava, a total of four containers were stored at the Vaziani base, three of which are now missing. It is not clear when the containers disappeared or what the exact quantity of the missing radioactive material was.[1,2] However, according to a Rustavi-2 TV report, the three containers with cesium-137 had been missing from the Vaziani base since summer 2002, while the criminal investigation in connection with the suspected theft was initiated by the Military Prosecutor’s Office only on 3 February 2003.[5] In addition to this, according to information provided by Georgian Ministry of Environment official Giorgi Nabakhtiani, two of the lost containers weighed 90 kg and 45 kg respectively and held three cesium-137 sources with the level of radioactivity of 4, 0.3 and 0.1 curie. It must also be noted that the containers at the Vaziani base were stored in the concrete underground vault.[4]
The head of the Radiation Security Department of the Georgian Ministry of Environment, Soso Kakushadze, stated that his office was notified about the suspected theft of the cesium-137 containers on 17 February 2003. Mr. Kakushadze dispatched a group of experts to gather evidence at the site, but they were denied access to the Vaziani base. Mr. Kakushadze stated that the containers held calibrated radiation measuring devices powered by cesium.[1]
On 19 February 2003, Rustavi-2 TV quoted several classified documents, one of which indicated that in October 2002 the Ministry of Defense asked the Ministry of Environment to transfer the containers with cesium-137 from the Vaziani base and to assume the responsibility for their safe storage. The transfer apparently did not take place. According to another classified document cited by Rustavi-2, high-ranking Georgian military officials reported that radioactive sources had been found on the territory of an army detachment in Dedoplis-Tskaro (eastern Georgia), the Akhaltsikhe tank battalion (southern Georgia) and the Khashuri fuel storage facility (central Georgia).[2]
The disappearance of cesium-137 containers from the Vaziani base raises grave security concerns because cesium-137 is one of the substances that can be used in the creation of a radiological dispersal device (RDD). An RDD, according to the U.S. Department of Defense, is “any device, including any weapon or equipment, other than a nuclear explosive device, specifically designed to employ radioactive material by disseminating it to cause destruction, damage, or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material.” One type of RDD is popularly known as a “dirty bomb,” which would use conventional explosives to spread radioactivity. The amounts of radioactivity in the missing cesium-137 containers, as reported by Mr. Nabakhtiani, are at the threshold of security concern. Spreading these radioactive materials in an urban environment might cause significant land contamination resulting in high cleanup costs and economic disruption, but would likely not lead to any deaths in the near term due to exposure to ionizing radiation. Although no verifiable information exists on the origins of the missing radioactive materials, according to Rustavi-2 the containers were left behind by the Russian military after it handed over the Vaziani base to the Georgian armed forces on 1 July 2001 in accordance with Russia’s pledge to withdraw its forces from Georgia given at the November 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul.[6]
Sources:
[1] Misha Dzhindzhikhashvili, “Radioactive materials go missing from Georgian base,” Associated Press, 17 February 2003, Anchorage Daily News <http://www.adn.com/24hour/world/v-printer/story/768825p-5534609c.html>.
[2] “S voennoi bazi v Gruzii propali tri konteinera s ‘tseziem-137,’” Newsru.com (in Russian), 17 February 2003, <http://www.newsru.com/world/17feb2003/cesium_print.html>; “V Gruzii pokhishcheni radioaktivnie konteineri,” Vesti.ru, 17 February 2003; Integrum Techno, <http://afnet.integrum.ru>; Eka Mekhuzla, “S odnoy iz voyennykh baz Gruzii propali tri konteinera s radioaktivnimi veshchestvami,” ITAR-TASS, 17 February 2003; Integrum Techno, <http://afnet.integrum.ru>.
[3] “Nuclear containers lost off Georgia’s military base,” Agence France Presse, 18 February 2003; Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
[4] CNS communication with Mr. Giorgi Nabakhtiani, Head of Inventory and Control Division of Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service at the Ministry of Environment of the Republic of Georgia, 11-12 March 2003.
[5] Rustavi-2 TV, 19 February 2003; in “Program summary: Georgian Rustavi-2 TV ‘Kurieri’ News,” FBIS Document ID CEP20030219000497.
