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Nuclear Chronology

1992

This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

1992
Subsequent to completion of development efforts, India embarks on program to weaponize its nuclear capabilities.
—"Nuclear Backdrop," From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report (New Delhi: Sage Publications, December 15, 1999), p. 205.

1 January 1992
India and Pakistan exchange the lists on nuclear installations under the Agreement on Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Facilities. India allegedly does not include a new gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility located near Mysore. However, Indian defense expert K. Subrahmanyam explains that India did provide coordinates for the plant's location at the side of the Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC) Rare Earths factory.
—"India and Pakistan Exchange Nuclear Data Under '91 Pact," Los Angeles Times, 2 January 1992, p. A12; George Perkovich, "American Nonproliferation Initiatives," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, & London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 325.

10 January 1992
US Senator Larry Pressler meets India's Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and other high-ranking government officials to discuss nuclear nonproliferation. During the meetings, Indian officials say there is no need for the United States to extend Pressler amendment to India since its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. India reiterates it will not sign the NPT due to its discriminatory character.
—"US Senator Holds Nuclear Talks with Indian Leaders," Agence France Presse, 10 January 1991; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 13 January 1991, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 January 1992
Addressing a press conference in New Delhi, US Senator Larry Pressler says there is no need to extend the Pressler amendment to India. He remarks that India's nuclear concerns are well taken. Pressler suggests a US-sponsored summit between India and Pakistan to resolve the nuclear issue in the region.
—"India, Pakistan Summit to Resolve Nuclear Issue Suggested by US Senator," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 11 January 1992; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 12 January 1992, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 January 1992
Prime Minister Narasimha Rao says India will seek the World Bank loans to finance its nuclear power program. Rao assures Indian lawmakers that India will not be "browbeaten" as far as the [research] reactor sale to Iran is concerned. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman P.K. Iyengar says Indian reserves of uranium are sufficient to meet the nuclear fuel needs of the first stage of India's planned three-stage nuclear power generation program. He adds that plutonium extracted from the spent fuel and thorium reserves will be sufficient for the second and third stages of the nuclear power program.
—"India to Seek World Bank Aid to Continue Nuclear Building," Nucleonics Week, 30 January 1992, pp. 16-17.

20 January 1992
A spokesperson for the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) says that India has abandoned the idea of building two Russian-supplied VVER reactors in Koodankulam (Tamil Nadu). According to the spokesperson, there is no information from the new Russian government on the continuation of the project. He says, however, that the NPC has disbanded the team working on the VVER project while hoping to get approval for the construction of two 500MW pressurized heavy water reactors at the site. He adds that few costs have yet been incurred on the project since most of investment was made in the site preparation and foundation studies so far. The detailed project report costing one billion rupees has not been prepared yet. The estimated cost of the VVER project was 64 billion rupees, of which 46 billion was to be financed by the former Soviet Union on a direct rupee/rouble exchange rate.
—"NPC Conforms No VVERs for Koodankulam," Nuclear Engineering International, March 1992, p. 7.

20-21 January 1992
Minister of External Affairs Madhavsingh Solanki visits Japan. Solanki explains India's position on the NPT. He denies reports that India abstains from the NPT because it has a secret nuclear weapons program. He cites Pakistan and China as the major obstacles to India's signing the NPT.
—"India Foreign Minister Says Nuke Treaty Discriminates," United Press International, 21 January 1992; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 12 January 1992, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 January 1992
Minister of External Affairs Madhavsingh Solanki says India's nuclear program is "totally dedicated to the peaceful uses of atomic energy."
—"'Suggestion' on Technology Transfer Refuted," Patriot (New Delhi), 29 January 1992, p. 1; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-92-008, 26 March 1992, p. 31.

31 January 1992
President Bush and Prime Minister Narasimha Rao meet at the UN Security Council Summit at New York. Bush urges Rao to reconsider India's rejection of the proposed five-party regional conference on nonproliferation. Rao instead proposes bilateral talks with the United States on nuclear proliferation issues.
—George Perkovich, "American Nonproliferation Initiatives," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, & London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 326.

January 1992
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Robert Gates testifies before Congress that although the United States does not believe that India and Pakistan maintain assembled or deployed nuclear weapons, such weapons could be assembled at short notice.
—George Perkovich, "American Nonproliferation Initiatives," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, & London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 326.

February 1992
India's Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) announces that the investment in India's nuclear power program will be half the originally planned 140 billion. The NPC hopes that the six 220MW units currently under construction (two units at Kaiga, two at Kakrapar, and two at Rajasthan) will be completed by the turn of the century.
—"Nuclear Budget Cut," Nuclear Engineering International, March 1992, p. 7.

