This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

1960
Indian technicians load the CIRUS research reactor with indigenously produced fuel rods.
—Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb (London: Zed Books, 1998), p. 121.

1960
Dr. Bhabha meets with US military engineer Major General Kenneth D. Nichols to discuss plans to build India's first nuclear power reactor. Nichols, who had supervised the plants that produced enriched uranium and plutonium for the Manhattan Project, visits India as a consultant to Westinghouse and chairman of the board of Westinghouse International Atomic Power Company in Geneva, Switzerland. Nichols first persuades both Dr. Bhabha and Prime Minister Nehru of the superiority of US light water reactors over British gas-cooled reactors. Nichols claims that, in the ensuing conversation between Prime Minister Nehru and Dr. Bhabha, Nehru asks Dr. Bhabha if he can "develop an atomic bomb." Upon receiving confirmation from Dr. Bhabha that he could do so in about a year, Nehru asks Nichols if he agrees with Dr. Bhabha's assessment. Nichols tells Nehru that he knows "of no reason why Bhabha could not do it." Nehru concludes the conversation by telling Dr. Bhabha, "Well, don't do it until I tell you to."
—Kenneth D. Nichols, The Road to Trinity (New York: Morrow, 1987), pp. 351-352.

February 1960
In light of the 1959 assessment by a US team that the capital costs for construction of nuclear power plants would exceed that of conventional power plants, Dr. Bhabha asks the United States to provide favorable terms of finance. The terms he requests include an Export-Import Bank loan and a deferred payment plan, to be repaid in rupees, for the reactor fuel that India would import from the United States.
—Dwight A. Ink, general manager of the AEC, to John McCone, chairman of the AEC, memorandum, 15 February 1960, in Virginia Foran, ed., US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy 1945-1991, no. 00625.

March 1960
Prime Minister Nehru reassures the Indian public that India is "determined not to go in for making atomic bombs and the like." Meanwhile he cautions the international community that India is "equally determined not to be left behind in this advance in the use of this new power."
—G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), p. 15.

10 July 1960
The CIRUS research reactor goes critical.
—Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1962-63," p. 3.

August 1960
Prime Minister Nehru announces in the Lok Sabha that India will construct its first nuclear power station at Tarapur and will follow through on proposed plans to build a plutonium separation facility at Trombay.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 37.

September 1960
Prime Minister Nehru meets with President Eisenhower at the fall UN General Assembly session. Nehru resumes India's traditional push for progress on a nuclear test ban. However, Eisenhower's response is pessimistic due to the inability to make progress with the Soviet Union about verification of arms control.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 51.

Late 1960
Russian diplomatic emissary and metallurgist V.S. Emelyanov confides to a US official that Dr. Bhabha had been "pressing" him to make an arrangement for Russia to supply India with a nuclear power plant. Mr. Emelyanov expresses his belief that such an arrangement would be premature. Furthermore, he warns that "India might be interested in atomic weapons in the future. India could make weapons from the plutonium that would be produced in the natural uranium reactors if Dr. Bhabha wished."
—Memorandum of conversation between AEC Chairman John McCone and V.S. Emelayanov, 19 November 1960, in Virginia Foran, ed., US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, 1945-91, no. 00701.

November 1960
Dr. Bhabha travels to Canada to enhance Indo-Canadian cooperation on nuclear issues.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 37.

Early 1961
With research reactors already in operation, India expresses interest in making contracts with foreign firms for the construction of India's first nuclear power plants.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 52.

9 January 1961
Prime Minister Nehru tells the National Development Council India is nearing a stage from which it may be possible to "make atomic weapons."
—Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Praeger, 1962, for Institute for Strategic Studies), p. 144.

14 January 1961
Prime Minister Nehru announces that India's third research reactor has gone critical and, in a statement to the National Development Council, he says that India could make nuclear weapons "within the next two or three years"; however, this announcement is made with the caveat that "absolutely under no circumstances shall we do so."
—G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), p. 235.

16 January 1961
Dr. H. Bhabha indicates his intention to extract reprocessed plutonium for use in future reactors. He states, "Work is in hand on the construction of a small plant at the northern end of this site [Trombay] for the reprocessing of the used fuel elements, the separation of radioactive fission products, and the extraction of the valuable plutonium or uranium-233 contained in them....Since India has the world's largest deposits of thorium in very high grade ore, it is essential that we should find a means of using the thorium for power production. This can only be done if we have at our disposal a concentrated fissionable material like plutonium which is naturally generated in the uranium fuel elements used in atomic reactors. The only other way of obtaining such concentrated fuels, namely by the extraction of uranium-235 from natural uranium, is extremely expensive both in capital and in running costs and consumes large amounts of electricity. We have, therefore, decided to follow the more economical way, of using plutonium produced in power stations fuelled with natural uranium."
—B.V. Sreekantan, Virendra Singh, and B.M. Udgaoankar, eds., Homi Jehangir Bhabha: Collected Scientific Papers. (Bombay: Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, 1985), p. 976.

2 February 1961
In response to a question about the length of time it would take to make nuclear weapons, Dr. Bhabha replies "about two years I suppose."
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 38.

3 February 1961
Dr. Bhabha announces that India is seeking contracts with foreign firms to build nuclear power plants. In particular, Dr. Bhabha hopes to make contracts for reactors to be built quickly and with minimum safeguards requirements. To encourage the participation of Western firms, Dr. Bhabha indicates that Indo-Soviet nuclear cooperation is gaining momentum.
—"Setting Up Nuclear Power Plant," Statesman, 3 February 1961, p. 1.

3 February 1961
Dr. Bhabha lobbies for popular support of nuclear power in India, arguing that resources that are invested in the present will lead to economic benefits in 10 to 15 years. According to Dr. Bhabha, India will be spared from on-going foreign exchange expenditures by uranium-fueled reactors because India could produce the fuel indigenously. In addition, he states that India may be able to produce breeder reactors in five years.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 37.

28 February-18 March 1961
A US team visits India to evaluate the possibility of supplying India with technology for its nuclear power program.
—Roberta Wohlstetter, "The Buddha Smiles": Absent-Minded Peaceful Aid and the Indian Bomb (Los Angeles: Pan Heuristics, 1977), p. 82-86.

3 March 1961
In connection to the possible contract for the US construction of two light water nuclear power reactors at Tarapur, India, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk sends an airgram to US Embassies revealing the general awareness among American officials that India's nuclear program could produce atomic weapons.
—Secretary of State Dean Rusk to US Embassies, airgram, circular CG-769, 3 March 1961, in Virginia I. Foran, ed., US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, 1945-1991, no. 0075.

