This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

Early 1983
The Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) reportedly develops a booted-fission weapon design. The tritium required for the boosted device is probably acquired through irradiating lithium in nuclear reactors.
—George Perkovich, "More Robust Nuclear Policy Is Considered," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 242.

February 1983
A high-level Indian delegation comprising defense scientists and Indian Air Force (IAF) officers visits Israel to purchase ground-based and airborne electronic warfare (EW) equipment that can potentially neutralize Pakistani air defenses around the Kahuta uranium enrichment facility. Israel reportedly provides India with technical details about F-16s in possession of the Pakistani Air Force; the aircraft's radar frequencies, and techniques to jam them, in exchange for performance details on MiG-23 combat aircraft, in service with the IAF.
—Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), p. 346.

February 1983
India's Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) expresses exasperation at the US government's failure to approve licenses for spare parts for the Tarapur reactors. The Director of DAE's power projects engineering division says his department is reconditioning some items and trying to find substitutes for others. The parts include pump seals from Byron Jackson, valves from Rockwell, and neutron sensing devices from General Electric.
—"Because of US Failure To Approve Licenses For Some Much Needed...," Nucleonics Week, 24 February 1983, p. 4.

14 February 1983
Bhabha Atomic Research Center's (BARC) Director Raja Ramanna tells Nuclear Fuel that India has begun reprocessing commercial spent nuclear fuel, from Unit 1 of the 220MW Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPP-1) at the Tarapur nuclear fuel reprocessing facility. The Tarapur nuclear fuel reprocessing facility has the capacity of reprocessing 100 tons of spent fuel annually. Ramanna says, "We started about two months ago. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors are there watching." Asked if the Tarapur reprocessing facility will also reprocess fuel from the US-built Tarapur nuclear reactor, Ramanna says that would depend on political interpretations of various agreements. "We here are only dealing with installation of the facilities and their utilization. If they (India government officials) say reprocess, we'll reprocess. We can do it. At the moment we are busy with the RAPS fuel," he says.

The Tarapur reprocessing facility has been inactive since 1976 because of a disagreement between the India and the United States about the "joint determination" of spent fuel from the US-built 210MW Tarapur reactors. In December 1980, Indian officials announced that "subsidiary arrangements" were made with the IAEA to allow reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel; but the United States denied it had resigned its right to joint determination.

In 1981, India announced that it had begun shipping RAPP-1 fuel for reprocessing and that it would soon be followed with spent fuel from the Tarapur nuclear power plant. However, India delayed reprocessing until now in order to resolve the US-India dispute over the 1963 Tarapur agreement.

Constructed in 1976, the Tarapur fuel reprocessing center was originally constructed to reprocess fuel from the RAPP-1 and RAPP-2 reactors, as well as the Tarapur nuclear power plant. It is "designed to use the chop leach method at the head end followed by dissolution, solvent extraction, separation of fission products, purification, of separate plutonium and residual uranium, and conversion to oxide forms."
—Pearl Marshal, "India Reprocesses Rapp Fuel under IAEA Eyes," Nuclear Fuel, 14 February 1983, pp. 12-13.

20 February 1983
The New York Times reports that India has commenced producing weapons-grade plutonium at the Tarapur nuclear fuel reprocessing facility near Bombay. The operation is being monitored by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors under an agreement with the United States, Canada, and France. However, India may refuse to allow the reprocessing operation to be placed under "full-scope safeguards" in the future. An Indian embassy source in Washington, DC says the reprocessing is experimental. He adds, "We are not aware of any large-scale processing by India, and in any event India has no intention of making the bomb." India contends that any plutonium obtained from reprocessing will either go into a fast breeder reactor or into civilian use.
—Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Indian Plant Now Producing Weapons-Grade Plutonium," New York Times, 21 February 1983 p. A4; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 21 February 1983, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 February 1983
India announces the establishment of the Institute of Modern Technology (IMT) at Indore in Madhya Pradesh. According to a spokesperson from the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), the IMT will be half the size of BARC can focus on fusion research. He states, "There is some activity (in India) on the theory side on tokamaks and lasers, but now it is time to concentrate on some of these lines. Things are getting close and we shouldn't be left out. IMT is scheduled to be complete in three years."
—Fusion Research is to be Given a Boost in India...," Nucleonics Week, 24 February 1983, p. 4.

