This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.
Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.
12 January 1993
The spokesperson for India's Ministry of External Affairs Shiv Mukherjee says that the START-2 agreement, signed by the United States and Russia, "should be followed up with a multilateral agreement on elimination of all nuclear weapons" in a specific timeframe. He adds that the five nuclear weapons states should agree "to a universal ban on further testing and manufacture of nuclear weapons as a first step toward comprehensive nuclear disarmament." According to Mukherjee, India would urge all countries to begin negotiations "for an agreement to prohibit use, or threat to use, nuclear weapons." He says that there is "a compelling need for nuclear weapon states to reexamine the doctrines of nuclear deterrence..., used in the past to justify the expansion of their nuclear arsenals" and halt a continued modernization of these arsenals.
—"India Calls for Global Ban on Nuclear Testing," United Press International, 12 January 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 12 January 1993, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/; "India Welcomes START II Treaty," Japan Economic Newswire, 12 January 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 12 January 1993, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/.
January 1993
Citing safety lapses and serious defects in the work system at the research reactors at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), Indian Express reports that in January 1993 the Dhruva research reactor was operated with "fewer than [the] stipulated number of staff."
—Sumit Ghoshal "Series of Near Accidents Cast Doubts on Safety at BARC," Indian Express (Mumbai), 17 July 1996, <http://www.expressindia.com>.
Late January-Early February 1993
Former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission P.K Iyengar is appointed head of a government committee tasked with recommending the future course for India's nuclear weaponization program. The committee recommends that nuclear tests be approved; in lieu of tests, the government kept the nuclear option open.
—Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security (Delhi: Macmillan India Limited, 2002), p. 370.
February 1993
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl announces in New Delhi that Germany will hold discussions with India to persuade it to sign the NPT, which he calls "a treaty of enormous significance."
—"India, France Discuss New Delhi's Opposition to NPT," United Press International, 26 February 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/.
12 February 1993
Japan's foreign ministry announces that Japan and India will discuss the issue of nuclear nonproliferation during talks in New Delhi in mid-March. According to the ministry officials, Japan will express its desire to see India join the NPT.
—"Japan, India to Hold Talks on Nuclear Nonproliferation," Japan Economic Newswire, 12 February 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/; Anwar Iqbal "Japan to Lobby Pakistan, India on Nuclear Issue," United Press International, 23 February 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/.
17 February 1993
Director of the reactor group at the Indira Gandhi Center for Atomic Research (IGCAR) S.B. Bhoje says that the design work on the 500MW prototype fast breeder reactor to be constructed near Chennai is close to completion.
—Brahma Chellaney "India to Complete Building Plutonium Breeding Reactor," United Press International, 17 February 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 22 October 1993 <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/.
24 February 1993
US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director James Woolsey testifies before Congress that "the arms race between India and Pakistan poses perhaps the most probable prospect for future use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons." Woolsey asserts that both India and Pakistan are capable of assembling nuclear weapons on short notice.
—Cited in, George Perkovich, "American Nonproliferation Initiatives," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, & London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 335.
26 February 1993
India begins a dialogue with France on arms control and disarmament issues.
—"India, France Discuss New Delhi's Opposition to NPT," United Press International, 26 February 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/.
March 1993
Citing continuing safety lapses in India's nuclear program, the Indian Express reports that a "self-serve aluminum ball" was recently found in a desk drawer at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC); the ball emitted a radiation field of "2 rads per hour," the "maximum permissible exposure for a worker in the radiation unit for an entire year." Subsequent investigations found no inventory for these balls, which puts a question mark on how many balls may have been lost. If such balls, which measure about two centimeters in size, were indeed lost, they could pose a severe radiation hazard to unshielded workers.
—Sumit Ghoshal "Series of Near Accidents Cast Doubts on Safety at BARC," Indian Express (Mumbai), 17 July 1996, <http://www.expressindia.com>.
3 March 1993
The Japanese foreign ministry announces that Japan will hold talks with India on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The Japanese Ambassador for Arms Control and Disarmament Mitsuro Donowaki and India's Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit will lead their respective delegations. The two sides plan to discuss "the present situation of India's nuclear power development, security in Asia and regional efforts for nuclear nonproliferation in Southwest Asia."