27 March 1961
Construction of the spent fuel reprocessing plant at Trombay begins. The plant, named Phoenix, is based on the Purex (plutonium-uranium extraction) reprocessing technique developed by the United States and promoted on a global level through the Atoms for Peace program's declassification of such information. The US firm, Vitro International, is contracted to prepare the blueprints; however, Indian engineers modify the plans during the actual construction of the plant.
[Note: The Purex process involves four main steps: (1) decladding--one of a variety of processes that is used to either open or dissolve the cladding of an irradiated uranium fuel rod to expose the contents; (2) dissolution of irradiated fuel--the contents of the fuel rod are dissolved in nitric acid and become nitrates in a solution while the dissolved cladding is separated and processed; 3) separation of plutonium and uranium--the nitrate solution is exposed to a mixture of the solvent tributyl phosphate (TBP) and kerosene, which separates the plutonium and uranium from the fission products; and (4) separation of plutonium and uranium from each other--once plutonium and uranium are separated by solvent extraction, they remain in solution as plutonium nitrate and uranium nitrate, prior to shipping the plutonium is typically converted into a solid oxide and uranium is typically converted into uranium trioxide.]
—Roberta Wohlstetter, "The Buddha Smiles": Absent-Minded Peaceful Aid and the Indian Bomb (Los Angeles: Pan Heuristics, 1977), pp. 63-64; George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 28; Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, <http://www.ieer.org/sdafiles/vol_5/5-1/purexch.html>.

August 1961
According to the Indian AEC's projections, Indian nuclear power plants would produce 3,000 megawatts of electricity by 1976.
—"India's Drive for Atomic Power," Times of India (Mumbai), 20 August 1961.

13 September 1961
In a top secret memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, US State Department official George McGee cites concern over "intelligence estimates that China could detonate a nuclear device as early as 1962." To counter the perception of China's power, McGee expresses the belief of State Department officers "that it would be desirable if a friendly Asian power beat Communist China to the punch" of exploding a nuclear device and that there is "no likelier candidate than India." McGee suggests that the US government should consider whether technical assistance from the United States could help persuade India to explode a nuclear device before China. The memo compares a statement made by Prime Minister Nehru on 31 August 1961 expressing opposition to nuclear tests "at any time in any place" to a statement made on the same day by an Indian government spokesman in New Delhi who makes an exception for "peaceful purposes under controlled conditions." Although McGee suggests that there is but a low probability that Prime Minister Nehru would agree to such a plan, he enumerates arguments to employ to persuade Nehru. These arguments include the ability to prevent Chinese nuclear blackmail against India, reduce Chinese intimidation of India's neighbors, and preclude any opportunity for India's Communist Party to claim that a Chinese test demonstrates the superiority of communism.
—McGhee to Rusk, "Anticipatory Action Pending Chinese Communist Demonstration of a Nuclear Capability," pp. 1-5, September 13, 1961, FIOA files, India, National Security Archive, Washington, DC.

6 October 1961
India signs an agreement to cooperate in the peaceful uses of atomic energy with the Soviet Union.
—A. Appadorai and M.S. Rajan, India's Foreign Policy and Relations (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers Private, 1985), p. 273.

7 October 1961
US Secretary of State Dean Rusk writes a memo to State Department Executive Secretary Lucius Battle in which he rejects McGee's proposal to convince India to explode a nuclear device before China. He notes that he is "not convinced we should depart for our stated policy that we are opposed to further extension of national nuclear weapons capability."
—Secretary of State Dean Rusk to State Department Executive Secretary Lucius Battle, memorandum, 7 October 1961, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, FOIA files, India, National Security Archive, Washington, DC.

1961
The Indian Planning Commission publishes its third Five-Year Plan (1961-1966). The plan proposes a three-phase plan for the Indian nuclear program in order to take advantage of India's abundant thorium reserves, which contain uranium-233. First-phase reactors would be fueled by natural uranium and would produce both plutonium and electricity. Second-phase reactors would be fueled by plutonium and thorium to produce electricity and uranium-233. The uranium-233 would then be used to fuel third-phase reactors. The report estimates the cost of nuclear power would be comparable to the cost of coal-based power stations in isolated areas. The final phase of nuclear power would be cheaper due to the use of uranium-233, which would be extracted from local thorium reserves. The report estimates that the first two nuclear power stations would cost 510 million rupees; therefore, this sum was earmarked for the five-year period from 1961-1966, along with 240 million rupees for the construction of uranium mining and fabrication plants. This sum constitutes 7.21 per cent of all investment for India's power program during the five-year period.
—Shyam Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb (Ghaziabad: Vikas, 1979), pp. 102-103.

April 1962
India's third research reactor, Zerlina, goes critical.
—Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1962-63," p. 3.

21 September 1962
The Indian government enacts the Atomic Energy Act, 1962, which replaces the Atomic Energy Act of 1948. The Act allows for enhanced secrecy and mandates central governmental control over atomic energy. The act encompasses "the development, control and use of atomic energy for the welfare of the people of India and for other peaceful purposes and for matters connected therewith."
—Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1962-63," p. 1; K.K. Pathak, Nuclear Policy of India (New Delhi: Gitanjali Prakashan, 1980), p. 80.

21 November 1962
China calls a unilateral cease-fire to end the border conflict with India that had been intensifying since mid-1962.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 39,46.

December 1962
In response to India's defeat by China in the Indo-Chinese border war of October-November 1962, the opposition Jana Sangh Party makes a formal demand in Parliament for the reversal of India's declared policy in order to produce nuclear weapons.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 39, 46.

1962
India receives seven tenders for the proposed nuclear power station at Tarapur; of these, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) finds the proposal from the International General Electric Company of the United States most suitable. India submits a "qualified" letter of intent to the company and begins negotiations on issues related to "financing, fuel supply, safeguards, and allied matters."
—Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1962-63," p. 11.

1962
According to the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), the proposed nuclear power plant at Tarapur (Maharashtra) will comprise two boiling water reactors and have a net capacity of 380MWe. The capital outlay for the station, including costs of site development, housing, taxes, and escalation, is estimated at 483.5 million rupees, of which 323.5 million rupees will be spent in the form of foreign exchange. The cost of power is estimated at 3.25 nP. per KWH, which according to the DAE compares favorably with the cost of generating conventional thermal power in the Indian states of Gujarat and Maharashtra. India applies for a loan to the US Agency of International Development to finance the foreign exchange component of the Tarapur reactor project.
—Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1962-63," p. 11.