25 February 1983
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi accuses Pakistan of "covertly attempting to make nuclear weapons." She says, "One doesn't know what President Zia wants or what his intentions are, or what you can discuss, if from what we hear he has made up his mind to acquire nuclear capability which is not for peaceful purposes, what can you discuss." Gandhi is scheduled to meet Zia at the nonaligned summit in New Delhi in less than two weeks.
—Alain Cass and John Elliot, "India Fears Pakistan Nuclear Intentions," Financial Times (London), 25 February 1983, p. 14; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 25 February 1983, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 February 1983
The Director of Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) Raja Ramanna says that India will not attempt to acquire highly enriched uranium from France to fuel India's 15MW, sodium-cooled Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) at Kalpakkam, near Madras. As an alternative to the traditionally used highly enriched uranium fuel, India intends to use its advanced plutonium-based mixed-carbide fuel. Plutonium-based mixed-carbide fuel has been explored as an alterative fuel in the West for 15 years, but India will be the first to use it "as a full core," says Ramanna. Until now, India's mixed-carbide fuel has only been tested on a laboratory scale; however, final testing can only take place within an operating FBTR. Ramanna admits, "there's a certain amount of risk in it, but from every point of view it looks very promising. Only next year will we be able to tell you how its works." India favors mixed-carbide fuel because of its better breeding ratio. Rather than taking 30 years to commission a second nuclear reactor on the fuel bred from the first one, Ramanna feels India's program can reduce the "doubling time" to 15 years.

Ramanna does not give further details about the mixed-carbide fuel. However, some Western observes believe the plutonium for the fuel was supplied by the Canadian-built CIRUS heavy water reactor in operation since 1964 at Trombay. Experts estimate that CIRUS could have yielded 50kg of plutonium from 1964-74 and later increased to 10kg year. India currently has only two commercial pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs) that can supply the FBTR with plutonium, both located in Rajasthan. However, the spent fuel from Unit 1 of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Plant (RAPP-1) is under International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) safeguards "in perpetuity" because the plant uses imported heavy water. Therefore, plutonium from RAPP-1 will not be used in India's FBTR program. India has recently proven its PHWR spent fuel repossessing capability by beginning to reprocess spent fuel from the RAPP-1 at the Tarapur reprocessing facility. Furthermore, India plans to protect future PHWRs from international safeguards by using indigenously produced materials.

Although the overall design of India's FBTR is based on the French example, with some of the smaller components purchased from France, the majority of components have been produced by Indian manufacturers. The reactor vessel, the intermediate heat exchangers, the steam generators and the sodium pumps were manufactured by Bharat Heavy Electrical Ltd. and Bharat Heavy Plate & Vessel Ltd. The majority of the instrumentation and control systems were designed and constructed by the Electronics Corporation of India Ltd.

The experience gained from the FBTR, in terms of material behavior, sodium cooling, pumps and electronics operations, will be channeled into the final design of the prototype 500MW fast breeder reactor (FBR) proposed to be built at Kalpakkam. "Each is being done separately and integrated. We have to take into account that all these components must be capable of being made in India, although there will be some raw material imports such as special steel alloys. This is being done for the FBTR so I do not see why it cannot be done for the FBR," says Ramanna. When India commissions the FBTR at Kalpakkam, it will enter the second phase of its nuclear development program, "breeding with plutonium generated and accumulated in its first stage – the pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs)." Western observers believe India's "enthusiasm" for an FBR program is to disguise its embryonic weapons program. With limited international safeguards on its nuclear plants, India could be producing 600kg of plutonium annually by the early 1990s, more than adequate to produce up to 60 nuclear bombs a year.
—Pearl Marshall, "India Will Run FBTR with Mixed-Carbide Fuel Next Year – Probably with Cirus Plutonium," Nuclear Fuel, 28 February 1983, pp. 9-11.

March 1983
Israeli electronic warfare (EW) equipment is secretly ferried to the Indian Air Force (IAF) base in Jamnagar in Gujarat.
—Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), p. 346.

