This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

1982
Indian nuclear scientists at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) reportedly develop an improved version of the nuclear device tested in 1974. The redesigned device weighs between 170-200kg and incorporates more reliable neutron initiators, better conventional high-explosive lenses, improved electronics, and other design changes to reduce the size and weight, and increase yield. Although the device's individual sub-subsystems are tested under laboratory conditions, the scientists make the case for full-scale explosive testing.
—George Perkovich, "More Robust Nuclear Policy Is Considered," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 242.

15 January 1982
In an interview with the Financial Times, Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi confirms that Pakistan did not give any assurances to Washington about not "detonating a nuclear device" in return for the recently ratified $3.2 billion arms and economic aid package from the United States. Shahi says, "We have given no assurances of any kind to the United States with regard to our nuclear program." However, he adds, that Pakistan understands the position of the US Congress. "The US has made its position clear and we have understood it. Whether we explode a nuclear device will be a decision Pakistan will take knowing the consequences," Shahi says. Finally he repeats that Pakistan has no intention of constructing nuclear weapons. "We make a distinction between an explosion and weapons," he says. "We do not rule out the possibility of a detonation if it is necessary for our program."
—Alain Cass, "Pakistan Denies Giving Pledge on N-Testing," Financial Times (London), 15 January 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 15 January 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 January 1982
Unit 2 of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS-2) is shut down because of erosion caused by excess moisture in the turbine. The turbines might take some six months to replace; and the moisture problem might take one year to resolve. A similar problem plagued Unit 1 in 1973-74. One report calculates that Unit 1 averaged a shut-down every 13 days; the figure for Unit 2 was 19 days. Apparently, the two units of RAPP have an operating record "in the lower 10 percent of the world's reactors."
—"Both Units of India's Rajasthan Nuclear Plant Have Been Shut Down," Nucleonics Week, 8 April 1982, p. 10.

13 February 1982
Delivering a speech to the National Productivity Council Federation, Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Dr. H.N. Sethna says, "Despite shortcomings, India has acquired its own nuclear high technology. This has made it possible to launch a fast reactor program based on plutonium." Also, according to a spokesman from the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), work has begun on India's fifth nuclear power station. Located in Gujarat, the station will consist of four 235MW units fueled by natural uranium and moderated by heavy water. The fuel for the project will be supplied by the Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) in Hyderabad. The first unit is expected to come online in nine years.
—"Energy: Nuclear Power," New Delhi Home Service, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 February 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 24 February 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 February 1982
When questioned about what India's response might be were Pakistan to develop a nuclear capability, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi replies, "...I don't think that I can give a categorical answer and bind the Indian government to any position. As I say, I don't think, even if Pakistan does something like this, that we should do it. But it's not right for me to make any kind of categorical statement on it." Gandhi claims that Pakistan is on the verge of developing a nuclear capability. However, she downplays the idea that India might intervene to prevent Pakistan from acquiring a nuclear bomb.
—"India's Gandhi Tells Why She is Sour on US," US News & World Report, 15 February 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 15 February 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 February 1982
When asked if Pakistan was acquiring fissile material or making nuclear weapons, Defense Minister Venkataraman tells the Lok Sabha (upper house of parliament) that New Delhi "hopes Pakistan would abide by its assurances that its nuclear program has no non-peaceful dimensions."
—"Indian Defense Minister on Pakistan's Nuclear Program," New Delhi Home Service, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 February 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 24 February 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

February 1982
India is reported to likely delay commissioning of the first unit of the Madras Atomic Power Plant (MAPP-1) at Kalpakkam near Madras for an unspecified amount of time because of a short fall in heavy water. New Delhi is currently deciding whether to purchase more heavy water from the Soviet Union, which would require placing MAPP-1 under international safeguards, or wait for its domestic heavy water capacity to increase. The reactor will require 240-250 tons of heavy water, but according to G.K. Reddy, a political observer, only 35 tons are currently available. Indian officials have not confirmed these figures. Although India has previously contracted 456 tons of heavy water from the Soviet Union, it intends to keep Units 1 and 2 of MAPP free from international safeguards. As part of the MAPP-1 and MAPP-2 fuel cycle, India is constructing its third spent-fuel reprocessing plant, with a 100 ton-per-year capacity, in the vicinity of the MAPP units. Not only will this plant reprocess spent fuel from the MAPP facility, but also be able to reprocess fuel from the 15MW fast breeder test reactor (FBTR) at Kalpakkam.

