This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

1996
The Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore purchases a supercomputer from the US company Digital Equipment Corp. [Note: IBM spokesperson Fred McNeese says that in April 1994, IBM installed a supercomputer at the Institute's Supercomputing Education and Research Center. The installed machine is capable of performing 1.4 billion operations per second.]
—Gary Milholin, "Made in America?" Washington Post, 8 June 1998, p. C1.

1996
According to the US Central Intelligence Agency India seeks nuclear-related items "some of which may have been intended for its nuclear weapons program."
—"The Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions," Director of Central Intelligence, Biannual Report to Congress, July-December 1996.

1996
Indian press reports suggest that Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL), an Indian government owned defense public sector company, has the expertise and relevant facilities for building nuclear-powered submarines. However, the facilities are not utilized since the Indian Navy does not have enough resources to place orders.
—Huma Siddiqui, "Rs 15,000 Crore Needed to Strengthen Navy: Report," Financial Express (Mumbai), 7 September 1996, <http://www.expressindia.com>.

1996
India's Tarapur nuclear power plant, which houses two boiling water reactors (BWRs), is encountering severe problems due to repeated shutdowns and a lack of spare parts. To remain in operation, Tarapur requires $200 million in equipment, including secondary steam generator replacements, recirculation pump components, instruments for monitoring core safety, control-rod drive components, and turbo generator components. Although General Electric (GE) of the United States has a monopoly in the manufacture of most of these spare parts, it no longer produces the equipment because BWR technology is out-of-date. India does not have the technical drawings necessary to indigenously produce the equipment, and it is unlikely that GE will provide them. Since 1974, when India conducted a nuclear test at Pokhran, nearly all the equipment for the Indian plant was bought from German, Spanish, Swedish, and other European firms.
—Sumit Ghoshal, "Tarapur N-Unit Faces Crisis Over Spares," Indian Express (Mumbai), 29 September 1996, <http://www.expressindia.com>.

1996
The new uranium fuel assembly plant is inaugurated in Hyderabad. The Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) claims that 95 percent of the production and quality control equipment are indigenous.
—Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report: 1996-1997, pp. 3:9-3:10.

1996
The Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) signs a deal with the US company Western Zirconium to supply 40MT of zirconium oxide. NFC also sells 1,805kg of Zircaloy-4 bars worth $157,347 to the Korea Nuclear Company.
— Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report: 1996-1997, p. 2:3.

1996
In view of mounting pressure from the Indian army to embark on a policy of nuclear weaponization, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao permits "Chiefs of Staff" targets to be assigned to the Army's Prithvi-1 (150km-range/1,000kg payload) ballistic missiles. The "Chiefs of Staff" targeting plan is analogous to the US Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). The Prithvi targets range from 'point targets' such as Ichiigoil Canal, to "high-value" targets such as oil refineries and nuclear installations. This marks a critical threshold in the operationalization of India's nuclear deterrent against Pakistan. The weapons in India's inventory include 20-100kt nuclear warheads and gravity bombs weighing 200-300kg. Tritium boosted fission weapons are also available. Despite the absence of field tests, the Bhabha Atomic Research Center has high confidence in the reliability of its weapon designs.
—Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), p. 376.

1 January 1996
India and Pakistan exchange the lists of their nuclear installations under the Agreement on Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Facilities signed in 1988.
—"India, Pakistan: Strany obmenyalis spiskami raspolozhennykh na territoriyakh dvukh gosudarstv yadernykh obyektov," Info-Tass, 2 January 1996; in Bulleten Tsentra Obshchestvennoy Informatsii po Atomnoy Energii, No. 4-5, 1996, p. 77.

11 January 1996
Speaking to the press in New Delhi, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Cretien says he hopes "India would find a way out to accept the nuclear nonproliferation treaty." He adds that he expects that "some more progress would be made on the issue during the visit" since for Canada it is important to improve relations with India.
—"Canada Tells India: Sign Nuclear Treaty," United Press International, 11 January 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 12 January 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Mid-January 1996
US Ambassador to India Frank Wisner urges India not to develop nuclear weapons because it would exacerbate regional tensions rather than enhance national security, as well as trigger a nearly complete cut-off of financial assistance from the United States.
—"US Accepts India Will Not Test N-Weapon," Reuters, 19 January 1996; in Compuserve-Executive News Service, 19 January 1996; Sid Balman Jr, "India Assures US on Nuke Test," Reuters, 19 January 1996; in Compuserve-Executive News Service, 19 January 1996.

19 January 1996
John Holum, director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, says the United States accepts India's assurances and assumes that India is not going to test a nuclear device. Holum says Indian diplomats assured their American counterparts in Geneva where talks on a test ban treaty are under way that India is not planning to test nuclear weapons.
—"US Accepts India Will Not Test N-Weapon," Reuters, 19 January 1996; in Compuserve-Executive News Service, 19 January 1996; Sid Balman Jr, "India Assures US on Nuke Test," Reuters, 19 January 1996; in Compuserve-Executive News Service, 19 January 1996.

19 January 1996
India's External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee says that India's nuclear program is for peaceful purposes and the reports suggesting otherwise are merely trying to "attack India on nonexistent issues."
—"External Affairs Minister on Nuclear Programme," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 January 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 8 June 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 January 1996
Brazil's President Fernando Henrique Cardoso confirms that Brazil is going to sign an agreement with India on the use of thorium for "purely scientific" purposes. He says there will be "no nuclear agreement."
—"Brazilian-Indian Thorium Deal Termed 'Purely Scientific'," Agencia Estado (Sao Paulo), 21 January 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-015, 21 January 1996; "Brazilian Official Views Nuclear Talks with India," Gazeta Mercantil (Sao Paulo), 24 January 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-018, 24 January 1996.

23 January 1996
Ambassador Ronaldo Sardemberg, presidential secretary for strategic affairs in Brazil, publicly states that Brazil may sign a memorandum of understanding with India "to obtain the necessary know-how to exploit thorium reserves." According to Sardemberg, the talks with India "do not involve an exchange of sensitive materials or uranium reprocessing and Brazil will not violate its commitments to the IAEA.
—"Brazilian Official Views Nuclear Talks with India," Gazeta Mercantil (Sao Paulo), 24 January 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-018, 24 January 1996

25 January 1996
Addressing Congress party workers at a public rally at Nagarjunasagar (Andhra Pradesh), India's Prime Minister Narasimha Rao declares that India will not give up its nuclear option. Rao states that India is against an arms race on the subcontinent; however "in whatever manner" conceivable, India is not behind Pakistan.
—"Indian Prime Minister rules Out Abandoning 'Nuclear Option'," Delhi All India Radio Network, 25 January 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-018, 25 January 1995; "India not to Forsake Its Nuclear Option, Says Premier Rao," Deutsche-Presse Agentur, 25 January 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 12 January 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 January 1996
Addressing the plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), India's Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, Ms. Arundhati Ghose, says India believes that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) "should be securely anchored in the global disarmament context and be linked through the treaty language to the elimination of all nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework." She remarks that the negotiating parties must "ensure that the CTBT leaves no loophole for activity, either explosive based or non-explosive based, aimed at the continued development and refinement of nuclear weapons." Having presented India's position on the issue, the Indian side "would be willing to examine any other language, which addresses [India's] concerns," she adds.
—Statement by Ms. Arundhati Ghose in the Plenary of the Conference on Disarmament, 25 January 1996; Embassy of India, Washington, DC, <http://www.indianembassy.org>.

Later in 1996
Indian Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Arundhati Ghose, meets scientists at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), Trombay who are opposed to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The scientists argue that a CTBT would prohibit them from testing their nuclear weapon designs and hurt India's nuclear weaponization program.
—Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), pp. 387-388.