24 March 1983
Indian Minister of State for Science and Technology Shivraj Patil tells parliament that India is estimated to have 67,000 tons of uranium ore reserves, which is sufficient to meet India's nuclear fuel needs. India's current annual requirement of uranium is 213 tons.
—"Uranium Reserves," New Delhi Home Service, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 March 1983; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 30 March 1983, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 March 1983
India and France sign an agreement on the supply of enriched uranium for the US-built nuclear power plant at Tarapur in Maharashtra. The agreement is signed by Cogema, a subsidiary of the French Atomic Energy Commission, and India's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The agreement is finalized only after France agrees to "waive the safeguards stipulated by the London Nuclear Club, which require members to insist on what are know as 'pursuit' and 'perpetuity' clauses," the Financial Times reports. The "pursuit" clause provides for international supervision of the reprocessing of spent fuel, while the "perpetuity" clause calls for international supervision of all nuclear power facilities.
—K.K. Sharma, "India and France Conclude N-Supply Deal," Financial Times (London), 25 March 1983, p. I4; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 25 March 1983, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 March 1983
India's Minister of State for Atomic Shivraj Patil reports to parliament that work has begun on building two new heavy water facilities at Pal in Maharashtra and Manuguru in Andhra Pradesh. He also states the heavy water plant at Kota, with an installed annual capacity of 100 tons, will be commissioned by the middle of the year. Finally, he confirms the first unit of the Madras Atomic Power Station (MAPS) is expected to be commissioned this year, and the second unit in 1984-85.
—"Heavy Water Plants," New Delhi Home Service, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 30 March 1983; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 6 April 1983, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 April 1983
During a parliament briefing, Indian Prime Minister Gandhi reports India has received a total of 547.6 tons of heavy water from the Soviet Union at a cost of about $85 million. According to public documents, India has only obtained heavy water from the Soviet Union on two occasions. The first occasion was in September 1976 when India purchased 200 tons of heavy water. As a supplement to the first agreement, India purchased an additional 256 tons in March 1980, of which 125 tons have yet to be delivered. This is the first time India has disclosed that it imported an additional 216 tons of heavy water from the Soviet Union than was revealed publicly. In October 1982, the Indian Parliament was told India's heavy water requirement for fiscal year 1982-93 was 426 tons. At the same time, India reported it had produced 124 tons of heavy water domestically. However, in 1981, India had only produced 39.4 tons of heavy water, leaving many observers skeptical of how India could have made up for the shortfall in heavy water production.
—"India Apparently Imported More Heavy Water from the USSR than it has Said...," Nucleonics Weeks, 21 April 1983, p. 8.

7 May 1983
The first shipment of enriched uranium from France arrives in Hyderabad by a chartered Air India cargo flight. The seven barrels of 2,500kg each of enriched uranium will be sent to the US-built Tarapur nuclear power station which has been running about half of its 420MW capacity for more than two years.
—"India Gets Atomic Fuel from France," Xinhua (Beijing), 7 May 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 7 May 1983, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 May 1983
Indian Minister for Science, Technology & Atomic Energy, Shivraj Patil, announces the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant at Trombay is ready for recommissioning. The plant was originally decommissioned in 1972 in order to expand its reprocessing capacity and increase the plant's life. The Indian Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) says the plant's increased reprocessing capacity will permit it to reprocess spent fuel from the R-5 or Dhruva research reactor expected to be commissioned in 1984.
—"The Reprocessing Plants at Trombay is Ready for Recommissioning," Nuclear Fuel, 9 May 1983, p. 7.

25 May 1983
The Hindustan Times reports that India has received a "secret nuclear consignment" from the Soviet Union. "Top secret consignment boxes, possibly containing enriched uranium" were offloaded from a Soviet Aeroflot Jet and placed on trucks bound for the Anushakti Atomic Power Project, Kota, Rajasthan. However, the Indian foreign ministry, while denying the enriched uranium shipment story, admits that India has received a consignment of heavy water. The spokesperson says that the Soviet Union has supplied 131 tons of heavy water out of the total of 256 tons, which it agreed to supply under a protocol signed in 1979.
—"Soviet Nuclear Consignment Arrives in India," Xinhua (Beijing), 25 May 1983; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 25 May 1983, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Arrival of Soviet Uranium in India Denied," Xinhua (Beijing), 25 May 1983; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 25 May 1983, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

June 1983
The chiefs of India's armed services submit a joint letter to the defense minister outlining their case for a nuclear deterrent. Chief of Army Staff General Krishna Rao also makes the case for nuclear weapons in person to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. However, the prime minister remains unpersuaded and cites economic constraints behind her decision not to test.
—Raj Chengappa, "Arsenal For The Gods," Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2000), pp. 286-287.