1962
On completion of a study by a joint Indo-Canadian technical team, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) decides to build a second nuclear power reactor in the vicinity of the Rana Pratap Sagar near Kotah, Rajasthan. This reactor will be of the CANDU type and will have an initial capacity of 200MWe. Total costs for this project are estimated at 320 million rupees. Unlike the Tarapur power station, which will be built by General Electric under a turnkey contract, the Rajasthan reactor will be built by Indian scientists and engineers on the basis of designs obtained from Canada.
—Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1962-63," p. 12.

1962
The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) says that no decision has been made on the "installation" of India's third proposed nuclear power station. However, when such a decision is made, the reactor is most likely to be located at Kalapakkam, near Mahabalipuram in Madras state.
—Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1962-63," p. 12.

1962
The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) reports progress in developing the Jaduguda uranium mines in Bihar state. The total number of personnel involved in mining operations includes 187 officers and related staff, and "361 daily-rated workers." Two mining consultants from the USSR visit Jaduguda to advise the DAE on rock formations and speeds for drilling to help it with the sinking of main shaft at the mine. The DAE also decides to set up a uranium mill at Jaduguda to treat uranium ore from the mines. The latter project will be executed by Indian Rare Earths Ltd. with assistance from foreign entities. Work begins on the design and procurement of equipment for the plant.
—Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1962-63," pp. 8, 13.

1962
India and the United Arab Republic (UAR) sign an agreement on the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. A small number of scientists from the UAR arrive in India for training.
—Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1962-63," p. 14.

1962
According to the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), the CIRUS research reactor operates steadily at power levels of 5-10MW, enough to meet "present requirements for research and radiation." In December 1962, the reactor's power level was raised to 15MW; DAE hopes that the power level will be raised to 40MW by 1963. The CIRUS is now fueled entirely by uranium pellets fabricated in India at Trombay (Maharashtra). Since the reactor first achieved criticality in August 1960, its total output amounts to "1,736MW days."
—Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1962-63," p. 3.

1962
The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) achieves considerable progress in Project Phoenix, which involves the setting up of a plant to process irradiated fuel elements from India's nuclear reactors. In 1962, the "main process building" nears completion. The boiler house and electrical sub-station are completed and their equipment commissioned. The "waste treatment building, the rod handling building, the filter house, the underground storage tanks for waste products, and the 450ft-high stack are under construction." Project Phoenix is being undertaken by the atomic energy establishment's Chemical Group in Trombay (Maharashtra). The Remote Handling Section of the Chemical Group makes progress in the design of a number of facilities for handling irradiated fuel from the CIRUS reactor. This includes a facility for handling irradiated fuel elements under 15ft of water.
—Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1962-63," pp. 3-4, 8.

1962
A uranium pilot plant at Ghatsila (Bihar) begins pilot plant testing of uranium ore from Jaduguda and other uranium mines. About 100 tons of Jaduguda uranium ore are processed at the plant and the data obtained is used to design the uranium mill to be set up there.
—Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1962-63," pp. 3, 7-8.

1962
As India's Tarapur and Rajasthan nuclear power reactors are likely to use uranium oxide (UO2) as fuel, the atomic energy establishment's Metallurgy Division focuses on developing technology uranium oxide fuel elements. The Metallurgy Division succeeds in producing uranium pellets "having a sintered capacity of 95 percent theoretical." The division also prepares a flow sheet for the preparation of reactor grade zirconium.
—Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1962-63," p. 8.

1962
India sends 76 nuclear scientists abroad for training.
—Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1962-63," p. 11.

Late 1962-Early 1963
Prime Minister Nehru responds to questions about whether India intends to permanently eschew a nuclear deterrent. He cites that one must have a "very powerful deterrent" because having "something showy" will not bolster the Indian situation if China were to conduct a nuclear test tomorrow. Therefore, he states that India is "not going to make bombs, not even thinking of making bombs," despite his belief that Indian nuclear science is more advanced than that of China.
—G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), p. 22.

12 February 1963
In a memo to the president of the United States, the Secretary of Defense endorses a comprehensive test ban and expresses concern over possible nuclear weapons proliferation in the absence of a test ban agreement. He cites the estimates of Pentagon officials that eight countries, including India, would be able to obtain basic nuclear weapons capability in the next ten years. The memo notes that the production costs of "a few weapons would come to about 150-175 million dollars," and that "[m]any countries have reduced the lead time and cost of acquiring weapons by getting research reactors and starting nuclear power programs." The analysis of India's program concludes that it could conduct its first nuclear test within four to five years; however, its motivation for such a test is low and depends upon its perception of threats from China.
—Secretary of Defense to the President, memorandum, "The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons with and without a Test Ban Agreement," February 12, 1963, p. 1, in Virginia Foran, ed., US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, 1945-1991, no. 00941.

23 March 1963
Ramachandra Bade, a member of the Jana Sangh Party, calls for developing nuclear weapons during a parliamentary discussion of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) budget. Bade argues, "Only those who wish to see Russians or Chinese ruling India will oppose the development of nuclear weapons. I beg the Prime Minister to make full use of our research in atomic energy." Prime Minister Nehru responds that India cannot call for the nuclear powers to renounce their nuclear tests and then "go in for doing the very thing which we have repeatedly asked the other powers not to do" to justify the minor psychological advantages that nuclear status would confer.
—Shyam Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb (Ghaziabad: Vikas, 1979), pp. 108-109; G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), p. 23.

25 March 1963
Prime Minister Nehru tells parliament, "We have often said, from the very first day we started the reactor in Bombay, that we on no account would manufacture nuclear weapons....I hold to that."
—Shyam Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb (Ghaziabad: Vikas, 1979), p. 121.

8 August 1963
The Agreement for Cooperation between the government of the United States and the government of India concerning the civil uses of atomic energy is signed in Washington. According to the terms of this agreement, the United States will supply two 200MW reactors, to be housed in one building at Tarapur, India. In exchange, India agrees to only use enriched uranium fuel provided by the United States and to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify that the fuel at this facility is not diverted from peaceful uses. The United States further stipulates that any subsequent separation of plutonium during spent fuel reprocessing must be approved by the US government. The agreement clearly spells out that any material received by India must not be used "for atomic weapons or for research on or development of atomic weapons or for any other military purpose." To finance the project, the United States offers a $80 million credit at 0.75 percent interest over 40 years.
—Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, signed in Washington, 8 August 1963, and entered into force 25 October 1963, Article VII, reprinted in Brahma Chellaney, Nuclear Proliferation: The US-India Conflict (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1993), pp. 26, 318-327.