27 January 1996
Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao sign a joint declaration where the two sides express their willingness to work on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to eliminate all the "loopholes through which nuclearized states may continue to develop and refine their arsenals." The National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) of Brazil and India's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) sign a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the field of nuclear energy in the areas of "research on the use of thorium as a fuel, nuclear safety, radiological protection, nuclear medicine, sterilization of food, and the use of nuclear techniques in agriculture and manufacturing heavy equipment."
—"Rao, Brazil's Cardoso Sign Joint Declaration, Accords," Agencia Estado (Sao Paulo), 27 January 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-021, 27 January 1996; "Brazilian President Departs Delhi; Nuclear Research Pact Signed," Delhi All India Network, 27 January 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-021, 27 January 1996.

January 1996
Officials from Uranium Corporation of India, along with police officers, destroy the village of Chatijkocha to construct a pond for storing depleted uranium from Jaduguda, India's primary uranium mine (Singhbhum East District of Jharkhand, 25km from the city of Jamshedpur). The uranium ore is milled and then transported to the Nuclear Fuels Complex (NFC) in Hyderabad to be fabricated into fuel rods. The uranium mines in Jaduguda, Batin, and Narwapahar are owned by the Uranium Corporation of India, which is regulated by India's Department of Atomic Energy (DAE).
—Xavier Dias, "Chatijkocha...Another Story," Unpublished report, Chaibasa, India, Mining Concerns Desk, Bindrai Institute for Research Study and Action, 12 February 1996.

January-February 1996
The Jaduguda-based mill of India's Uranium Corporation is expanding its capacity from 1,350 tons to 2,100 tons of uranium ore per day to process additional uranium ore of 1,000 tons per day produced by the recently commissioned Narwa Pahar mine. The resulting yellow cake will be sent to the Nuclear Fuels Complex (NFC) in Hyderabad for further processing before it is used in nuclear power reactors.
—"India: Television Details Steps to Boost Uranium Production," Delhi Doordarshan Television Network, 4 February 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-003, 4 February 1996.

2 February 1996
Jasjit Singh, director of the New Delhi-based Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA) says that Indo-US defense cooperation will be limited as long as the United States continues to treat India as a major proliferation threat.
—Teresa Hitchens and Vivek Raghuvanshi, "Nuke Policies Strain US-India Ties," Defense News, 12 February 1996, pp. 3, 36.

3 February 1996
Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) Director A.N. Prasad says India's Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) "has achieved self-sufficiency" in meeting India's demand for heavy water and now can export the surplus to countries like South Korea, China, Romania, and Argentina.
—"India to Sell Heavy Water," United Press International, 3 February 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 12 January 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "India Has 100 Tons of Heavy Water for Export," Deutsche-Presse-Agentur, 21 February 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 21 February 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 February 1996
A US State Department official says that US-India defense cooperation is limited by the international nonproliferation regimes and by related US export laws. He says the Indian government may have "unrealistic expectations" about the results of defense cooperation agreement (signed on January 1995).
—Teresa Hitchens and Vivek Raghuvanshi, "Nuke Policies Strain US-India Ties," Defense News (Springfield, VA), 12 February 1996, pp. 3, 36.

15 February 1996
Indian Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, Arundhati Ghose, says the "lack of flexibility on the part of few delegations" to reach an agreement on broader talks on elimination of the nuclear weapons will affect India's stance on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Ghose proposes an international convention to "codify the legal norm against the use of nuclear weapons." According to Ghose, a failure to link disarmament to the test ban treaty is "not only a matter of deep regret but of dismay."
—"India Renews Call for Talks on Nuclear Weapons Ban," Reuters, 15 February 1996; Compuserve-Executive News Service, 15 February 1996; "N-Test Ban Target Seen Threatened as Powers Scrap," 15 February 1996; in Compuserve-Executive News Service, 15 February 1996; "New Delhi Tries to Tie N-Test Ban in Knots," Financial Times, 16 February 1996, p. 4.

Mid-February 1996
Speaking at the "Nuclear Nonproliferation and the Millennium: Prospects and Initiatives" Conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, India's permanent Representative to the UN, Prakash Shah, asserts that India does not have any "hidden agenda" and does not intend to "sabotage" the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Former Indian Defense Minister K.C. Pant emphasizes that India is "the only country in history to incontrovertibly demonstrate its capability to explode a nuclear device and then withhold weaponization despite pressing security concerns and the continued proliferation of nuclear weapons across its frontiers and elsewhere in the world." Pant declares that "India's interests dictate that it be a part of global disarmament campaign, not of a disarmament charade." Jaswant Singh, a senior leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), says his party believes India should openly declare itself a nuclear weapon state since it is much better to have an explicit rather than implicit program. According to Singh, India will appreciate if Pakistan decides to "follow a particular path of weaponization" to fulfill its security requirements. He acknowledges, however, that those embarking on weaponization, as well as the ones assisting them, will have to pay the price. He declared that countries in South Asia have their own national interests and asks the United States to "leave Asia alone" while at the same time working with it since "the next millennium really belongs to Asia."
—Aziz Haniffa, "Nuclear Pakistan No Problem for BJP Aide," India Abroad, 23 February 1996, p. 24; Aziz Haniffa, "Proliferation Fears Hover Over Conference," India Abroad, 23 February 1996, p. 22.

29 February 1996
In the budget for fiscal year 1996/97 presented to parliament by India's finance minister Manmohan Singh, the Department of Energy (DAE) gets 14.43 billion rupees (about $418.26 million) up from 14.02 billion rupees for FY 1996/97. The Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) gets 9.75 billion rupees (around $282.68 million), down from 11.22 billion rupees in 1995-1996 and 1.5 billion rupees ($43 million) less than it requested. The Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) will receive 2.68 billion rupees, up from 2.66 billion rupees last year; the Indira Gandhi Center for Atomic Research (IGCAR) will receive 575 million rupees, while the Nuclear Fuels Complex (NFC) and Center for Advanced Computing will receive 293.2 million and 275 million rupees respectively.
—Neel Patri, "NPC Funding Continues to Drop as Indian Nuclear Revenues Lag," Nucleonics Week, 7 March 1996, pp. 17-18; Neel Patri, "Nuclear R&D Budget Rises Slightly in India for Coming Fiscal Year," Nucleonics Week, 14 March 1996, pp. 15-16.

Week of 26 February 1996
Speaking in parliament, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao says that both the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) are "defective" and "ineffective" and India is not going to give up its demand on making the CTBT conditional upon a specified timeframe for complete nuclear disarmament.
—Praful Bidwai, "Disarmament: India, Nonaligned Drift apart on Nuclear Ban," Inter Press Service, 8 March 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 12 January 1996, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 March 1996
A report from India's Standing Committee on Atomic Energy states that the status of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS) should be changed to a research and development project since the plant is a heavy financial burden on the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC). The report states that RAPS-1 is "essentially an experimental station" and RAPS-2 also has "repeated and considerable technical difficulties and should provide an opportunity to our scientists and nuclear engineers to devise various indigenous alternatives and fabricate the needed machinery." Managing Director of the NPC, Y.S.R. Prasad, says the NPC's funds are barely enough to support current infrastructure and are insufficient for any expansion. He says the government should return to its policy of sharing half of the investment in nuclear power projects.
—"Committee Consider Indian Programme," Nuclear Engineering International, May 1996, p. 8; "India to Curtail Nuclear Activity," United Press International, 7 March 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 8 March 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Early March 1996
According to the sources at the Kurchatov Energy Institute in Moscow, officials from Russia, Iran, China, and India have signed a protocol to set up an Asian Fusion Research Foundation to further research in nuclear fusion energy. The final agreement will be prepared within several months and signed during the IAEA-sponsored conference in Montreal in August. According to Russian officials, the financing of the project was not discussed by the parties.
—"Russia, China, Iran, and India Agree to Fusion R&D Cooperation," Nucleonics Week, 21 March 1996, p. 15.