30 June 1983
Citing safety concerns, US Secretary of State George Shultz tells Indian foreign minister P.V. Narashima Rao that the United States "is prepared to take the necessary actions to supply those parts which are not available from elsewhere." India hopes to obtain the spare parts, such as pump seals and valves, from sources outside the United States. These sources would likely be Italy or France. Under the US Nonproliferation Act of 1978, the Untied States is forbidden to supply nuclear related materials to countries that refuse full-scope international safeguards.
—Philip Taubman, "Schultz Tells India That US will Drop Reactor Parts Ban," New York Times, 1 July 1983, p. A4; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 1 July 1983, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 July 1983
Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi starts up the first unit of India's first domestically designed and built nuclear power plant at Kalpakkam, 60 miles south of Madras. As India's third nuclear plant, the Kalpakkam nuclear power facility is composed of two units, "each capable of producing 235MW of power." The second unit is expected to become operational in 18 months. The nuclear reactors at Kalpakkam will not be subject to international safeguards. While dedicating the nuclear power plant, Gandhi says, "India desires to make deserts bloom and not make cities deserts." She adds, "India has no intention to embark on a nuclear weapons program. India did not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) because the nuclear weapons powers have not stopped production of nuclear weapons, and because the treaty is discriminatory against non-nuclear powers."
—S.G. Roy, "Gandhi Dedicated Nuclear Plant, Promised Peaceful Goals," UPI, 23 July 1983; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 23 July 1983, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 July 1983
One of the two reactors at the US-built Tarapur nuclear power plant is shut down for repairs following a leak in a circulation pump. Indian officials attribute the leak to worn-out parts and blame the United States for holding up the sales of spares for the plant.
—"Reactor at Indian Atom Plant Built by US is Closed Down," New York Times, 26 July 1983, p. A8; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 26 July 1983, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Mid or Late 1983
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reportedly asks the Chief of Air Staff Air Marshall Dilbagh Singh to ready a strike mission against Pakistan's nuclear weapon-related facilities. In anticipation of the final strike order from New Delhi, earmarked Indian Air Force (IAF) Jaguar squadrons begin practicing low-level routing as well as approach-to-target and toss-bombing techniques with 1,000-2,000lbs bombs. The IAF plan calls for intense air activity along the western border and decoy runs to "spoof" and distract the Pakistani Air Force (PAF).
—Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), pp. 346-347.

11 August 1983
In an address to parliament, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi rules out "any atomic test for peaceful purposes like the one held at Pokhran in 1974." She also says her government is considering setting up more nuclear power plants in addition to the six already approved for the Seventh Five-Year Plan, and the needs of India's eastern region will be taken into account.
—"Mrs. Gandhi Rules out Nuclear Tests," New Delhi Home Service, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 August 1983; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 15 August 1983, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Post-August 1983
Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman, Munir Ahmed Khan, and Indian AEC Chairman, Dr. Raja Ramanna, meet at Imperial Hotel in Vienna where both are attending an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) meeting. Khan warns Ramanna of the potential dangers of a joint Indo-Israeli attack on Pakistan's nuclear facilities at PINSTECH and Kahuta. While disclaiming that he is negotiating on behalf of the Pakistani government, Khan warns that Pakistan will retaliate against Indian nuclear facilities in Trombay, which would probably result in the release of "...massive amounts of radiation to a large populated area causing a disaster." In response, Ramanna assures Khan that he will discuss the matter with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
—George Perkovich, "More Robust Nuclear Policy Is Considered," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 241.