3 February 1992
Inaugurating an international conference on "Synchrotron Radiation Sources" at the Center for Advanced Technology, AEC Chairman P.K. Iyengar says India's confidence in the nuclear energy development has increased with the development of a 100MW research reactor at BARC. He emphasizes the importance of exchange of information among developing countries on research and development activities. The objective of the conference, the second in a series, is to provide a forum for exchange of information. Scientists from the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, China, Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Korea, Syria, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia are participating in this conference.
—"Global Link in Nuclear Energy Studies Urged," Times of India (Mumbai), 5 February 1992, p. 11; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-92-008, 26 March 1992, pp. 30-31.

4 February 1992
A senior public prosecutor Anstein Gjengedal in Oslo says Norway has fresh evidence that India has illegally received 12.5 tons of heavy water that was originally destined for Romania in 1986. According to Gjengedal, the heavy water was reshipped to the Directorate of Purchase and Storage in Mumbai. Norwegian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Bjoern Blokhus says that Norway has informed the Indian government of its findings and has given India "reasonable time to respond." Norway expects a comment from India by 13 February and intends to undertake a "tougher strategy" if the response is not forthcoming.
—Karen Fossli, "Rules Broken by India, Says Oslo," Financial Times, 5 February, 1992; "Report from Oslo," Times of India (Mumbai), 5 February 1992, p. 1; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-92-008, 26 March 1992, p. 25.

6 February 1992
A spokesperson from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs says that India has never imported heavy water from Norway or any other country with the exception of the former Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union supplied the heavy water for the Rajasthan Atomic Power Plant, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was aware it. The spokesperson adds that India's position on Norway's allegations will be conveyed to the ambassador of Norway in India shortly. Norwegian officials say it will be hard to compel India to return the 12.5 tons of heavy water they claim it has received via Romania in 1986 in the absence of a formal agreement between India and Norway. Norway says the fact-finding trip to Bucharest in late January confirmed that the heavy water produced by Norsk Hydro AS and supplied to Romania for the Candu pressurized heavy water reactors under construction in Cernavoda was re-exported to the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) in Mumbai on 20 March 1986.
—"India Denies Diversion of Heavy Water," Times of India (Mumbai), 9 February 1992, p. 3; "Denial Reported," Telegraph (Calcutta), 7 February 1992, p. 1; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-92-008, 26 March 1992, p. 26; "New Delhi 'Not Compelled' to Return Heavy Water to Norway," Nuclear Fuel, 17 February 1992, pp. 9-10.

8 February 1992
Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Shahryar Khan tells editors at the Washington Post that Pakistan has the knowledge and components to assemble at least one nuclear device.
—George Perkovich, "American Nonproliferation Initiatives," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, & London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 326.

8 February 1992
India's Minister of External Affairs Madhavsingh Solanki publicly states that "nuclear bomb... is a part of defense preparedness and we have the defense preparedness."
—"Solanki Meets Press on Approach to Pakistan," Hindu (Chennai), 9 February 1992, p. 1; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-92-008, 26 March 1992, p. 26.

8 February 1992
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)President Murli Manohar Joshi states that India "must waste no time to go nuclear" since Pakistan admits being a nuclear weapon country. According to Joshi, Pakistan has undertaken "various provocative steps," including "nuclear blackmail" not only because of its anti-India attitude but also to show "to its terrorist clients in Kashmir that it is willing to do something more for them than fight India to the last Kashmiri."
—"BJP President Urges Delhi 'To Go Nuclear'," Indian Express (Mumbai), 9 February 1992, p. 1; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-92-008, 26 March 1992, p. 27.

9 February 1992
Vice-Admiral K.K. Nayar, former Vice-Chief of Naval Staff, says that Pakistan's admission of having a capability to assemble a nuclear device "should force us [India] to have a realistic assessment of security environment in our region." In Nayar's view, Pakistan's testing of a nuclear device will indicate they need it for the sake of prestige. If Pakistan does not test the device, it will indicate it aims at India, he says.
—"Military Experts Say Time for Nuclear Option," Hindu (Chennai), 10 February 1992, p. 9; in FBIS Document, jprs-tnd-92-008, 26 March 1992, p. 30.