Apparently, heavy water production is the only area left in India's commercial nuclear power program where it is unable to "solve the technical constraints and become self-reliant." India currently has four heavy water production facilities:

• Baroda in Gujarat, with a capacity of 67 tons per year, began producing heavy water in July 1980 after a fire and explosion in December 1977 closed the plant. The Baroda facility still faces numerous operational and technical problems, as well as lack of feeder stock and a reliable power supply.
  
  
• Tuticorin in Tamil Nadu, with a capacity of 71 tons per year, was commissioned in mid-1978; the facility has "faced a number of operational problems, including technical difficulties, lack of feeder stock and power constraints."
  
  
• Kota in Rajasthan, with a capacity of 100 tons/year, will be commissioned later during 1982. A Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) spokesperson says the performance of the facility has been "satisfactory."

• Hazira in Gujarat State is similar to the Thal Vaishet facility in that it is also connected with a fertilizer project and is expected to have a capacity of 70-85 tons per year. The plant will also be based on an ammonia/ hydrogen monothermal exchange process. However, the project "has been deferred for some time," says a DAE spokesperson.
  
  
• Manuguru in Andhra Pradesh will be modeled on the Kota facility; its annual production capacity is expected to be 200 tons, double that of the Kota facility. The Manuguru plant will be based on the hydrogen sulfide-water bithermal exchange process.

5-6 March 1982
India's Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) sends a senior official to the Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC), Hyderabad, to investigate charges of illegal dumping of hazardous material outside its plant. The illegal dumping allegedly caused a fire that fatally burned two children who were in the area. The Indian Express reports that a preliminary police investigation "has revealed that potentially dangerous waste material was regularly being dumped by the NFC on open ground with no fencing or warning signs." A NFC safety manager reportedly told police that the NPC only disposes non-combustible magnesium chloride on the open dumping ground, but later "admittedly reluctantly" that zirconium power might have been mixed with the waste material. DAE officials state that the children did not come into contact with any radioactive material and that the accident occurred on the boundary of the complex, "beyond the protected area." The NFC maintains it only uses the area for dumping non-combustible materials, specifically magnesium chloride. Last March a similar accident occurred resulting in three deaths and several injuries.
—"India Probes Fatal Fire near Waste Dump," Nuclear Fuel, 15 March 1982, p. 17; "India's Department of Atomic Energy has Concluded...," Nuclear Fuel, 9 March 1982, p. 17.

6 March 1982
Unit 1 of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS-1) is shut down because of leaks in the moderator and the heat exchangers and the end shroud of the reactor. Although replacing the heat exchangers is not expected to take long, the shutdown could become more prolonged depending on the duration of other problems. According to one calculation, Unit 1 of the plant has averaged a shutdown every 13 days during the nine years of its operation. A Western observer remarks that the problems are not endemic to the Canadian-supplied CANDU reactors and can be fixed with the "...right metallurgy, good welding, and proper water treatment."
—"Both Units of India's Rajasthan Nuclear Plant Have Been Shut Down," Nucleonics Week, 8 April 1982, p. 10.

