This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

6 January 1999
US Ambassador to India Richard F. Celeste says the United States wants to know "concrete terms" for India's minimum nuclear deterrent so that the proposed deterrent is not perceived as an "open-ended threat" by India's neighbors. The Indian government reiterates that India's proposed nuclear deterrent "is not a fixity" and dismisses the US demand as "inconsequential."
—"India Dismisses US Demand on Minimum Nuclear Deterrence," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 6 January 1999, <http://www.hindustantimes.com>.

7 January 1999
Pakistan's High Commissioner to India Ashraf Jehangir Qazi says that Pakistan wants to institutionalize a regime of restraints in both conventional and nuclear fields to minimize the risk of accidents and an uncontrolled arms race in South Asia. Qazi speaks about the need to have "concrete and positive discussions on these issues" and come up with confidence-building measures. Indian and Pakistani foreign secretaries are scheduled to meet in New Delhi in February 1999.
—"Pakistan Offers to Discuss Regime of Restraints," Hindu (Chennai), 7 January 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

8 January 1999
Senior Advisor at the US Department of State's South Asia bureau George Pickart says the list of Indian entities sanctioned for suspected dual technology use "has been drawn on the basis of available information and can be revised if other evidence is provided." Pickart adds that the US Congress might expand the waiver of sanctions provided in the November 1998 list by the time the waiver is due for renewal on 21 October 1999. According to Pickart, the situation with the loans from the World Bank will not be subject to change soon.
—Sushma Ramachandran, "US Willing to Revise Entities List," Hindu (Chennai), 8 January 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

Early January 1999
In an interview with India Today, India's Minister for External Affairs Jaswant Singh says that the nuclear tests India carried out on 11-13 May 1998 were "a continuity [of the policy held by successive Indian governments] inasmuch as development of technology." Singh calls the tests a defining event "in the last quarter of the century...not simply in terms of scientific and technical experiment but also as a switch from what was earlier a covert attitude to an overt policy frame." Singh argues that India, having carried out these tests, acquired "much-needed strategic space," as well as strategic autonomy. Speaking about the progress of Indo-US talks, Singh notes that the goal of the talks is not to "resolve" the differences but to "harmonize" them. He points out that there is no going back on India's weaponization program, missile development and flight testing program. He also indicates that there is an understanding of these issues in Washington. Singh points out that the concept of minimum deterrence is not a "physical quantification" but rather an "enunciation of fixity" that is "to be determined in accordance with the reality assessment of the security situation." According to Singh, India is moving "towards achieving a national viewpoint" on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) issue.
—Prabhu Chawla and Raj Chengappa, Interview: Jaswant Singh, "Let's not Take the Worm's Eye View," India Today, 11 January 1999, <http://www.india-today.com>.

Mid-January 1999
In an address at the seventh Carnegie International Conference on Nonproliferation in Washington, DC, India's Deputy Chief of Mission T.P. Srinivasan says: "In carrying out the [nuclear] tests in May 1998, India did not violate any international agreement, but merely underscored the point that if some nuclear powers are here to stay, including those in our immediate neighborhood, then India has no choice but to maintain its minimal, assured nuclear/missile capabilities." Srinivasan reiterates India's rejection of a "South Asian regional nonproliferation regime" and indicates that India's right to minimum credible deterrent is non-negotiable.
—"India Refuses to Accept Regional Non-Proliferation," Rediff On The Net, 13 January 1999, <http://www.rediff.com>; C. Raja Mohan, "China Slams India's Nuclear Talks," Hindu (Chennai), 18 January 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

Mid-January 1999
China publicly questions the legitimacy of the US-India nuclear dialogue. Acording to the Director-General of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament in China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Sha Zukang, negotiating with India the issues of "nuclear deterrence capability" violates the UN Security Council resolution 1172. Sha also says it is very "unhelpful to publicly support India's permanent membership in the UN Security Council soon after its nuclear tests."
—C. Raja Mohan, "China Slams India's Nuclear Talks," Hindu (Chennai), 18 January 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

14 January 1998
The United States rejects permission for eight senior US physicists from the Fermi National Accelerator Lab and the Argon National Lab to participate in an international symposium on particle physics at the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) in Mumbai. TIFR is on the list of sanctioned entities issued in November 1998. However, 25 US scientists from private institutions and universities attend the symposium.
—Pallava Bagla, "Washington Blocks 8 US Scientists from TIFR Physics Seminar," Indian Express (Mumbai), 15 January 1999, <http://www.expressindia.com>.

15 January 1999
India's Minister of State for External Affairs Vasundhara Raje Scindia says that India and the United States have "narrowed down" the issues and are moving "in the right direction." According to Raje, Indo-US talks over the past six months have been "very crucial and helpful" for mutual understanding.
—"India Satisfied Over Arms Talks with US," United Press of India (New Delhi), 15 January 1999.

Mid-January 1999
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman Dr. R. Chidambaram says that India has an adequate scientific database "for designing...a credible minimum deterrent." However, Chidambaram adds, should the government change the 'minimum' parameters of the proposed deterrent in terms of yields and performance criteria, then tests will become necessary.
—Cited in, Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), p. 427.

16 January 1999
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott addresses a conference on 'Diplomacy and Preventive Defense' at Stanford University in California. In his address, Talbott acknowledges the "irreversible fact" of India and Pakistan going overtly nuclear. He points out several steps for India and Pakistan "to move in the right direction" in order to enhance their security after they have crossed the nuclear threshold. These steps include intensification of contacts and confidence-building measures, including the issue of Kashmir; adhering to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); "making possible" a moratorium on fissile material production; "demonstrating prudence and restraint in the development, flight testing and storage of ballistic missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft;" and strengthening their export control laws. According to Talbott, the essence of the US position is to ensure that both countries, while pursuing "their ill-advised reliance on nuclear deterrence," are not jeopardizing "the other, political and economic dimensions of their own safety." Acknowledging India's democratic tradition, Talbott notes that "if India's democracy continues to flourish, it can exercise a positive influence on those countries in East Asia where democracy is either in jeopardy or only a gleam in the eye of would-be reformers." Talbott points out the inevitability of controversial issues if the United States attempts to "hold India's and Pakistani feet to the fire" and insist on the countries' adherence to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states and banning flight-testing of missiles as a precondition for sanctions relief. He notes that this approach "will make the best enemy of the good." Referring to Indo-US dialogue, Talbott notes that while the United States does not make a claim to have "a formal mandate or proxy" from any other country or organization, it will adhere to the communiqués issued by P-5, G-8 and the South Asia Task Force in June 1998.
—Strobe Talbott, "Dialogue, Democracy and Nuclear Weapons in South Asia," Address at the Conference on Diplomacy and Preventive Defense at Stanford University, 16 January 1998, the US Department of State, <http://www.state.gov>.