13 February 1992
The Parliamentary Consultative Committee (affiliated with the Ministry of External Affairs) meets to discuss nonproliferation issues and agrees by consensus that India should maintain its status of a nuclear "technology state." Minister of External Affairs Madhavsingh Solanki informs the members of the committee that India cannot accept the NPT with its "unnatural and perpetual" division of the world into nuclear haves and have nots. The Committee also endorses the government's rejection of Pakistan's proposal for a five-nation conference on the creation of the nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia.
—"Parliamentary Panel Discusses Nuclear Option," Patriot (New Delhi), 14 February 1992, p. 1; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-92-008, 26 March 1992, p. 27; Viplav Vidrohi, "South Asia: Pakistan and India in New Nuclear Stand-off," Inter Press Service, 17 February 1992; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 19 January 1992, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 February 1992
During a lecture on nuclear science for national development in Bhubaneswar (Orissa), Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman P.K. Iyengar says India's current nuclear energy generation capacity is 1,500MW. He remarks that with a "suitable strategy," India can increase its installed capacity to 2,000MW within the next five years and reach 8,000MW by the turn of the century.
—"India should Opt for Nuclear Strategy: Official," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 22 February 1992; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 12 January 1992, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

March 1992
The Union Budget for the FY 1992 provides 8.098 billion rupees in allocations for the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and another 9.66 billion rupees for the nuclear power construction projects.
—"India Funds Nuclear Construction, Operations, and Research in FY-92," Nucleonics Week, 19 March 1992, pp. 9-10.

March 1992
Former Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman M.R. Srinivasan says the collapse of the India-USSR deal for two VVER-1,000 reactors at Koodankulam (Tamil Nadu) does not mean that the reactors cannot be constructed with the help of the West. He says a deal with France is being negotiated. France requires that the facilities be under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Finland is also considering to fill the vacuum created by Russia's withdrawal.
—"Indian PWR Not Yet Dead," Nuclear Engineering International, April 1992, p. 10.

6 March 1992
Two 220MW pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) units planned for construction at Kaiga receive environmental clearance.
—"Nuclear Wins in Budget Allocation," Nuclear Engineering International, May 1992, p. 8.

7 March 1992
Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) Director R. Chidambaram tells the Washington Post that India has not "stockpiled" or "deployed" nuclear weapons.
—George Perkovich, "American Nonproliferation Initiatives," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, & London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 327.

9-10 March 1992
During his visit to Washington, DC, India's foreign secretary J.N. Dixit publicly states that although India has "the capacity to build and deliver a nuclear weapon," to his knowledge, it has not developed any yet and he does not know how long it will take to develop one. He denies reports that India has 60 nuclear warheads. According to Dixit, India's nuclear program is currently less advanced than that of Pakistan. He adds that closer relations with the United States will make India more receptive to the idea of a five-country conference to discuss nuclear proliferation on the subcontinent. He also says that such a conference "should not be conceived in a vacuum" and should address India's concerns over Chinese missiles and tactical nuclear weapons in Tibet and the status of such weapons in Kazakhstan. India will not accept the conference where "three powers outside the region tell [India] what to do." Dixit adds that India is ready to talk about the nonproliferation regime that is "global, nondiscriminatory and aimed at permanent eradication of nuclear weapons." He rejects the possibility of South Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone "when the whole region is bristling with nuclear weapons." The US State Department's report states that the two sides agreed "to continue discussions on ways to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in South Asia."
—John Ward Anderson, "India Cool to US Call for Nuclear Talks," Washington Post, 11 March 1992, p. A24; Gus Constantine, "India Ready to Discuss Nuclear Arms Control with US," Washington Times, 11 March 1992, p. A8; Douglas Frantz and Norman Kempster, "India Warns US on Pakistan Arms Sales," Los Angeles Times, 11 March 1992, p. A19; Tim McGirk, "India Woos US with Promise of Nuclear Discussion," Independent, 13 March 1992; Anwar Iqbal, "Officials Call Meeting Over Indian Nuclear Plan," News (Islamabad), 15 March 1992, pp. 1, 5; in FBIS Document JPRS-92-008, 26 March 1992; "India's Nuclear Posture Viewed," Frontier Post (Peshawar), 15 March 1992, p. 10; in FBIS Document JPRS-92-008, 26 March 1992, p. 39.

10-16 March 1992
In the aftermath of foreign secretary J.N. Dixit's visit to the United States, Indian opposition parties charge that the Rao government is succumbing to US pressure and is "losing its self-respect to the US." On 16 March 1992, the Minister of State for External Affairs Eduardo Faleiro states in parliament that there is no change in India's policy towards the NPT, but India is prepared to talk with the United States on nonproliferation issues.
—Cameron Barr, "Indian Nod toward Nonproliferation Draws Fire at Home," Christian Science Monitor,19 March 1992, p. 4.

Mid-March 1992
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman P.K. Iyengar tells Nucleonics Week that a second gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility is now operational. The facility is located at Rattehali, close to Mysore (Karnataka). The facility consists of "several hundred operating centrifuges made of domestically produced maraging steel." According to Iyengar, India does not intend to start a large-scale production of centrifuges. India did not include this facility in the list of nuclear entities it presented to Pakistan.
—Mark Hibbs, "Second Indian Enrichment Facility Using Centrifuges is Operational," Nucleonics Week, 26 March 1992, pp. 9-10.