12 March 1996
The turbine for the Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) is run for the first time after clearance from the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board. The FBTR runs continuously for 17 days at a power level of 10.5MWt.
—Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report: 1996-1997, pp. 14-15.

23 March 1996
Cold commissioning of the Kalpakkam Fuel Reprocessing Plant (KARP) is initiated. The new facility will enable the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) to increase plutonium output from spent fuel. The plutonium will reportedly be used in India's Fast Reactor Program.
—Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report: 1996-1997, p. 2:3.

26 March 1996
In a first comprehensive assessment of India's nuclear safety, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) lists 120 potential safety-related problems in India's nuclear power stations. The report warns that several installations pose serious safety concerns especially the nuclear power stations in Chennai (Tamil Nadu) and Kota (Rajasthan), which have obsolete emergency core cooling systems, inadequate to handle the reactor core melt-down. The AERB report proposes the following measures to improve reactor safety: improved waste management systems, an assessment of reactor's earthquake survivability, and inspection and replacement of faulty pressure tubes.
—"Report: Indian Nuclear Plants Unsafe," United Press International, 26 March 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 27 March 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Report Lists 120 Safety-related problems in Indian Nuclear Plants," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 26 March 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 26 March 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "India Commissions Third Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 27 March 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 27 March 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 March 1996
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman R. Chidambaram inaugurates a final testing of India's third nuclear fuel reprocessing plant at Kalpakkam. He initiates "a trial chopping of unirradiated natural uranium fuel assemblies" as the first stage of "cold commissioning." A comprehensive testing program of the plant will be carried out before the operations with the first batch of spent fuel from the Madras Atomic Power Station (MAPS) commence within about six months. The plant will separate plutonium from the spent fuel. This plutonium will be used to fuel India's prototype fast breeder reactor planned for Kalpakkam. Chidambaram says that reprocessing is "one of the most secretive operations in the nuclear world and a crucial part of the nuclear fuel cycle."
—"Third Reprocessing Plant Opened at Kalpakkam," Nuclear News, May 1996, p.43; "Third Reprocessing Plant Starts Up," Nuclear Engineering International, May 1996, p.8; "India Commissions Third Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 27 March 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 27 March 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 March 1996
The Safe Energy Communication Council (SECC) issues a report stating that India's nuclear program is plagued with technical delays and cost overruns "despite its strong scientific infrastructure." The report indicates that the performance of India's nuclear reactors is among the lowest in the world, averaging 28 percent of rated capacity. The report notes that India operates "some of the world's most accident-prone and inefficient nuclear facilities." Commenting on the report, the Managing Director of India's Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) Y.S.R. Prasad says the actual capacity of India's reactors is about 40 percent and this is largely due to the accident at Narora (March 1993), when the NPC had to shut down and inspect the turbo-generators of all plants. According to Prasad, the SECC "may not have made its assessments properly."
—"Indian Nuclear Plants Unsafe," Hindu (Chennai), 6 April 1996, p. 16.

March 1996
The Indian Express (Mumbai) reports that the storage tanks, containing radioactive waste from the CIRUS and Dhruva reactors have developed leaks.
—"India Commissions Third Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 27 March 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 27 March 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Rahul Bedi, "Nuclear Safety Flaws Played Down," South China Morning Post, 28 March 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 29 March 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Spring 1996
Frustrated with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, Indian Ambassador to the CD Arundhati Ghose recommends that India pull out of the negotiations. However, Ghose is overruled by the Ministry of External Affairs on grounds that there was no distinction between pulling out of the treaty and blocking it.
—Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), p. 390.

April 1996
The Janata Dal party's election manifesto says the party will "continue to oppose the NPT and its adjunct CTBT [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty]." The Communist Party of India (Marxist) advocates against the "attempts to impose" the NPT and the CTBT on India. The Congress party's manifesto says the party "favors a nuclear-weapon-free world and will continue efforts for total and complete disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament." The Congress indicates that in the case of Pakistan's development and deployment of nuclear weapons, India will have to review its nuclear policy to meet the threat.
—Mahesh Uniyal, "Disarmament-India: Nuclear Bomb an Election Issue," Inter Press Service, 21 April 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 23 April 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "India: Experts Say New Government Needs to Declare Nuclear Policy," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 29 April 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-086, 29 April 1996.

April 1996
Sources in India's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) say that the situation with the deal on the construction of two VVER-1,000 reactors in Koodankulam (Tamil Nadu) with Russia's help is "very fluid." Russia wants to renegotiate the agreement signed in 1988 to attach safeguards to these facilities and to settle the payment terms in hard currency.
—Jyoti Malhotra, "India: US Pressure Cited for Faltering Russian Nuclear Deal," Business Standard (New Delhi), 23 April 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-080, 23 April 1996.

7 April 1996
Former Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) Director A.N. Prasad tells Indian Express (Mumbai) that the spent fuel reprocessing plant at Trombay has accumulated 1.5 to 2 million liters of liquid radioactive waste. He adds that the waste storage tanks at Trombay and Tarapur need repairs since they are at least 25 years old.
—"Highly Radioactive Waste Accumulating in India's Atomic Plant," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 7 April 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 19 April 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 April 1996
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) issues its 80-page election manifesto. The party aims at a "strong and secure India" that will be a major player at the international arena. In the manifesto the BJP promises to exercise the option to "induct" nuclear weapons, proceed with the production and deployment of Prithvi and Agni ballistic missiles, upgrade conventional weapons systems, link defense expenditure to real requirements, and seek "sovereign equality among nations" in handling security and foreign policies. According to the manifesto, the BJP intends to set up national security council that reevaluate India's nuclear policy. The BJP announces it will not accept the world of nuclear apartheid and not sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) unless other nuclear powers agree to a time-bound elimination of nuclear weapons.
—"India: BJP Declares Readiness to Deploy Nuclear Weapons," Business Standard (New Delhi), 8 April 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-070, 8 April 1996; "India: BJP Promises 'Sweeping' Changes," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 8 April 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-070, 8 April 1996; "India: Bharatiya Janata Party Releases Election Manifesto," Delhi All India Radio Network, 7 April 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-069, 7 April 1996; "Opposition Party Backs Indian Nuclear 'Sword'," Washington Times, 8 April 1996, p.A10; "India: Experts Say New Government Needs to Declare Nuclear Policy," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 29 April 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-086, 29 April 1996.

18 April 1996
The Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS) is temporarily shut down.
—"Indian State Shuts off Industry Lights," United Press International, 18 April 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 19 April 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 April 1996
Senior Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee says that his party "will keep the nuclear option open to protect India" if voted to power. He adds that India needs "to be prepared not to rely on the intentions of others." He says the BJP will increase India's defense budget.
—"Hindu Party Leader Vows to Keep Open India's Nuclear Option," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 25 April 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 25 April 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 May 1996
Speaking at the news conference, Atal Bihari Vajpayee says that his party expects that the nuclear "haves" will embark on elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. Otherwise, India will do "whatever is required" to safeguard its security.
—Vivek Raghuvanshi, "India's New Leaders to Fortify Nuke Policy, Heighten Readiness," Defense News (Springfield, VA), 20-26 May 1996.