19 January 1999
Under the framework of the 1986 Indo-Vietnamese Agreement for cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy, India and Vietnam sign an accord on cooperation in the field of nuclear energy. The "Detailed Cooperation Plan for 1999" is signed by Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) chairman Dr. R. Chidambaram and the chairman of the Vietnam Atomic Energy Commission Professor Tran Huu Phat in Hanoi. The Plan is a sequel to the Memorandum of Understanding the two sides signed in February 1998. Under the plan, India is to set up a "Nuclear Training Center" in Dalat city in Vietnam, as well as train Vietnamese scientists and engineers at Indian nuclear facilities. Work on the construction of the Center will begin in 1999 and will be completed by 2000. India will train Vietnamese scientists and engineers in the following areas: utilization of research reactors, reactor operation issues, nuclear science and technology for applications in a variety of fields ranging from industry and agriculture to environment and medicine. India will also undertake to provide training in the areas of nuclear power, nuclear materials, and nuclear fuel.
—P.S. Suryanarayana, "India, Vietnam Sign Pact on N-Energy Cooperation," Hindu (Chennai), 21 January 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

20 January 1999
National Security Adviser and the Principal Secretary to the prime minister, Brajesh Mishra pledges to the British Foreign Office Minister Derek Fatchett that India will not explode any new nuclear device before signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
—Michael Binyon, "India Renounces Nuclear testing," London Times (London), 21 January 1999; in Early Bird 21 January 1999, <http://ebird.dtic.mil>.

21 January 1999
US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Karl F. Inderfurth delivers a speech at the Foreign Policy Institution in Washington, DC. Commenting on the progress in Indo-US talks, Inderfurth says the horizons for Indo-US cooperation are "boundless." He recognizes that the issues under discussion "are very difficult, of fundamental importance to all concerned and related to the history of the region that has had more than its security concerns." Inderfurth says that this is not prevention but "management of thresholds that have already been crossed" that dominates the US relations with South Asia. According to Inderfurth, as the Indo-US relationship matures, the US "interaction with India will be less prone to misunderstanding and assume a proper equilibrium."
—"Inderfurth Paints Rosy Picture of Indo-US Relations Ahead of Jaswant-Talbott Talks," Rediff On The Net, 22 January 1999, <http://wwww.rediff.com>.

21 January 1999
US Ambassador to India Richard Celeste says "it is in India's interest to articulate in concrete terms" what it means by a minimum credible deterrent and "how it works." Celeste asserts that it is solely up to the Government of India to decide what India's defense and security needs are. He also says the US government is not demanding that India reveal any sensitive security-related information. Rather, "between the need for a level of secrecy and the theme of minimum deterrence there is a lot of room for a more concrete description of what that involves."
—K.V. Krishnaswamy, "Celeste Defends Demand on Deterrence," Hindu (Chennai), 23 January 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

22 January 1999
Russia declines to recognize India as a nuclear weapon power. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov says "the issue is not on the agenda." According to Ivanov, Russia will attempt to strengthen cooperation with both India and China during 1999. The statement is made a day after the Russian Ambassador to India Albert Chernyshev expressed an understanding of India's "internal and external difficulties" in the nuclear field and expressed satisfaction with New Delhi's approach" on the issue.
—"Russia Rules out Recognizing India as Nuclear Power," Times of India (Mumbai), 23 January 1999, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>.

22 January 1999
The Senior Director for Near East and South Asia in the US National Security Council Bruce Riedel says that during the eighth round of Indo-US talks, US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott is going to suggest "new ideas" for resolving nuclear differences with India. Without going into details, Riedel states that India must make sufficient progress on nonproliferation issues before the United States can consider indefinite extension and lifting of the sanctions imposed in the wake of the May 1998 nuclear tests.
—Sridhar Krishnaswamy, "Talbott Remark Was Misread, Says US," Hindu (Chennai), 24 January 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

24 January 1999
India's Ambassador to the United States Naresh Chandra says the fact that India has offered not to bloc the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty's (CTBT) entry into force. This offer indicates that India has met conditions on the US wish list "half way." Chandra says there should be a "proper package" for India to move further. Chandra also points out that the two sides agreed to adhere to "harmonizing interests" rather than following a quid pro quo principle. According to Chandra, there is now a "full recognition" of India's security requirements. Chandra states the United States is going beyond prescribed Glenn amendment sanctions to block international financing for India. He says that the Asian Development Bank and Japan follow US behavior. Chandra notes that the US position is not conducive to progress in the talks since "it created [a] negative environment."
—Sridhar Krishnaswamy, "CTBT: 'India Has Come a Long Way'," Hindu (Chennai), 24 January 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>; Chidanand Rajghatta, "Loan Blockade to Figure in Indo-US Talks," Indian Express (Mumbai), 28 January 1999, <http://www.expressindia.com>.

26 January 1999
US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Karl F. Inderfurth says the United States is ready for the slow paced negotiations with India and Pakistan since "difficult issues need more discussion." In addition, the United States is determined to work with both countries to address "their security concerns in a way that moves them towards the global nonproliferation regime." Inderfurth says the issue of World Bank loans for India is on the agenda and America's ultimate goal is "to remove all sanctions." However, the pace of sanctions rollback will depend on the progress made during the talks.
—K. Arora, "US Expects No Immediate Breakthrough in Jaswant-Talbott Talks," Rediff On The Net, 27 January 1999, <http://www.rediff.com>; Chidanand Rajghatta, "Loan Blockade to Figure in Indo-US Talks," Indian Express (Mumbai), 28 January 1999, <http://www.expressindia.com>; Sridhar Krishnaswami, "Talbott to Pursue P-5 Benchmarks," Hindu (Chennai), 27 January 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

27 January 1999
Speaking at the conference on Asian Security in the 21st Century in New Delhi, defence minister George Fernandes says it is important that nuclear doctrines of nuclear weapon states are "in harmony" with the concepts of cooperative security and commitment of no-first-use in order to reduce the risk of accident and miscalculation. Fernandes says that global disarmament is another urgent issue to be addressed.
—"Fernandes Presses for No-First-Use Pledge," Rediff On The Net, 27 January 1999, <http://www.rediff.com>.