7 September 1983
India's Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC) Chairman Dr. Raja Ramanna requests the Gandhi government to invest 1.5 billion rupees (about $987 million) in India's nuclear energy program. The AEC has refocused its nuclear power generation priorities to the use of pressurized heavy water reactor technology, natural uranium as fuel, and heavy water as a coolant. Ramanna suggests an advanced commitment by the government would "enable the nuclear power industry to plan its production and help cut costs." All planned nuclear power projects in the next few years will consists of standardized 235MW power reactors. India first fast breeder test reactor at Kalpakkam and the R5 research reactor at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) in Trombay are expected to become operational in 1984.
—R.C. Murthy, "India's N-Plant Chief Seeks Extra Cash," Financial Times (London), 7 September 1983, p. I4; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 7 September 1983, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 September 1983
During the opening speech of the 12th World Energy Conference in New Delhi, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi gives a brief assessment of India's nuclear program. Gandhi says India's decision to acquire nuclear power "aroused opposition from many countries, who accused us of imprudence and impracticality. The opposition continues and we are obstructed at every step. But Indian technology has acquired the capacity to design, fabricate and build nuclear power stations....I hope you are all aware that our nuclear program is prompted not by military objectives but by developmental necessity. It is dedicated to agriculture, medicine and meeting our energy needs. We are opposed to nuclear weapons and do not have any," she says.

During the course of the conference, other Indian government officials present papers that provide some insight on the current status of India nuclear program and its possible future direction. For example, one paper by the Indian Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) views an immediate switch to 500MW pressurized heavy water units as unfeasible because of India's limited capacity to manufacture larger reactor components. The paper also states that India might deviate from it current nuclear power plan—building 235MW breeder reactors and developing a thorium fuel cycle—by considering obtaining from abroad pressurized water type (PWR) reactors on a limited basis, provided the terms are acceptable to New Delhi. The DAE also indicates its willingness to supply heavy water reactors to other developing countries at some point in the future.
—Richard S. Ehrlich, "Indian Prime Minister: We have no A-bombs," UPI, 18 September 1983; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 18 September 1983, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Rob Laufer, "USSR, India Outline Their Nuclear Programs at World Energy Conference," Nucleonics Week, 22 September 1983, pp. 8-9.

6 October 1983
India and West Germany exchange a "verbal note" under which India agrees to abide by international nuclear safeguards at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) in exchange for German spare parts for the facility. The understanding is expected to pave the way for India to purchase spare parts from the German company Kraft Werke Union for the Tarapur plant.
—Neal Robbins, "India, West Germany Agree on Nuclear Plant," UPI, 1 November 1983; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 1 November 1983, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 October 1983
The Indian Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) says that several significant uranium deposits have been detected in Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh; detailed investigations are being conducted to assess their economic viability.
—"India Discovers Uranium," Xinhua (Beijing), 24 October 1983; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 24 October 1983, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 December 1983
Responding to questions from parliament, Indian defense minister R. Venkataraman suggests that the Indian government might decide to purchase a nuclear submarine. While listing the recent purchases being made by India in Western Europe and the Soviet Union, he says, "We (India) might go in to for a nuclear powered submarine also."
—John Elliott, "India 'May buy Nuclear Submarine'," Financial Times (London), 7 December 1983, p. 4; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 7 December 1983, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 December 1983
The French Minister for Industry and Research Laurent Fabius says France is prepared to provide uranium fuel for the fast breeder reactor under construction at the Madras nuclear power station (MAPS). However, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi tells parliament that "India has developed its own indigenous fuel for the fast breeder test reactor; therefore it has no need to get fuel from France."
—"Uranium Reserves Discovered in India," Xinhua (Beijing), 14 December 1983; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 14 December 1983; <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 December 1983
Shivraj Patil, Minister of State for Science and Technology, tells parliament that about 73,000 tons of uranium reserves have been discovered throughout India. Also, he says, this additional uranium discovery will enable India's nuclear program to reach an installed capacity of 10,000MW by the year 2000.
—"Uranium Reserves Discovered in India," Xinhua (Beijing), 14 December 1983; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 14 December 1983; <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Late 1983
US intelligence reportedly learns about Indian attack plans on Pakistani nuclear facilities and alerts Islamabad. Indian intelligence subsequently picks up signs of changes in the alert status of the Pakistani Air Force, and possibly plans to attack Indian nuclear facilities in Trombay. Fearing the potential radioactive damage from a Pakistani retaliatory strike, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi shelves plans for a pre-emptive attack.
—Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), pp. 347-348.