—"Japan and India to Talk on Spread of Nuclear Weapons," United Press International, 3 March 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/; "Japan-India Nuke Talks Slated for March 12," Jiji Press Ticker Service; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/.
11 March 1993
India's federal government does not increase budget allocations for the nuclear power sector in the fiscal year 1993-94. The new budget provides 9.5996 billion rupees as against the 9.593 billion rupees allocated during 1992-93.
—Neel Patri, "Indian Budget Gives No Increase in Nuclear Plant Building Money," Nucleonics Week, 11 March 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/.
24 March 1993
India's Minister of External Affairs Dinesh Singh states in parliament that India will never sign the NPT because it is highly discriminatory and attempts to create "a permanent division between the nuclear haves and have nots." According to Singh, former US President George Bush, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, British Prime Minister John Major, Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl urged India to join the NPT. Singh says that the Prime Minister Narasimha Rao told these leaders that India "could not sign the treaty because the NPT places arms control curbs only on the non-nuclear states, not on the five acknowledged nuclear weapon powers."
—"India Vows Never to Sign Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty," United Press International, 24 March 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/.
22 March 1993
Citing US government and intelligence sources, Seymour Hersh writes an investigative piece for New Yorker in which he alleges that in 1990, India and Pakistan were on the verge of nuclear war. According to Hersh, the US intelligence satellites picked up "intense increase in Pakistan radar activity." Further, Pakistan's Air Force "stepped up its F-16 training to practice what seemed to be dropping a nuclear bomb." He cites German intelligence suggesting that "the Pakistanis had designed a nuclear warhead that could be fitted under the wing of an F-16, and that the design had gone through a series of wind-tunnel tests." Hersh further states that Pakistan "has learned to program its in-flight computer system to provide the correct flight path for a nuclear bomb run." Hersh remarks that in the early spring of 1990 the US government discovered that Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff General Beg "had authorized the technicians at Kahuta to put together nuclear weapons [and] was prepared to use the bomb against India if necessary." In May 1990, US satellites registered evacuation of the Kahuta uranium enrichment facility. He further notes that Pakistan had "F-16s pre-positioned and armed for delivery – on full alert, with pilots in the aircraft." However, Hersh also cites US Ambassador to Pakistan Robert Oakley saying that there was not "any hard evidence that any nuclear warheads had been delivered to an airbase. ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence] was putting out all sorts of messages, but we had no evidence that a nuclear exchange was imminent."
—Seymour Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge," New Yorker, 29 March 1993, pp. 56-73.
22 March 1993
A top Pakistani government official denies the allegations in Seymour Hersh's New Yorker story that India and Pakistan were on the brink of nuclear war in 1990.
—Ranjan Roy, "News Report Denied of Nuclear Standoff between India, Pakistan," Associated Press, 22 March 1990; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
25 March 1993
India's Minister of External Affairs Dinesh Singh denies that India was on the brink of nuclear war with Pakistan in 1990. He adds that India never had a "surreptitious nuclear program" and has never concealed its nuclear capability. Speaking about India's reaction to North Korea's decision to withdraw from the NPT, Singh says that this development only reinforces India's argument that the treaty is discriminatory and that no "bilateral or sectoral" agreements to contain proliferation will work unless there is "a global arrangement."
—"India Denies Reports on Indo-Pak Nuclear War," Japan Economic Newswire, 25 March 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 25 March 1993, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/.
31 March 1993
At 3.30 a.m. a fire breaks out in the turbine generator of the 235MW reactor at the Narora Atomic Power Station (NAPS). The fire rages on for 12 hours. According to the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), the fire is directly linked to turbine blades in the generator that suddenly failed. The fire reportedly does not damage the reactor building and all the safety systems performed "as per design intent."
—Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1993-1994, p. 9; "Turbine in Nuclear Power Station Catches Fire," Associated Press, 31 March 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/.