[6] Rustavi-2 TV, 17 February 2003; in “Program summary: Georgian Rustavi-2 TV ‘Kurieri’ News,” FBIS Document ID CEP20030217000323.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
January 2003: GEORGIAN NUCLEAR PHYSICISTS AND AIRCRAFT ENGINEERS WORKING IN IRAN
On 11 January 2003, the independent Georgian TV station Rustavi-2 reported that the U.S. Ambassador to Georgia, Richard Miles, informed Georgian authorities that aircraft engineers from the 31st Aircraft Assembly Plant Tbilaviamsheni were refurbishing Soviet-made SU-25 fighter jets in Iran. According to evidence gathered by the U.S. Department of State and U.S. intelligence services, in May 2002, 50 Georgian aircraft specialists traveled to Iran to prepare five SU-25 planes for combat flights.[1] After the report was aired on Rustavi-2, the Georgian Ministry of State Security launched an investigation into the allegations.[2]
In Soviet times, the 31st Aircraft Assembly Plant in Tbilisi produced SU-25 fighter planes and employed about 15,000 workers.[1,3] The dramatic deterioration of socio-economic conditions that followed the collapse of the USSR brought the factory to a virtual standstill and forced 10,000 employees to quit.[1] The last time the plant sold an SU-25 was in 1998.[4] Commenting on the Georgian aircraft engineers in Iran, Vazha Tordia, the chairman of the supervisory board of the factory, said, “It is no longer our [the factory administration’s] prerogative to find out where the 10,000 skilled specialists are and what they are doing at present. I cannot rule out the possibility of Georgians working there [in Iran].”[1]
On 13 January 2003, in his traditional weekly radio address to the nation, President Shevardnadze confirmed the fact that there were some Georgian aircraft engineers in Iran, and added that Iran was also hosting a group of nuclear physicists from Sukhumi Institute of Physics and Technology (SIPT). This research facility reportedly once housed weapons grade uranium that has been unaccounted for since the region of Abkhazia became de facto independent, following the successful bid for secession by Abkhazian separatists in 1993.[5] According to various reports, the amount of missing material varies between 655 grams and 2 kilograms, far short of the 25 kilograms that would be needed for a nuclear device, according to standards used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[6]
In his remarks, President Shevardnadze also stated, “We have informed the previous American [Clinton] administration that several former workers of the Tbilisi aircraft factory are working in Iran on the repair of SU-25s. The Americans also knew that former specialists from Sukhumi research institute worked in Iran.”[3] The president emphasized that the Georgian specialists were working in Iran on private contracts that had not been authorized by the government, and that the Georgian authorities’ capability to monitor private contacts of individual Georgian citizens was “limited.”[3] President Shevardnadze also added that Georgia will not sell SU-25s to Iran because, as a matter of state policy, Georgia refrains from selling military equipment to countries “suspected of possessing or seeking to acquire atomic bombs.”[7] In conclusion, Shevardnadze stressed that the issue of Georgian aircraft engineers in Iran should be resolved in such a way so as “not to spoil relations with Iran, but also to satisfy the legitimate concerns of the United States.”[3]
Shevardnadze’s public admission of the presence of Georgian nuclear scientists in Iran generated speculations in Georgian media regarding their possible contribution to the development of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. However, on January 15, 2003, Georgian Minister of State Security Valeriy Khaburdzania dismissed these speculations as exaggerated. He noted that the Georgian intelligence services were verifying reports about the presence of researchers from SIPT in Iran. Khaburdzania admitted that in conducting these investigations it was difficult to establish the purpose of Georgian citizens’ visits to Iran.[8]
On 15 January 2003, Iranian Minister of Defense, Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, publicly confirmed that Georgian aircraft engineers were in Iran “to maintain and repair SU-25 fighter jets,” but he categorically denied that Georgian nuclear experts were in Iran.[9] Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid-Reza Asefi echoed this statement during a weekly press conference on January 19, 2003. He rejected the reports on Iran-Georgia nuclear cooperation as “exaggerated and inaccurate.”[10]
It must be noted that in the late 1990s, the Iranian government showed considerable interest in the plant. In 1997, the then-manager of Tbilaviamsheni, Mr. Tordia, visited Iran three times.[1] Furthermore, it appears that in the late 1990s, Tehran approached Tbilisi with a $120 million proposal to jointly produce SU-25s, but as the deal was nearing completion it was blocked by President Shevardnadze at the request of the U.S. government.[1,11]
Sources:
[1] “Georgian aircraft factory accused of helping Iran to build fighter aircraft,” Transcript of Rustavi-2 TV broadcast, January 11, 2003, BBC Monitoring International Reports, 12 January 2003, available through Lexis Nexis database.
