Historical Overview

India's nuclear program was conceived in the pre-independence era by a small group of influential scientists who grasped the significance of nuclear energy and persuaded political leaders from the Indian National Congress to invest resources in the nuclear sector. In the aftermath of independence in August 1947, the Congress government led by Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru launched an ambitious dual-use, three-stage nuclear program to exploit India's abundant natural thorium reserves. The primary focus of the program was the production of inexpensive electricity. However, the decision to develop the complete nuclear fuel cycle — ore mining, processing and fuel fabrication facilities, research and power reactors, spent-fuel reprocessing plants, heavy water production plants, and waste treatment and disposal facilities — also led to India's acquiring the technical capability to build nuclear weapons.

India's defeat in the 1962 war with China and the latter's nuclear test in 1964 triggered an internal debate within the Indian government on whether India should follow suit. Ultimately, in November 1964, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri authorized theoretical work on the Subterranean Nuclear Explosion for Peaceful Purposes (SNEPP). The SNEPP project culminated in the test of a fission device on 18 May 1974 during Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's tenure. India described the test as a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE). However, India did not follow the 1974 test with subsequent tests, nor did it immediately weaponize the device that was tested.

During the brief tenure of the Janata Party government (1977-79), the nuclear weapons program was put on hold. However, the weapons program was resumed after Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi authorized preparations for additional nuclear tests in 1982, but the tests were canceled for reasons that have never been explained publicly. However, in the late 1980s, advances in Pakistan's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, as well as the oblique nuclear threats issued by Islamabad in the wake of the 1986-87 Brasstacks crisis, appear to have persuaded Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to authorize weaponization of India's nuclear capability.

By May 1994, India acquired the capability to deliver nuclear weapons using combat aircraft; by 1996, Indian scientists also succeeded in developing a nuclear warhead that could be mated on to the Army's Prithvi-1 ballistic missile. In the winter of 1995, in an apparent reaction to the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and advances in negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Narasimha Rao government considered a crash program of nuclear tests. However, India's test preparations were detected by U.S. intelligence agencies; subsequently, U.S. pressure convinced Rao's government to postpone the tests.

Plans for testing were renewed when the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee came to power for a brief period in 1996. However, Vajpayee's government was unable to win a parliamentary majority and decided not to go through with the tests as they would create a political crisis for the incoming administration. However, when returned to power in 1998, the BJP finally authorized two rounds of nuclear tests in May 1998, after which it formally declared India's nuclear status. Subsequent to the tests, the Vajpayee government declared that India would build a "credible minimum deterrent." Since then, successive Indian governments formally articulated a nuclear doctrine of "no-first-use" and spelled out the broad outlines of India's nuclear command, control, and communications framework. At the same time, India has put in place various levels of delivery systems while also extending the range of missiles in line with its credible minimum deterrent doctrine. Finally, given the persistent threat from terrorist groups in the region, New Delhi has also focused on securing its nuclear facilities more effectively from the threat of a terrorist attack.

The Indo-U.S. Nuclear Agreement and India's Participation in International Nuclear Commerce

A key development in recent years has been the Indo-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement which was first unveiled in July 2005. This agreement and the subsequent endorsement of India's case by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) allows India to engage in international nuclear trade while New Delhi would allow safeguards on a select number of nuclear facilities that would be classified as "civilian." The remaining facilities will come under the military side of the program and off-limits to international inspectors.

The agreement process required a number of steps — passage of the Hyde Act by the U.S. Congress to authorize the United States government to negotiate a bilateral nuclear agreement with India (passed in December 2006); adoption of a bilateral 123 agreement between India and the United States under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act (the text of this agreement was agreed to in August 2007) [40]; approval of a safeguards agreement between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), (this step was completed in August 2008); and waiver by the by the NSG to its rules which would allow Indian participation in nuclear trade (approval granted in September2008).[14]