7 March 1982
Sources at the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) confirm that two more 235MW units will be added to the Narora Atomic Power Complex in Uttar Pradesh. A total of six nuclear power units are planned for the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1978-83). A committee is currently evaluating locations in Assam for a two unit nuclear power plant.
—"Energy: Nuclear Power," New Delhi Home Service, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 7 March 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 17 March 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 April 1982
The Indian Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) releases a report to parliament stating that construction on India's fifth nuclear power station has started. The station is located at Kakrapar in Gujarat state; it will have two 235MW reactors. The report also states that "preparations are on to start reprocessing of power reactor fuel at the reprocessing plant in Tarapur to recover plutonium." The report says the plutonium produced would be of fuel grade. However, an Indian nuclear scientist says the reprocessing plant is designed to produce both weapons-grade or fuel-grade plutonium, depending on what the government wants. The reprocessing plant is located near the US-built Tarapur nuclear power plant, which is fueled by US-supplied uranium. The United States halted uranium fuel shipments in 1981 because of India's refusal to accept Washington's conditions for international safeguards on all its nuclear power plants." Trial runs at the Tarapur reprocessing plant were conducted for several months during 1981 and a few spent fuel rods from the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS) have been sent to the plant to start operations.
—"India Builds New Atomic Power Stations," Xinhua (Beijing), 16 April 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 16 April 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; S.G. Roy, "India is Preparing...," UPI, 16 April 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 16 April 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "India to Start Producing Plutonium," New York Times, 17 April 1982, p. 5; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 17 April 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

March-April 1982
Admiral Dawson, who succeeds Pereira as the Naval Chief of Staff, also opposes the nuclear submarine project. A team of naval designers led by Captain Subbarao persuades Dawson to reject the Bhabha Atomic Research Center's (BARC) nuclear reactor design in favor of the one designed by naval engineers. In subsequent meetings with defense minister R. Venkataraman, Dawson opposes suggestions to get Soviet assistance in the design of a nuclear reactor and complains that the Navy is not being kept abreast of the Soviet proposal. Dawson is also supported by BARC, which views the Soviet offer as a ploy to undermine indigenous efforts. However, Venkataraman overrules Dawson and informs him that the government has decided to seek Soviet assistance.
—Raj Chengappa, "Arsenal For The Gods," Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2000), pp. 287-288.

19 April 1982
During a meeting with Japanese foreign minister Yoshio Sakurauchi, India's foreign minister P.V. Narashima Rao reiterates that India will not sign the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) because it believes the treaty "discriminates between nuclear powers and non-nuclear countries." However, Rao says India will continue to work with Japan in "advancing disarmament."
—"India Not to Join the NPT, Rao Tells Sakurauchi," Jili Press Service (Tokyo), 19 April 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 19 April 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>

21 April 1982
India plans to construct two additional heavy water plants to end the chronic heavy water shortages in its nuclear industry. The new plants will be built using indigenous technology and resources. India declined Soviet offers to supply heavy water because the latter insisted that any plants using their heavy water would have to be subject to international safeguards.
—Alain Cass, "Delhi to Build Two Heavy Water Plants for N-Power Stations," Financial Times (London), 21 April 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 21 April 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 May 1982
The Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Dr. H.N. Sethna announces that a heavy water plant will be constructed on the banks of the Godavari River in Andhra Pradesh.
—"Nuclear Power," New Delhi Home Service, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 May 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 12 May 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 May 1982
During a private meeting with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Chief of Army Staff General Krishna Rao makes the case for an Indian nuclear deterrent. Rao cites potential nuclear threats from Pakistan, China, and the United States to buttress his case; he also briefs the prime minister on the contents of a top-secret 1976 Army report that made the case for an Indian nuclear deterrent. The prime minister tells Rao that she will inform him of her decision in the course of a few weeks.
—Raj Chengappa, "Do You Want Our Skulls Cracked," Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2000), pp. 253-255.

6 May 1982
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi denies that the Kota nuclear power station in Rajasthan is having numerous breakdowns. She says, "There is no waste of heavy water in the plant...The make-up requirements of heavy water have been well within limits." The Minister of State for Science and Technology C.P.N. Singh informs parliament "that there is no need to import heavy water for atomic reactors." India is currently producing heavy water at Baroda and Tuticorin and will start producing heavy water at the Talcher and Kota plants in the near future.
—"Nuclear Energy," New Delhi Home Service, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6 May 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 16 June 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 May 1982
Minister of State for Science and Technology C.P.N. Singh tells parliament that the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) will establish a second nuclear research facility in Madhya Pradesh to relieve overcrowding at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) at Trombay. Singh also reports that New Delhi still expects to use indigenously produced heavy water for the Unit 1 of the proposed Madras Atomic Power Plant (MAPP). Singh does not provide details on when Mapp-1 will become operational. The Mapp-1 reactor requires 240-250 tons of heavy water, but unofficial estimates of heavy water availability are between 60 to 120 tons.
—India's Department of Atomic Energy will Establish a Second...," Nucleonics Week, 13 May 1983, p. 9.