[2] “Georgia Probes Report on Alleged Repairing of Iranian SU-25,” Civil Georgia, 13 January 2003, <http://www.civil.ge>.
[3] “Georgia not selling warplanes to Iran, says Shevardnadze,” ITAR-TASS, 13 January 2003, BBC Monitoring International Reports, January 15, 2003, available through Lexis Nexis database; and “Georgia: Shevardnadze Says Experts Working In Iran,” RFE/RL, 13 January 2003, <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2003/01/13012003142857.asp>.
[4] “Aircraft Factory No 31 Awarded With International Certificate,” Civil Georgia, 3 December 2001, <http://www.civil.ge>.
[5] For more information on SIPT and on the theft of HEU see the NIS Country Profiles Database, <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/georgia/vekua.htm>.
[6] “Georgian scientists working in Iran,” The Associated Press, 14 January 2003, The International Herald Tribune, <http://www.iht.com>.
[7] “Shevardnadze says Georgian nuclear experts are in Iran,” Agence France Press, 14 January 2003, Lexis Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
[8] “Georgian official denies his country helping Iran to build nuclear bomb,” Prime-News news agency, 15 January 2003, FBIS Document ID CEP20030115000282.
[9] “Iran Denies Presence of Georgian Nuclear Experts,” Civil Georgia, 17 January 2003, <http://www.civil.ge>.
[10] “Iran rejects nuke cooperation with Georgia,” Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), 19 January 2003, <http://www.irna.com/en/head/030119124505.ehe.shtml>.
[11] “Officials Say Government Did Not Send Georgians To Work in Iran,” Mtavari Gazeti, 13 January 2003, FBIS Document ID CEP20030113000167.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
13 January 2003: GEORGIAN GOVERNMENT CONFIRMS GEORGIAN SCIENTISTS' PRESENCE IN IRAN
On 13 January 2003 Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze confirmed that a number of Georgian scientists, including nuclear physicists and aircraft engineers, are working in Iran. The president emphasized that these specialists were working in Iran on private contracts that had not been authorized by the Georgian government, and that the Georgian authorities' capability to monitor individual Georgian citizens is limited. Shevardnadze also noted that Iran was hosting a group of nuclear physicists from the Sukhumi Institute of Physics and Technology (SIPT), which reportedly once housed up to 2kg of weapons-grade uranium, but since the 1993 de facto independence of the Abkhazian region, the HEU has been unaccounted for.[1] Of particular concern to US nuclear nonproliferation experts is that equipment and know-how from SIPT might provide crucial assistance to any nation aspiring to a nuclear weapons program.[2] According to Georgian Minister of State Security Valeriy Khaburdzania, Georgian intelligence services are verifying reports about the presence of SIPT researchers in Iran. Khaburdzania admitted that in conducting these investigations, it was difficult to establish the purpose of Georgian citizens' visits to Iran.[3] However, Iranian Minister of Defense Ali Shamkhani categorically denied that Georgian nuclear experts were in Iran, although he confirmed the presence of Georgian aircraft engineers in the country.[4]
Sources:
[1] "Georgian scientists working in Iran," Associated Press; in International Herald Tribune online addition, 14 January 2003, <http://www.iht.com/
ihtsearch.php?id=83219&owner=
(The Associated Press)&date=20030115115919>.
[2] "Eduard Shevardnadze: Georgian nuclear scientists working in Iran," Caspian Information Agency, 17 February 2003.
[3] Prime-news, 15 January 2003; in "Georgian official denies his country helping Iran to build nuclear bomb," FBIS Document CEP20030115000282.