Subsequently, in October 2008, the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement was approved by the U.S. Congress and signed into law by the then President George W. Bush. In March 2009, the IAEA formally approved the Additional Protocol (AP) to the Indian safeguards agreement, which differs on several levels from previous APs concluded between the agency and other states.[18] The India Specific Safeguards Agreement (ISSA) still has to be ratified, and according to Indian officials, speaking in April 2009, New Delhi was working on the ratification procedures.[38] The first set of two nuclear power plants, units at the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS) have been formally placed under the safeguards agreement.[39] In October 2009, India notified a plan to put 14 out of its 22 nuclear reactors under IAEA safeguards by 2014.[39] In July 2009, India and the United States commenced talks on "arrangements and procedures" to allow reprocessing U.S.-origin spent fuel on Indian territory in accordance with the '123' agreement.[44]

Following the NSG waiver, India signed nuclear cooperation agreements, which include the supply of nuclear reactors and uranium, with France in October 2008, Russia in December 2008, Namibia in August 2009, and Argentina in October 2009. India also plans to sign an agreement with Kazakhstan, under which the Central Asian state will provide uranium to India and in return India may build several medium-sized 200-300 MW nuclear reactors for Kazakhstan. [30, 31]

The Indian Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) received the first batch of 60 tons of uranium from Areva in March 2009, under a December 2008 agreement between the French company and the NPCIL to supply India with 300 tons of uranium.[25, 29] Additionally, the Russian company TVEL supplied a first batch of 30 tons of natural uranium fuel pellets to the NFC in April 2009.[32]

According to Indian officials, New Delhi could import up to 40 nuclear reactors in the next decade.[11] The U.S.-India Business Council stated that India might spend up to $175 billion to expand its nuclear sector in the next 25 years.[17] According to October 2008 reports, in the next five years, India will construct 21 nuclear power facilities, including six French reactors (1,600 MW each), four Russian reactors (1,000 MW each), and four American reactors (1,500 MW each).[22] In February 2009, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) and the Areva concluded an agreement for supply of two European Pressurized Reactors (EPR) of 1650MW each.[26] In October 2009, New Delhi identified two locations, in the states of Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh, that would host reactors constructed by GE Hitachi and Westinghouse[42]

New Delhi has approved NPCIL's identification of five locations across the country which will host about 30 nuclear plants.[41] A total of six reactors are currently under construction (since prior to the NSG waiver). These include two Russian reactors at Kudankulam, a 500 MW fast breeder reactors at Kalpakkam, two 220 MW PHWRs and a 220 MW unit at Kaiga.[41]

Capabilities

There is considerable controversy over the yield and reliability of India's nuclear devices. When India tested its first fission device in May 1974, Indian scientists claimed the device had a yield of about 12 kilotons (kt). However, that figure has been disputed by independent analysts who estimate that the yield was far lower, probably between 2-6kt.

Similar controversy dogs India's May 1998 tests. After the first of round of tests on May 11, India's Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) announced that it had tested three nuclear devices: a fission device with a yield of 12kt; a thermonuclear device with a yield of 43kt; and a sub-kiloton device with a yield of 0.2kt; The figures were later revised to 45kt for the thermonuclear device and 15kt for the fission device. However, these figures have been disputed by independent analysts, who — citing evidence from seismic data — claim that the cumulative yield of the Indian tests was more likely between 20-30kt, the implications being the thermonuclear test was likely to have been a failure. Senior Indian scientists such as P.K. Iyengar have also publicly suggested that it is likely that the fusion device only burned partially.

However, the former head of India's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Dr. R. Chidambaram has claimed that a "post-shot" analysis of the Pokhran II tests confirmed that the May 1998 tests yielded about 60kt. Chidambaram subsequently asserted that the tests provided India with "the capability to design and fabricate nuclear weapons [in the range] of low-yields up to 200 kilotons." Following the May 11 tests, India carried out two tests of sub-kiloton devices on May 13 "to generate additional data for improved computer simulation of designs and for attaining the capability to carry out sub-critical experiments, if considered necessary."[12]

Controversy regarding the 1998 tests was provoked once again in 2009 following the assertion by K. Santhanam, field director during the 1998 tests, that the thermonuclear test had actually been a failure, leading to calls by some senior scientists that New Delhi should conduct another test and desist from signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).[43] In its response, the Indian government refuted these allegations, and reaffirmed the voluntary moratorium on tests.[45]