May 1982
US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger confronts visiting Indian foreign secretary M. Rasgotra with photographic evidence of India's efforts to build nuclear test shafts at Pokhran and demands an explanation. Rasgotra, who is evidently unaware of the activities, denies knowledge of any impending tests. On his return to India, Rasgotra briefs Prime Minister Indira Gandhi about his visit and warns that a nuclear test will have negative repercussions for India.
—Raj Chengappa, "Do You Want Our Skulls Cracked," Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2000), pp. 256-257.

27 May 1982
India Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman Homi Sethna inaugurates the new Nuclear Plant & Equipment Division to be operated by the Association of Indian Engineering Industry, which represents more than 1,500 Indian engineering companies. The primary purpose of the new division is to "promote indigenization" of nuclear plant and equipment production. "The DAE's highly ambitious targets call for massive collective efforts and a tremendous resource mobilization both on the part of the department and the part of industry," says T.S. Champaknath, chairman of the Nuclear Plant & Equipment Division.
—"Calling for Industry to Gear Itself up to Help India Achieve...," Nucleonics Week, 27 May 1982, pp. 6-7.

2 July 1982
Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reports that the technical problems responsible for the delays in heavy water production at the Kota heavy water plant have been identified and are being rectified; the plant is expected to start producing reactor-grade heavy water by the end of 1982. The current capacity of the Kota plant, which is 45 tons per annum, will be increased to 80 tons by March 1983.
—"Heavy Water Production," New Delhi Home Service, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 July 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 28 July 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 July 1982
Beginning October 1982, the Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) at Hyderabad will undergo an expansion program, which will increase its annual production of natural uranium from 100 to 200 tons.
—"Energy; Uranium," New Delhi Home Service, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts," 6 July 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 14 July 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 July 1982
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi informs parliament the existing stock of nuclear fuel in the US-built Tarapur Nuclear Power Station (TAPS) will probably last until 1984. Furthermore, the enriched uranium sections of the Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) at Hyderabad will be closed down "in the event of non-receipt of further supplies." Gandhi assures parliament that her administration will keep Tarapur operational.
—"Shortage of Nuclear Fuel," New Delhi Home Service, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 July 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 28 July 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 July 1982
The Reagan administration announces the United States and India have reached a compromise that will allow France to supply low-enriched uranium fuel to the American-built Tarapur nuclear power plant. The settlement will effectively waive a provision of the 1963 bilateral agreement between the United States and India which states that Tarapur nuclear power plant "shall be operated on no other special nuclear material than that made available by the United State commission and special nuclear material produced therefrom." According to the report, India agrees to place all the spent-fuel stored at Tarapur and the fuel provide by France under international safeguards. Also, India assures the United States that the fuel it supplied for the Tarapur facility will not be reprocessed without the consent of the United States. A US State Department official says, "the agreement provides that any special nuclear material produced at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) may only be reprocessed in India facilities upon a joint determination by the parties – both India and the United States – that the article of the (1963) agreement that include safeguards provisions maybe be effectively applied."
—"India Not Involved in Power Grouping, Says Indira Gandhi," Xinhua (Beijing), 30 July 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 30 July 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Bernard Weintraub, "Reagan and Mrs. Gandhi Dispute on Nuclear Fuel for India," New York Times, 30 July 1982, p. 1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 30 July 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US to Okay French Fuel for Tarapur," Nuclear Fuel, 2 August 1982, p. 1.