15 May 1996
India's President Shankar Dayal Sharma invites the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to form a government in New Delhi. He appoints Atal Bihari Vajpayee as prime minister. The BJP and its allies, the Samata party, and two regional parties from Haryana and Punjab hold 195 seats in the 545-seat lower house of parliament (Lok Sabha), 77 seats short of majority.
—John F. Burns, "Hindu Party Head Chosen for Post of India's Premier," New York Times, 16 May 1996, pp. A1, A6; Mark Nicholson, "India's BJP Party Leader to Be Sworn in as PM," Financial Times (London), 16 May 1996, pp. 1, 12; Ashok Sharma, "President Invites Hindu Nationalist to Form Government," Associated Press, 15 May 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 15 May 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 May 1996
Atal Bihari Vajpayee is sworn in as prime minister of India. Vajpayee has to prove he has the support of a parliamentary majority by 31 May 1996. Pramod Mahajan is appointed as India's defense minister. Vajpayee immediately authorizes a program of nuclear tests. Subsequent to his authorization, at least one nuclear device is emplaced in a test shaft.
—Mark Nicholson, "India's BJP Party Leader to Be Sworn in as PM," Financial Times (London), 16 May 1996, pp. 1, 12; Vivek Raghuvanshi, "India's New Leaders to Fortify Nuke Policy, Heighten Readiness," Defense News (Springfield, VA), 20-26 May 1996; George Perkovich, "India Verges On Tests," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, & London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 374.

May 1996
Subsequent to the discovery by US intelligence sources of India's renewed test preparations, the Clinton administration issues quiet demarches to the Vajpayee government to exercise restraint.
—George Perkovich, "India Verges On Tests," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, & London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 374.

24 May 1996
Admiral Vijay Singh Shekhawat, India's Chief of Naval Staff, says India is not going to rush with the nuclear submarine program. Although the Navy is eager to have a nuclear-powered submarine, financial constraints are a significant hurdle, he adds.
—Pamela D'Mello, "India: Navy Chief Denies Plan for Nuclear Submarines by 2004," Asian Age (New Delhi), 25 May 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-105, 25 May 1996.

May 1996
Prime Minister Vajpayee is advised that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) will most likely lose the vote-of-confidence in parliament and should postpone the nuclear tests until such time that it gains a parliamentary majority. Vajpayee agrees to postpone the tests so as not to saddle the successor government with a testing program's domestic and international repercussions.
—George Perkovich, "India Verges On Tests," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, & London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 375.

28 May 1996
The BJP government fails to win the vote-of-confidence in parliament.
—"Deve Gowda Sworn in as a Prime Minister," Agence France Presse, 1 June 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 15 May 1996, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

May 1996
Captain Richard Sharpe says in Jane's Fighting Ships that the Indian Navy has already tested the nuclear propulsion for India's Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) or nuclear submarine project. According to Sharpe, the fabrication of the 6,000 ton displacement hull will begin in 1997 and the project is expected to be completed by 2004. Sharpe adds that India is seeking assistance from the Russian submarine development organization Rubin in order to develop the pressurized water reactor capable of producing 190MW of power. Rubin is cooperating with the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), he says.
—Mahesh Hebbar, "India: Russia to Aid in Building First Nuclear Sub by 2004," Asian Age (New Delhi), 25 May 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-105, 25 May 1996.

June 1996
With reference to the entry-into-force (EIF) clause of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the British delegation to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) proposes that all countries that have offered to host seismic stations as part of the international monitoring system should have to sign the CTBT. In response, India withdraws its offer to host a seismic facility. Indian Ambassador Arundhati Ghose warns that India will not sign the treaty unless its name is taken off the list of 44 countries required to sign the CTBT to bring it into force. The Indian delegation maintains that forcibly putting India's name on the list in the 44-nation list, contravenes the Vienna Convention on treaties that forbids compelling a sovereign state to sign a treaty not in its national interest.
—Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), p. 391.

1 June 1996
India's President Shankar Dayal Sharma invites the United Front (UF) coalition, led by H.D. Deve Gowda, to form a government in New Delhi.
—"Deve Gowda Sworn in as a Prime Minister," Agence France Presse, 1 June 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 1 June 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 June 1996
Indian nuclear and defense scientists renew their request to the United Front (UF) government, led by Deve Gowda, to authorize the pending nuclear tests. Prime Minister Gowda does not veto the scientists' request, but he also does not consider the tests a high priority. [Note: Subsequent to the May 1998 tests, former Prime Minister Deve Gowda revealed that he had declined permission for the tests for economic reasons, and not because he feared international repercussions.]
— George Perkovich, "India Verges On Tests," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, & London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 376.

June 1996
US President Bill Clinton writes to Foreign Minister Gujral urging India not to reject the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty's (CTBT) entry-into-force (EIF) clause and sign the treaty.
—Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), p. 392.

Early June 1996
Prime Minister Deve Gowda summons Ambassador Arundhati Ghose for a meeting at parliament house in New Delhi to discuss India's future course of action on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Among others, the meeting is also attended by Foreign Minister Gujral, Foreign Secretary Salman Haider, and Rakesh Sood, Director of Disarmament at the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). Ghose advises the prime minister that if the entry-into-force (EIF) of the treaty is changed, India ought not to be a party to the treaty, but should not oppose it either. However, if the EIF provision remains unchanged then India should "block everything, even the transmission of the CD [Conference on Disarmament] report to the UN General Assembly." Gowda and other participants in the meeting endorse this strategy.
— Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), pp. 393-394.

3 June 1996
India's new Defense Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav declares that his United Front (UF) government "will spend every single penny of available resources to upgrade the capability of the armed forces. The government will take all steps to ensure that our armed forces remain in a state of readiness better that that of any potential enemy."
—"New Indian Defense Minister Pledges to Hike Defense Budget," Agence France Presse, 3 June 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 3 June 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 June 1996
India's United Front (UF) government issues a policy document stating that it will retain its nuclear option while continuing to work towards global nuclear disarmament. The new government is scheduled to seek a confidence vote in the Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament) on 12 June 1996.
—Rahul Bedi, "India Vows to Keep Nuclear Option," Daily Telegraph (London), 6 June 1996, p.9; Javed Naqvi, "Indian Government Sets Nuclear, Kashmir Policies," Reuters, 5 June 1996; in Compuserve-Executive News Service 5 June 1996.

7 June 1996
India's Minister for External Affairs I.K. Gujral says that New Delhi has conveyed to the international community its requirement that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) be linked to a specified time frame for complete elimination of nuclear weapons. He adds that India has made its proposed "suggestions and amendments" to the draft document.
—"India Declines to Comment on Signing Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 7 June 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 7 June 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 June 1996
H.S. Surjeet, a Politburo member of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) that supports the current coalition government from the outside, says "there is absolutely no question" for India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). He adds that the government has to safeguard India's interests and cannot submit to the threat of sanctions.
—"Hitch over India Signing the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 7 June 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 7 June 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "India Declines to Comment on Signing Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 7 June 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 7 June 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 June 1996
A retired vice admiral of the Indian Navy, K.R. Menon, tells Defense News that the Indian Navy "does not have the full expertise to build a nuclear submarine, and India will need a fresh infusion of talent and money" to proceed with its Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project. According to Menon's estimates, the Navy would need "at least $714.3 million" to complete the project. The project is experiencing problems in building a containment vessel for the reactor, as well as several "integration and fabrication" problems.
—Vivek Raghuvanshi, "Technical Snags Frustrate Indian Nuclear Sub Program," Defense News (Springfield, VA), 24-30 June 1996, p. 40.