Fissile Material Stocks

The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists estimated in November 2008 that India has approximately 70 assembled warheads, with about 50 of them completely operational.[37] According to the 2009 SIPRI Yearbook, the Indian arsenal comprises of 60-70 operationalized weapons.[46] Such estimates are generally dependent on estimates of the stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium that India has produced.[46]

The plutonium for India's nuclear stockpile is most likely obtained from two research reactors: the 40 megawatts (MW) CIRUS and 100MW Dhruva, which went critical in 1960 and 1985, respectively. The CIRUS reactor is capable of producing 9-10 kilograms (kg) of weapons-grade plutonium annually; the corresponding figure for the Dhruva reactor is 20-25 kg. The irradiated fuel from the reactors is probably reprocessed at either the Plutonium Reprocessing Plant in Trombay (50 tons per year) or the Kalpakkam Reprocessing Plant at Kalpakkam (100-125 tons per year).

According to published sources, India produces 20-40 kg of plutonium annually and has probably accumulated 280-600kg of weapons-grade plutonium, enough to build 40-120 weapons. India also has a small stock of highly enriched uranium, but it is unclear if the latter has been used to build nuclear weapons.

Custody/Command and Control

India does not maintain a constituted nuclear force on a heightened state of alert. The nuclear-capable missiles, bombers, non-nuclear warhead assemblies, and fissile cores are maintained in a de-alerted state by their respective custodians — the individual armed services, the DRDO, and the DAE — with plans to reconstitute them rapidly during an emergency or national crisis.

India maintains a Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) at the apex of the command and control framework, which is controlled by the civilian authorities and which includes the tri-service Strategic Forces Command (SFC), which administers the nuclear-capable missiles and aircraft.[47] However, despite the SFC, the actual control of the specific delivery systems remains with the individual services.[47]

Nuclear-Use Doctrine

India's primary goal is to achieve "economic, political, social, scientific, and technological development" and autonomy in domestic and strategic decisionmaking in an environment free of coercion from either the threat or use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. With these objectives in view, the Indian government has adopted a nuclear "no-first-use" or doctrine of "retaliation only." The doctrine's central goal is to deter the threat of nuclear (subsequently revised to include chemical and biological) weapons use by any state or entity against India or its armed forces. In the event of deterrence failure, the doctrine states that India will resort to punitive strikes to inflict unacceptable losses on the adversary state or entity. However, India will not resort to the threat of use or use of nuclear weapons against states that do not possess nuclear (subsequently revised to include chemical and biological) weapons, or are not aligned with states that possess such capabilities.

The most recent review of India's nuclear posture, in 2007, recommended a "comprehensive and integrated nuclear defense capability" taking into account the persistent political instability in the region and China's continued nuclear cooperation with Pakistan.[6]

India and the Nonproliferation Regime

India remains steadfastly opposed to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Since the late 1960s, a consensus has emerged in India that the NPT is an inequitable instrument that divides the world into "nuclear haves" and "have nots," and the solution to the problem of nuclear proliferation is comprehensive global nuclear disarmament. Although India was initially one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) when that treaty was first proposed in the 1950s and among the first to sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963, the Indian government's position has changed radically since then. By the early 1990s, when negotiations on the CTBT rapidly moved towards a resolution, Indian elites came to regard the CTBT not as an instrument of controlling the nuclear arms race, its original goal when it was first proposed, but rather as an instrument of nonproliferation that sought to freeze countries along the nuclear learning curve.

After conducting nuclear tests in May 1998, the Indian government announced that it would abide by a self-imposed moratorium on further nuclear testing and declared that India would not be the first state to resume nuclear tests.

Despite some reservations, India has participated in discussions at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). In 2007, New Delhi stated that it would not pose a hurdle toward any movement on drafting an FMCT.[5] In general, the main objection from the Indian side has been its support for an FMCT that is "universal, non-discriminatory, and internationally and effectively verifiable."[5]

As a non-signatory to the NPT, India remains the target of nuclear supplier export controls. Although India is not a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, it formally abides by strict domestic export control laws and regulations to control the export of nuclear and related dual-use technologies. In this context, legislative mechanisms have been strengthened, such as through the "Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act 2005," that was officially notified in June 2005. Additionally, under the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act 1992, the Indian government banned the transfers of any technology and products that could assist Iran's nuclear weapons and delivery systems programs.[13]

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	Updated October 2009