25 October 1963
The Agreement for Cooperation between the government of the United States and the government of India concerning the civil uses of Atomic Energy enters into force.
—Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, signed in Washington, 8 August 1963, and entered into force 25 October 1963, Article VII, reprinted in Brahma Chellaney, Nuclear Proliferation: The US-India Conflict (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1993), pp. 318-327.

1963
Prime Minister Nehru is one of the first world leaders to sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT). He proclaims that it "will take us towards disarmament and peace."
—G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), p. 240.

1963
Representatives from the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and General Electric conclude a draft contract on the construction of the Tarapur nuclear power station. According to the plans, construction will be completed by the end of 1967 and the reactors will attain full power by the mid-1968. DAE speculates on the possibility of adding additional capacity to the Tarapur plant in the future.
—"Brief Annual Report: 1963-64," Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, p. 20.

1963
India and Canada sign two agreements on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Under the first agreement, the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) "will enable a free exchange of scientific and technical information between the two parties for the development of heavy water moderated reactor systems. It will also enable either party to obtain at no cost information and detailed design data, including plans and working drawings regarding the design and construction of nuclear power stations of the heavy water type." Under the second agreement, Canada agrees to cooperate with India in the construction of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS). Canada agrees to provide the "design, detailed working drawings and specifications for the power station up to the steam raising equipment, while India will provide the design for the rest of the station." Canada also agrees to supply half of the initial uranium fuel charge for the reactor; the other half will be fabricated in India. The government of Canada also agrees to extend credit (not exceeding $36 million) to cover nearly 50 percent of the total cost of the RAPS project.
[Note: The total cost of RAPS is estimated at $76 million.]
—"Brief Annual Report: 1963-64," Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, p. 21.

1963
According to the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), the Jaduguda uranium mines are being developed to "enable the production of nearly 1,000 tons of uranium ore per day." In addition, a uranium mill to process the ore is being set up near the mines. Orders for the most of the equipment for the mill are expected to be place before the end of March 1964.
—"Brief Annual Report: 1963-64," Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, p. 21.

1963
India concludes cooperation agreements on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with Denmark and Poland.
—"Brief Annual Report: 1963-64," Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, p. 25.

1963
The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) designs and fabricates distillation columns to re-concentrate downgraded heavy water. The existing facilities can re-concentrate 45kg of downgraded heavy water per month. The DAE plans to double this capacity by 1964.
—"Brief Annual Report: 1963-64," Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, p. 12.

1963
Considerable progress is made in Project Phoenix, the facility to process irradiated fuel from India's nuclear reactors. The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) completes construction of the "main process building, rod handling building, filter house, organic waste laboratory, oil storage tank, and waste treatment building..." Construction of the "underground tanks for the storage of high active waste" nears completion. The plant's 450ft-high reinforced concrete stack is completed and progress is made in laying underground exhaust ducts. Other significant milestones in the project include the fabrication of the plant's equipment, progress in the Waste Evaporation Plant, and installation and commissioning of utilities. The first phase of the plant is likely to be commissioned by April 1964.
—"Brief Annual Report: 1963-64," Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, p. 13.

1963
The atomic energy establishment's Remote Handling Section completes work on the design and setting up of an isotope production unit and a hot cell for handling highly radioactive materials.
—"Brief Annual Report: 1963-64," Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, p. 13.

1963
The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) plans to set up a Zircaloy Fabrication Plant with an initial annual capacity of 50 tons of "finished zircaloy components..." At a later stage, the plant's capacity will be expanded to 75 tons. Plans are also made to build a zirconium sponge plant with an annual capacity of 60 tons. The zirconium sponge plant and the zircaloy fabrication facility are expected to meet the zircaloy requirements for the half the initial fuel loadings required for the proposed Tarapur and Rajasthan nuclear power plants.
—"Brief Annual Report: 1963-64," Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, pp. 14-15.

1964
The US Atomic Energy Commission conducts an international Plowshare Symposium to fuel international interest in peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE) for large-scale engineering projects.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 90, 498.

1964
According to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency National Intelligence Estimate concludes that India employs a "large number" of experts to work on plutonium metallurgy.
—US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, National Intelligence Estimate paper, "The Indian Nuclear Problem: Proposed Course of Action," October 21, 1964, revised appendix 4, p. 2, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, FOIA files, India, National Security Archive, Washington, DC.

1954-1964
US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency analysts determine that India had spent $220 million on its nuclear program through the Department of Atomic Energy and that additional amounts could have been concealed in other accounts.
—US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, National Intelligence Estimate paper, "The Indian Nuclear Problem: Proposed Course of Action," 13 October 1964, app. 3, "Economic Factors," p. 1, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, FOIA files, India, National Security Archive, Washington, DC.

27 January-1 February 1964
The Twelfth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs convenes in Udaipur, India to discuss "Current Problems of Disarmament and World Security." At this conference, Dr. Bhabha presents a paper entitled "The Implication of a Wider Dispersal of Military Power for World Security and the Problem of Safeguards." This paper describes the benefits of nuclear deterrence in the face of asymmetrical capabilities, noting in particular the advantage China enjoys due to the size of its population. Dr. Bhabha suggests that if "any State is to be asked to renounce a possible dependence on nuclear weapons to redress the balance of power against a larger and more powerful State not having nuclear weapons, such as China, its security must be guaranteed by both the major nuclear powers." To keep countries such as India from developing nuclear weapons, Dr. Bhabha indicates that the impetus rests with the United States and the Soviet Union to provide security assurances or lead the way towards nuclear disarmament.
—Homi J. Bhabha, "The Implications of a Wider Dispersal of Military Power for World Security and the Problem of Safeguards," in Proceedings of the Twelfth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, 27 January-1 February 1964, Udaipur, India, pp. 75-78.

April 1964
India and Canada reach agreement on the Canadian financing of the heavy-water moderated CANDU (Canadian deuterium-uranium) power reactor, also known as RAPS-1, to be built in Rajasthan by Indian engineers with design assistance and technology provided by Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL). The agreement details information sharing and assistance from Canada including blueprints for the facility, as well as a $37 million loan from Canada to pay the foreign exchange expenses for the services and technology Canada will provide. The safeguards agreement worked out between India and Canada allows for reciprocal inspection rights, whereby Canadians could inspect the facility at Rajasthan and Indians could inspect the Douglas Point power station in Ottawa, Canada. India further promises to use the Canadian technology and fuel only for peaceful purposes.
—G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), p. 242.