28 January 1999
In an interview, the former chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) (1993-1996) A. Gopalakrishnan claims that an accident at the Narora Atomic Power Station on 31 March 1993 brought the reactor close to a partial meltdown. The fire that broke out in the generating unit of the reactor "burned through both regular and emergency power cables, which were bundled together. The reactor's coolant pumps halted, and the entire station was plunged into darkness. The control room's 400 plus instrument panels that indicate reactor status went blank. Smoke poured into control room..." According to Gopalakrishnan, prompt reaction by the personnel helped to avert possible "partial meltdown or a localized explosion": four crew members "groped up the steps beside the reactor to a platform 18-storey high, where they cranked open valves and poured in a boron solution" into the reactor's core halting the nuclear reaction. However, AERB secretary K.S. Parastharthy denies the possibility of a meltdown at Narora and says that boron was released "as a measure of abundant caution." Gopalakrishnan contends that India has serious problems with old-vintage CANDU-type reactors that lack emergency core-cooling systems. He also says that India's General Electric reactors, built at Tarapur in 1969, have "many critical components and welded joints in locations that cannot be inspected." Such a design that does not allow for "assessing the health of these crucial components from time to time" will not be permitted to operate anywhere in the world today, he says. Gopalakrishnan confirms that India's nuclear installations use outside labor and sometimes military personnel "to clean up radioactive areas." The cumulative radiation exposure of such workers is never measured, he charges. Gopalakrishnan states that Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) chairman R. Chidambaram regularly gathers commission members to "coach each one what to say and what not to say."
—"Doomsday Averted," Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 February 1999; in ProquestDirect, <http://www.proquest.umi.com>; "The Perils of Power," Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 February 1999; in ProquestDirect, <http://www.proquest.umi.com>; "Narrowly Averted Meltdown in 1993," Hindu (Chennai), 29 January 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

28 January 1999
India's foreign minister Jaswant Singh says that "India is a restrained country" and it is unclear to him what the United States means when it says that India should adopt nuclear and missile restraint. Indian Express, citing Indian government sources reports that India is ready to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) once all the economic sanctions are lifted.
—Jyoti Malhotra, "India Not to Accede to US Pressure on Nuclear Issue," Indian Express (Mumbai), 29 January 1999, <http://www.expressindia.com>.

29 January 1999
US President Bill Clinton telephones India's Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Clinton expresses his appreciation of India's undertaking to adhere to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by September 1999. Clinton informs Vajpayee that this is "a very important step" for the development of Indo-US relations.
—"Clinton Happy with Indian Stand on CTBT," Rediff On The Net, 30 January 1999, <http://www.rediff.com>.

30 January 1999
US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott delivers an address at the India International Center in New Delhi. Commenting on the Indo-US dialogue Talbott says: "As a part and parcel of fully respecting the sovereignty of your nation, we take it as predicate of our diplomatic dialogue that the only workable solution to the nuclear issue is one that Indian leaders and the Indian public clearly see as in the best long-term interests of India itself." He says that the word "concession" is not a part of vocabulary of the American team. According to Talbott, the Indo-US dialogue is "not about winning or losing; it's aimed at a win-win outcome. Which is to say our talks are about laying the foundation for a future in which the US and India are able to maximize common goals—and that means one in which we are also able to minimize and manage our differences." Talbott says the goal of the talks is to "harmonize India's interests, convictions, and perceptions with those of the US..." He says this is a difficult task but he is hopeful that the solution is forthcoming.
—Strobe Talbott, Address at India International Center, 30 January 1999, New Delhi, US Department of State, <http://www.state.gov>.

31 January 1999
The eighth round of Strobe Talbott-Jaswant Singh talks held between 29-31 January, concludes. The talks consisted of four plenary meetings, expert level discussions, and several meetings between the heads of the two delegations, Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott.
The text of the Indo-US Joint Statement issued at the end of talks states that "both delegations are satisfied with the outcome of the talks...and a work plan for the next steps in the US-Indian dialogue was agreed." Further, "the US and Indian delegations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva will endeavor to consult frequently on the status of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and possibly other multilateral initiatives." India and the United States also agree to have a ninth round of talks in the middle of the year. In addition, a follow-up meeting on export controls is scheduled for March 1999. Finally, the joint statement states that both countries are "laying the foundation for a new, broad-based relationship that has eluded the United States and India in the past which both sides are determined to achieve in the future."
—India-US Joint Statement, Press Release, 31 January 1999, Embassy of India in Washington, DC, <http://www.indianembassy.org>.

1 February 1999
The New York Times, citing US and Indian officials, reports that India has made a "conditional offer" to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) provided economic sanctions imposed in the wake of its nuclear tests are lifted.
—"India, Pakistan Move on Nuke Issue," New York Times, 1 February 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com/>.

1 February 1999
The United States invites the ambassadors of the G-8 countries in New Delhi to discuss the issue of resuming World Bank loans to India for road, power, and other development projects. According to the World Bank estimates, economic sanctions imposed in the wake of the May 1998 nuclear tests have cost India $1.2 billion. However, the Hindustan Times, citing an official spokesperson from India's foreign ministry, reports there is no linkage between India's stand on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and any easing of lending by multilateral institutions. The official says the easing of sanctions on loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund will be only a "small step towards [the creation of a] positive environment" India needs before proceeding to sign the treaty. At the same time, the official reiterates that India will not block the treaty's entry into force.
—Celia W. Dugger, "US-India Talks Gain and Could Lead to Easing of Sanctions," New York Times, 1 February 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com/>; "India Contradicts US View on Easing of Sanctions," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 1 February 1999, <http://www.hindustantimes.com>.

1 February 1999
Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee expresses satisfaction at the progress in the Indo-US dialogue and commends the concluding part of Indo-US Joint Statement issued on 31 January 1999 on the importance of "laying the foundation for a new, broad-based relationship that has eluded the United States and India in the past."
—K.K. Katyal, "PM Satisfied with Talks Progress," Hindu (Chennai), 2 February 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

2 February 1999
US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott informs the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright that India has agreed to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the date of its entry into force date in September 1999 in return for lifting some of the sanctions on the loans from multilateral institutions. State Department spokesperson James Rubin says at a press briefing that "progress has been made in these most recent negotiations and we are consulting with Congress and other members of international community on how to respond to the movement in the right direction, in terms of the Comprehensive Test Ban." According to Rubin, "the movement in the right direction" had to do with the timing of the CTBT signing. He mentions that the United States has "received some encouraging indications on the timing" and is "considering how to respond" to that.
—"India Ready to Sign CTBT, Albright Told," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 3 February 1999, <http://www.hindustantimes.com>; Sridhar Krishnaswami, "Movement in the Right Direction on CTBT," Hindu (Chennai), 3 February 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

3 February 1999
US Ambassador to India Richard F. Celeste publicly says that the United States could lift sanctions sooner than anticipated.
—"India Ready to Sign CTBT, Albright Told," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 3 February 1999, <http://www.hindustantimes.com>.