Early April 1993
Managing Director of the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) tells the PTI news agency that the fire at Narora resulted in a "complete power outage for more than 10 hours, disabling the reactor's primary and secondary cooling systems. [However, the plant's] passive cooling system was able to carry away the heat from the reactor core." Executive Director of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) S.V. Kumar says "no plant workers were killed or injured and there was no radiation hazard to either the staff or the public." AERB "provisionally" classifies the event at Level 3 on the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) International Nuclear Event Scale (INES). According to Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman R. Chidambaram, the turbine generator can be fixed within four months.
—Neel Patri, "NAPS-1 Turbine Generator Wrecked; Fire Damage Will Take Months to Fix," Nucleonics Week, 8 April 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/; Brahma Chellaney "Backup Cooling System Averted Indian Reactor Meltdown," United Press International, 4 April 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/.
26 April 1993
Speaking in Hyderabad, the Chief Executive of the Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) K. Balamamurthy says the NFC now has the expertise to produce sophisticated zircaloy tubes, "meeting the stringent technical specifications right from the raw material stage to the finished product." Canada, South Korea, Argentina, and Romania have expressed their interest in the NFC technology, he says. He adds that this year, India intends to export some of its technologies, apart from meeting the requirements for its nuclear power program. According to Balamamurthy, the NFC has developed an alternative route to supply fuel for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS)– by using mixed oxide fuel. He says the technique was already standardized and could be used "at any moment." He adds that the NFC has prepared a "perspective growth plan to raise the production capacity of pressurized heavy water reactor fuel to about 1,000 tons per year and zircaloy to 160 tons per year by the end of 1993-94" in order to meet the target of 6,000MW by the year 2000. To achieve this target, the NFC plans four projects with a total investment of 70 billion rupees during the Eighth and Ninth Plan.
—"Plans Discussed," Deccan Chronicle (Hyderabad), 27 April 1993, p. 3; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-022, 12 July 1993.
April 1993
In a congressionally mandated report, the Clinton administration declares that nonproliferation will be the major issue in US relations with India and Pakistan. The US goal in South Asia is to "first cap, then over time reduce, and finally eliminate the possession of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery."
—George Perkovich, "American Nonproliferation Initiatives," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, & London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 335.
5 May 1993
The Unit 1 reactor of the Kakrapar Atomic Power Station (KAPS) begins commercial operations. Total power generated from this reactor is estimated to reach 5,500 million units (MUs).
—Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1993-1994, p. 4.
6 May 1993
India's Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) testifies before parliament and chastises the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) for a 16-year delay and 570 million rupees cost overrun in India's Fast Breeder Test Reactor Program (FBTR). CAG says that neither the final cost of the project nor its completion date have yet been determined. According to the CAG's report, the 13MW FBTR located at the Indira Gandhi Center for Atomic Research (IGCAR), which was set to begin operation in 1976 at a cost of 340 million rupees, by March 1992 had run up a cost of 910 million rupees.
—"Auditor Unimpressed by FBR Delays," Nuclear Engineering International, July 1993, p. 8; "Kalpakkam Reactor Cost Up by Rs 57 Cr," Times of India (Mumbai), 14 May 1993; in Strategic Digest, July 1993, p. 1139.
12 May 1993
India's Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) reports 147 "safety-related, unusual occurrences" at India's nuclear power plants during 1992. The report states that in five cases employees were killed but no radiation leakage was detected outside any of the plants. The Department of Atomic Energy's (DAE) spokesperson says the Indian government has "not hidden any accidents and every effort is being made to see that our program remains accident free."
—Brahma Chellaney, "Agency Reports 147 Safety Incidents at Indian Nuclear Plants," United Press International, 12 May 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/; Dilip Ganguly, "147 Accidents in India's Nuclear Plants Last Year," Associated Press, 17 May 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/; "India: Phased Closure of Nuclear Plants for Safety Inspection," Inter Press Service, 16 July 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 9 July 1993, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/.
Early June 1993
At the meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) International Working Group (IWG) on fast breeder reactors, director of the reactor group at the Indira Gandhi Center for Atomic Research (IGCAR) S.B. Bhoje says that financial constraints froze the construction of the 500MW Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) in India. He adds that "the immediate goal in [India's] fast breeder program is to commission the turbo-generator set [of India's 40MW (thermal)/13MW electric mixed-carbide-fuelled, sodium-cooled, loop type Fast Breeder Test Reactor and connect it to the grid]." He adds that FBR program in India will be finalized within the next two years, noting that some 1,500 scientists are working on the program that has a budget of 500 million rupees for 1993-94.
