Introduction

India views its nuclear weapons and long-range power projection programs as the key to maintaining strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific region, deterring Pakistan, safeguarding against potential nuclear threats from China, and attaining great-power status. Among all the developing states with aspirations for weapons of mass destruction and long-range power projection capabilities, India alone has achieved a unique degree of success. Outside the group of the five legally accepted nuclear weapon states and Israel, India perhaps harbors the most sophisticated ballistic and cruise missile programs in the world. India's strategic missile programs have matured to the extent that New Delhi can now deploy short- and medium-range nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles in an operational mode against Pakistan and China. Four decades of investments in a missile-related design, development, and manufacturing infrastructure have also made this sector less vulnerable to long-term disruption by technology denial regimes. More significantly, India's sophisticated civilian satellite launch capability makes it one of the few developing states theoretically capable of building an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) within this decade.[1]

India continues its wide-ranging pursuit of ballistic and cruise missile capabilities. It also carried out two successful tests of its 3,000-3,500 km range Agni-III ballistic missile in April 2007 and May 2008, and a successful test of the K-15 (Sagarika) submarine-launched ballistic missile in February 2008. Apart from its ballistic missile arsenal, India has inducted the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, the product of an Indian-Russian joint venture, into its armed forces.

Indian defense planners are also looking toward introducing basic changes in the missile development process. In January 2008, the Indian government announced that the IGMDP would end by the close of the year.[2][3] The focus will now be on serial production of the missiles that are part of the program and for some specific missile systems, foreign collaboration will be considered.[3]

Historical Overview

India's missile programs can be roughly divided into five phases. During the first phase (1958-1970), India's missile ambitions were confined to building a first-generation anti-tank missile (ATGM) and developing a three-ton thrust, liquid-fueled rocket engine most likely based on the Soviet SA-2 sustainer motor. Both projects were undertaken by the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) with the objective of gaining scientific expertise and creating a technological infrastructure to build modern missiles indigenously in the long term; there were no plans for the immediate serial production of missile systems. However, the DRDO's technical and organizational shortcomings, opposition from the armed services, and weak support from politicians and civilian bureaucrats in the federal government resulted in the failure and ultimate termination of both projects.[4]

Phase II of India's missile program spans the decade of the 1970s. During this period, the DRDO undertook two significant projects. The first, Project Devil, was an attempt to "reverse-engineer" the Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM). The second, Project Valiant, was an ambitious attempt to develop a 1,500km-range ballistic missile. Both projects emanated from an alliance of interests between scientists in the DRDO, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and some of her influential bureaucratic advisors. Design competence and political symbolism were the primary objectives of both projects. For these reasons and because of the peculiarities of India's civil-military relations, the armed services were kept at the margins of the decision-making process. However, India lacked the scientific, engineering, and industrial base to build a long-range ballistic missile. Due to faltering progress, the Indian government terminated the Valiant program in 1974. On the other hand, Project Devil proved to be a partial success. Although Indian engineers were unable to reverse-engineer the SA-2 missile system entirely, they apparently succeeded in developing two solid-fuel boosters and a three-ton, liquid-sustainer engine for the Devil missile.[5]

The Indian government revived the flailing missile program in 1980 and in 1983 launched the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP) to develop a family of strategic and tactical guided missiles. The IGMDP involved the development of two strategic ballistic missile systems: two variants of a short-range ballistic missile (Prithvi), and a medium-range technology demonstrator (Agni). Under the program, the DRDO also sought to develop medium- and short-range SAMs (Akash and Trishul), and a third-generation ATGM (Nag). The years 1980-1994, the third phase in India's missile program, marked a crucial turning point. During this period, India's forays into missile building were transformed from exercises in technology-gathering, reverse-engineering, and design competence into a full-fledged program to build a series of operational missile systems. By 1996-1997, the successful development of the Prithvi-1 (150km-range) provided India with the technical option to deploy a limited nuclear strike capability against Pakistan. Similarly, two successful flight-tests of the 1,400km-range Agni missile validated India's "re-entry vehicle" technology. The Agni program thus served as a building block for the design and development of longer-range ballistic missile systems--systems that would provide India with a nuclear strike capability against China in the future.[6]

The fourth phase of India's strategic missile program stretches from the mid-1990s until 2000. This phase was characterized by the partial success of IGMDP, and limited serial production of the Prithvi and Agni ballistic missiles. As a result of the armed services commitment to actually purchase indigenous missile systems, the DRDO has been able to shift its focus from technology demonstration to modifying missile systems to meet the field requirements of the user in terms of deployment and operability. Capitalizing on its successes with the Prithvi and Agni, the DRDO embarked on programs to develop shorter- and longer-range versions of the Agni (Agni-1 and Agni-III), a supersonic cruise missile (BrahMos) with Russian collaboration, and a naval variant of the Prithvi (Dhanush). The DRDO is also believed to be developing a sea-launched ballistic missile, the Sagarika, which is expected to become operational by 2010. In addition, India has sought U.S., Russian and Israeli collaboration in the development of an anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) system.[7]