8 August 1982
French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson reports that France has been asked to supply nuclear fuel (low-grade uranium) for the Tarapur plant in India. According to Cheysson, France will not ask for "any special safeguards or joint determination for reprocessing spent fuel." However, it would require the "fissile materials from the reprocessing to be subject to control of the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA)." Cheysson concludes that the United States would not be part of the agreement. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, when questioned whether India would reprocess the US-supplied spent fuel at Tarapur, said, "we will face" the issue when it comes up.
—"French Foreign Minister Visits India," Xinhua (Beijing), 8 August 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 8 August 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; S.G. Roy, "The United States will not...," UPI, 8 August 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 8 August 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 August 1982
Prime Minister India Gandhi tells parliament that India will reprocess the spent uranium from the Tarapur nuclear power plant, "despite objections from Washington." Gandhi remarks, "The American government has reservations about it, but that does not make a difference to us....India has made it clear that it reserves the right to reprocessing...and the work will be done as and when necessary." The prime minister adds that although the United States claims the right to prior consent to any reprocessing of spent fuel, such a stipulation was not written into the 1963 contract for the Tarapur plant. In a separate speech, India's Minister of State for Science and Technology C.P.N. Singh says that the Tarapur agreement has a specific clause that allows India to reprocess the plant's spent-fuel.
—S.G. Roy, "Gandhi: India will Reprocess Nuclear Fuel," UPI, 11 August 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 11 August 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; S.G. Roy, "India Vows to Reprocess Nuclear Waste," UPI, 12 August 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 12 August 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> .