[4] "Iran Denies Presence of Georgian Nuclear Experts," Civil Georgia, <http://www.civil.ge/cgi-bin/newspro/fullnews.cgi?newsid1042751070,60367>, 17 January 2003.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>. {Entered 25 March 2003 AD}
8 January 2003: GEORGIAN GOVERNMENT APPROVES AMENDMENTS TO EXPORT CONTROL LAW
On 8 January 2003 the government of Georgia approved a bill proposing changes and amendments to the Law On Export Control over Armaments, Military Equipment and Dual-Use Goods.[1] According to the document, the Georgian Ministry of Justice will be the licensing authority for export, import, re-export, and transit of weapons, as well as for services and activities related to the production of weapons.[1] The export and import of strategic dual-use goods will be licensed by the Georgian Ministry of Economy, Industry, and Trade.[2] The bill stipulates that transit licenses for dual-use goods are required only for goods included on a “special list.”[1] The transit of all other dual-use goods through Georgia will be monitored by the Georgian Customs Service in compliance with general customs rules.[2]
The proposed new amendments would also introduce changes in the list of documents required for license applications. In addition to the documents mandated by the Law On Licensing of Entrepreneurial Activity and Grounds for Issuance of Licenses, license applicants for the export and import of weapons must present an export and/or import contract and a production certificate.[1,2,3] License application files for the export of dual-use goods that appear on the “special list” must also provide an end-user certificate, which must include explicit assurances from authorized government bodies in the recipient country that the delivered dual-use goods will be used for peaceful purposes only and that the goods will not be sold to a third country without the prior approval of the exporting country.[2,3]
The bill urges importers and exporters of weapons, military equipment, and dual-use goods to inform relevant government agencies about their business activities in a timely fashion and in full compliance with the rules and regulations stipulated by the Administrative Code of the Republic of Georgia.[2,3] After approval by the Georgian government, the bill was sent to the Georgian parliament for further legislative discussions.[1]
Sources:
[1] Eka Mekhuzla, “Pravitelstvo Gruzii odobrilo zakonoproyekt o novom poryadke eksportnogo kontolya za vooruzheniyami i voyennoy produktsiey,” ITAR-TASS, 9 January 2003, Integrum Techno, <http://afnet.integrum.ru>.
[2] “Georgian Justice Ministry to issue permits to export, import arms,” Black Sea Press, 9 January 2003, FBIS Document ID CEP20030109000191.
[3] “Razresheniye na eksport i import oruzhiya budet vydavat ministerstvo yustitsii,” Economic Newsline, Black Sea Press, 9 January 2003, Abkhazeti.ru website, <http://abkhazeti.ru/news_detail.php?id=3967>.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
November 2002: SEARCH FOR ORPHAN SOURCES IN GEORGIA AND MOLDOVA YIELDS CESIUM-137
The NIS media have echoed an article published in the Washington Post on 11 November 2002, reporting that the 10-month search for orphan radioactive sources in Georgia and Moldova conducted as part of the IAEA Technical Assistance Program yielded radioactive devices that were once used in a secret Soviet agricultural research project, code named “Gamma Kolos” (Gamma Ears). The research project was designed to measure the effects of radiation on plants and animals. Some of the tests simulated farming conditions after a nuclear strike.[1] For this purpose, the lead-shielded canisters containing cesium-137, with a 4,500 curie strength each, were mounted on tractors to irradiate seeds or were buried in fields to assess the effects of radiation on germination and crop yields.[1,2] Animals were typically exposed to cesium-137 in a special chamber, then transferred to a vivarium and monitored.[3] In Georgia, these sources were used by the Institute of Radiology of the Ministry of Agriculture.[4] In Moldova, cesium-137 was used on experimental fields of the University of Agriculture.[2] It is unclear when this research project ended and how these sources became orphaned. So far, five canisters have been found in Georgia, some of which were found at the former Soviet military base in Vaziani, close to Tbilisi.[5] Five canisters were also found at undisclosed locations in Moldova. The Gamma Kolos canisters contain cesium-137 in the form of cesium chloride, prepared as pellets or fine powder.[1,2,6] These devices are small and portable and could be used by terrorist groups to produce “dirty bombs.” The canisters found in these two republics are now being secured with assistance and funding from the U.S. Department of Energy.
Sources:
[1] Joby Warrick, “Hunting a Deadly Soviet Legacy,” Washington Post, 11 November 2002, p. A1.
[2] “Opposition Paper Confirms Radioactive Material in Moldova,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 21 November 2002 in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
[3] CNS interview with U.S. Department of Energy official.
[4] CNS communication with Mr. Giorgi Nabakhtiani, Head of Inventory and Control Division of Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service at the Ministry of Environment of the Republic of Georgia, 13 December 2002.
[5] Bryan Bender, “Radiological Weapons: Georgia Wraps Up Search for Radiological Sources,” Global Security Newswire, 23 October 2002, Nuclear Threat Initiative Website, <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/newswires/2002_10_23.html>.