During the fifth phase, which roughly stretches from 2001 until the present, DRDO has sought to improve the performance of the ballistic missiles developed during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Key initiatives in this phase include the incorporation of features to improve the "hit to kill" capabilities of the missiles and the use of newer and lighter materials in the construction of the missile systems.[8] Among other priorities are projects to manufacture BrahMos variants for the different services, the hypersonic variant of the BrahMos, the development of 'smart' missiles that are smaller, lighter, agile, and can home in on targets with great accuracy; the development of hypersonic vehicles, nanotechnologies, homing guidance, very large systems integration, miniaturized electro-mechanical systems, system on chip, and newer materials such as ceramics and lightweight composites.[9] The DRDO has also made some progress on its building its anti-ballistic missile capability. Two successful tests of components of this system took place in November 2006 and December 2007.

Current Development/Operational Status of Strategic Missile Programs

Prithvi

Developmental work on the single-stage, liquid-engine Prithvi ballistic missile started in the early 1980s.[10] Flight-tests of the 150km-range/1,000kg-payload, army-version of the missile (Prithvi-1/SS-150) began in 1987[11] and lasted until late 1993. In recent years, the missile was tested in May 2007. Subsequent to user trials with the Indian Army in 1994, the missile entered serial production at Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL), Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh).[12] The Indian Army has already raised two missile groups--333rd and 334th Missile Groups--both based in Secunderabad (Andhra Pradesh), to handle all logistical and operational details related to the Prithvi. During peacetime, the missiles and their support equipment are reportedly stored in Secunderabad, Jalandhar (Punjab), and Jammu (Jammu &Kashmir).[13] Current numerical estimates of the Indian Army's Prithvi inventory range from 75-90 missiles[14] and reports published in 2003-2004 suggest that that the Army might acquire an additional 30-50 missiles.[15]

Flight-tests of the 250km-range/500kg-payload, Indian Air Force (IAF)-version of the Prithvi (Prithvi-2/SS-250) started in 1993.[16] The IAF subsequently inducted the Prithvi-II in 2004.[17] Nevertheless, some reports in 2005 stated that the IAF was not too keen on the Prithvi-II and favored acquisition of an air-launched version of the BrahMos.[18] The IAF's two missile squadrons--one of which may be called the 2203 Squadron--are reportedly based in Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh).[19] However, the missiles will be moved closer to the border with Pakistan during a crisis or war. The IAF's Prithvi inventory is estimated at 25, although more recent reports suggest that the service might acquire an additional 50 missile systems.[20]

The army's variant of the Prithvi-II was test-fired in May 2008 for the first time since the missile was handed over to the army in 2006.[17][21] This test was also the first with an extended range of 350 km for the army version.[17]

The third variant of this missile is the Prithvi-III, versions of which have been referred to variously as Dhanush, Sagarika, and K-15. Reportedly, the Prithvi-III is the same as the Sagarika submarine-launched ballistic missile that is under development.[22] In 1998, the DRDO had announced that it was developing a 350km-range, naval-version of the Prithvi (Dhanush/SS-350).[23] The first test of the Dhanush in April 2000 ended in failure.[24] However, after two subsequent successful tests, the DRDO declared in September 2002 that Dhanush was "ready for induction after successful trials at sea."[25] In October 2004, DRDO conducted the first successful underwater launch of the Dhanush from an especially designed canister placed in an artificial body of water.[26][27] The DRDO also declared a subsequent off-shore flight-test of the Dhanush in November 2004 from the INS Subhadra a success.[28] The missile and its sub-systems have also been referred to by the project name K-15 and have been placed on a fast track development path. In December 2004, Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee informed parliament that development flight-tests for the Dhanush had been completed.[29] It might be noted that the K-15 (also known as the Sagarika) was tested successfully in March 2008 (for more details on the K-15/Sagarika test, see below).

Prithvi also has a role in India's pursuit of an anti-ballistic missile capability. Variants of the Prithvi, including the Prithvi-II, were used in "attacker" and "interceptor" mode in the tests of India's fledgling anti-ballistic missile system in November 2006 and December 2007.[30]

The Prithvi is mainly a Pakistan-specific missile system and has reportedly been configured for nuclear delivery. [If we assume that the Sagarika or Dhanush or the K-15 are versions of the Prithvi-III, then this missile would form the mainstay of India's submarine launched ballistic missile arsenal, which has China as its primary focus as part of New Delhi's quest for a triad of delivery systems.] In addition, the DRDO has designed a variety of conventional warheads for use in different battlefield support roles. The Indian government is believed to have upgraded the alert status of some nuclear-capable Prithvi missile units during the Kargil war with Pakistan (May-July 1999),[31] and during the Indo-Pakistani military standoff that lasted from December 2001 until October 2002.[32] Reports in 2003, however, stated that the Indian government no longer planned to use the Prithvi as a nuclear delivery system. Instead the missiles would be armed with conventional warheads and be used as long-range artillery to attack Pakistan's strategic and theater reserves.[33] However, as of 2008, the Prithvi-I and the Prithvi-III both remained part of the India's existing and proposed nuclear delivery systems.[34][35]