15-16 June 1996
Former prime minister and a senior leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Atal Bihari Vajpayee says India "should get out of the CTBT [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty]" because it does not serve New Delhi's concerns regarding disarmament.
—"Decisive Phase of Nuclear Test Ban Talks, India Toughens Its Stand," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 17 June 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 17 June 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 June 1996
In an interview to the Indian Express (Mumbai), India's External Affairs Minister I.K. Gujral says India will have to "safeguard its security interests" since the nuclear weapon states are not willing to agree with it on the issues of phased nuclear disarmament in a specified timeframe. He remarks that "the ultimate criteria for [the talks] in Geneva will be national interest."
—"Decisive Phase of Nuclear Test Ban Talks, India Toughens Its Stand," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 17 June 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 17 June 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 June 1996
The outgoing head of India's Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) A. Gopalakrishnan warns that serious safety concerns at India's nuclear power plants are not being adequately addressed. He remarks that the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) has largely ignored AERB's recommendations thus making the AERB "subservient to those whom it is supposed to regulate." Gopalakrishnan declares India's nuclear-regulatory process "a total farce."
—"Regulator: India Failing in Nuke Safety," United Press International, 18 June 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 19 June 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Madhui Nainan, "Most Indian Atomic-Power Stations Unsafe: Ex-Nuclear Regulatory Chief," Agence France Presse, 18 June 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 18 June 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 June 1996
India refuses to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva until a time-bound framework for total elimination of nuclear weapons is set up. India's Ambassador to the CD Arundhati Ghose says that the drafted scope of the treaty "remains very narrow and does not fulfill the requirement of a comprehensive ban [but rather] a nuclear weapon test explosion ban treaty. The CTBT that we see emerging appears to be shaped more by the technological preferences of the nuclear weapon states rather than the imperatives of nuclear disarmament. This was not the CTBT that India envisaged in 1954. This cannot be the CTBT that India can be expected to accept." Ms. Ghose declares that the "inconsistency in the approach [to nuclear disarmament] can only be explained by the desire to retain a monopoly, a desire which is sought to be futured by the CTBT. We cannot accept that it is legitimate for some countries to rely on nuclear weapons for their security while denying this right to others." Given these circumstances, she adds, national security has become a key factor in India's decisionmaking. She asserts that an emerging "flawed and eternal treaty" is not a measure towards comprehensive nuclear disarmament and hence "is not in India's national security interest. India therefore cannot subscribe to it in its present form." Ghose emphasizes that India will not accept "any language in the treaty text, which would affect [India's] sovereign right to decide, in the light of supreme national interest, whether [it] should or should not accede to such a treaty."
—Arundhati Ghose, Statement at the Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 20 June 1996; Embassy of India, Washington, DC, <http://www.indianembassy.org>; "India to Quit Nuke Monitor Club," Reuters, 26 June 1996; in Compuserve-Executive News 26 June 1996; Christopher Bellamy, "India Pose Threat to Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," Independent (London), 21 June 1996, p. 10; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 21 June 1996.

20 June 1996
India's Foreign Secretary Salman Haider states at a press conference in New Delhi that India cannot subscribe to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in its present form because the treaty is not "truly comprehensive" and not connected to "a specifically timed nuclear disarmament program." He says that for India, the security environment in South Asia is a "key consideration" and the treaty does not contribute to its improvement.
—Kanak Nair, "India Declares Intention not to Sign Test Ban Treaty," Japan Economic Newswire, 20 June 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 20 June 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 June 1996
Lev Ryabev, the Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, tells the Interfax news agency that Russia is not going to link its cooperation with India in the field of nuclear energy to India's stance on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). According to Ryabev, an agreement on construction of the power station in Koodankulam (Tamil Nadu) is in progress. The value of this contract may exceed $1 billion.
—"Minatom RF ne nameren uvyazyvat kontrakty s Indiey v yadernoy oblasti s eyo prisoedineniem k DZYAI," Interfax, 24 June 1996.

28-29 June 1996
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) President L.K. Advani says his party wants India "to have nuclear parity with neighbors." He says there is "no reason" for India to refrain from developing a nuclear deterrent when both China and Pakistan have developed nuclear weapons.
—Nelson Graves, "India Under the Gun to Build Nuclear Weapons," Reuters, 30 June 1996; in Compuserve-Executive News, 30 June 1996.

June 1996
India says it will withdraw from the Group of Experts' Seismological Technical Tests (GESTT) in case it becomes a part of the International Monitoring System under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). According to the press reports, New Delhi intends to dismantle three seismic monitoring stations across the country constructed to detect nuclear explosions under GESTT.
—"India to Quit Nuke Monitor Club," Reuters, 26 June 1996; in Compuserve-Executive News 26 June 1996.

June 1996
A senior official at India's defense ministry says it is time for India to abandon its policy of keeping the nuclear option open and "examine how best to translate this into effective deterrence to safeguard our vital interests in political and military terms" since "there is no longer any ambiguity about reports that China has helped Pakistan with its nuclear program and has supplied to it nuclear capable M-11 medium range missiles."
—"India: Officials Claim Nation Faces Nuclear Threat from Neighbors," Times of India (Mumbai), 28 June 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-128, 28 June 1996.

June-July 1996
India rejects the proposed draft of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva. India's Foreign Secretary Salman Haider says India will keep its nuclear option without disengaging from CTBT negotiations. According to Haider, India's objections to the CTBT are based on the fact that the treaty aims to contain only horizontal, not vertical, proliferation; since the treaty bans only the nuclear explosions while allowing for hydro-nuclear, hydro-dynamic, sub-critical tests, and computer simulations. He says the treaty lacks verification mechanisms to check for the transfer of nuclear technology from nuclear weapon states to their clients and does not guarantee India's security. He adds India will continue to press for the total elimination of nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework.
—"India Delivers Blow to Nuclear Test Ban," Jane's Defense Weekly (Coulsdon, Surrey), 3 July 1996, pp. 27-29.

June-July 1996
Prime Minister Deve Gowda consults Finance Minister P. Chidambaram and Foreign Minister I.K. Gujral on the question of conducting nuclear tests. Both ministers advise against conducting tests in the near term for economic and foreign policy reasons.
—Raj Chengappa, "Why Play Pahalwan?" Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (2000: Harper Collins Publishers India, New Delhi), p. 398.

Early July 1996
Unit 1 of the Kaiga Atomic Power Station (KAPS) is scheduled to go critical in July pending approval from the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB). According to a former AERB Chairman A. Gopalakrishnan (retired 15 June), the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) has not met the AERB's design specifications. Commenting on the design of the project, Additional Chief Engineer S.V. Rajgopalan (civil) says, "Kaiga would have pressurized water reactors which use naturally occurring uranium as fuel and heavy water as coolant for the core of the reactor and moderator. The use of natural uranium eliminates sudden power excursions during operation." Talking about the safety issues, Additional Engineer (planning) M.V. Rao says that "protection against any radiation leakage into the atmosphere is exceptionally strong [at Kaiga]. Uranium dioxide pellets and the zircalloy cladding of the fuel, which are housed in zircalloy pressure tubes, comprise the primary defense. For radiation to leak, the fuel has to overheat and rupture the zircalloy sheath. To prevent overheating due to loss of coolant, a highly reliable coolant injection system is provided. Finally, the reactor is located inside two sealed concrete buildings, forming the "double containment." According to press reports, agitation by ecologists and antinuclear activists against the Kaiga project "may delay the commissioning but is unlikely to stall it, given a lack of political and local support."
—"Row Over Dome Design Delays Kaiga Atomic Project," India Power Daily (Mumbai), 2 July 1996, <http://www.power.indiaworld.com>; "With Weak Green Lobby and Locals Not Against it Per se, Kaiga May Sail Through," India Power Daily (Mumbai), 4 July 1996, <http://www.power.indiaworld.com>.