[6] According to the director of IAEA’s Division of Radiation and Waste Safety, Mr. Abel J. Gonzalez, Cesium chloride (CsCl) is a salt whose physical form is a highly dispersible powder similar to talc in its spreading properties. Abel J. Gonzalez, “Security of Radioactive Sources. The Evolving New International Dimensions,” IAEA Bulletin, No. 43, April 2001, p. 41.
July 2002: U.S. CONTINUES ASSISTANCE TO GEORGIAN CUSTOMS
According to Aleksander Aslanikashvili, chairman of the Georgian Customs Department, the U.S. Customs Service has agreed to appropriate $1.6 million for the overhaul of a customs checkpoint on the Georgian-Azerbaijani border and procurement of customs control equipment for Tbilisi International Airport. According to Aslanikashvili, the United States also helped to introduce electronic customs declarations software that will soon be in operation at all checkpoints.[1]
Technical and training assistance has been underway for several years within the framework of the "Georgia Border Security and Related Law Enforcement Assistance Program." This project is a congressionally mandated multi-agency partnership, with the U.S. Customs Service acting as the executive agent, and involving assistance and expertise from the Department of State, Coast Guard, Border Patrol, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Federal Bureau of Investigations, and Department of Commerce. The program includes the following elements:
- Assisting Georgia in gaining control of its seacoast, particularly the Poti Port;
- Establishing a transparent land border regime, focusing on the Azerbaijani, Armenian, and Turkish borders;
- Enhancing the Georgian Border Guard and Customs export control capabilities to prevent, deter, and detect potential weapons of mass destruction smuggling, focusing on the border with Russia.
The activities implemented under this program include the provision of material (uniforms, helicopters, vehicles, radiation pagers, etc.), construction of facilities (barracks at checkpoints, a radar tower at Supsa), and training in the areas of narcotics and firearms interdiction, port security, and export control.[2,3]
During his visit to Tbilisi in November 2002 to supervise the implementation of the above program, US Customs Service Deputy Commissioner Douglas Browning noted that the program has brought tangible results: customs procedures have been streamlined and Georgia's tariff policy has been improved, which is especially important for Georgia as a transit country. Browning mentioned that the US Administration and Congress are prepared to increase aid to Georgia to help reform the country's customs system and develop its infrastructure.[1]
Sources:
[1] "SSHA pomogayut Gruzii v reformirovanii tamozhennoy sistemy," Interfax, 7 November 2002.
[2] "US Customs Assists Georgia Counterparts," US Customs Service Press Release, 8 July 1999; US Customs Service webwite, <http://www.customs.gov/hot-new/pressrel/1999/0708-02.htm>.
[3]"The Republic of Georgia," U.S. Customs Service website,
<http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/
international_programs/assistance_programs/republic_of_georgia.xml/
commercial_enforcement/international_programs/assistance_programs/
republic_of_georgia.xml>. {Entered 4 March 2003 AD}
September 2000: SALE OF URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM IN TBILISI PREVENTED
Four men were arrested in Georgia while trying to sell 3.2g of uranium and approximately 50g of plutonium. According to Georgian Security Ministry officials, the men tried to sell the uranium for $100,000 and the plutonium for $750,000. For more information, see the 16 September 2000 entry in the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database.
Source:
Tengiz Pachkoria, "Attempt to sell radioactive materials thwarted in Georgia," ITAR-TASS News Agency, September 16, 2000; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>. {Entered 6 March 2001 KB}
April 2000: GEORGIAN POLICE DETAIN FOUR URANIUM SMUGGLERS
In April 2000, Georgian police arrested four Georgian nationals from whom they confiscated about 1kg of uranium. A 29 April 2000 report in the Moscow daily Segodnya cited physicists from the Georgian Institute of Physics as saying that the material seized was 920g of 30% enriched uranium of a type used at nuclear power plants. For more information, please see the 19 April 2000 entry in the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database.
Source:
Mikhail Vignanskiy, "Iran otritsayet svoyu prichastnost k zaderzhannomu v Adzharii uranu ," Segodnya, 29 April 2000, <http://www.eastview.com/>. {Entered 6 March 2001 KB}
December 1999: GEORGIAN DUAL-USE LIST NEARLY FINISHED
Georgian Deputy Minister of Trade and Foreign Economic Relations Vilen Alavidze announced that the country had drawn up an official list of dual-use goods and was bringing it in line with international standards. He added that during the next 15 months, his ministry, in coordination with the Georgian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice, will complete the development of the country's export control system. He added that Georgia does not produce nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, nor does it deploy such weapons on its territory. However, the country's industrial and medical sectors use components that could also be used in WMD systems. Thus, according to Alavidze, it is important that the movement and sale of these components be placed under strict control to prevent them from falling into the hands of those who might use them for terrorism.