Agni

In the early 1980s, the hybrid, two-stage (solid-motor/liquid-engine) Agni was conceived as a "technology demonstrator" (TD) to test propulsion, staging, and re-entry technologies for applications in medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile systems. Work on the 1,200-1,500km-range/1,000kg-payload Agni TD most likely began in 1983. Between 1989 and 1994, the DRDO conducted three developmental flight-tests, of which two were successful.[36] Although flight-tests were suspended between 1995 and 1998, research and development on an improved variant continued uninterrupted.[37] Testing was revived in 1999.[38] Between April 1999 and August 2004, the DRDO conducted three successful developmental flight tests of the rail-/road-mobile, two-stage, all solid-fueled, 2,000-2,500km-range/1,000kg-payload Agni-II.[39]

In 1999, the Indian government approved the development of a rail-/road-mobile, single-stage, solid-motor, 700-800km-range/1,000kg-payload variant of the Agni missile. This variant, which was later dubbed as the Agni-I, was conceived as a bridge between the short-range Prithvi and the longer-range Agni-TD and Agni-II ballistic missiles. Between January 2002 and June 2004, the short-range variant of the Agni has been tested thrice successfully.[40] Senior Indian defense officials have suggested that although more user flight-tests are in the offing, the missile is ready for induction into the armed services. The Indian Army is raising two missile groups--444th and 555th--to induct and manage the Agni-I and II variants.[41] Although the Indian government stated in 2006 that the Agni I & II have been inducted into the armed forces, it is unclear to what extent they have actually been operationalized.[87]

After years of rumors that a test of the 3,000-4,000 km-range variant of the Agni ballistic missile, the Agni III, was imminent, India finally flight-tested the missile on 9 July 2006. However, the missile, which is 16 meters tall, weighs 48 tons, and capable of delivering a 1.5 ton warhead, failed within 50 seconds of launch. Officials at India's Defense Research & Development Organization (DRDO) initially suggested that the failure likely resulted due to separation problems between the two-stage missile's first and second stages.[42] However, a subsequent report published in Force magazine suggests that test failure could have resulted from either: (a) malfunctioning gimbaled nozzles in the first stage; (b) irregular flow of propellant in the first stage; or (c) problems with the solid propellant itself.[43]

Subsequently, the Agni-III was successfully tested in April 2007 and May 2008. According to a senior defense scientist, a "truly deliverable version" was tested in May 2008 and that the missile was ready for induction into the armed forces.[44] Other reports stated that the army might receive the missile in 2009 following a flight trial.[45]

The Agni missiles have been designed and developed for delivering nuclear munitions. Despite earlier suggestions of the Agni's potential conventional role, this is now unlikely for reasons of cost-effectiveness and accuracy.[46] The Agni-I will most probably replace the Prithvi for nuclear-targeting missions against Pakistan. Although the longer-range variants of the Agni will inherently be capable of targeting Pakistan as well (the Agni-I, with its 700 km range is probably Pakistan-specific), they are primarily being developed to give India a nuclear deterrent capability against China.[45]

Reports in May 2008 stated that the Indian government has given the go-ahead to develop the Agni-V missile, with a range of 5,000 km and above in the next two years, although other reports have stated that the missile will be a key nuclear delivery system in seven years, with the first test flights expected in 3-4 years.[47][48] With the Agni-V, India will be able to credibly target parts of northeastern China (including Beijing) from launchers that do not necessarily have to be located close to the border with China. There were reports in summer 2007 that New Delhi had approved the Agni III* (Agni III Star), with a range of 5,000 km, but the 2008 reports indicate that the next missile in the Agni series after Agni-III would in fact be the Agni-V, rather than the Agni-IV or Agni-III*.[49] The Agni-V was not part of the original IGMDP which provided the framework for India's missile development plans since 1983.[47] The missile will involve adding a third stage to the Agni-III.

BrahMos

Increasingly, a key component of India's missile force is the BrahMos cruise missile. This is a 280-300km-range/200-300kg-payload, supersonic cruise missile in joint partnership with the Russian entity, NPO Mashinostroyeniye. The joint development work on the missile was started in 1998, while the joint company establishing the program was registered in 1995.[50] Derived from the Russian anti-ship missile called the Yakhont, the BrahMos is a dual-mode cruise missile, with its primary mode as an anti-ship missile, with a backup capability to attack shore-based, radio-contrast targets. The missile features a two-stage propulsion system employing a solid propellant booster with a liquid ramjet engine. Russia is believed to be primarily responsible for the propulsion system and systems integration, while India has responsibility for the on-board guidance system.[51] The first test of the missile in India was conducted in June 2001[52]; it was followed by a second flight-test in April 2002.[53] Three developmental flight tests were conducted in 2003[54] followed by an additional three tests during 2004.[55] During two tests conducted in November 2003 and 2004 respectively, the missile was successfully used to destroy a moving target from a warship at sea.[56] The missile is now in serial production.