16 March 1992
Minister of State for External Affairs Eduardo Faleiro notifies the Parliament that India is ready to begin talks with the United States on nonproliferation issues in South Asia. The first round of talks will be held in May in New Delhi when a US delegation comes to explore the possibility of confidence-building measures. Faleiro confirms that India and the United States intend to conduct joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean for the first time. He adds that India has put on hold a Pakistani proposal for a five-nation conference. India's new policy causes uproar among the opposition parties, who charge that the government has succumbed to US pressure.
—David Housego, "Indians Shift Stance on N-Weapons," Financial Times, 17 March 1992; Sanjoy Hazarika "India Moves to Improve Relations with US," International Herald Tribune, 16 March 1992.

18 March 1992
Kirghiz President Askar Akaev publicly states that Kirghizstan has offered to supply enriched uranium to India under international safeguards. A spokesperson for Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy reiterates, however, that all enrichment facilities of the former Soviet Union are located in Russia and, hence, Kirghizstan has only uranium milling equipment.
—"India/Kirghizstan: Uranium Offered," Nuclear Fuel, 30 March 1992, pp. 16-17; "Reports Continue on Exports of Uranium: Kyrgyz President Explains," Izvestiya (Moscow), 20 March 1992, Morning Edition, p. 1; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-92-011, 15 April 1992, p. 11.

Late March 1992
The Dhruva research reactor located at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) is shut down for fueling and maintenance. According to S.K. Sharma, associate director of the BARC reactor group, "Dhruva is routinely operated for four weeks, and then shut down for four to seven days for partial core refueling, maintenance, and experimental work." The reactor has been operating smoothly since 1987.
—Mark Hibbs, "Dhruva Operating Smoothly Within Refueling, Availability Limits," Nucleonics Week, 26 March 1992, pp. 8-9.

April 1992
Indian Finance Minister Manmohan Singh allocates 10.08 billion rupees for the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) in the budget for the fiscal year 1992/93, an increase of 1.12 billion rupees over the previous year.
—"Nuclear Wins Budget Allocation," Nuclear Engineering International, May 1992, p. 8.

Early April 1992
The Atomic Energy Research Board (AERB) conducts a survey of social and physical scientists. The results indicate that 86 percent (out of 762 respondents) believe that nuclear power can supplement other energy resources. However, only 51 percent favor a large-scale nuclear power program to meet India's energy needs.
—"India: Some Surprises from Survey of Scientists," Nucleonics Week, 9 April 1992, p. 15.

Early April 1992
According to a senior French government official, France will discontinue supplies of low-enriched uranium for Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) unless India accepts full scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The Tarapur nuclear supply contract expires in 1993. [Note: The two 210MW reactors for the TAPS were supplied by the US firm General Electric under the 1963 India-US cooperation agreement, which expires in 1993. The reactors use low-enriched uranium as a fuel. In 1978, the US Congress passed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, under which India had to open all nuclear facilities to international inspection as a precondition for further fuel supplies. In 1982, the Reagan administration reached a compromise settlement and France took over as a fuel supplier. France is also bound by the requirement of full-scope safeguards since it is getting ready to adhere to the NPT.]
—"India Can't Count on France for Tarapur Fuel Past 1993," Nucleonics Week, 16 April 1992, pp. 9-10; "India," Program for Promoting Nuclear Nonproliferation Newsbrief, No. 18, Summer 1992, p. 4; in Pacific Research, August 1992, p. 28; Brahma Chellaney "India to Urge France to Extend Nuclear Fuel Contract," Compuserve-Executive News Service, 28 September 1992.

15 April 1992
Shibdas Burman, a scientist at the National Institute of Science, Technology and Development Studies in New Delhi, publishes a study on India's CANDU-type nuclear reactors. According to the study, India's CANDU reactors are much safer than the Chernobyl nuclear power station and light water reactors in Western Europe.
—"India's Nuclear Reactors Safer: Study," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 15 April 1992; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 16 April 1992, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20-23 April 1992
S.K. Chatterjee, an executive director in charge of projects at the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC), says the Indian government approved only 15 percent of the requested 9 billion rupees for ongoing projects during the fiscal year 1992/93. According to Chatterjee, NPC is considering raising 7.5 billion rupees in loans to fund its projects. Criticism of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) grows both in the Parliament and within Rao's government due to cost and schedule overruns that plague the projects and low availability and capacity factors of the operating facilities. According to Chatterjee, India can hardly reach the new target of 5,700MW of nuclear energy by the year 2000.
—"Indian Government Giving NPC Just 15 % of Nuclear Building Budget," Nucleonics Week, 23 April 1992, pp. 4-5; "Foreign Financing for Indian DAE Hinges on Safeguards, US Says," Nucleonics Week, 30 April 1992, pp. 9-10.