Source:
NTV, 8 December 1999; in "Sistema eksportnogo kontrolya za obychnym vooruzheniyem, a takzhe za produktsiyey i tekhnologiyami dvoynogo naznacheniya formiruyetsya v Gruzii," Unian News Service, No. 049 (084), 6-12 December 1999. {Entered 6 March 2001 KB}
21 September 1999: GEORGIAN CUSTOMS FOIL ATTEMPT TO EXPORT URANIUM
Four men attempting to sell 1kg of uranium were arrested in Batumi on 21 September 1999. The Georgian special services reported that the material came from a northern country and was in transit through Georgia to a southern country. The material was sent to the Institute of Physics near Tbilisi for analysis and storage. Please see the 21 September 1999 entry in the NIS Trafficking Database for more details.
Source:
Mikhail Vignanskiy, "Georgians Detain Uranium Traders," Segodnya, 23 September 1999, p. 7; in "Georgia: Seized Uranium May Have Been Iran-Bound," FBIS Document FTS19990923000335. {Entered 6 March 2001 KB}
21 June 1999: RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS FOUND IN TBILISI
A lead container holding an unidentified radioactive substance was discovered buried near the Botanical Garden in Tbilisi, Kavkasia-Press reported on 21 June 1999. The source was discovered by employees of the department of emergency situations and civil defense of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs. For more information, see the 21 June 1999 entry in the NIS Trafficking Database.
Source:
Kavkasia-Press, 21 June 1999; in "Source of Radiation Found in Georgian Capital Tbilisi," FBIS Document FTS19990621001684 {Entered 9 May 2001 KB}
May 1999: U.S. STRENGTHENS GEORGIAN CUSTOMS AND BORDER CONTROLS
According to Lieutenant General Valeriy Chkheidze, the head of the Georgian Department of Border Forces, the United States allocated more than $12 million in FY 1999 to help upgrade Georgia's border control facilities. The program focuses on improving monitoring and control of Georgia's Black Sea border, particularly near Supsa. US assistance has also been targeted on the Poti Border Division, increasing its operations facilities, buying new patrol vehicles, and establishing a border forces and customs personnel training center. The United States has also opened a tender for private companies to install and operate an electronic border and customs control system. Funding continues to be a problem on the Georgian side, however, causing difficulties in resolving technical problems and staffing new border facilities.[1] In another sign of difficulties, the United States expelled four Georgian customs officers who were attending a training course in the United States in March 1999. Revaz Adamia, chairman of the Georgian parliament's Committee for Defense and Security, demanded that the officers be terminated if the United States confirms that they were expelled for undisciplined behavior. The officers, however, claim they merely missed training sessions because they were ill.[2]
Sources:
[1] Vladimir Mokhov, "Stateside Millions: Having Renounced the Services of Russia's Bprder Guards, Georgia Intends To Guard its Borders With the Help of the West," Krasnaya zvezda, 13 May 1999, p. 3; in "Georgia Looks to US for Border Protection," FBIS Document FTS19990515000695.
[2] Prime-News, 3 April 1999; in "Georgian Customs Officers Expelled From US," FBIS Document FTS19990404000153. {Entered 3 September 1999 TR}
May 1999: UNITED KINGDOM COMPANY HELPS MANAGE GEORGIAN CUSTOMS SERVICE
According to Georgian Minister of Finance Davit Onoprishvili, the Georgian government has awarded the British firm ITS Group a contract to manage the Georgian Customs Service, effective 1 June 1999.[1] ITS Group prevailed over six other companies that participated in the international competition, including Societe Generale Surveillance (SGS) of Switzerland. As part of the three-year contract, scheduled for signature in the beginning of May 1999, ITS Group is responsible for controlling purchase transaction conditions for products imported into Georgia, confirming the accurate completion of customs declarations, and forecasting import volumes. ITS Group, which specializes in import control, plans to enlist the help of the UK customs service to fulfill the contract and must increase customs collections by 50 percent the first year and 20 percent over each of the next two years. According to Izvestiya, the contract could result in the resolution of operational problems by training Georgian customs officials how to operate at international standards, decrease the amount of corruption, and increase revenue. The Georgian government can unilaterally cancel the contract at any time.[1] ITS Group plans to bring 25 experts into Georgia to fulfill the contract.[2] Shortly after the Georgian government announced the winner of the tender, Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Ajaria Aslan Abashidze declared that he will not allow IGS Group access to the customs checkpoint in Sarpi on the border with Turkey.[2] According to Abashidze's press secretary, Giorgi Targamadze, Ajarian authorities disagree with the transfer of "state facilities and bodies of strategic importance" to foreigners.[3] Head of the Ajarian Representative Office in Tbilisi Vakhtang Razmadze added that since the Sarpi customs checkpoint "meets its objectives" on a regular basis, there is no need to interfere with its activities.[2]
Sources:
[1] Semen Novoprudskiy, "British 'Trick Riding': Georgian Customs To Be Turned Over to British Management Effective 1 June," Izvestiya, 27 April 1999, p. 5; in "British Firm to Manage Customs Work," FBIS Document FTS1999042900283.