-—Gamini Seneviratne, "Breeder Development Moves East as West Looks at Waste Disposal," Nucleonics Week, 17 June 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 9 July 1993, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/.
9 June 1993
Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) Director A.N. Prasad says India's nuclear program is "passing through a dark phase" due too technology control regimes. Prasad emphasizes the importance for Indian industry to "come forward and interact with BARC, which has the know-how for the required equipment" to develop the necessary components indigenously.
—"Top Official Says Western Embargo Hurting Indian Nuclear Program," United Press International, 9 June 1993; in Executive News Service, 9 June 1993; "Indian Nuclear Program 'Passing through Dark Phase' due to Embargo," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 June 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/.
July 1993
During a visit to India, Kazakhstan Deputy Prime Minister G.A. Abilsyitov offers to supply enriched uranium pellets and uranium oxide to India. Indian government officials say they cannot treat the Kazakh offer seriously since Russia and the Western countries would object to the deal. Moreover, an agreement will have to include Russia since Kazakhstan does not have an indigenous enrichment facility.
—Neel Patri, "Indians Say Kazakh Uranium Offer Does not Resolve Tarapur Problem," Nuclear Fuel, 2 August 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 26 August 1993, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/.
July 1993
Former Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman P.K. Iyengar says some countries have approached India to contract for its heavy water supplies.
—Mark Hibbs, "India, China Seek to Crack Seoul's Heavy Water Market," Nuclear Fuel, 16 August 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 10 September 1993, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/.
8 July 1993
The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) asks the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) to shut down seven nuclear power plants for "a thorough inspection of the turbines and generators and their associated components." According to the AERB officials, this is a precaution in light of the deficiencies revealed by investigations into the causes of the fire at Narora on 31 March. The experts investigating the fire at Narora say a combination of "fatigue failure [of two stream turbine blades and] deficiencies in the cabling system" resulted in the loss of electric power supply, which could have been avoided if AERB's recommendations to segregate cables and provide fire barriers had been followed. NPC will begin closures on July 31, starting with unit one of the Madras Atomic Power Station (MAPS).
—"India to Close Atomic Stations for Inspection," Agence France Presse, 8 July 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 8 July 1993, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/; "India: Phased Closure of Nuclear Plants for Safety Inspection," Inter Press Service, 16 July 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 9 July 1993, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/; Krishnan Guruswamy, "Accident Forces India to Shut Down Nuclear Plants for Inspection," Associated Press, 9 July 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/; Shiraz Sidhva, "India Orders Closure of N-reactors," Financial Times (London), 10 July 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 11 July 1993, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/.
8 July 1993
The Indian government reiterates that it will not sign the NPT despite the mounting pressure from France, which announced it would not renew a nuclear fuel contract for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS), due to expire in October 1993, unless India accedes to the NPT.
—"India Firm against Nuclear Treaty," United Press International, 8 July 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/.
16 August 1993
Citing "well placed commercial and government sources," Nuclear Fuel reports that India intends to supply South Korea with "a large amount of heavy water for the Wolsong-2 PHWR" and Argentina with the heavy water for its Atucha-2 PHWR.
—Mark Hibbs, "India, China Seek to Crack Seoul's Heavy Water Market," Nuclear Fuel, 16 August 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 10 September 1993, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/.
Early September 1993
UPI news agency reports that India and the United States will reopen talks on the subject of the "emerging nuclear arms race in South Asia" on 15 September in Washington. India's Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit will lead the Indian delegation.
—"US-Indian Nonproliferation Talks to Begin Next Week," United Press International, 10 September 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/.