31 March 1964
An "unirradiated fuel rod" is fed into the dissolver and processed through the different stages of the plutonium reprocessing facility. Following the success of this process, a few "mildly irradiated" fuel elements are introduced and dissolved to test the "performance and reliability" of the various parts of the plant. The results from the tests are deemed satisfactory, preparing the ground for the introduction of irradiated fuel elements.
—Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1964-65," p. 12.

April 1964
The plutonium separation plant at Trombay is completed. In a press release announcing the completion of the facility, the Indian DAE states that the plant "was designed and built entirely by the staff of the Atomic Energy Establishment at Trombay."
—Indian DAE press release, appended to American Consulate (Bombay) to the Department of State, airgram no. A-253, April 29, 1964, p. 2, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, FOIA files, India, National Security Archive, Washington DC.

1964
Prime Minister Nehru approves Dr. Bhabha's memo describing the agreement reached with Canada. Nehru allegedly notes in the margins of the memo: "Apart from building power stations and developing electricity, there is always a built-in advantage of defense use if the need should arise."
—Ashok Kapur, India's Nuclear Option (New York: Praeger, 1976), p. 193.

Early 1964
India announces a five-year defense plan that calls for defense expenditures to be doubled to $2 billion by 1969. This amount makes up 5 percent of India's national income.
—Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 206-207.

8 May 1964
The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and General Electric Company of the United States sign a contract for the construction of two boiling water reactors with a total output of 380,000KW; the reactors are expected to achieve "full power operation" by October 1968. The total cost of the project is estimated at 485 million rupees; fabrication of the initial fuel charge is calculated at 50 million rupees. On the basis of these estimates, DAE projects the cost of power from the station at about "3 paise per kilowatt hour."
—Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1964-65," p. 46.

27 May 1964
Prime Minister Nehru dies of heart failure.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 60, 63.

1 June 1964
Active fuel from the CIRUS reactor is introduced into the plutonium reprocessing facility, Trombay for the first time.
—Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1964-65," p. 1.

2 June 1964
Prime Minister Nehru's successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, officially assumes duties.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 64.

1964
India produces its first weapon-grade plutonium by reprocessing spent fuel from the CIRUS reactor at the Phoenix plant at Trombay.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 28, 64.

3 August 1964
Dr. Bhabha describes the nuclear facility at Trombay on All-India Radio saying, it is "by far the largest scientific and technical institution in the country, with a staff of some 1,550 scientist and engineers, and a total staff of nearly 7,000."
—Homi. J. Bhabha, "Development of Atomic Energy in India," All India Radio address, 3 August 1964, in Jain, Nuclear India, vol. 2, p. 146.

18 August 1964
The "first batch of fully irradiated fuel elements" are charged for processing in the plutonium reprocessing facility, Trombay (Maharashtra). Since then the plant is in put into continuous operation, taking into account safety considerations. The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) reports that as a consequence of the reprocessing operations, "plutonium in appreciable quantities has been isolated in a pure state in the form of an aqueous solution of its compound and as an oxide."
—Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1964-65," pp. 12-13.

17 September 1964
Dr. Bhabha attends an IAEA meeting in Vienna and states that India welcomes the prospect of utilizing atomic explosions for civil engineering projects, under the supervision of the international community.
—Statement by Bhabha at the Eighth IAEA General Conference, 17 September 1964 in J.P. Jain, Nuclear India, vol. 2, p. 157.

29 September 1964
US Secretary of State Dean Rusk announces that the United States anticipates a Chinese atmospheric nuclear test in the near future. Shortly after this statement is made, Dr. Bhabha undertakes a public and private campaign for authorization from Prime Minister Shastri to conduct more work on the direct military applications of nuclear energy.
—G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), p. 242; George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 65.

4 October 1964
On a visit to London, Dr. Bhabha announces that India could detonate a nuclear bomb within 18 months if such a decision were taken; however, he asserts "I do not think such a decision will be taken."
—"Bhabha: India Can Make Atom Bomb in 18 Months," National Herald, 5 October 1964, in George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 65.

6 October 1964
B.K. Nehru, India's ambassador to the United States, requests that the US secretary of state make a public announcement that "India, like Communist China, has potential to produce nuclear weapons but as good citizen of world India has no intention of producing nuclear weapons" and also commend India for its policy.
—State Department to US Embassy (New Delhi), cable no. 744, 6 October 1964, p. 1, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy FOIA files, India, National Security Archive, Washington, DC, in George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 489.

7 October 1964
Prime Minister Shastri attends a conference of non-aligned nations in Cairo and seeks the support of other states to "persuade China to desist from developing nuclear weapons." Meanwhile, he insists that in India the nuclear establishment is "under firm orders not to make a single experiment, not to perfect a single device which is not needed for peaceful uses of atomic energy."
—G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), p. 25.

13 October 1964
According to the "US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's National Intelligence Estimate," India's defense budget amounts to $1.8 billion, or 28 percent of India's total government spending. The spending on activities in the nuclear field amounts to $63 million, or one percent of the national budget. The "Intelligence Estimate" also concludes that Department of Atomic Energy records indicate that from 1954 through 1964 India, spent $220 million on its nuclear program, although additional, hidden sources of funding may also exist. During this period there are three varying prices put forward for the cost of developing nuclear weapons: according to Dr. Bhabha a single nuclear device would cost 1.75 million rupees ($350,000), according to Prime Minister Shastri it would cost 40-50 crore rupees ($84-105 million), and according to one American scientist a "militarily significant program" would cost 25 crore rupees ($52.5 million) plus and additional 10 crore rupees ($21 million) for operating expenses.
—US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, National Intelligence Estimate paper, "The Indian Nuclear Problem: Proposed Course of Action," October 13, 1964, app. 3, "Economic Factors," p. 1, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, FOIA files, India, National Security Archive, Washington, DC, in George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 69, 79.

16 October 1964
China conducts a test of a nuclear weapon. Prime Minister Shastri declares that the test threatens world peace.
—US Embassy (New Delhi) to State Department, cable no. 1203, 16 October 1964, p. 1, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy FOIA files, India, National Security Archive, Washington, DC, in George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 490.

16 October 1964
Dr. H. Bhabha calls a press conference in London when he hears about the Chinese nuclear test. He informs reporters that, if they wanted to, Indian scientists could also produce a "nuclear bomb" within 18 months.
—Shyam Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb (Ghaziabad: Vikas, 1979), p. 113.