[2] Khatuna Bitsadze, "The Customs look like an inflated balloon ready to burst," Rezonansi, 23 April 1999, p. 9; in FBIS Document FTS19990501000483.
[3] Prime-News, 17 April 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990418000231.{entered 28 January 2000 SDP}
April 1999: GEORGIAN CUSTOMS SERVICE VOTED THIRD MOST CORRUPTIBLE AGENCY
According to an opinion poll, the Georgian Customs Service ranks third among those agencies voted most corruptible, following the Georgian Tax Inspectorate and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The World Bank Institute for Economic Development and the World Bank's European and Central Asian regional sector conducted the survey of 110 civil servants, 13.1 percent of whom singled out the Customs Service.
Source:
Kavkasia-Press, 10 April 1999; in BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union-Political, 11 April 1999; in "Opinion Poll Reveals Most Unscrupulous Civil Services in Georgia," Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>. {Entered 3 September 1999 TR}
March 1999: GEORGIANS OPEN INTERNATIONAL TENDER FOR MANAGEMENT OF CUSTOMS SERVICE
In order to improve the resources and equipment of the Georgian Customs Service, train customs specialists, and establish an effective system for preventing smuggling, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze issued a decree calling for an international competition to choose a company to assume management of the service. After several changes in the management of the Customs Service, Georgian Minister of Finance Davit Onoprishvili, as chairman of the commission responsible for running the competition, invited 11 companies to participate in spring 1999. Four to five companies accepted the offer, including Societe Generale de Surveillance (SGS), a Swiss company that has extensive experience inspecting imported items and providing customs services for international organizations and individual governments. SGS already has an office in Tbilisi, works with Uzbekistan, and hopes to secure a contract in Armenia as well. Revenue growth is a primary provision of the competition, and the winner will have from 1999 to 2001 to increase revenue and achieve European customs standards. According to the deputy vice president of SGS, V. Zemlika, the customs system in Georgia is more developed and has better equipment than many other post-Soviet states. At the same time, the extent of smuggling constitutes a major shortcoming. Zemlika and Head of the Georgian Customs Service Tamaz Maghlakelidze appear to have similar approaches to reforming the Georgian customs system.
Source:
Sakartvelos Respublika, 3 March 1999, p. 2; in Experts to Improve Georgian Customs, FBIS Document FTS19990408001621. {entered 28 January 2000 SDP}
July 1997: GEORGIAN PHYSICISTS WORKING IN IRAN
A March 1996 article in the journal Science reported that university representatives from Iran and Libya were successfully recruiting Georgian scientists and physicists. Physicists were reportedly offered $1,000 a month for one or two year contracts. Georgian scientists usually earn between $10 and $150 a month.[1] According to Temuri Yakobashvili, America's desk officer at the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at least 30 Georgian scientists were working in the Iranian nuclear industry as of July 1997. This was confirmed by Giorgi Kharadze, director of the Andronikashvili Institute of Physics.[2]
Sources:
[1] "Libya and Iran Seek Ex-Soviet Scientists," Science, Vol. 271, 15 March 1996.
[2] Bill Samii, "Iran's Kharrazi Visits Georgia," RFE/RL Iran Report, Vol. 2, No. 24, 14 June 1999.{Entered 9 May 2001 KB}
Parts of this report were originally prepared by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies in January 1998 under a grant from the United States Dep |