3 February 1999
A senior Chinese diplomat says China is not going to change its position on the nuclear issue in South Asia and will insist that India sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) unconditionally. The Hindu reports that the Chinese government is "concerned" with the US moves to recognize India's demands for a minimum nuclear deterrent. Sha Zukang, China's Director-General of the Department of Arms Control under the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs says, "it is a direct violation of the UN Security Council resolution 1172 to negotiate, or even to discuss with India, the so-called minimum deterrence capability."
—"China concerned over US Move on Indian N-Tests," Hindu (Chennai), 4 February 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

3 February 1999
Speaking to reporters at Lucknow, Prime Minister Vajpayee says India wants the United States to lift the sanctions imposed in the aftermath of the May 1998 tests and reduce the list of Indian entities banned from trade with the United States. He says that "some progress" was made during the eighth round of Indo-US talks but "much ground is yet to be covered." Vajpayee emphasizes that India will not block the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
—"More Steps Needed for Signing CTBT: Vajpayee," Hindu (Chennai), 4 February 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

4 February 1999
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman Dr. R. Chidambaram addresses the Association of Indian Science Writers. He asserts that a "post-shot" analysis of the Pokhran II tests had confirmed that the May 1998 tests yielded about 60 kilotons as had been initially estimated by the AEC. Chidambaram says the scientists at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) had used four methods to calculate the yields. These methods included the measurement of various types of shock waves and comparison of "some of the data from other seismic centers all over the world." Chidambaram points out that India had tested a "fusion-fission-fusion" device on 11 May 1998. He says a boosted fission device was a part of this design and there was no need to test it separately. According to Chidambaram, India was working on powerful lasers for "inertial confinement to produce fusion energy and uranium enrichment." He says India has developed the lasers although it does "not have the full energy yet." Chidambaram notes that Pokhran tests were "perfect" since Indian scientists had mastered "optimum emplacement of the device to ensure that over-digging or radioactive spillover was avoided."
—"Further Nuclear Tests Unnecessary," Hindu (Chennai), 4 February 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

4 February 1999
The United States begins easing some of the sanctions imposed by indicating that the US representative at the World Bank will not block a $125 million loan for a power project in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. The United States also invites the Indian Chief of the Army Staff General V.P. Malik to attend a ceremony of the change of guards at the Pacific Command in Hawaii.
—K.K. Katyal, "US Shows Signs of Easing Sanctions," Hindu (Chennai), 5 February 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>; "US Lifts Opposition to India Loans," New York Times, 17 February 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com/>.

6 February 1999
White House spokesperson Joe Lockart says US President Bill Clinton is not ready to lift sanctions against India and Pakistan.
—Sridhar Krishnaswami, "US not to Lift Sanctions," Hindu (Chennai), 7 February 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

10 February 1999
India's Defense Minister George Fernandes publicly states that India will not proceed with the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) unless there is a unanimous approval of both Houses of Parliament and India's security needs are taken care of.
—"Signing of CTBT only after Consensus," Hindu (Chennai), 11 February 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

11 February 1999
The G-8 task force chairman Nobuyasu Abe says India and Pakistan should comply "with all the demands of the UN Security Council" before sanctions can be lifted. The task force also asks India and Pakistan to reduce bilateral tensions.
—"G-8 Officials Support Curbs on India, Pakistan," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 12 February 1999, <http://www.hindustantimes.com>.

11 February 1999
An Indian foreign ministry official says that creation of a "positive and conducive international environment," is essential for India to proceed with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
—"Positive Environment Needed for Signing CTBT: India," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 12 February 1999, <http://www.hindustantimes.com>.

February 1999
The Indian Army's Signals Officer-in-Chief Lieutenant General Prakash Gokarn tells Asia Defence News International that the Indian Army Corps of Signals is preparing to deal with electromagnetic pulses generated during a nuclear explosion. He says: "The Corps of Signals is aware of the lurking danger to our automated information systems in the nuclear age and is busy creating firewalls against any attempt to go for the nation's 'electronic jugular'."
—"Corps of Signals Gears up to Face a Nuclear Threat," Rediff On The Net, 15 February 1999, <http://www.rediff.com>.

February 1999
In an interview with India Today, US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott says that during negotiations, both India and the United States are trying "to preserve the integrity of each government's deeply held positions and long-range strategy while at the same time advance the cause which is also important for both governments. And that is finally getting the US-India relations right." Talbott says the four benchmarks of the negotiations (signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), controlling fissile material production, export controls, and reduction of tensions with Pakistan) are "eminently feasible" targets. He says the United States is not going to dictate what India's defense posture should be; however, he points the need to reconcile "two adjectives, credible and minimum" in India's deterrent concept.
—Raj Chengappa, "We are Keen to Put Sanctions Behind Us: Interview with Strobe Talbott," India Today, 15 February 1999, <http://www.india-today.com>.

20 February 1999
The chairman of the India's Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) lays the foundation stone for the Safety Research Institute (SRI) at Kalpakkam, near Chennai. The SRI "is conceived as a forum to bring together plant designers, operators, research groups and regulators to formulate and manage research programs for resolving safety-related issues in nuclear establishments." According to the AERB chairman Professor Rama Rao, the SRI will carry out a substantial amount of research internationally. Besides carrying out the atmospheric studies, the institute will set up a "safety-related code depository" and develop "safety-critical software in the area of plant safety." Rao says the institute "would serve as an instrument to review, authorize and enforce standards, from the safety angle, during various phases of development, maintenance, and operation of nuclear facilities." Among other planned activities for SRI, Rao mentions training and discussion meetings by experts and visiting scholars, development of the models for assessing fire hazards in nuclear fuel cycle facilities, risk assessment for operations involving hazardous materials such as beryllium. During the ceremony, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) chairman R. Chidambaram says the SRI should coordinate the activities of the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC), and the Indira Gandhi Center for Atomic Research (IGCAR) in the field of probabilistic safety assessment.
—"N-Safety Research Facility Near Chennai," Hindu (Chennai), 21 February 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

21 February 1999
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and a 16-member delegation visits Pakistan inaugurating the bus service between New Delhi and Lahore. In Pakistan, Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister sign the Lahore Declaration in the historic city of Lahore. Under the terms of the declaration, the two sides agree to "intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir; to refrain from intervention and interference in each other's internal affairs; to intensify their composite and integrated dialogue process for an early and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda; to take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict." The Joint Statement issued at the end of Vajpayee's visit to Pakistan says that the two sides agree to "meet periodically to discuss all issues of mutual concern, including nuclear related issues."
—The Lahore Declaration, 21 February 1999, Joint Statement, 21 February 1999, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, <http://www.meadev.nic.in>.