11 July 1996
Addressing parliament, India's Minister of State for Science and Technology Y.K. Alagh says that Thailand has turned down India's offer to set up a "nuclear research reactor of advanced design in that country."
—"Thailand Turns Down India's Offer of Nuclear Research Reactor," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 11 July 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 17 June 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 July 1996
Addressing a press conference in Hyderabad, the Chief Executive of the Nuclear Fuels Complex (NFC) K.K. Sinha says the NFC is planning to commission three plants between December 1996 and June 1997. The planned expansion project consists of uranium oxide fabrication, zirconium fabrication, and uranium fuel assembly plants. According to Sinha, the project costs are estimated at 2.15 billion rupees and will be met by the NFC's budgetary allocations. Sinha says that production capacity of nuclear fuel will go up to 400 tons after the plants' commissioning.
—"NFC Gearing to Double Uranium Output," Hindu (Chennai), 15 July 1996, <http://www.hinduonline.com>; "India: Nuclear Fuel Complex to Double Production by December," Delhi All India Network, 14 July 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-137, 14 July 1996.

15 July 1996
Speaking at a workshop at the Tamil Nadu Agricultural University (Coimbatore), D.D. Sood, director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Center's (BARC) Radio-Chemistry and Isotope Group, says the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant under construction at Kalpakkam is in the final stages of construction, adding that reprocessing plants are already functioning at Tarapur and Trombay. Sood says India possesses thorium reserves enough for generating 300,000MW of energy for 300 years. He notes that nuclear power plants add only 1.1 percent to the existing radiation level in India and, thus, are not only viable but also "indispensable and profitable" for India.
-—"Kalpakkam N-Fuel Reprocess Plant Almost Ready," Hindu (Chennai), 16 July 1996, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

15 July 1996
Addressing parliament, India's Minister for External Affairs I.K. Gujral says that without stating a commitment to the time-bound elimination of nuclear weapons in the text of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the treaty "will be an end in itself rather than a first step on the road to nuclear disarmament." Gujral emphasizes that India's nuclear policy is intimately linked to its national security concerns. He reiterates that the Indian government continues to maintain the "option so that [India] is able to take all necessary measures to cope with any threat that may be posed to the security of the nation. [The government] cannot allow this option to be restricted in any manner if other countries remain unwilling to accept the obligation of eliminating their nuclear arsenals." He remarks that in the prevailing circumstances it is "inescapable" that national security considerations govern India's decision-making. Gujral states that India cannot accept the CTBT "in the present form" since the text does not address the issues of concern to India. He says, however, that India will remain engaged in the negotiations "to ensure that [its] freedom of choice is not constrained in any manner." India's approach will remain responsible, he adds.
—Statement by I.K. Gujral, Minister of External Affairs, in the Indian Parliament, 15 July 1996; Embassy of India, Washington, DC, <http://www.indianembassy.org>.

28 July 1996
Speaking on the eve of a session of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, India's Minister for External Affairs I.K. Gujral says India cannot accept the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the present form because it asks India to give up its nuclear option. He says his government is ready to accept being isolated and aims to safeguard India's "vital security interest."
—"India not Ready to Accept Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 28 July 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 17 June 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

31 July 1996
Addressing the Indian parliament, India's Minister for External Affairs I.K. Gujral expresses dismay over the nuclear tests carried out at the time of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations. He says that "ongoing testing programs, whether at the test sites or in the laboratories, are clear indications that the nuclear weapon states are not willing to give up their reliance on their nuclear arsenals and consider the CTBT merely as a nonproliferation measure. Such testing programs inevitably give rise to questions relating to India's national security. While we have adopted a policy of restraint after demonstrating our capability, we remain fully conscious of the evolving security situation. We are committed to taking all steps necessary to enable us to cope with any threat that may be posed to the security of India." He adds that the government cannot permit "any language" in the text of the CTBT that will directly or indirectly impose an obligation on India.
—Statement by I.K. Gujral, Minister of External Affairs, in the Indian Parliament, 31 July 1996; Embassy of India, Washington, DC, <http://www.indianembassy.org>.

End of July 1996
The nuclear devices emplaced in the test shafts are removed following denial of permission for a testing program by the Deve Gowda government.
—George Perkovich, "India Verges On Tests," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, & London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 377.

August 1996
Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) Director G.R. Srinivasan says the repairs of the leak of heavy water in a pressure system of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station-1 (RAPS) will be completed by December and the unit will be restarted in January 1997. The unit has been shut down since February 1996. There are plans to replace all of the unit's channels with the ones designed to increase its capacity by 50MW and extend operational life by 15-16 years.
—"Repairs Continue at Rajasthan," Nuclear Engineering International, September 1996, p. 4.

August 1996
India's Minister of External Affairs I.K. Gujral writes to the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, suggesting that the draft of the proposed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) be modified.
—"India's Foreign Minister Seeks Modification of Nuclear Draft," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 August 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 18 August 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 August 1996
Brajesh Mishra, chairman of the Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP) foreign affairs cell, tells reporters in New Delhi that India should carry out one or more nuclear tests in order to be able to design "nuclear warheads for our missiles." Mishra says India's nuclear status is justified in the regional environment "with China a nuclear power and Pakistan a 'nuclear threshold power'." He urges the government of H.D. Deve Gowda to prevent passage of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, noting that the "draft treaty in its present form would only perpetuate the situation of the nuclear haves and have nots." He says India should block the treaty if its entry-into-force provision is not changed to eliminate the requirement of India's mandatory adherence to the treaty.
—"India: BJP Demands 'Two Nuclear Tests' to Develop Warheads," Hindu (Chennai), 8 August 1996, p. 7; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-155, 8 August 1996; "BJP Urges Nuclear Tests to Perfect Warheads," Washington Times, 10 August 1996, p. A7; "Indian Opposition Urges Nation to 'Go Nuclear'," Reuters, 7 August 1996; in Compuserve Executive News Service, 8 August 1996.

8 August 1996
Addressing the plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), India's Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva Arundhati Ghose says that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) draft of 28 June 1996 "not only ignores [India's] substantive objections but also contains Article XIV, to which [India has] the strongest objections." She remarks that the article seeks to oblige India to sign the treaty against its will, totally disregarding India's stated refusal to accede to the treaty. She declares that the Indian government "would be reluctantly obliged to oppose" the efforts to impose the treaty in its present form on India. She adds that India does not intend to prevent the countries wishing to accede to the treaty from exercising their sovereign right. At the same time, India will not allow "its sovereign right not to sign the treaty taken away and accept obligations on India that [it] cannot and will not accept."
—Statement by Ms. Arundhati Ghose, in the Plenary of the Conference on Disarmament, 8 August 1996; Embassy of India, Washington, DC, <http://www.indianembassy.org>.

9 August 1996
During the meeting with India's Ambassador to the United States Naresh Chandra, the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher urges India not to block the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the Conference on Disarmament (CD).
—"US Secretary of State Christopher Urges India not to Block the Test Ban Treaty," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10 August 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 9 August 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 August 1996
Addressing the press in Bhutan, India's Minister of External Affairs I.K. Gujral says India will not succumb to the US pressure to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) since "no one can bring India down to its knees when there is national consensus to oppose the treaty."
—"India not to Succumb to US pressure on CTBT, Says Gujral," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12 August 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 12 August 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 August 1996
India blocks consensus on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) at Geneva.
—George Perkovich, "India Rejects The CTBT," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, Los Angeles, & London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 383.

15 August 1996
Addressing the nation on Independence Day, India's Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda says that "India will oppose any treaty that discriminates [between nuclear weapon and nuclear non-weapon states] and is imposed on India [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty]. We will not compromise our national security at any cost."
—"India: Test Ban Threatens Our Security," United Press International, 15 August 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 16 August 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "India to Oppose Move to Push through Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 15 August 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 15 August 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Indian Premier Gowda Talks Tough on Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 15 August 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 15 August 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 August 1996
Addressing the Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), India's Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva Arundhati Ghose says that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) draft of 14 August 1996 "does not serve the purpose of promoting the realization of the universal disarmament goals." She says that the text of the treaty does not address "continuing nuclear weapon development and proliferation" in South Asia, which exacerbates India's security concerns. She remarks that modification of the entry-into-force article (Article XIV) "apparently at the insistence of small countries with the clear aim of imposing obligations on India and placing it in a position in which it did not wish to be...is perceived very negatively in [New Delhi]." She declares that India opposes the move to forward the treaty to the UN General Assembly for endorsement.
—Statement by Ms. Arundhati Ghose in the Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, 20 August 1996; Embassy of India, Washington, DC, <http://www.indianembassy.org>.