17 August 1982
Iran's speaker of the parliament, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani says that India will assist Iran in developing its nuclear energy program. He says, "What we need from India is cooperation. We do not want to depend on the Western powers and what we need we will get from India." An unidentified Indian industry ministry official confirms India intention to help Iran with its nuclear energy program. "India will consider favorably any specific request from Iran identifying the areas of cooperation needed for nuclear power generation," the official says.
—"An Iranian Leader...," UPI, 17 August 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 17 August 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 August 1982
France suspends talks with India on the delivery of enriched uranium fuel for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) because of a disagreement over appropriate safeguards. Nuclear industry sources say that India has refused to submit to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) controls. The disagreement seems to revolve around the "perpetuity" and "pursuit" clause in the IAEA safeguards. "The 'perpetuity' clause calls for international supervision of the nuclear power plants, while the 'pursuit' clause provides for international supervision of the reprocessing of spent fuel." The Indian foreign ministry says France did not make acceptance of the above clauses a condition for the supply of nuclear fuel when India and the United States worked out an agreement on the issue. However, France maintains that Indian officials are well aware that both France and the United States adhere to IAEA regulations. An Indian foreign ministry official says, "It is for France now to make a political decision." Indian foreign secretary M.K. Rasgotra informs the US embassy in New Delhi that it was the responsibility of the United States to ensure that France would supply the nuclear fuel under the terms of the 1963 agreement. Rasgotra warns that if France persists in its demands for extra safeguards, India would abrogate the 1963 agreement and reprocess the spent-fuel and use the derived plutonium to run the Tarapur plant on mixed-oxide fuel. India's position is that since France is a surrogate supplier of nuclear fuel, it does not have any right to demand additional safeguards, not included in the original 1963 agreement.
—"France said Monday...," UPI, 30 August 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 30 August 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; S.G. Roy, "India Adamant over Nuclear Inspections," UPI, 31 August 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 31 August 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; William Claiborne, "Safeguards Issue Snags Tarapur Agreement; Indian Government Balks at Terms for Reprocessing Nuclear Fuel," Washington Post, 1 September 1983, p. A18; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 1 September 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 September 1982
India and France resume negotiations on the supply of nuclear fuel for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS).
—"Foreign News Briefs," UPI, 6 September 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 6 September 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 September 1982
French and Indian officials end three days of negotiations on the nuclear fuel supply issue without resolving their differences.
—K.K. Sharma, "Franco-Indian on N-Fuel End without Deal," Financial Times (London), 10 September 1982, p. 4; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 10 September 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 September 1982
During a press conference, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi confirms that the Soviet Union has offered to construct a 1,000MW nuclear power plant in India. Gandhi says New Delhi will "very carefully" examine the offer and leave "the technical details of the offer...to be worked out by experts later." An unidentified senior official from the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) says, "It is not a new offer. It was made when [Soviet President] Leonid Brezhnev came to New Delhi in December 1980." India did not accept the previous offer because it would have to alter its nuclear power development plans radically, says the official. India's nuclear power generation plans do not envisage building 1,000MW "super atomic power stations." Existing Indian power plants have a capacity below 500MW; and future plants will be designed to produce around 400MW.
—S.G. Roy, "India Cautious on Soviet Nuclear Offer," UPI, 23 September 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 23 September 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 October 1982
A French Embassy official says France is prepared to rush a shipment of enriched uranium fuel for the US-built Tarapur nuclear power plant if its uranium stock "dropped below a level that would not sustain the plants operation." The official says, "If there is urgency, we could deliver the fuel and then again discuss the safeguards."
—"French Assure India of Nuclear Fuel Supply," New York Times, 19 October 1982, p. 5; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 23 September 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 November 1982
French Ambassador Andre Ross and India's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman Homi N. Sethna sign an accord under which France will supply fuel the US-built Tarapur reactors. The Indo-French joint statement says, "Within the framework of the 1963 agreement for cooperation between India and the United States, France in lieu of the United States has agreed to supply enriched uranium for the Tarapur plant." The terms of the agreement call for India to purchase 20 tons of slightly enriched uranium (maximum amount under the 1963 agreement), at an annual price of $6.3 million. Ross insists safeguards will be in place but did not elaborate.
—Richard S. Ehrlich, "France, India Reach Agreement on Uranium for US-built Plant," UPI, 27 November 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 27 November 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; William Claiborne, "India Greets Mitterrand After A-Pact Signed," Washington Post, 27 November 1982, p. A16; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 27 November 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 November 1982
The United States and India exchange diplomatic notes confirming the agreement signed between US President Ronald Reagan and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 29 July 1982. By exchanging diplomatic notes, the United States waives its right to be the sole nuclear fuel supplier to the Tarapur nuclear power plant under article 2A of the 1963 US-India agreement. In return, India releases the United States from this obligation. France signed an agreement with India on 27 November 1982 to formally replace the United States as the single fuel supplier for the US-built Tarapur nuclear power plant until the end of the 1963 US-India agreement in 1993. US sources say three significant differences remain between the United States and India regarding the Tarapur nuclear power plant. The first difference is clarified by the exchanging of diplomatic notes. The sources say the new agreement implies that the Tarapur nuclear power plant will not operate on any other fuel, including mixed plutonium and uranium oxides. France will supply India with enriched uranium. Two other differences between the United States and India include: India's right to reprocess Tarapur's spent fuel, which the United States says it still has not conceded; and the Untied States contends that international safeguards still apply until the end of the original 30-year 1963 US-India agreement.
—Pearl Marshall, "US and India Take Last Formal Step Ending Fuel Supply Pact for Tarapur," Nuclear Fuel, 5 December 1982, p. 5.