21 February 1999
Indian and Pakistani foreign secretaries (K. Raghunath and Shamshad Ahmed) sign a Memorandum of Understanding in which they agree to "engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts and nuclear doctrines, with a view of developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict; to provide each other with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight-tests, and to conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard; to undertake national measures to reduce the risks of accidental and unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under their respective control; to notify each other immediately in the event of any accidental, unauthorized, or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a fallout with adverse consequences for both sides, or an outbreak of a nuclear war between the two countries; to adopt measures aimed at diminishing the possibility of such actions or such incidents being misinterpreted by the other; to identify/establish appropriate mechanism for this purpose; to continue to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions unless either side, in exercise of national sovereignty, decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interests." The two sides also agree "to review periodically the implementation of existing confidence building measures [CBMs] and where necessary set up appropriate consultative mechanisms to monitor and ensure effective implementation of these CBMs; to review the existing communication links (e.g., between the respective Directors-Generals, Military Operations) with a view of upgrading and improving these links, and to provide for fail-safe and secure communications; engage in bilateral consultations on security, disarmament and nonproliferation issues within the context of negotiations on these issues in multilateral fora."
—Memorandum of Understanding, 21 February 1999, Ministry of External Affairs, the Government of India, <http://www.meadev.nic.in>.

24 February 1999
In an address to parliament, India's Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh declares that India is a nuclear weapon state despite the fact that this is not acknowledged by the United States. Singh states that in determining the concept of minimum nuclear deterrence India will rely on its own security requirements "which are changing." According to Singh, India has "not agreed to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by September this year" and "there is no iota of truth in press reports" on the issue.
—"India is a Nuclear Power, Asserts Jaswant," Rediff On The Net, 24 February 1999, <http://www.rediff.com>.

24 February 1999
US Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Fiscal Year Budget 2000. Albright says, "If the past year was a time of disappointment and unfulfilled promise in South Asia, we are working hard to see that the coming year is one of opportunity and progress." Speaking on progress in South Asia, she says that both India and Pakistan have "agreed to adhere to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by year's end, join negotiations for a fissile materials production cutoff and tighten export controls." Noting the "successful summit in Lahore," Albright says that India and Pakistan "have taken encouraging steps" to improve bilateral relations with each other. With respect to future US policy in South Asia she says that "throughout the region, we will be working hard to advance our core foreign policy objectives of strengthening democracy, enhancing economic ties, countering terrorism, extending the rule of law and promoting respect for human rights."
—"Fiscal Year 2000 Budget," Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 24 February 1999, US Department of State, <http://www.state.gov>.

26 February 1999
India's Minister for External Affairs Jaswant Singh refutes US Secretary of State Madeline Albright's statement that India has agreed to adhere to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In a speech before parliament, Singh says the Indian government's position on not signing the CTBT is "explicit, clear and unambiguous" and he cannot be held responsible for Ms. Albright's remarks.
—"Albright's Remarks Do not Reflect India's Stand: Jaswant," Hindu (Chennai), 27 February 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

26 February 1999
In Suo Motu statement before parliament, India's Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh talks about Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to Pakistan on 20-21 February. Singh describes it "the most significant engagement between India and Pakistan in over a quarter of a century." Singh indicates that the visit "provided the prime minister with an opportunity to emphasize that India and Pakistan must together work to build a comprehensive structure of cooperation, resolve outstanding issues through peaceful and direct bilateral discussions and negotiations and that the path of violence was futile and senseless." Singh calls the Lahore declaration signed by the two sides on 21 February "a landmark for peace and security of the two nations."
—Suo Motu Statement of the Minister of External Affairs in Parliament on Prime Minister's Visit to Pakistan, 26 February 1999, Ministry of External Affairs, the Government of India, <http://www.meadev.nic.in>.

February-March 1999
Indian government officials say the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan on 21 February 1999 requires "considerable work before it yields working arrangements." Indian officials say the document can be operationalized only if "political direction remains constant" pointing at agreements on Siachen and Tulbul projects that were never implemented.
—Manoj Joshi, "Peace Pledge," India Today, 8 March 1999, <http://www.india-today.com>.

February-March 1999
In an article in Foreign Affairs, the US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott writes that the United States "must remain committed to the long-range goal of universal adherence to the NPT. It cannot concede, even by implication that India and Pakistan have by their tests established themselves as nuclear weapon states with all the rights and privileges enjoyed by the parties to the NPT, such as full international help in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. To relent would break faith with those states that have forsworn the capability they could have acquired." Talbott states that "until India and Pakistan disavow nuclear weapons and accept safeguards on all their nuclear activities, they will continue to forfeit the full recognition and benefits that accrue to members in good standing of the NPT." Talbott indicates that "lifting sanctions would be only one component of a return to the process of transforming the relationships, which was among the first casualties of the May tests." He points out that the United States "does not expect either [India or Pakistan] to alter or constrain its defense programs simply because we have asked it to. The essence of the case the administration is making to both is that they can meet their security requirements as we have heard them define them without further testing nuclear weapons, without producing more fissile material, and without deploying nuclear capable missiles." Talbott mentions "five practical steps" for both countries to concentrate on. The steps include: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT); strategic restraint; export controls; and India-Pakistan dialogue.
—Strobe Talbott, "Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia," Foreign Affairs, Volume 78, No. 2, March-April 1999, pp. 110-122.

6 March 1999
India's Chief of Army Staff General Ved Prakash Malik says, "Nuclear deterrence does reduce the possibility of war, but it does not make war redundant." Hence, India should keep a strong military force and continue with its military modernization program. Malik says, "there would be no compromise on training the personnel despite the escalation in costs."
—"Nuclear Deterrence Doesn't Make War Redundant," Rediff On The Net, 6 March 1999, <http://www.rediff.com>.