October 1964
Defense Minister Y.B Chavan claims that the Chinese nuclear test will not have a significant impact on China's military strength since the short-term threat to India remains China's conventional forces.
—G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), p. 26.

18 October 1964
To reassure India in the wake of China's nuclear test, President Lyndon Johnson announces that the United States would offer its "strong support" for non-nuclear weapons states in the event of nuclear blackmail.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 87.

18 October 1964
Nath Pai, leader of the opposition Praja Socialist Party, challenges Prime Minister Shastri's leadership and states that India should consider obtaining its own nuclear deterrent.
—"Nath Pai Wants to Produce the Bomb," Indian Express, 19 October 1964, in George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 66.

19 October 1964
Prime Minister Shastri tells a radio audience that the India government is not in favor of following the Chinese example of developing and testing nuclear weapons.
—Shyam Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb (Ghaziabad: Vikas, 1979), p. 109.

20 October 1964
In a conversation with an official from the US embassy, Joint Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs V.C. Trivedi states that India is committed to keeping its nuclear program limited to peaceful uses, although "no one could at present gauge the degree of pressure that might be mounted on the government to alter its present policy."
—US Embassy (New Delhi) to the State Department, airgram no. A-411, "India's Nuclear Policy in the Wake of ChiCom Nuclear Detonation," 23 October 1964, in Virginia Foran, US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, 1945-1991, no. 01016.

21 October 1964
According to a US National Intelligence Estimate, "India, given the facilities it now has, could produce and test a first nuclear device in one to three years after a decision to do so." This estimate calls attention to the apparent discrepancy between the plutonium separation capacity of the plant at Trombay and the needs of the peaceful nuclear program. In addition, the estimate notes that the plant produces weapons-grade plutonium that could be used by metallurgical specialists to construct the cores of nuclear weapons.
—US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, memorandum for members of the Committee of Principals, "Revision of Appendix 4 of the paper entitled 'The Indian Nuclear Problem: Proposed Course of Action,' dated October 13, 1964," 19 November 1964, p. 2, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy FOIA files, India, National Security Archive, Washington, DC, in George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 67.

22 October 1964
While in Paris, Indian Minister of Information and Broadcasting Indira Gandhi states in a televised interview that "India is in a position to produce the bomb within 18 months. But I think we should not deviate from our stand and should use atomic energy for peaceful purposes only."
—G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), p. 30.

24 October 1964
Dr. Bhabha gives a broadcast on All India Radio, saying that "atomic weapons give a State possessing them in adequate numbers a deterrent power against attack from a much stronger State." He cites a study by US nuclear scientists on peaceful nuclear explosions to support claims about the remarkably low cost of nuclear weapons. He asserts that a 10kt explosion would cost "USD 350,000 or Rs. 17.5 lakhs [1.75 million rupees]" and a "two megaton explosion, i.e. one equivalent to 2 million tons of TNT, would cost USD 600,000 or 30 lakh rupees [three million]." He contrasts this with the "current prices" of TNT, saying that "2 million tons of it would cost some 150 crore rupees [1,500 million rupees]." Dr. Bhabha further calculates that "a stockpile of some 50 atomic bombs would cost under 10 crore rupees [100 million rupees] and a stockpile of 50 two-megaton hydrogen bombs something of the order of 15 crore rupees [150 million rupees]." Dr. Bhabha concludes his broadcast by calling for the United Nations and the "great powers" to pursue nuclear disarmament so that states like India that have voluntarily refrained from developing weapons will not have to do so in the future.
—Homi. J. Bhabha, All India Radio address, 24 October 1964 in J.P. Jain, Nuclear India, vol. 2, pp. 159-161.

24 October 1964
Indian Defense Minister Yeshwant Rao Chavan makes a statement reflecting the views of Prime Minister Shastri, saying that the Chinese nuclear test will not lead to a change in India's nuclear policies.
—Shyam Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb (Ghaziabad: Vikas, 1979), p. 120.

26 October 1964
In its weekly magazine, Organiser, the Hindu-nationalist Jana Sangh Party strongly advocates nuclear weapons by stating that "the eunuch government decided years ago in its ahimisic (the philosophy of non-violence) idiocy to spend crores on nuclear power but not to use the same crores on developing the nuclear bomb. We had the chance to do it before China did it and so we could tell that we meant business and that we were ahead of China. In our criminal folly we missed it."
—T.T. Poulose, "India's Nuclear Policy" in Poulose, ed. Perspectives of India's Nuclear Policy (New Delhi: Young Asia, 1978), p. 105.

26 October 1964
Former Defense Minister Y.B. Chavan addresses a public meeting, saying "Our joining the atomic race will only end our non-alignment and hasten war and worldwide destruction. China, by her test, has invited worldwide resentment, whereas India has earned world-wide appreciation." In his opinion, India should neither build nuclear weapons nor accept a nuclear umbrella.
—G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), p. 30.

27 October 1964
The Congress party holds a meeting to draft policy resolutions for adoption at an All India Congress Committee (AICC) meeting to take place on 7 November. Foreign Minister Swaran Singh prepares the draft resolution, which demonstrates approval of the government's current policy of refraining from manufacturing nuclear weapons.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 68.

29 October 1964
An official at the US embassy sends a cable to the US secretary of state in Washington reporting that "there appears to be a considerable body of opinion both within and outside Congress Party which favors Indian construction of bomb regardless of cost and of prior GOI [Government of India] pledges to restrict itself to peaceful uses of nuclear power. Support for moving ahead on bomb construction doubtless was given fillip when Bhabha made the disingenuous statement to radio audience on October 24 that 'atom bomb explosion' on the same dimensions as Hiroshima would only cost India about USD 350,000." On the subject of Prime Minister Shastri, the cable states that he "may well find himself in difficult position if he persists in no-bomb policy. His opponents within Congress are likely to make efforts to capitalize on the issue, which is ready-made for those who have alleged that Shastri (unlike Morarji) would be a 'weak' [prime minister]."
—US Embassy (New Delhi) to Secretary of State, cable no. 1323, 29 October 1964, in Virginia Foran, US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, 1945-1991, no. 01031.

29 October 1964
A second cable from the US embassy in New Delhi to Washington reports that an official from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs told the embassy that internal pressures to "develop its own bomb" were increasing and that Dr. Bhabha was "the leading advocate for this group, and he was actively campaigning to go down nuclear road."
—US Embassy (New Delhi) to Secretary of State, cable no. 1323, 29 October 1964, in Virginia Foran, US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, 1945-1991, no. 01031.