The BrahMos was originally planned for a coastal defense (land-to-ship) role but in recent years it has been tasked with multiple objectives – navy (ship-to-ship) and army (land-to-land) besides ongoing development on submarine-launch and air-to-air versions.[57] Developmental flight tests of the naval variant of the BrahMos were reportedly completed in 2004 and the same year, the Indian Navy placed a "letter of intent" with the joint Indo-Russian venture BrahMos Aersopace Ltd. to acquire an undisclosed number of the cruise missiles.[58] The missile has since been inducted into the navy.

In March 2008, the Indian government conducted the first test of the naval version of the BrahMos against a land target, confirming its sea-to-land attack capability.[59] The DRDO is also developing a submarine-launch version and an air-to-air version of the BrahMos that is due to be tested in 2008 and 2009.[60] For these versions, the navy's Kilo-class submarines and the air force's Sukhoi aircraft are likely to be used.[61] The CEO and Managing Director of BrahMos Aerospace Ltd. Dr. A. Sivathanu Pillai stated in December 2004 that development of the Air Force variant is expected to be completed within the next three to five years.[62] The Air Force version of the BrahMos will have reduced length and weight, employ a new booster and a cap nose.

India is also developing an army variant of the missile. Delivery of the missile to the army commenced in June 2007. Two tests of the Army variant had been successfully conducted in June and December 2004.[63]

The next stage of the BrahMos development process is the production of a hypersonic variant (i.e., with a speed of over Mach 5), laboratory tests of which had taken place by May 2008.

Some defense observers believe that the India will likely to use technologies acquired and developed under the BrahMos program to develop longer-range nuclear capable cruise missiles in the future.[64] Reports in may 2008 stated that the DRDO is developing a hypersonic missile that can also be used as a long-range cruise missile.[65] The project, termed the Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV) project is being developed in collaboration with the Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI).[66]

According to some estimations, in the next decade, India will purchase about 1,000 BrahMos missiles for its military, while about 2,000 missiles will be for export purposes.[67] India and Russia have announced plans to export the BrahMos to friendly "third countries" with mutual consent. Production facilities for the BrahMos are being established in India and Russia; 20 Indian and 10 Russian companies are expected to participate in its manufacture.[68] In 2004, BrahMos Aerospace Ltd. had signed an agreement with Russia's main arms export agency--Rosoboronexport--to market the missile in the international market.[69]

Nirbhay

In July 2007, Indian defense scientists announced the proposed development of a new cruise missile system, the Nirbhay (Fearless). Nirbhay will be a 1,000 km-range subsonic cruise missile that can be deployed on multiple platforms.[70] A technology demonstrator is scheduled to be completed in early 2009. With its terrain-hugging capability, the missile would be able to avoid detection ground radar.[70]

Sagarika

In February 2008, India tested its K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missile from a submerged pontoon in the Bay of Bengal. This missile had been tested four times previously, although with very little publicity.[71] As noted above, the K-15 (also called the Sagarika or ‘Oceanic') has also been known previously as Prithvi-III and Dhanush.

India's Aeronautical Development Establishment is rumored to be developing a submarine-launched missile with "significant engineering assistance," especially in underwater launch technology, from scientists associated with quasi-public research institutes in Russia.[72] There has been considerable debate over the Sagarika's characteristics. Indian defense analysts have described it as a cruise missile program[73], but the U.S. Department of Defense has categorized the Sagarika as a submarine-launched ballistic missile, although with the 2008 the debate has been settled in favor of the latter description. The range, propulsion, payload, and other technical parameters of this missile remain unknown, except that it will probably arm India's nuclear submarine, the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV).[74]

Development work on the missile apparently began in 1992.. Reports in 2008 stated that the K-15/Sagarika will be launched from a submarine in about two years and subsequently from a nuclear powered submarine (the Advanced Technology Vessel-ATV) under construction which will be ready for sea trials by then.[71]

Despite the submarine focus of the Sagarika, the missile can also be launched from land and mobile launchers.[104] The missile weighs about 7 tons and can carry nuclear warheads that weight up to 600 kg over a range of about 700 km.[71][75]

The Sagarika program is believed to be driven by India's long-term goals to achieve a secure sea-based, second-strike nuclear capability.

Avatar

India reportedly plans to fly a hypersonic plane in 2007. An eight-meter technology demonstrator is being built by the Defense Research & Development Laboratory (DRDL) in Hyderabad; the demonstrator vehicle will be powered by a "Scramjet" engine that takes in oxygen from the atmosphere and burns liquid hydrogen. The hypersonic prototype will apparently be a precursor to the DRDO's Aerobic Vehicle for Hypersonic Aerospace Transportation (AVATAR).[76] The proposed Avatar will be able to take off and land like an aircraft and will also be able to place a payload of 1,000kg in low-earth orbit. The vehicle would be capable of performing about 100 re-entries into the atmosphere. According to a DRDO official, the primary function of the vehicle is to act as a "reusable missile launcher, one which can launch missiles, land ... and be loaded again for more missions." The official estimates the total cost for the project to be about $2 billion with a developmental period of 10 years. Components of the Avatar program such as the Scramjet engine are being developed and tested at India's premier missile laboratory - Research Center Imarat (RCI), Hyderabad.[77]

Role of Ballistic and Cruise Missiles in India's Proposed Nuclear Strike Force

In the long term, the Indian government envisions a "minimal deterrent" based on a triad of land-, air-, and sea-based nuclear forces. Ballistic and cruise missiles will be key components of the envisioned nuclear strike force.