17 March 1999
In a speech before India's parliament, Defense Minister George Fernandes says the Indian Army "has devised a three-tier system of training medical officers and paramedical staff to handle casualties of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The Army officers would form the first tier, junior commissioned officers the second and battle field nursing assistants the third." He says that India has "to do much more keeping in view the impending danger of nuclear and biological weapons." He says India is prepared to meet any eventuality, including the use of chemical and biological weapons.
—"Sukhoi manufacture: final decision yet to be taken," Hindu (Chennai), 18 March 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

19 March 1999
Indian and Pakistani foreign ministers Jaswant Singh and Sartaj Aziz meet on the sidelines of the 21st session of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Council of Ministers at Nuvara Eliya, Sri Lanka. Both ministers agree to hold a meeting of experts for the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (signed on 21 February 1999) in the next two months; to start a new round of dialogue in May 1999 in New Delhi and Islamabad; and to meet shortly upon completion of the proposed May-June dialogue process.
—"India-Pakistan Joint Statement Issued at Nuvara Eliya, Sri Lanka," 19 March 1999, Embassy of India, Washington, DC, <http://www.indianembassy.org>.

22 March 1999
Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz says security experts from India and Pakistan will meet next month "to agree on security concepts and nuclear doctrines." According to Aziz, Pakistan "is pursuing in good faith various confidence-building measures. But the progress will be difficult to sustain or even justify if there is no progress on the substantive issue of Kashmir."
—"India, Pakistan to Discuss Kashmir in May," Rediff On The Net, 23 March 1999, <http://www.rediff.com>.

26 March 1999
Heavy water leakage occurs in the second unit of the Madras Atomic Power Station (MAPS). However, Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) do not disclose the precise nature of the leak nor how much heavy water leaked into the reactor vault.
—R.K. Radhakrishnan, "MAPS Tightlipped over Heavy Water Leak," Hindu (Chennai), 3 April 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

29-30 March 1999
India and the United States hold talks on export controls in New Delhi in continuation of the talks held on 9-10 November 1998. According to India's Ministry of External Affairs, "the talks were useful and positive and held the prospect of continued cooperation in this area." However, no progress is reported. During the talks, US officials decline to address the question of the list of Indian entities banned from trading with the United States.
-—"Export Control Talks Inconclusive," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 31 March 1999, <http://www.hindustantimes.com>.

2 April 1999
India's National Security Adviser and Principal Secretary to Prime Minister Brajesh Mishra tells reporters that India's National Security Advisory Board will submit a draft of India's nuclear doctrine later in April.
—"Jaswant May Visit Beijing, Says Brajesh Mishra," Hindu (Chennai), 3 April 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

April 1999
The Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs says that Indo-US talks are being conducted "on the basis of comprehensive proposals that India has put forward on disarmament and nonproliferation matters." According to the report, the dialogue has created some progress "in creating better understanding of India's security concerns by the US authorities." The report reiterates that India's concerns over the adverse affect of China's cooperation with Pakistan, specifically in its nuclear and missile development program, have been communicated to the Chinese government. The report states that the nuclear tests carried out in May 1998 were not country-specific and India's "nuclear weapons and missile development programs are based on the principles of minimum sufficiency and deterrent capability. Like China, India has declared a no first use doctrine."
—Annual Report 1999-2000, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, <http://www.meadev.nic.in>; "Progress in Jaswant, Talbott Talks," Times of India (Mumbai), 7 April 1999, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>.

8 April 1999
Seven workers who helped plug a heavy water leak in the second unit of Madras Atomic Power Station (MAPS) on 26 March 1999 are placed in the "removal category." These workers will not be allowed into radioactive areas due to the heavy dosage of radiation they received during the operation. An estimated 40 to 50 workers were present at MAPS at the time of the incident. Most of them will be placed in the "caution category," that is "they could come to the plant but should not receive the 'normal' dose of radiation," a representative of the MAPS workers says. Neither MAPS, the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC), nor the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) disclose the precise reason for the leak or release information on the amount of heavy water that leaked into the reactor vault. The AERB does note, however, that the pressure tubes in the pressurized heavy water reactor units one and two "were made of inferior quality zircalloy which was prone to hydrogen pick up and damage." The Hindu reports that in June 1996, the AERB knew that several tubes had "elongated, sagged, and made contact with the calandria tubes." Citing an expert, the Hindu reports that "leaving them [the tubes] in that state and continuing to operate was highly unsafe" and could potentially expose the population of the Kalpakkam neighborhood to radiation. David Kyd, Public Information Director at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) says, "the Indian authorities have not seen it fit so far to request our help on safety matters and hence we have never been able to send a safety-related team to any Indian nuclear power plant."
—R.K. Radhakrishnan, "MAPS Tightlipped over Heavy Water Leak," Hindu (Chennai), 3 April 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

17 April 1999
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance loses a vote-of-confidence in parliament by one vote. Prime Minister Vajpayee resigns. However, President Narayanan asks him to "continue in office till alternative arrangements are made."
—Harish Khare, "BJP-led govt. quits after losing by one vote," The Hindu (Chennai), 18 April 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

April 1999
The United States postpones the expert-level meeting with India on fissile material cut-off scheduled in April. The Indo-US dialogue is to resume once a new government assumes office in New Delhi.
—K.K. Katyal, "Dialogue Process Put on Hold," Hindu (Chennai), 28 April 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

21 April 1999
The Swedish National Radio, citing unidentified sources, states that a diplomat at the Indian embassy "sought to have a Swedish operator get details about Swedish defence material exports to Pakistan" and expressed interest in "Swedish technology that could be used in making nuclear weapons." Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs spokesperson Jens Odlander refuses to comment on the allegations.
—"India Tried to Get Nuclear Information from Stockholm," Times of India (Mumbai), 23 April 1999, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>.

26 April 1999
President Narayanan dissolves India's lower house of parliament (Lok Sabha) and orders fresh elections. The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government led by Prime Minister Vajpayee continues to rule in a caretaker capacity.
—K.K. Katyal, "Lok Sabha dissolved, elections ordered," The Hindu (Chennai), 27 April 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

27 April 1999
India resumes its dialogue with China. The Indo-Chinese Joint Working Group meets in Beijing for the first time since August 1997. India's Foreign Secretary K. Raghunath is quoted by the Press Trust of India as saying, "we will forcefully raise with China all our concerns, including the Beijing-Islamabad nexus against India and China's attempt to isolate India amongst the developed nations on the nuclear issue."
—Seema Guha, "India to Raise Security Concerns with China," Times of India (Mumbai), 27 April 1999, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>.

28 April 1999
Defense Minister George Fernandes addresses a plenary session of the National Conference of the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). He says India is unable to sign either the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or the NPT until its security concerns are properly addressed. Fernandes states that following the Pokhran II tests and the launch of Agni II, India has been converted from "a soft state" into a "strong" one.
—"Security Must Be Assessed, Says Fernandes," Hindu (Chennai), 29 April 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

28 April 1999
Pakistani foreign office spokesperson Tariq Altaf tells Dawn that secretary-level talks with India will take place despite the dissolution of Lok Sabha (India's lower house of parliament) in India. According to Altaf, "the tentative time period agreed for the talks was June-July 1999, [but] since the talks are to take place in India, they have to intimate us about the exact dates." Altaf says that Pakistan "had asked India for a strategic restraint regime" and "will continue pressing for the same."
—Ansar Abbasi, "Talks with India Likely to Go Ahead," Dawn (Karachi), 29 April 1999, <http://www.dawn.com>.