20 December 1982
The Washington Post, citing US intelligence sources, alleges that Indian military leaders have prepared contingency plans to carry out a pre-emptive attack against Pakistan's nuclear facilities; the plans call for air strikes against Pakistan's New Labs (plutonium reprocessing plant) built next to the Pakistan Institute for Nuclear Science and Technology in Islamabad and the uranium enrichment plant being built in the village of Kahuta. The contingency plans were presented to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi as early as March 1982. Although Gandhi ruled out an attack at the time, she did not foreclose the option in the event Pakistan appears on the verge of acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. Apparently, the prime minister was concerned that an Indian attack might invite similar Pakistani retaliation against Indian nuclear facilities. India's Ambassador to the United States K.R. Narayanan dismisses the Post report as a "figment of imagination." Indira Gandhi's spokesperson H.Y. Prasad also denies the veracity of the Post story. Prasad says, "There is no substance in this at all. There is no proof..."
—Milton R. Benjamin, "India Said to Eye Raid on Pakistani A-Plants," The Washington Post, 20 December 1982, p. A1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 20 December 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Late 1982
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi clears a top-secret project to prepare an aerial delivery platform for nuclear weapons. Subsequently, Chief Scientific Advisor to the Indian government, V.S. Arunachalam, tasks the Armaments Research and Development Establishment (ARDE), Pune, to prepare a container to hold an air-deliverable bomb. Arunachalam also requests Vice Chief of Air Staff Air Marshall Chandrakant Gole to earmark a Jaguar aircraft from an existing squadron and a pilot to the Aircraft Systems and Testing Establishment (ASTE) in Bangalore. The Indian Air Force (IAF) is not informed about the true purpose of the mission. Irked by the conspiratorial nature of decisionmaking surrounding nuclear issues, the IAF later complains about the lack of institutional planning and the secrecy surrounding the project. [Note: Most analysts believe that India did not have a credible air-delivery platform until the mid-1990s. However, Dr. V.S. Arunachalam differs in his assessment and claims: "We had kept the platform ready and we would have delivered it even then. But it was kept a secret and we kept the misinformation going."]
—Raj Chengappa, "Arsenal For The Gods," Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2000), pp. 284-285.

Late 1982
India and the Soviet Union arrive at an understanding on the nuclear submarine project during Soviet defense minister Dmitri Ustinov's visit to New Delhi. The Soviet Union allegedly agrees to secretly assist Indian scientists in the construction of a nuclear reactor for the submarine. However, the Soviet offer to dispatch technicians for this purpose to India is reportedly rejected by the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC). Ustinov also offers to sell an older nuclear submarine to India. But Indian negotiators fear that the submarine will probably have to be decommissioned soon and leave India with the burden of disposing the radioactive reactor as well as saddle it with legal issues surrounding the spent nuclear fuel. In a counter offer, India proposes to lease a Soviet submarine instead. Ultimately, Indian and Soviet negotiators settle on a nuclear submarine lease price of approximately 3-4 billion rupees for a period of two to three years. As part of the deal, Indian naval crews will be trained in nuclear submarine operations at the headquarters of the Soviet Pacific fleet in Vladivostok.
—Raj Chengappa, "Arsenal For The Gods," Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2000), pp. 288-289; Bharat Karnad, "The Perils of Deterrence by Half Measures," Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan India Limited, 2002), p. 650.

Late 1982
The Indian government forms a secret committee to oversee plans to build a nuclear submarine; the project is called Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV). Committee members include the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), secretary of the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), Chief of Naval Staff, cabinet secretary, defense secretary, finance secretary, and home secretary. To maintain secrecy, the committee is bound by the government's policy not to commit anything on paper. The ATV project is also kept out of parliament's purview by placing it under the DRDO, whose budget and accounting rules are secret.
—Bharat Karnad, "The Perils of Deterrence by Half Measures," Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan India Limited, 2002), p. 649.

Late 1982 or Early 1983
In a secret meeting, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi tentatively approves plans for additional nuclear tests. The meeting is attended by the Scientific Advisor V.S. Arunachalam, Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) Director, Raja Ramanna, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, P.C. Alexander, Cabinet Secretary, Krishnaswamy Rao Sahib, and defense minister, Venkataraman. During the meeting, Arunachalam and Ramanna do not frame the tests as the beginning of a nuclear weaponization program; rather, they frame it is another experiment. The scientists also suggest that the risks of detection by US national technical means could be obviated by conducting the test at a test site other than Pokhran in the Rajasthan desert. However, the prime minister changes her mind and cancels the planned tests within a day of approving them. [Note: There is no documentary historical evidence to explain the reasons behind the change in the prime minister's decision to test. However, interviews with key Indian decisionmakers at the time suggest the prime minister retreated under the threat of negative economic repercussions of US and international sanctions.]
—George Perkovich, "More Robust Nuclear Policy Is Considered," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 243.

	Updated October 2003