At present, the Prithvi-I, Prithvi-II, Agni-I and the Agni-II are the ballistic missiles in service with the Indian Army and Air Force respectively, although there are some doubts over the operational status of the latter two (see above). The Prithvi missiles are inherently nuclear-capable, and an undisclosed number of Prithvi-1 missiles have reportedly been modified to deliver nuclear warheads. However, the Prithvi suffers from several limitations such as its short-range, liquid-fueled engine, which add to the logistics burden, and fuel toxicity, which increases the difficulty of handling the weapon system in the field. Hence the Prithvi missiles will most likely be replaced by the Agni ballistic missiles for nuclear missions. The existing and proposed inventory of missiles will most likely be reassigned to perform conventional battlefield support functions. The DRDO is also developing a 350km-range naval-variant of the Prithvi: the Dhanush. The Dhanush is currently undergoing flight-trials. In 2004, DRDO conducted an underwater launch of the Dhanush from a specially designed container placed in an artificial body of water. The underwater test suggests that India is developing submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) technology. However, the IN has not made a decision to deploy the Dhanush on board surface warships citing limitations of range and problems related to the missile's hypergolic and toxic liquid fuel. Nor does the IN possess submarines capable of carrying and launching ballistic missiles. Despite these limitations, the Indian Navy might acquire a small number of these missiles and deploy them on board surface warships as part of the inter-services organizational battle to acquire a stake in the proposed "minimal deterrent."

The short-, medium-, and intermediate-range variants of the Agni ballistic missile are likely to be the mainstay of India's land-based missile force in the future. In comparison to the Prithvi, each of these variants of the Agni combines the advantages of longer-range, higher-payload, and solid-fueled motors. Although India is developing an intermediate-range ballistic missile and presumably has the technology to build intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), it appears to have stopped well short of actually building an ICBM. In June 2004, the Scientific Advisor to India's Defense Minister Dr. V. K. Aatre told reporters that "...we [India] have all the technologies...it (ICBM) needs a larger engine, longer burning time, improvement in the guidance system, among others... it's not a question of whether we can build an ICBM or not, but whether we want an ICBM, which I am not going to talk about."[78] New Delhi's restraint in this regard is probably the result of a conscious political choice to avoid threatening or challenging the legally recognized members of the nuclear club, with the exception of China, which India regards as a potential long-term threat to its security. Furthermore, as India moves in the direction of an operational nuclear force, Indian elites perhaps feel reduced pressure to rely on technological symbols to demonstrate political resolve.

Thus, although the Indian government gave approval for the 5,000 km range Agni-V in May 2008 (which can target China more credibly), there were reports in 2007 that New Delhi had capped the range that limit and would not go for a full-fledged ICBM.[79][80] Such a decision was seen as a "goodwill gesture" especially at a time of negotiations between India and the United States on their bilateral nuclear agreement.[80]

India's quest for a secure, sea-based, second-strike capability centers on its submarine-launched missile: the Sagarika. The Sagarika, which is expected to arm India's ATV, has suffered from program delays and is not expected to become operational before 2010. There has been some controversy over whether the Sagarika belongs to the cruise or ballistic class of missiles, but since the Sagarika's test in February 2008, it has been referred to as a ballistic missile.

In addition, the DRDO is also developing a supersonic anti-ship cruise missile, the BrahMos/PJ-10, in close collaboration with the Russian entity NPO Mashinostroyeniye. Three versions of the missile are under development: a naval version for surface and sub-surface vessels; a land-attack Army version; and an aircraft-based version. Although the BrahMos is primarily an anti-ship cruise missile, many observers believe that the technologies acquired and developed under the program will most likely help India develop nuclear-capable long-range cruise missiles in the medium- and long-term.

Table of Indian Ballistic and Cruise Missiles

Custody/Command and Control

India does not maintain a constituted nuclear force on a heightened state of alert. The nuclear-capable missiles, non-nuclear warhead assemblies, and fissile cores are maintained in a de-alerted state by the individual armed services, the DRDO, and the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), respectively, with plans to reconstitute them rapidly during an emergency or national crisis.[81]

After much debate, deliberations, and delay, the Indian government has entrusted operational control of India's nuclear missile force to the Indian Army. Although the Indian Air Force deploys an undisclosed number of nuclear-capable bombers and is actively planning to upgrade the air leg of the dyad, it has lost the inter-organizational battle with the Army for custody of India's nuclear missile force.[82]

Although the nuclear-capable missiles and aircraft are under the control of individual armed services, India's consolidated nuclear force is administered by a tri-service Strategic Forces Command (SFC).[83] Due to the delay in the appointment of the proposed Chief of Defense Staff (CDS), who will ultimately head a joint tri-service command, the commander-in-chief of the SFC currently reports to the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Ultimately, however, the SFC will report to the CDS, who will act as the "single-point" military advisor to the Indian government and act as the interface between the civilian executive and the armed services.[84]