21 April 1992
Speaking to the UN disarmament commission, Indian representative Prakash Shah says India favors global disarmament as the only realistic solution to nuclear proliferation since regional and bilateral arrangements did not result in the quantitative and qualitative reduction of these weapons. Commending the agreement between the United States and Russia to cut certain categories of weapons in their nuclear arsenals, Shah says the fissile material from the decommissioned weapons should be placed under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and be used only for peaceful purposes. Shah commends the Action Plan suggested by India in 1988 to the UN special session on disarmament. The plan calls all nuclear weapon states to undertake equal obligations and provides for a phased elimination of the nuclear weapons. He urges countries that believe in the "ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons to make this plan workable."
—"India Restates Stand in N-Proliferation," Times of India (Mumbai), 23 April 1992, p. 4.

22 April 1992
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman P.K. Iyengar says the Indo-Russian deal on the construction of two VVER-1,000 reactors in Koodankulam (Tamil Nadu) may fall apart due to Russia's insistence on dollar payments. Nevertheless, Russia is still interested in the deal. Iyengar says it is better that India rely on indigenous technology and resources rather than purchase reactors from others .
—"India May Not Get Russian N-Reactor," Times of India (Mumbai), 23 April 1992.

21 May 1992
China tests a huge one-megaton nuclear device while Indian President R. Venkataraman is on a state visit to China.
—Barbara Crossette, "Chinese Set Off Their Biggest Nuclear Explosion," New York Times, 21 May 1992, Section A, p. 1.

29 May 1992
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman P.K. Iyengar says AEC is planning to construct two 500MW pressurized heavy water reactors at Koodankulam (Tamil Nadu) where two Russia-supplied VVER-1,000 reactors were to be built. The deal with Russia on reactor construction has not been formally cancelled.
—"Confusion at Koodankulam," Nuclear Engineering International, August 1992, p. 7.

Early June 1992
H.N. Paul at the Indian Embassy in Oslo (Norway) tells reporters that "India has not received any Norwegian heavy water either from Norway or via other countries." This is India's final answer, he says.
—"Ministry Denies Receiving Norwegian Heavy Water," Aftenposten (Oslo), 9 June 1992, p. 2; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-92-024, 21 July 1992.

15 June 1992
Indian government denies a report published by Sunday Times (London) that the British firm GEC-Marconi had "secretly exported nuclear and missile technology to India, in conflict with government's commitment to halt the spread of strategic weapons." According to the export manager of Marconi, Allan Luskow, the firm tried to register equipment destined for the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) as related to medical research. A spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs of India says the report is "inaccurate..., misleading, mischievous and malicious." According to the spokesperson, India had negotiations with this firm regarding some missile components since 1986 with the prior permission of the British government.
—"India Denies Report on British Nuclear Deal," Reuters, 15 June 1992; in Compuserve-Executive News Service, 17 June 1992; "Firm Said Exporting Nuclear Technology to India," Muslim (Islamabad), 15 June 1992, pp. 1, 12; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-92-024, 21 July 1992; "Procurement of Nuclear Parts from UK Denied," Delhi All India Radio Network, 15 June 1992; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-92-024, 21 July 1992, p. 16.

18-19 June 1992
India and the United States hold talks on nuclear proliferation in South Asia. During the meeting, the United States acknowledges Indian objections and requests New Delhi to propose alternatives for regional arm control initiatives. Indian representatives do not reject US proposals and offer to deliberate on alternative ways of convening a five-power conference to address regional and global security issues.
—"US Holds Non-Proliferation Talks with India," Associated Press, 18 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Indo-US Talks on Nuclear Issues End," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 19 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Thomas Wagner "India Rejects US Proposal on Nuclear Weapons," Associated Press, 19 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; George Perkovich, "American Nonproliferation Initiatives," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, & London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 329.

20 June 1992
Speaking to a group of Japanese journalists, India's Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao says India will not sign the NPT since the country believes in the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
—"Rao Reaffirms Intention Not to Sign NPT: Underlines Peaceful Purposes," Delhi All India Radio Network, 21 June 1992; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-92-020, 25 June 1992, p. 12.

24 June 1992
Addressing a press conference in Tokyo, Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao calls for modification of the NPT to include a time-bound framework for elimination of all nuclear weapons. He emphasizes that the Japanese government has not pressed India to sign the treaty.
—"Rao Reaffirms Intention Not to Sign NPT: Calls for Modified NPT," Delhi All India Radio Network, 21 June 1992; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-92-020, 25 June 1992, p. 12.