April 1999
In interviews to India Today and Outlook, Prime Minister of India Atal Bihari Vajpayee says India cannot commit itself to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the September 1999 deadline since the dissolution of parliament has made it impossible to reach a consensus on the issue. He says, however, that his government would try to call an all-party meeting to come to an agreement on this issue. Vajpayee says he does "not have much hope since we are in the midst of [a] do-or-die election."
—"CTBT Signing by September Unlikely: PM," Times of India (Mumbai), 1 May 1999, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com.

April 1999
Speaking to a group of Indian journalists, a senior official of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs says France is quite confident that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government will sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) before the September 1999 deadline. He says it is "not fair to cut India from nuclear cooperation and energy. India's goal of raising nuclear energy from the present two percent of its total energy production to eight-ten percent seems reasonable." According to the spokesperson, France has "always taken the stand that India should be given some time to prove its bona fides as far as conformity to the nonproliferation regime is concerned." He says it is important that India signs the CTBT and Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) for France to be able "to help India in nuclear energy development."
—"Government Has Committed Itself to Signing CTBT," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 6 May 1999, <http://www.hindustantimes.com>.

1 May 1999
The New York Times reports that a classified US intelligence report says that China poses an "acute intelligence threat" to US nuclear laboratories. This 25-page report was prepared by counterintelligence experts in November 1998. India appears in the list of countries "spying" on US nuclear secrets. According to the report, "an unknown individual sent 38 faxes to India from inside a sensitive area of the Oak Ridge Laboratory in Tennessee, during a 30-day period in 1995 and 1996."
-—Jeff Gerth, James Risen, "1998 Report Told of Lab Breaches and China Threat," New York Times, 2 May 1999; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 2 May 1999, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 May 1999
India's Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) terms the allegations that India was stealing US nuclear weapons secrets as "malicious and completely baseless." According to an MEA spokesperson, India's nuclear program "is an excellent example of indigenization" and the US news report attempted to "tarnish [India's] remarkable achievement."
—"India Terms Spying Charge Malicious," Times of India (Mumbai), 1 May 1999, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>.

3 May 1999
India discovers Pakistani intrusions along the Kargil sector along the Line of Control in Indian-administered Kashmir.
—"Kargil Intrusion Reconstructed," From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report, (New Delhi: 2000, Sage Publications India Pvt. Limited), p. 98.

6 May 1999
The Times of India reports that Indian scientists "have identified possible sites for constructing the first deep geological repository where radioactive waste can be stored for over a million years." The names of the sites are not yet disclosed. However, it is known that the sites will be constructed in granite rocks due to their "structural stability, location in low seismicity zones, favorable hydrological conditions," as well as "low mining value, accessibility, and distance from populated areas." The Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) is responsible for managing nuclear waste from power plants and fuel reprocessing facilities. It has carried out research and development activities for the construction of geological repositories at an abandoned gold mine at Kolar, Karnataka. The newspaper reports that modeling and simulation studies have been carried out "to see how the rocks will interact with the waste." BARC is also developing processes "to extract useful materials from waste so that the amount of radioactivity in waste could be reduced." BARC has submitted a proposal to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) to construct a pilot geological repository that could cost around three billion rupees. It has been estimated that the construction of a deep repository could take up to ten to twelve years.
—Dinesh C. Sharma, "Burial Sites for N-Waste Identified," Times of India (Mumbai), 1 May 1999, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>.

8 May 1999
In an interview, India's Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh says there is now "better...understanding of India's position [on nuclear issues] and a much greater appreciation of India as a factor in the international community." According to Singh, "India now has acquired for itself greater and more enhanced strategic space and, without a doubt, greater consequential strategic autonomy." Singh reiterates that India "has not forsaken" its commitment to nuclear disarmament due to the tests of 11 and 13 May 1998. It remains committed to the principle of "equal and legitimate security for all" that is achievable "only through the path of global disarmament." Referring to the ongoing Indo-US talks, Singh calls them "the longest lasting, the most productive and potentially, the most useful talks the United States and India have had in the past many decades." He points out that despite the greater harmonization of the viewpoints, the two sides have not yet reached "the end of the road." Thus, he says, the talks must continue. With respect to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Singh says that until the elections are over, the government cannot proceed with this issue. Singh also asserts that India is a nuclear weapon power. "This is a fact and facts cannot be disinvented," he says. This status "confers upon India a much greater responsibility and India is mindful" of this. Singh asserts that India is "not set out on the path of disturbing the Non-Proliferation Treaty nor has it deviated from the goal of complete global disarmament."
—Amberish K. Diwanji, "India in Neither in the First, Second or Third World, India is a World in Its Own Right," Rediff On The Net, 11 May 1999, <http://www.rediff.com>; "India is Not Marginalized, India Cannot Be Marginalized," Rediff On The Net, 11 May 1999, <http://www.rediff.com>.

11 May 1999
Caretaker Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee publicly states that India will "conduct further nuclear or missile tests if needed" for the country's "self-defense so that no country will dare attack India in the future." Vajpayee also says that India would sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) "provided that the pact fulfilled India's aspirations on time-bound global disarmament."
—"India to Conduct More Nuclear Tests if Needed: Vajpayee," Dawn (Karachi), 12 May 1999, <http://www.dawn.com>.

11-17 May 1999
The Indian Army acquires additional information that Pakistani intrusions have occurred along the Line of Control in the Kargil, Batalik, Dras, and Mashkoh sectors. In response, the Army's Northern Commands begins preparations to recapture occupied Indian territory.
—"Kargil Intrusion Reconstructed," From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report (New Delhi: 2000, Sage Publications India Pvt. Limited), p. 100.

16 May 1999
In an interview with the Times of India, the Chief of Air Staff Marshall Ashok Yashwant Tipnis says that the Indian Air Force (IAF) is "seeking to build up both offensive and defensive capabilities to counter 'extra-regional influences'." He says he would like the IAF to take possession of the Agni intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). According to Tipnis, India will be getting more Sukhoi-30 and Mirage-2000 fighters. Tipnis says the role of IAF as a strategic force has increased since India has carried out nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998 and it is watching closely the "military capabilities being acquired both in our neighborhood and outside."
—Dinesh Kumar, "Let's Be Stronger and Smarter, Says IAF Chief," Times of India (Mumbai), 16 May 1999, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>.