At the level of the civilian executive, India's Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) is responsible for the management of its nuclear forces and for making all decisions pertaining to the use of nuclear weapons. The NCA is a two-layered structure. It comprises a Political Council (PC) and an Executive Council (EC). The PC is chaired by the prime minister and is the "sole body which can authorize the use of nuclear weapons." The decisions of the PC are conveyed to the EC, headed by the prime minister's National Security Advisor, who then interfaces with the SFC to execute the political directives of the PC.[85]

Import Dependency and Export Controls

After four decades of investments in its aerospace sector, India has succeeded in achieving a relatively high-degree of autonomy in the development, engineering, and manufacture of first-generation ballistic missiles. As a result, international "technology-denial" regimes can at best delay and add to the opportunity cost of India's ballistic missile programs. However, such regimes cannot disrupt them in the long term.

With the help of Western European and North American aerospace companies in the late 1960s and 1970s, the Indian government created an elaborate infrastructure for the development and manufacture of solid and liquid propellants, composites, structural materials, navigation, avionics, flight control, launch support equipment, computers, and software needed for civilian satellite launch vehicles. At about the same time, the Indian government also began creating an infrastructure for designing, developing, testing, and building guided missiles. This included "aerodynamic, structural, and environmental test facilities, liquid- and solid-propulsion test facilities, fabrication and engineering facilities, control, guidance, rubber, and computer facilities." [86]

After the launch of the IGMDP in 1983, the DRDO further expanded and refurbished these facilities, and gained competence in the areas of solid propellants, composites, and advanced metallurgy. In 1987, India's Defense Research and Development Laboratory inaugurated a new state-of-the-art facility for designing and building modern missiles at Imarat Kancha near Hyderabad. The new facility was named Research Center Imarat (RCI). It includes "an inertial instrumentation lab, full-scale environmental and electronic warfare test facilities, a composites production center, high enthalpy facility, and a missile integration and check out center."[87] In addition, India has built a dedicated test range on its east coast in Orissa (Chandipur-On-Sea) to test "long-range missiles, air defense missiles, high 'G' maneuverable missiles, weapon systems delivered by aircraft, and multi-target weapon systems." Range tracking and acquisition radars and some of the support equipment for this test range were imported from the United States and Russia in the 1980s and 1990s.[88]

Senior Indian defense officials have publicly claimed that India now has the capability to design, develop, and produce any type of missile.[89] They have claimed that the import content of the Agni and Prithvi ballistic missiles has been reduced to about ten and five percent, respectively.[90] However, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency believes that India "still lacks engineering or production expertise in key missile technologies" and continues to import missile-related and dual-use technologies and goods from entities in Russia and Western Europe.[91]

Despite its emergence as a potential "second-tier" supplier state, India is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). New Delhi rejects participation in the MTCR on grounds that India is a victim of such technology-denial regimes, that such regimes are insensitive to India's national security needs, and they interfere with the peaceful uses of space technology. In the past, senior Indian defense officials such as Sivathanu Pillai and Dr. Abdul Kalam have expressed the view that Indian missile programs, both strategic and tactical, are not only aimed at providing the Indian military with weapon systems, but also to generate exports.[92] In 1994, the Indian defense ministry's Department of Defense Production and Supplies included the Prithvi in its catalogue of defense items available for export. Although no Prithvi exports have occurred to date, Indian defense officials have suggested that India may sell some of the missile's subsystems in the international market.[93] Indian and Russian officials have publicly expressed their intent to export the BrahMos/PJ-10 cruise missile to friendly "third countries" with mutual consent.[94]

But since the late 1990s, especially after the nuclear tests in May 1998 and the subsequent strategic dialogue with the United States, the Indian government has apparently resolved the internal debate on exports in favor of robust export controls on strategic nuclear, missile, and related dual-use goods and technologies.[95] However, the recent indictment of the Indian company NEC Engineers Private, Limited, for illegally exporting material and equipment that could be used in the manufacture of solid propellants for missiles to Iraq has raised doubts about the efficacy with which Indian export control regulations and laws are policed in practice.[96]

Stakeholders in India's Missile Program

A stakeholders' analysis shows that India's missile program is supported by a diverse coalition of actors and institutions. This composite group is united by a common string of shared values; but members of the coalition also represent different, though often interrelated and overlapping, individual and institutional interests. Since the stakeholders' interests sometimes conflict, missile-related organizational and technical outcomes are determined by collective bargaining among them.