1 July 1992
Unit 2 reactor of the Narora Atomic Power Station (NAPS) begins commercial operations.
—Government of India, "Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1992-1993," p. 9.

20 August 1992
Minister of Science and Technology R. Kumaramangalam says that "preliminary discussions have been initiated with the Russian Federation" to continue the project of two VVER-1,000 construction at Koodankulam (Tamil Nadu) in the new political situation.
—"India Eyes Joint Ventures with Nuclear Plant Vendors," Nucleonics Week, 27 August 1992, pp. 5-6.

Late August 1992
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman P.K. Iyengar says he will begin a dialogue with public and private sector companies in India to form joint ventures in the field of nuclear power generation and other nuclear technologies. According to Iyengar, the government-owned Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. and the private sector Larsen & Toubro Ltd. that produce about 60 percent of equipment for the nuclear power plants can "now help the corporation [Nuclear Power Corporation] in forming its capital base and share the equity." He says the private companies may be offered equity in new nuclear units at Rajasthan, Kaiga, and Tarapur. Pending a formal decision, Nuclear Fuel Complex (Hyderabad) signs a memorandum of understanding with Tata Oil Company for the production of zirconium and titanium salts in a three-billion-rupees plant to be constructed at Palaikad (Tamil Nadu).
—"India Eyes Joint Ventures with Nuclear Plant Vendors," Nucleonics Week, 27 August 1992, pp. 5-6.

1 September 1992
A British documentary, Nuclear India: A Dream Gone Sour, chronicles India's gross neglect towards nuclear safety and the secrecy that surrounds its nuclear program. Safety of the workers and local population at the sites of India's nuclear installations is ignored, the report says. Despite its 40-year history, nuclear power accounts for only two percent of electricity in India. Dhirendra Sharma, professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi), claims the main purpose of India's nuclear program is production of weapons-grade plutonium.
—Raymond Whitaker "India Ignores Nuclear Safety," Independent, 1 September 1992; L.K. Sharma "Indian N-Plant Gets Bad Coverage in UK Film," Times of India (Mumbai), 3 September 1992, p. 16.

3 September 1992
The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) announces that the Unit 1 220MW pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) of the Kakrapar Atomic Power Project (KAPP) has achieved criticality. India's installed nuclear power production capacity thereby reaches 1,720MW. According to DAE's press release, the second PHWR at Kakrapar is expected to be commissioned in 1993. KAPP uses indigenously produced natural uranium as fuel and heavy water as moderator and coolant.
—Government of India, "Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1992-1993," p. 9; "India's New Reactor Commissioned," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 3 September 1992; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 4 September 1992, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 September 1992
An Indian government official says that Defense Minister Sharad Pawar will express interest in buying advanced nuclear powered submarines when he meets Russian President Boris Yeltsin next week. Pawar will discuss the possibilities of acquiring submarine launched missiles, electronic warfare equipment, and the latest version of MiG-29 fighter jets. The minister will also discuss the disruption in the supply of Russian components to the Indian military production complex manufacturing Soviet-model weapon systems under license.
[Note: India leased a Russian Charlie I-class nuclear submarine Chakra in 1988 for training purposes for a period of three years. India returned the submarine to Russia after the expiry of the lease in early January 1991.]
—Brahma Chellaney, "India Seeks Nuclear Submarine from Russia," Compuserve-Executive News Service, 4 September 1992.

7 September 1992
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman P.K. Iyengar says the government released only $53 million out of planned $318 million allocated for nuclear power projects. He remarks that the NPC is undergoing a major resource crisis. He adds that India's nuclear program will definitely slow down "but it won't come to a screeching halt."
—"India's Nuclear Power Program Hit by Economic Crisis," United Press International, 7 September 1992; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 September 1992
Indian Express reports that the Dhruva and CIRUS research reactors, which use water from Arabian Sea as a secondary coolant, discharge the radioactive waste back into the sea. A Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) official denies the allegation as an "exaggerated portrayal... by workers."
—"Indian Plutonium-producing Reactors Said to Have Leaked Radioactivity," United Press International, 11 September 1992; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 12 January 1992, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 September 1992
A spokesperson for India's Ministry of External Affairs says that India will resume talks on regional nuclear nonproliferation with the United States on 3-4 November 1992.
—"India-US Nuclear Talks Scheduled for Early November," United Press International, 19 September 1992; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 September 1992
Delivering a lecture on national security in New Delhi, former Chief of the Army Staff General Sundarji says India must have limited nuclear deterrence in case of a nuclear strike against it.
—"Former Army Chief on Limited Nuclear Deterrence," Delhi All India Radio Network, 25 September 1992; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-92-036, 7 October 1992, p. 12.