29 October 1964
According to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Indian Minister of External Affairs Swaran Singh and Minister of Railways S.K. Patil unite with Dr. Bhabha in advocating a program to develop nuclear weapons during a cabinet meeting on nuclear policy. Only two cabinet ministers, Defense Minister Y.B. Chavan and Food and Agriculture Minister C. Subramaniam, oppose Indian development of nuclear weapons. A source from the Ministry of External Affairs claims that the "discussions had gone far enough for Shastri to authorize Bhabha to come up with estimate of what was involved in India's attempting an underground 'explosion'."
—Robert Rochlin, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, memorandum, "Comments on Non-Proliferation Background Papers of December 12, 1964," 31 December 1964, p. 2 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, FOIA files, National Security Archive, Washington, DC; US Embassy (New Delhi) to Secretary of State, cable no. 1323, October 29, 1964, in Virginia Foran, US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, 1945-1991, no. 01031.

2 November 1964
At a press conference M.R. Masani, General Secretary of the Swatantra Party, advocates that India seek protection of a US nuclear umbrella instead of pursuing indigenous nuclear weapons development. He says, "A nuclear force, in order to act as a deterrent, must be vastly superior to that of the enemy. It is highly problematic whether India would ever be capable of achieving such superiority over Communist China."
—G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), p. 27.

7 November 1964
During a session of the All-India Congress Committee (AICC) held in Guntur, Uttar Pradesh, a group of delegates led by Congress Parliamentary Party General Secretary, Bibhuti Mishra, argues that the Congress policy should support the indigenous manufacture of nuclear weapons. He upholds that the benefits of having nuclear weapons would be a better defense against China, a heightened sense of national morale, and the restoration of Indian leadership in South Asia. Mishra states, "If we do not decide today to make the bomb, events will force us after some time to do so. If suddenly China attacks us, we will have to seek the help of the USA or Russia. This should not be. We must have our own bomb." Also during this session, more than 100 Congressmen sign a document that requests a "secret session" be held during the 1965 meeting of the AICC in Durgapur to discuss the development of nuclear weapons in more detail.
—Shyam Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb (Ghaziabad: Vikas, 1979), pp. 110-111, 122.; G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), p. 28.

8 November 1964
Despite discussions in support of a pro-nuclear weapon policy, the AICC resolution of 8 November endorses the existing party policy, which supports the development of nuclear energy for strictly peaceful purposes. However, the resolution also advocates that the government "re-double" its work in the development of peaceful nuclear energy in order to benefit the Indian people. At this time Prime Minister Shastri proclaimed, "we will try to eliminate the threat and terror of nuclear weapons rather than enter into competition with other countries to make or produce atom bombs here."
—Shyam Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb (Ghaziabad: Vikas, 1979), p. 111; G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), p. 29.

10 November 1964
Prime Minister Shastri makes a public statement that India should work toward the elimination of nuclear weapons instead of building them.
—Shyam Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb (Ghaziabad: Vikas, 1979), p. 120.

17 November 1964
Dr. Bhabha tells the press that he opposes "India being stampeded into developing [a] nuclear arsenal merely because China has detonated a nuclear device." He also restates that his conclusions about the cost of developing a peaceful nuclear explosion came from information from US scientists and that he would stand by those figures.
—Times of India, 18 November 1964, in George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 75.

20 November 1964
Defense Minister Chavan makes a statement in response to the Chinese nuclear threat saying that "If any country uses nuclear weapons, it would not remain a local conflict. It would mean escalation into a major war. If such a war were to break out, we have friends to support us."
—Times of India, 21 November 1964, in George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 77.

Late November 1964
As a result of the Chinese nuclear test, the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) includes Plowshare projects with other areas of proposed cooperation with India to counterbalance the impact of China's test. A discussion paper from the AEC mentions interest on behalf of the World Bank and various US agencies in "the role nuclear excavation projects might play in solving some of India's basic river problems." This paper also expresses that the United States and Dr. Bhabha conduct preliminary talks on the issue of a US-India assessment of Plowshare applications that could make use of "US devices, under sole US control."
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 91.

23-25 November 1964
During its winter session, the Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament) holds a debate on international affairs, which erupts into a nuclear weapons row. The debate centers on interpretations of China's motivations and how Indian should respond. The opposition Jan Sangh Party takes the lead in advocating the Realist approach that India develop nuclear weapons to negotiate with the international community from a position of strength, regardless of cost. Congress Party members argue that nuclear weapons are linked to international prestige more so than security and that is why India should leave its options open. Those who oppose Indian nuclear weapons development make two claims in regard to China: first, China was able to put the money toward nuclear weapons because it lacked the democratic decisionmaking that would put societal needs first; and second, Russia provided technological assistance to China and that cooperation would continue. Under such circumstances, India would not be able to maintain its policy of non-alignment and should therefore seek nuclear protection from the United States. Following this debate, Prime Minister Shastri says that the government will proceed with the development of nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. However, his statement that "Our policy stands, but who can guarantee what will happen in the future," indicates that the nuclear debate is not over.
—Shyam Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb (Ghaziabad: Vikas, 1979), p. 76, 111-12; Lok Sabha Debates, 23 November 1964, col. 1280, in George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 77; "PM Rejects Plea for Change in Atoms-for-Peace Policy." Hindustan Times, November 24, 1964, in George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 68.

26 November 1964
The Executive Committee of the Congress Parliamentary Party meets to continue the nuclear debate and to attempt to sway the prime minister to change his stance. Party leaders recommend enhancing nuclear science and investigating the implications of the Chinese test. A colleague of Dr. Bhabha, K.C. Pant, suggests that India should develop its capacity to manufacture a nuclear weapon quickly in case of necessity.
—"Shastri's Stand on Bomb Issue," Times of India, 27 November 1964, p. 1, in George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 68.

27 November 1964
The Lok Sabha (India's lower house of parliament) holds another nuclear debate. The Jana Sangh Party introduces a resolution calling for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The Swatantra Party is more hesitant, reiterating Masani's suggestion to seek US nuclear protection; however, acknowledging that if this protection is not sought or is not available, the Indian government should encourage the development of a domestic nuclear weapons capability. The Communist Party criticizes the resolution and supports the government's current position against developing nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Shastri intervenes in the debate, instructing a Jan Sangh MP to refrain from quoting Dr. Bhabha out of context in regard to the potential for inexpensive development of nuclear weapons. He announces that Dr. Bhaba fully supports his policy and says that while they oppose building nuclear weapons, he clarifies that they are in favor of peaceful nuclear developments, including nuclear explosives for use in building tunnels and other such large-scale industrial projects.
—Shyam Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb (Ghaziabad: Vikas, 1979), p. 113, 120; George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 82.