The programmatic narrative of India's missile development activities also reveals that the diversification and growth of the missile coalition has partially transformed the underlying mandate of the missile program. During the 1960s and 1970s, for example, the missile programs were characterized by political symbolism and technological determinism. Both characteristics were the outcome of the domination of the DRDO and its political patrons in the coalition. However, technological symbolism and the DRDO's organizational interests are now giving way to strategically determined political objectives and the operational requirements of the armed services.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the DRDO and a handful of politicians and their civilian bureaucratic aides in the federal government, made up the primary stakeholders in the missile program. Due to the peculiarity of India's civil-military relations, the armed services were largely excluded from defense planning related to strategic weapon systems. Furthermore, the armed forces doubted the DRDO's competence in producing major high-technology weapon systems. Due to the specificities of these institutional relationships, India's missile programs were not based on actual user requirements. The goal was technology gathering and "reverse-engineering." Since there were no plans for the serial production and manufacture of actual weapon systems, the DRDO did not build sustainable alliances with government-owned public sector entities. Similarly, the secrecy surrounding the programs effectively excluded private sector companies, quasi-governmental research institutes, and the growing body of civilian strategic analysts, who occupy influential positions in India's civil society, from participation.

Since then, however, the DRDO has succeeded in building a relatively robust alliance with the military. Limited production of the Prithvi and Agni ballistic missile systems has also given government-owned public sector companies a stake in the missile program. The DRDO's adoption of a consortium approach by subcontracting research, development, and manufacture to semi-autonomous institutions and private sector companies has also added to the list of the stakeholders in the missile program. Furthermore, the program has gained legitimacy due to support from vocal elements among India's lobby of civilian strategic analysts.

Strategic missile systems such as the Prithvi and Agni series have emerged as the center of the DRDO's efforts to develop major weapon systems. These weapon systems are not only important politically and strategically, but more so because they represent the DRDO's first success in developing a major weapon system that has gained acceptability from India's armed services. Even though the Prithvi and Agni represent vintage technologies from the 1950s and 1960s, in the Indian context, they are considered relatively state-of-the-art because of international curbs on the sale of long range missiles, and because India happens to be among the select few countries that has managed to develop them, despite technology denials from the United States and other developed countries. In India's case, the ballistic missile programs have helped the DRDO partially transform its image from an institution that was synonymous with program failures to an organization that symbolizes organizational and technological excellence. Equally significantly, the success of both programs has provided political cover for the DRDO's inability to overcome developmental problems related to the Akash and Trishul SAMs, which were originally conceived as parts of the IGMDP in the 1980s.[97]

Future Trends

India's missile coalition has capitalized on the success of the Prithvi and Agni programs to seek political support for new missile programs. Proposed programs include both defensive and offensive missile systems. The list of defensive systems includes ATBMs designed to provide "point defense" for India's nuclear command and control centers and high-density population targets. Offensive weapon systems include an intermediate-range version of the Agni ballistic missile, the BrahMos cruise missile, and the Avatar program that would theoretically be capable of launching nuclear strikes from outer space.

The former Vajpayee government's political conclusion that U.S. ballistic missile defense is inevitable and the DRDO's case for a limited ATBM capability have produced a historic shift in the India's position on ballistic missile defense; from opposition, India has resorted to outright support for the U.S. program. The flip side, of course, is that India's missile coalition expects technological assistance from the United States and its allies to build a limited ATBM system capable of intercepting short-range ballistic missiles. In the interim, however, the DRDO hopes to integrate Russian S-300 SAMs or the Israeli Arrow-2 with the indigenous Rajendra phased-array radar system. In this context, India has also acquired the Green Pine radar system from Israel for purposes of detecting long-range ballistic missile launches.

In its push for an ATBM capability, the DRDO has received support from the Indian Air Force. The Air Force, which has lost the battle against the Army for overall control of India's missile-based nuclear delivery systems, now appears to be backing the ATBM project to safeguard its redefined organizational goals as an air and space force. The Air Force is also actively pushing the BrahMos cruise missile project. The DRDO hopes that the BrahMos cruise missile could ultimately be configured for launch from air-, land-, and sea-based platforms. Thus in the future, the Air Force could be expected to make the case for an air-leg of the proposed "minimal deterrent," using long-range strike aircraft with a standoff cruise missile capability. In this regard, the Air Force is also likely to support the DRDO's futuristic Avatar reusable space launch vehicle. The Avatar could theoretically be used as a nuclear delivery system with a global strike capability; it could also serve as an asset to strike enemy space-based surveillance and communication targets, or for ferrying civilian and military payloads into space. Should this project become successful, there could be a consolidation of interests between the DRDO, the civilian Indian Space and Research Organization (ISRO), and the Indian Air Force with active support from India's political leadership.

The DRDO is also actively consolidating its alliance with the Indian Navy by developing sea-launched versions of the Prithvi ballistic missile and by planning to configure the BrahMos cruise missile for launch from submarines and ships. The current version of the BrahMos has an anti-ship capability, but future systems will incorporate a land attack capability. The current sea-based version of the Prithvi (Dhanush) is limited by its short-range (350km) and liquid-fueled engine. The missile's short range and the dangers associated with liquid fuel on board submarines and surface ships make it unlikely that the Navy will accept the Dhanush for active deployment. However, the development of the Dhanush will most likely enable the Navy to stake a claim in India's emerging nuclear deterrent. There is also positive evidence to suggest that India is developing an SLBM capability. India's draft nuclear doctrine, which should be read as a statement of ambitions and future intent, does envisage a sea-based nuclear capability for reasons of operational flexibility and survivability. If New Delhi does indeed succeed in acquiring nuclear submarines and cruise missile technology from Russia in the near term, an Indian sea-based nuclear capability could emerge by the end of this decade.