28 September 1992
Prime Minister of India Narasimha Rao leaves for France, where he plans to request that French President Francois Mitterand extend the fuel contract for the supply of low-enriched uranium to the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS). The lifespan of the two Tarapur reactors ends in 1993 along with the fuel supply contract, but the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) expects them to run for another ten years. DAE expects to run the reactor with mixed-oxide fuel containing plutonium from the reactors' spent fuel.
—Brahma Chellaney, "India to Urge France to Extend Nuclear Fuel Contract," Compuserve-Executive News Service, 28 September 1992; "Tarapur Considers Ten More Years," Nuclear Engineering International, October 1992, p. 3; "Commentary on Rao's Visit to France, Uranium Transfers," Delhi All India Radio Network, 25 September 1992; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-92-036, 7 October 1992, p. 12.

28 September 1992
Addressing a news conference in New Delhi, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman P.K. Iyengar says India has the capability to produce nuclear weapons as quickly as needed. He remarks that India is self-reliant in nuclear technology and is not vulnerable to outside pressure.
—Shikha Bose, "Top Official Says India Can Quickly Produce Nuclear Bomb," United Press International, 28 October 1992; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Late September 1992
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman P.K. Iyengar says the deal with the Russian Federation for the supply of the two VVER-1,000 reactors is "virtually aborted" because the "Russian federation simply does not have the capital" to fund the project. According to Iyengar, the most attractive condition of the deal with Russia was a deferred payment plan. Iyengar adds that lower budget allocations this year will cause a slow-down in the AEC's nuclear plant construction program. Iyengar notes that ongoing work on the pressurized heavy water reactors' construction continues uninterrupted and Kakrapar-2, Kaiga-2, and Rajasthan-2 reactors are on schedule. Iyengar underlines that the cuts in the financing from the federal government and involvement of state governments and private companies in nuclear power plant construction does not mean that India's nuclear program is undergoing privatization. He says the nuclear program will continue to be run by AEC due to the "special requirements of nuclear technology."
—Neel Patri, "Lack of Capital Deters Russians from Building VVERs in India," Nucleonics Week, 1 October 1992, pp. 10-11.

Early October 1992
Prime Minister of India Narasimha Rao fails to convince France to continue the supply of low-enriched uranium for the two Tarapur boiling water reactors. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman P.K. Iyengar says, however, that there is an alternative way to supply fuel for the reactors by either using domestically produced mixed-oxide fuel or domestically produced enriched uranium. Iyengar says, however, that no decision has been made yet to use the enrichment facility at Rattehalli (Karnataka) to enrich uranium for Tarapur reactors.
—Neel Patri and Ann MacLachlan, "Iyengar Says India Can Make Fuel for Tarapur as French Rebuff Rao," Nucleonics Week, 8 October 1992, p. 12.

14 October 1992
Indian defense minister Sharad Pawar visits Ukraine to hold talks on arms supplies. Indian officials say that India is interested in buying Ukrainian nuclear-powered or conventional diesel-electric submarines and tactical boats.
—Brahma Chellaney, "Indian Defense Minister to Shop for Arms in Ukraine," Compuserve-Executive News Service, 13 October 1992.

20 October 1992
The Indian government announces it will resume the talks with the United States on 12-13 November in Washington, DC.
—Brahma Chellaney, "India to Resume Nuclear Talks with US despite Internal Criticism," United Press International, 20 October 1992; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 October 1992
The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the Ministry of External Affairs reject Norway's allegation that consignments of heavy water headed to Germany and Romania ended up in India. Both agencies claim that India produces a sufficient amount of heavy water. AEC Chairman P.K. Iyengar says India exported 11 tons of heavy water to Belgium in 1965 and presently has about 500 tons in surplus.
—"India: Norwegian Heavy Water Has Not Been Diverted to India," Inter Press Service, 30 October 1992; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12-13 November 1992
During Indo-US talks in Washington, the US team proposes that India halt fissile material production either unilaterally or through a bilateral agreement with Pakistan. India rejects the proposal. A senior official at the Indian Ministry of External Affairs says India cannot accept a regional freeze that prohibits fissile material production; any such freeze should be nondiscriminatory and applicable to all nations. US State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher says the talks with India were "intended not to produce a specific agreement but to explore concrete ideas for reducing tensions and avoiding conflicts." According to Boucher, the talks included "discussions of possible confidence- and security-building measures and ways to halt the proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons and ballistic missile systems."
—Brahma Chellaney "India Rejects US Proposal to Halt Producing Bomb..." Compuserve-Executive News Service, 16 November 1992.