15 September 1993
Indian and US officials begin their third round of discussions on nonproliferation issues in Washington. During the talks, Indian officials reject US requests for resumption of an Indo-Pakistani nuclear dialogue, as well as the idea of a five nation conference to discuss nonproliferation issues. However, India expresses interest in a global ban on fissile material production for explosive purposes, so long as the proposed treaty does not require countries to surrender acquired fissile material. Indian and US officials also discuss the issue of nuclear fuel supply for the Tarapur nuclear power reactors. The Indo-US nuclear fuel supply contract is due to expire in October 1993 and France the substitute supplier has declared its inability to continue the supply of nuclear fuel due to its acceptance of full-scope safeguards requirements for any foreign country to which it exports sensitive nuclear technology or material. In light of Indian difficulties, US officials assure their counterparts that Washington will try and find an alternative fuel supplier. However, they also warn Indian officials that pressure would be exerted on India if it proceeds to reprocess the fuel originally supplied by the United States or abandons safeguards on the Tarapur reactors.
—George Perkovich, "American Nonproliferation Initiatives," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, & London: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 337-338.
1 October 1993
Speaking at the 12th Plenary Meeting of the 48th Session of the UN General Assembly, India's Minister for External Affairs Dinesh Singh says that India welcomes the unilateral decision of the United States "to extend moratorium on nuclear testing until the end of 1994." He points out that "the focus of the nuclear weapon powers should now be on the early conclusion of a universal, verifiable, and comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty leading to the elimination of all nuclear weapons." He emphasizes that India believes in an early consideration of "a new and uniformly applicable regime for nonproliferation which does not discriminate between the nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon States." Singh points out that "for nuclear nonproliferation to be truly meaningful, it must also address the questions of a convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons, a verifiable freeze on the production of fissionable material, a total ban on nuclear weapon tests and negotiations on general and complete disarmament." He adds that "the global spread and reach of nuclear weapons reduce to a travesty the objective of achieving genuine peace and security within a narrow regional framework." Singh also touches the issue of export controls, emphasizing that actions should be taken to prevent the export control regimes from impeding the development. He argues that developing countries should have access to critical technologies and dual-use items to be employed for peaceful purposes.
—Dinesh Singh, Speech at the 12th Plenary Meeting of the 48th Session of the UN General Assembly, 1 October 1993; in Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, http://www.meadev.nic.in
16 October 1993
Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Hans Blix announces in Mumbai that the IAEA and India have bilaterally agreed to extend the Tarapur safeguards arrangement until December 1993. This temporary arrangement replaces the tripartite agreement between India, the IAEA, and the United States, which expires on 24 October. According to India's AEC Chairman R. Chidambaram, India has "entered in this arrangement voluntarily as a confidence-building measure" and by the time temporary bilateral arrangement expires, India plans to finalize an agreement with the IAEA.
—Vithel Nadkarni, "Interim Pact on Tarapur Reached With IAEA," Times of India (Mumbai), 17 October 1993; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-038, 29 December 1993.
16 December 1993
Indian minister Bhuvanesh Chaturvedi states in parliament that "certain deficiencies" had been found in India's current turbine-generator technology. He adds that the government has asked Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd, which produces turbine generators for the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC), to upgrade its technology and bring it "on par with the best available in the world."
—"India to Upgrade Turbine Generator Technology after Nuclear Accident," United Press International, 16 December 1993; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 17 December 1993, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>/.
December 1993
The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) sets up a Directorate of Regulatory Inspection and Enforcement for the surveillance of nuclear installations, as well as industrial and medical centers using radioactive material.
—Neelam Jain "Expert Warns India of Nuclear Scrutiny," United Press International, 22 March 1995; in Lexis-Nexis Academic World, 22 March 1995, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
1993
The Indian Army regiment tasked with maintaining the Pokhran nuclear test site in the Rajasthan desert caps one of the deeper test shafts built in 1982.
—Raj Chengappa, "Tell Your President, I Keep My Word," Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers Limited, 2000), p. 394.
1993
Mid-level diplomats from the Ministry of External Affairs reportedly bypass the official delegation at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Geneva and the Indian embassy in Washington to arrive at a nonproliferation deal with the US State Department. The Indian offer includes proposals for Indian tests and the willingness to negotiate a future global nonproliferation order; India's preparedness to discuss a regional nonproliferation regime linked to the nuclear weapon states agreeing to reduce their nuclear arsenals, but not within any given time frame; and the United States writing a protocol to the NPT or adopting alternative diplomatic means to accord countries such as India with proven nuclear capabilities.
—Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), pp. 372-373.