22 August 1996
During a press conference in New Delhi, India's Minister of External Affairs I.K. Gujral says India had to veto the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) because the treaty would compromise India's national security without advancing global nuclear disarmament. He says India is particularly opposed to the treaty's entry-into-force article, which compels India to sign the treaty against its will. He adds that India's refusal to join the CTBT is based on the existential threats from nuclear China and nuclear capable Pakistan. He underscores that "just because [India] did not sign the Treaty, it doesn't mean that [India] is testing new weapons."
—Amy Louise Kazmin, "India Defends Veto of the Test Ban Treaty," United Press International, 22 August 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 22 August 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 August 1996
India's Minister of External Affairs I.K. Gujral assures the Indian Parliament that the government "is monitoring the developments [on the CTBT] and will take all necessary actions, consistent with [India's] policy, to indicate opposition to this text."
—Suo Motu Statement by I.K. Gujral in the Indian Parliament, 26 August 1996; Embassy of India, Washington, DC, <http://www.indianembassy.org>.

29 August 1996
British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind says that Britain "fully respects India's right to reach its own decisions on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty's negotiations in the light of its security interests." He says the question of sanctions on India due to its opposition to the CTBT is "irrelevant." Rifkind says the international community must try to understand India's concerns and reasons for vetoing the CTBT. He also expresses a hope that India will eventually change its stand on the issue.
—"Britain Still Hopes India will Change Stand on Nuclear Test Ban," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 29 August 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 22 August 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 September 1996
In an interview to a private television channel, India's Minister of External Affairs I.K. Gujral says India "will make the weapons [nuclear] as and when it [finds suitable and it is] not going to let others decide for India."
—"India Retains Its Nuclear Option, Says Gujral," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 7 September 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 7 September 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 September 1996
The Parliamentary Committee on Energy demands higher budget allocations for atomic energy. The committee expresses concern over curtailing the nuclear power program and calls for better performance by nuclear power stations. In a report, presented to the parliament, the committee regrets that the capacity addition in the central sector fell short by over 14,100MW during the past four years.
—"India: Committee Demands Increased Allocation for Nuclear Energy," Delhi All India Radio Network, 8 September 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-175, 8 September 1996.

9 September 1996
Addressing the 50th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations Prakash Shah says that the UNGA should discuss the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) "in its essential perspective, the perspective of nuclear disarmament and progress towards the common objective of a nuclear weapon free world." He expresses India's concern that the text of the treaty on which the Conference on Disarmament (CD) did not reach consensus was submitted to the UNGA, bypassing the Ad Hoc Committee on the Nuclear Test Ban to the Plenary of the CD. He underscores that "treaties are made through voluntary agreements and the legitimate exercise of sovereign choice and not by procedural maneuver and political persuasion." Shah adds that India was "deliberately thrust" to oppose the CTBT at the CD when the entry-into-force provision was changed to require India sign the treaty. He points out that India had "no choice but to stop the transmittal of a text containing as it did a provision contrary to international law, a provision which we continue to view as coercive." According to Shah, India's security environment "obliges" it to keep the nuclear option "as long as nuclear weapon states remain unwilling to accept the obligation to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. This is a position which has and shall remain grounded in complete national consensus."
—Statement by Prakash Shah on Item 65: CTBT at the 50th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 9 September 1996; Embassy of India, Washington, DC, <http://www.indianembassy.org>.

10 September 1996
Addressing the 50th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva Arundhati Ghose says that India "is not satisfied with mere preambular references [to nuclear disarmament in the text of the CTBT.]" She remarks that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) draft, as it is submitted to the UNGA, "is not only flawed but dangerous." She argues that by banning only explosive testing the CTBT may encourage "a nuclear weapon technology race" and hence cannot be considered a first step towards nuclear disarmament. Ms. Ghose adds that India believes the current CTBT draft "fails in the overarching objective set out in the mandate reiterated in GA resolution 50/65 – 'the enhancement of international peace and security'....It has confirmed and perpetuated the existing global insecurity born of a world divided unequally into nuclear haves and have-nots." Ms Ghose declares "that India will never sign this unequal Treaty, not now, not later."
—Statement in explanation of vote by Ms Arundhati Ghose on Item 65: CTBT at the 50th Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 10 September 1996; Embassy of India, Washington, DC, <http://www.indianembassy.org>.

10 September 1996
In an interview with a Japanese economic daily, India's Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda says that India will neither build nuclear weapons nor conduct any more nuclear tests. He remarks that India's nuclear program will be confined solely to power generation.
—"India not to Make Nuclear Weapons," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 11 September 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 12 September 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 September 1996
In an address to parliament, India's Minister of External Affairs I.K. Gujral says the government "will maintain its position not to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The entry-into-force will ensure that this treaty shall never enter into force unless its proponents agree to amend this provision in order to remove any possibility of imposing any obligations on India. There have been no pressures on India and if there are any in future, I am confident that this country has the national will to withstand such pressures." He commends the national consensus behind the government's CTBT policy. He adds that India will continue with initiatives towards universal nuclear disarmament in international forums.
—Statement by I.K. Gujral in the Indian Parliament, 11 September 1996; Embassy of India, Washington, DC, <http://www.indianembassy.org>.

15 September 1996
In an interview with India Today, India's Minister of External Affairs I.K. Gujral says that India does not have weaponization on its agenda. When the issue will arise depends on India's security environment, he argues. He reiterates that India had to reject the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) after the new entry-into-force provision (Article XIV) was added. He argues that India became suspicious with the clause to summon a review conference in two years after the CTBT's submission for signature in the case the treaty had not entered into force by that time. The clause states that "measures" will be taken against the nations, which delay the treaty's entry into force. Gujral remarks that India interpreted this statement as a threat of sanctions and hence rejected the treaty. According to Gujral, India will not be isolated due to its refusal to sign the CTBT.
—Raj Chengappa, "We Had No Option," India Today, 15 September 1996, p. 78.

20 September 1996
In an interview with Asianet TV channel, India's Minister of External Affairs I.K. Gujral says India "may need a nuclear weapon, sometimes [India] may not want a nuclear weapon. But I would not let others decide for us."
—"Indian Minister Says He will not Let Others Decide Nuclear Policy," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 20 September, 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 20 September 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 September 1996
Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) metallurgist Professor P. Rama Rao is appointed chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) for a period of three years.
—"India: New Chairman of Atomic Energy Regulatory Board Named," Delhi All India Radio Network, 25 September 1996; in FBIS-NES-96-187, 25 September 1996.

27 September 1996
Kazakhstan offers to sell uranium to India as a part of defense and energy cooperation agreement. An official from Kazakh State Atomic Power Engineering and Industry Corporation (KATEP) says Kazakhstan has "uranium and all the facilities needed to manufacture fuel elements, except uranium enrichment."
—Andrei Ivanov, "India Will Buy Uranium from Kazakhstan," Interpress Service, 27 September 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

October 1996
Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) Chairman Y.S.R. Prasad says India wants Russia to build two nuclear reactors at Koodankulam (Tamil Nadu) on a turnkey basis. He says the terms of the deal have to be renegotiated since costs and other factors have changed since 1988, when the deal was signed.
—Neel Patri, "India and Russi Revive Talks for Two VVER-1,000s in South India," Nucleonics Week, 24 October 1996, p. 8.