4 December 1964
The Jan Sangh Party formalizes its support for a policy to develop nuclear weapons in a resolution of the Party's General Working Committee. The resolution states that the Committee "considers it imperative that an all out effort be made to build up an independent nuclear deterrent" and it urges the government to reverse its policy of opposition to nuclear weapons development.
—R.L.M. Patel, India: Nuclear Weapons and International Politics (Delhi: National, 1961), p. 79, cited in Shyam Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb (Ghaziabad: Vikas, 1979), p. 112.

4 December 1964
In a memorandum on the review of US nonproliferation policy, the deputy under secretary of state includes a preliminary study on the implications of providing nuclear weapons "under US custody" to "friendly Asian" militaries in cases of threat or attack by China. The memo anticipates that military units in these countries would have to be trained to handle and deliver the weapons by US personnel. India is given special consideration for this plan since the United States hopes to preclude an independent national program. US officials estimate that India would be able to indigenously develop and test its own nuclear device one to three years after deciding to do so and by 1970 could produce "about a dozen weapons in the 20kt range."
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 91-92.

5 December 1964
While in London, Prime Minister Shastri tells the press that he has spoken with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson about the possibility of nuclear assurances from the "great powers" to deter nuclear threats from China.
—Shyam Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb (Ghaziabad: Vikas, 1979), p. 121.

7 December 1964
Prime Minister Shastri clarifies that in his discussions with Prime Minister Wilson, he was concerned about protection for all nations without nuclear weapons, not only India, and that in regard to the United States and the Soviet Union, it is their responsibility to prevent nuclear proliferation and that the best way to do so is through the complete elimination of those weapons.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 87.

8 December 1964
Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs R.K. Nehru delivers a speech at a meeting of the Indian Council of World Affairs. He declares that the government remains devoted to its policy of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and that suggestions to seek super power protection against China and to develop an indigenous nuclear weapon capability have been rejected. He states that the Indian government made this decision based on India's commitment to limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the hope of achieving disarmament on a global scale and on the finding that China's motives for developing nuclear weapons were purely political. He concludes that it would take China six to seven years to build a "minimum size" nuclear arsenal and that, lacking Soviet support, China would be unlikely to develop a "modern" delivery system.
—Shyam Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb (Ghaziabad: Vikas, 1979), p. 119.

1964
The waste evaporation plant set up to handle "medium and low active wastes" from the plutonium reprocessing facility reveals several problems related to the facility. The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) proposes to carry out "modifications" in the "radioactive portion" of the plant to allow for continuous operations.
—Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1964-65," p. 13.

1964
The 40MW CIRUS reactor continues to be operated at its peak level. During 1964, the reactor achieves a total power output and operating time of 8,169MW days and 5,541 hours respectively. This brings the reactor's total power output to 14,543MW and operating time to 17,878 hours since it first became critical in July 1960. Some uranium fuel rods in the reactor are irradiated for "maximum fuel burn-up."
—Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1964-65," p. 3.

1964
The Atomic Energy Research Board approves the Reactor Engineering Division's report on a "prototype power reactor." The proposed reactor will be "...fueled by natural uranium dioxide enriched with plutonium and moderated with heavy water. It will have pressurized heavy water as coolant in the inner 37 channels and provision for other test coolants like organic, boiling water, or fog in the surrounding 18 channels." The reactor will be generate 15MW of electric power and is expected to cost 80 million rupees.
—Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1964-65," p. 4.

1964
Preliminary work is completed for setting up of a "20-element seismic array for the detection of nuclear explosions" at Gauribidnur, about 47-miles north of Bangalore (Karnataka). The first phase of the project, which involves the setting up of 10 elements of the array, is expected to be completed by the end of 1965.
—Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1964-65," p. 6.

1964
After conducting "pilot plant studies," the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) finalizes plans for the production of "ceramic grade uranium dioxide" at the uranium metal plant at Trombay (Maharashtra). DAE also plans to expand the uranium metal plant and set up a new plant for the manufacture of "ceramic grade uranium dioxide." Plans are also drawn to set up a plant to produce "hafnium-free zirconium oxide."
—Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1964-65," pp. 11-12.

1964
During 1964, 725kg of heavy water is reconcentrated at the Heavy Water Reconcentration Plant. The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) begins work on a project report to build a heavy water plant with an annual capacity of 200 tons.
—Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1964-65," p. 12.

1964
The Department of Atomic Energy's (DAE) Fuel Element Fabrication Facility completes five years of operation. During 1964, 275 fuel elements containing about 15 tons of uranium metal are fabricated at the facility for use in the CIRUS reactor and for experiments in the plutonium reprocessing facility.
—Department of Atomic Energy: Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1964-65," p. 16.

1964
With the help of air samples collected by the Indian Air Force (IAF), the Department of Atomic Energy's (DAE') Air Monitoring Section determines that China used U-235 as the fissionable material for its first nuclear test on 16 October 1964. The DAE establishes two additional monitoring stations in Nainital (Uttar Pradesh) and Gulmarg (Kashmir).
—Department of Atomic Energy: Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1964-65," p. 10.

1964
The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) prepares a "preliminary project report" for the setting up of an enriched uranium fabrication facility to supply uranium fuel elements for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station. However, the enriched uranium is likely to be imported.
—Department of Atomic Energy: Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1964-65," p. 17.

1964
Subsequent to the successful pilot-scale production of nuclear-grade zirconium sponge, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) decides to proceed with the construction with a "full-scale zirconium plant at Trombay (Maharashtra). In addition, a detailed "technical project report" is also prepared to fabricate finished zircaloy sections to meet the requirements of "future nuclear power stations" in India.
—Department of Atomic Energy: Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1964-65," pp. 17, 19.

1964
The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) initiates a study for "setting up an experimental fast reactor in the first stage, and later a fast breeder reactor" for exploiting India's vast reserves of thorium. In addition a study is commissioned to analyze the design of a Swedish Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor for the use of thorium in India.
—Department of Atomic Energy: Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1964-65," p. 22.

Late 1964-Early 1965
Dr. Bhabha seeks a "Plowshare device" or blue prints for a device from the United States.
—George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 90.

22 January 1965
Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri formally inaugurates India's plutonium reprocessing facility at Trombay (Maharashtra).
—Department of Atomic Energy: Government of India, "Brief Annual Report: 1964-1965," p. 1.