Despite rumors and occasional calls from Indian missile scientists for the development of a global strike capability, it is doubtful that an ICBM program will have support from India's political elite or its military leadership. Unlike the 1970s and 1980s when the political accent was on developing technological artifacts for demonstration and symbolism purposes, current Indian programs have a greater national security component. Since Indian strategic and military elites only perceive potential nuclear threats from China and Pakistan, it is feasible that India might restrict its ballistic and cruise missile programs to intermediate- and medium-range systems as a conscious political choice to avoid ruffling sensibilities of the other nuclear weapon states. Such a decision could also partly be a function of the growing strategic partnership with the United States and the need to cooperate with the United States and Israel in developing a limited ballistic missile defense.[98]

Finally, the centrality of strategic missiles in the DRDO's organizational priority of interests, potential nuclear threats from Pakistan and China, and the growth and expansion of India's missile coalition have ended the technological fragmentation within India's high-tech nuclear, missile, and civilian space sectors. At their inception in the late 1960s, India's missile programs were hampered by the fragmentation in India's high-technology sector. The federal government made no attempt to harmonize, complement, or integrate the technological and organizational strengths of the civilian space sector and the DRDO's missile laboratories; neither did the government impose any specific national security objectives for this high-tech sector or what has also been described as India's "strategic enclave." For example, the subterranean nuclear explosive project was executed in 1974 without any reference to the DRDO's missile programs.

However, that situation has now changed. Since the early 1980s, the Indian government has attempted to end the fragmentation within India's "strategic enclave" and give it a strategic direction. In this regard, the IGMDP and the Agni program marked the beginning of cooperation between the ISRO and the DRDO. By the late 1980s, the DRDO and the DAE launched joint programs to weaponize nuclear devices and modify a limited number of air breathing platforms and ballistic missiles for the delivery of nuclear munitions. Cooperation between the three sectors of India's "strategic enclave" continued in the 1990s. During this period, the DRDO and the ISRO jointly worked on the second phase of the Agni program; likewise, the DRDO and the DAE cooperated in the design, development, and weaponization of more sophisticated nuclear warheads. The Vajpayee government's authorization of nuclear tests in May 1998 and subsequent decision to build a "credible minimum deterrent" have now created an overarching strategic framework for cooperation among these organizations.

Further changes in the missile development process can be expected, especially with respect to collaboration with other countries. In February 2008, New Delhi announced that the IGMDP will end by the close of the year.[2] The emphasis will now be on serial production of the missiles developed under this program. Crucially, some specific projects might involve foreign collaboration, although strategic projects will be developed "in house."[2][3]

After over three decades, India's guided missile program has now assumed a self-sustaining character. Unlike the 1970s, the missile program is now guided by a clear strategic vision and buttressed by a diverse coalition with strong organizational stakes in politically and strategically determined technological outcomes. In retrospect, the guided missile program has not only become central to India's proposed "minimal deterrent," but more significantly, it has emerged as the symbol of an independent, self-reliant, and strategically autonomous Indian state.

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[86] For details of how India created its civilian space and military missile infrastructure see, 'India Missile Chronology' for years 1947-1979.
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[90] "Interview: A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, " India Today (New Delhi), 26 April 1999, <http://www.india-today.com>; Kalam with Tiwari, Wings of Fire: An Autobiography, p. 153; Harbir K. Mannshaiya, "India's Prithvi," International Defense Review, August 1995, p. 24.
[91] "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015," Central Intelligence Agency, December 2001, <http://www.cia.gov>.
[92] "India-Russia to develop air-launched version BrahMos," The Hindu, 6 December 2004; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 5 December 2004, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
[93] Rajat Pandit, "New Delhi Planning to Sell Missiles to Friends," Times of India (Mumbai), 2 May 2003; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 1 May 2003, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; "India to Export Missiles to Friendly Countries: Reports," Agence France Presse, 2 May 2003, International News; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 1 May 2003, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
[94] Yuri Sidorov, "India equipping armed forces with BrahMos missile," ITAR-TASS, 21 July 2004; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 22 July 2004, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; "Navy starts inducting BrahMos," Business Insight, 23 July 2004; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 10 August 2004, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Rajat Pandit, "Navy begins to induct BrahMos," Times of India, 24 July 2004; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 26 July 2004, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
[95] Anupam Srivastava and Seema Gahlaut, "Curbing Proliferation from Emerging Suppliers: Export Controls in India and Pakistan," Arms Control Today, September 2003, <http://www.armscontrol.org>.
[96] Shishir Gupta, "The Indian Connection," India Today, 14 October 2002, <http://www.india-today.com>.
[97] Kampani, "Stakeholders in the Indian Strategic Missile Program," pp. 60-65.
[98] Ibid, pp. 65-67.

	Updated August 2008