4 October 1996
Addressing the 51st Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), India's Minister of External Affairs I.K. Gujral says that "the only way to achieve ultimate security is to ban production, possession, and use of nuclear weapons within an agreed timeframe." Partial and halfhearted measures of arms control, such as NPT or CTBT [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty], defeat this objective, by legitimizing possession of nuclear weapons and permitting non-explosive testing of nuclear weapons by nuclear weapon countries. India, therefore, cannot be a party to such flawed arrangements." He remarks that India remains committed to the cause of universal nuclear disarmament and will participate "fully and actively" in any negotiations on a treaty banning nuclear weapons and all types of tests. Gujral adds that India will present the convention on non-use of nuclear weapons at this session of the UNGA.
—Statement by Minister of External Affairs I.K. Gujral, the 51st session of the UN General Assembly, 4 October 1996, New York; Embassy of India, Washington, DC, <http://www.indianembassy.org>.

13 October 1996
Nuclear Power Corporation's (NPC) Director for health, safety, and environment G.R. Srinivasan says the NPC is negotiating with private industries to embark on construction of nuclear power plants in India and abroad. According to Srinivasan, developing countries demonstrate a great interest in nuclear power projects and India has the relevant technology and expertise.
—"Nuclear Technology Export to Benefit Companies," India Power Daily (Mumbai), 15 October 1996, <http://www.power.indiaworld.com.>.

14 October 1996
The Indian Atomic Energy Forum (IAEF) is initiated in New Delhi. The consortium will deal with the nuclear power projects in India and abroad. G.R. Srinivasan of the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) says the IAEF will highlight a unified approach for private companies to start investing in nuclear power projects. The Deputy Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for nuclear safety Z. Domaratzki speaks in support of India's exports of nuclear related technologies and services, saying that with the high standards of safety followed by the NPC, India's isolation has to be ended. He says the IAEA is committed to help India given the country's safety record and the IAEA's agenda to promote nuclear power as the energy of the future.
—"Nuclear Technology Export to Benefit Companies," India Power Daily (Mumbai), 15 October 1996, <http://www.power.indiaworld.com>; "IAEF to be Launched on October 14," India Power Daily (Mumbai), 15 October 1996, <http://www.power.indiaworld.com>; "India: Consortium will Be Launched to Build Nuclear Power Plants," Delhi All India Network, 26 September 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-189, 26 September 1996.

15 October 1996
Addressing an international seminar in New Delhi on the relevance of nuclear energy, former Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman R. Srinivasan says that Europe and India should intensify cooperation in the field of light water reactors in pursuance of mutual interest.
—"India Should Go in for Light Water Nuclear Reactors, Expert Says," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 15 October 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 October 1996
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman R. Chidambaram says the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) is working on a design of a "self-sustaining" high breeder reactor with the "very high safety features." Chidambaram adds that the design "basis" was approved by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) and will have the safety features recommended by the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) and AERB. He says the reactor is expected to be functional by mid-1998.
—"India to Build Advanced High Breeder Reactor," Indian Express (Mumbai), 20 October 1996, <http://www.expressindia.com>.

26 October 1996
India's Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) officials say Russia's demand for payment in US dollars is a major stumbling block for the agreement on the construction of two VVER-1,000 reactors in Koodankulam (Tamil Nadu). DAE estimates that the foreign exchange outflow will constitute between 180 and 200 billion rupees which is "prohibitive." Minister of State for Science and Technology Y.K. Alagh expresses the willingness of the government to reconsider the project to advance the economy of southern states.
—Shivaji Sarkar, "Kadamkonam Nuclear Power Project May Be Delayed," Financial Express (Mumbai), 27 October 1996, <http://www.expressindia.com>.

28 October 1996
Russia's Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Davydov says India and Russia are "quite near to concluding final agreement" on the construction of two VVER-1,000 nuclear reactors in Koodankulam (Tamil Nadu). He does not disclose the total cost of the contract but says that Russia will provide India with credit and will fund a part of the project cost.
—"India, Russia Near Pact to Make 2 India Nuclear Reactors," Wall Street Journal, 28 October 1996, <http://online.wsj.com/public/us>; Sunil Kataria, "India, Russia Near Nuclear Power Plant Deal," Reuters, 28 October 1996; in Compuserve-Executive News Service, 28 October 1996; "Russia Ready to Help Build Nuclear Reactors," Agence France Presse, 28 October 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Russia: Upcoming Contract to Build Nuclear Plant in India Seen," Kommersant-Daily (Moscow), 31 October 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-213, 31 October 1996.

29 October 1996
The Kalpakkam Mini Reactor (Kamini), a 30KW (thermal) research reactor, goes critical. The reactor was designed by the scientists at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), Trombay and the Indira Gandhi Center for Atomic Research (IGCAR), Kalpakkam. Kamini is the first experimental reactor in India to use Uranium-233 as a fuel. Uranium-233 is obtained by irradiating thorium found in abundance in the monazite sands in Kerala. According to BARC director Anil Kakodkar, Kamini is "an important milestone along the path to extracting the vast energy landlocked in India's thorium reserves." A BARC press release states that "the reactor system consists of U-233 aluminum alloy plates with beryllium oxide encased in zircalloy acting as reflector. Demineralized light water acts as moderator, coolant and shield. The reactor is controlled by the safety control plates, which also provide emergency shut down. The entire reactor system is housed in a stainless steel tank which is surrounded by a high density concrete biological shield." According to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman, R. Chidambaram, the reactor represents a "small but significant step in the thorium cycle [and demonstrates India's] comprehensive capability in the nuclear fuel cycle and its command over a sustainable nuclear energy development program." The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) limits the reactor operation to 100 watts. According to the AERB, the reactor will have to undergo a series of tests before it is allowed to work up to its full capacity. Srinivasan says the test sequel should be completed within approximately one month. Kamini will be used for neutron radiography of irradiated fuel of the fast breeder test reactor at Kalpakkam.
—Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report: 1996-1997, p. 4:1; Neel Patri, "India Starts up Research Unit Using Fuel Made from Thorium," Nucleonics Week, 7 November 1996, p. 2; "Kamini to Boost Nuclear Power Generation," Indian Express (Mumbai), 31 October 1996, <http://www.expressindia.com>; "Uranium 233 Feeds Critical Kamini," Indian Express (Mumbai), 30 October 1996, <http://www.expressindia.com>; "India: Mini Reactor Kamini Attains Criticality," Delhi All India Radio Network, 29 October 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-210, 29 October 1996; "Experimental Indian Nuclear Reactor Inaugurated," Reuters, 29 October 1996; in Compuserve Executive New Service, 1 November 1996; "New Indian Nuke to Go Online," United Press International, 29 October 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Early November 1996
A public sector company, Hindustan Machine Tools (HMT), develops a servo-manipulator to be used for handling nuclear material at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), Trombay.
—"India: System for Handling Nuclear Materials Developed," Delhi All India Network, 4 November 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-214, 4 November 1996.

4 November 1996
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman R. Chidambaram says that two 500MW heavy water reactors will be operational at Tarapur (Maharashtra) by 2003. He adds that two 220MW units will be constructed at Kaiga (Karnataka) and, if finances permit, additional 500MW reactors at Kota (Rajasthan).
—"India: Official Plan for Future Nuclear Power Plants," Delhi All India Network, 4 November 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-215, 4 November 1996.

1996
According to press reports, Bharat Heavy Electricals (BHEL) has produced more than 20,000 DC and high tension AC motors for several industries including nuclear power projects. BHEL, India's largest producer of AC/DC motors, can manufactures motors with low vibration levels used for operating centrifuge compressors.
—"BHEL Largest Maker of AC/DC Motors," Financial Express, 14 October 1996, <http://www.expressindia.com>.

	Updated October 2003