15 November 1992
The spokesperson for the French Ministry of External Affairs M. Gaurdault-Montagne says France will continue to supply low-enriched uranium to the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) in India in 1993 since India is committed to the principle of nonproliferation and desists from building nuclear weapons even though it possesses the know-how. He adds that France will plead to the other nuclear weapon powers to include India in any emerging safety regime aimed at preventing the diversion of nuclear and missile technologies for military purposes. According to the spokesperson, France understands India's position on the NPT as an unrealistic treaty and that India cannot be pressured into signing the document as negotiations on the future of the treaty commence next year. He says that France and India will have regular consultations on the NPT and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
—"French Supply of Nuclear Fuel to Continue," Hindu (Chennai), 16 November 1992, p. 1; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-92-046, 11 December 1992.

Mid-November 1992
Prime Minister Narasimha Rao states in parliament that nuclear policy is the key area of national consensus in India and no external pressures can sway India's stand on the issue.
—Brahma Chellaney "India Rejects US Proposal to Halt Producing Bomb..." Compuserve-Executive News Service, 16 November 1992.

24 November 1992
India's new 220MW PHWR at Kakrapar begins generating electricity.
—"India's Newest Nuclear Power Reactor Starts Operating," United Press International, 24 November 1992; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 November 1992
Indian Journal of Cancer releases a study that indicates that the incidence of leukemia in males from Western Rajasthan is 5.2 percent, compared to the world average of 3.2 percent for men. The study argues that the incidence of bone and skin cancer is higher in Western Rajasthan than in any other part of India. Dr. R.G. Sharma suggests that India's nuclear test of 1974 at Pokhran is the cause of high incidence of cancer in the region.
—"Doctors Suspect Nuclear Test Cause of Cancer in Indian State," United Press International, 30 November 1992; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Early December 1992
The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) orders "developmental studies" of technology to compensate for the loss of low-enriched uranium from France for the two boiling water reactors at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS). The Minister of State for External Affairs Eduardo Faleiro says in the parliament that India is "ironing out" differences on the NPT with the United States, China, and Pakistan "with the view to evolving [a] national consensus."
—Neel Patri, Ann MacLachlan and Rauf Siddiqi, "India Mulling Over for Tarapur Fuel if France Cuts Supply After 1993," Nucleonics Week, 7 December 1992, pp. 14-15.

Early December 1992
The NBC reports that Pakistan assembled seven nuclear devices during the 1989-1990 crisis with India. The report evinces an anxious response from Indian parliamentarians who demand that the Indian government explain how India's nuclear policy will be tailored in light of this revelation.
—George Perkovich, "American Nonproliferation Initiatives," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, & London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 333.

28 December 1992
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman P.K. Iyengar says the target for nuclear power production is lowered to 5,800MW of electricity by the turn of the century.
—Brahma Chellaney, "India Cuts Its Nuclear Power Production Target by Almost Half," Compuserve-Executive News Service, 28 December 1992.

1992
India claims that it has fabricated stainless steel vessels for interim storage of highly radioactive waste solution in corrosive medium. The last of the five vessels will be installed at the Fuel Reprocessing Plant at IGCAR (Kalpakkam).
—"Reprocessing Facility: First for India," Nuclear Engineering International, August 1992, p. 51.

1992
Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao reportedly authorizes Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit to inform the US government that India will most likely conduct nuclear tests no later than 1992-93. The message is conveyed among others to the Secretary of State Madeline Albright, Undersecretary of State for Policy Peter Tarnoff, and the Ambassador-at-large at the State Department Thomas Pickering. The Indian government demands that in return for not springing surprises on the Clinton administration and communicating clarity of purpose, the United States avoid imposing economic sanctions on India. Tarnoff and Pickering inform Dixit that the Indian government should not inform Washington of its proposed actions beforehand as the US government will be compelled to act to stop the tests. Pickering also assures Dixit that the United States will not use force in the event India conducts nuclear tests, but that it has other means to take action against India.
—Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security (Delhi: Macmillan India Limited, 2002), pp. 369-370.

1992-1993
Although the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) meets the heavy water requirements for its new nuclear power stations, the Talcher Heavy Water Plant's output is heavily restricted. This is reportedly due to the poor performance of a local fertilizer plant that supplies some of its inputs.
—Government of India, "Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1992-1993," p. 11.

1992-1993
A heavy water enrichment plant is commissioned at the Hazira Heavy Water Plant. This new enrichment facility will reportedly allow the Hazira Plant to upgrade 50 to 60 percent of its heavy water to a reactor grade level of 99 percent or better.
— Government of India, "Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1992-1993," p. 3.



 

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