31 May 1999
In view of the expanded military operations along the Line of Control in the Kargil sector, Pakistan's foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmed warns India that "we [Pakistan] will not hesitate to use any weapon in our arsenal to defend our territorial integrity."
—"Pak won't hesitate to use 'any weapon'," Rediff On The Net, 31 May 1999, <http://www.rediff.com>.

8 June 1999
The US Senate approves Amendment No. 602 suggested by senators Sam Brownback and Pat Roberts on "Suspension of Certain Sanctions against India and Pakistan" (known as the Brownback Amendment). The amendment suspends the sanctions imposed under Section 101 of the Arm Export Control Act, Section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act (except for subsection (b)(2)(B), (C) or (G) dealing with the exports of military and dual-use items), and Section 2(b)(4) of the Export Import Bank Act for the period of five years. The amendment calls for a revision of the list of 300 Indian and Pakistani entities prohibited from importing goods from the United States. The revised list is to be submitted to the Senate by the president within 60 days of enactment of the Amendment. The suspension of the above mentioned sanctions can be renewed by the president for the additional period of five years provided that the President within 30 days prior to each renewal certifies that it is in the national interest of the United States.
—Brownback Amendment No. 602, Senate, 8 June 1999, Thomas Legislative Information on the Internet, <http://thomas.loc.gov>.

20 June 1999
India's Home Minister L.K. Advani says India wants to treat the conflict with Pakistan in Kargil as "a limited war" and make sure that it does not escalate.
—"India for Treating Kargil as Limited War: Advani," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 20 June 1999, <http://www.hindustantimes.com>.

21 June 1999
Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister and National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra says India will "stick to 'no-first-use' of nuclear weapons but would go all out if any attempt is made against it."
—"India Firm on 'No First Use' of Nuke Weapons," Rediff On The Net, 21 June 1999, <http://www.rediff.com>.

24 June 1999
The Pakistani daily The News reports that Pakistan will continue to support the infiltrators in Drass and Kargil and may not hesitate to use its "ultimate option" in the case of an attack from India. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif warns of "irreparable losses" if the situation along the Line of Control escalated into a wider war.
—Vijay Datt, "Pakistan Does Not Rule Out Use of N-Arms: Report," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 24 June 1999, <http://www.hindustantimes.com>; Kamal Siddiqi and Agencies, "Pak peeved, say US not 'fair & balanced'," Indian Express (Mumbai), 25 June 1999, <http://www.expressindia.com>.

1 July 1999
In response to Pakistan's threat to use nuclear weapons in the event of a larger conventional war, Prime Minister Vajpayee remarks that "we [India] are prepared for all eventualities."
—"India not daunted by Pak nuke threat: PM," Times of India (Mumbai), 1 July 1999, <http://www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com>.

20 July 1999
In an interview with BBC, Defense Minister George Fernandes says that India does not intend to join the "bomb race" and considers nuclear weapons "only as a deterrent." He also says he was misquoted as having said that China is India's number one enemy. He asserts he had actually said it was "a potential number one enemy" and "there is a difference between enemy number one and potential enemy number one."
—"Fernandes Says India's Nukes are Only a Deterrent," Rediff On The Net, 21 June 1999, <http://www.rediff.com>.

27 July 1999
Hindustan Times reports that "a highly classified nuclear submarine project has already started and was coming well." The report says that a budget of 300 million rupees has been allotted for the project. The government has yet to decide whether nuclear powered submarines will actually carry nuclear weapons.
—"India to Produce Indigenous N-Submarine," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 24 June 1999, <http://www.hindustantimes.com>.

11 August 1999
In a warning to Pakistan, Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh says that the Indian government expects that "Pakistan would not be so unwise as to assume that India will not act in protecting its territorial integrity—land, sea, or air—simply because the Indian armed forces, under instructions from the government, acted with exemplary restraint during the Kargil confrontation." Indian government officials say the shadow of possible nuclear confrontation has led Pakistan to believe that "it could push the envelope of military tensions and India might remain inhibited in its response."
—C. Raja Mohan, "Jaswant Cautions Pakistan," Hindu (Chennai), 12 August 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

17 August 1999
India's National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra releases the "Draft Report of India's Nuclear Doctrine." The report dwells on India's key nuclear policy objectives, proposed nuclear force architecture, issues of survivability, credibility, command and control of nuclear forces, safety and security, research and development, and position on arms control and disarmament issues.
—"Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) on Indian Nuclear Doctrine," 17 August 1999, <http://meadev.nic.in/govt/indnucld.htm>.

18 August 1999
India's foreign affairs minister Jaswant Singh discusses the "Draft Report" submitted by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) in an interview with a private television channel. Singh says "there is no need for anyone to fear" what he calls "a discussion paper." He also notes that India's nuclear program is "neither country specific, nor strike specific" and it is "completely unwarranted" to read anything more in it. Singh says that as soon as the elections are over, the Government of India will "endeavor to create a larger political consensus" on this issue.
—"Jaswant Allays US Fears on Nuclear Policy; Opposition Assails Government," Times of India (Mumbai), 19 August 1999, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>.

August 1999
The Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) enters the final stage of assembling an electron accelerating machine Kali-5000. Work on this project was suspended in 1985 by R. Chidambaram, then Director of BARC. It resumed in 1989. The Hindu reports that in the present form the machine "weighs 26 tons, including tanks containing 12000 liters of fuel....The machine will shoot several thousand bursts of microwaves, each burst lasting for just 60 billionths of a second and packed with a power of about four gigawatts." According to BARC scientists, it can be used as a beam weapon by bursting microwaves that would cripple the electronic systems and computer chips of the enemy aircraft and missiles. The scientists say that Kali "for the first time provided India a way to 'harden' the electronic systems used in satellites and missiles against the deadly electromagnetic impulses generated by nuclear weapons." The Head of Accelerator and Pulse Power Division at BARC Mr. P.H. Ron says the machine is to be ready for testing by the end of this year. According to Ron, Kali was developed for industrial use and its "defense use was a recent spin off." The Hindu reports that the Defence Ballistics Research Institute in Chandigarh is already using an X-ray version of Kali to study the speed of projectiles. Another defense institute in Bangalore is using a microwave-producing version of Kali to test the vulnerability of the electronic systems and design electrostatic shields to protect them from the microwave attack by the enemy.
—"India's Beam Weapon in Final Stages," Hindu (Chennai), 19 August 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

19 August 1999
India's Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh publicly states he is ready to discuss the Indian draft nuclear doctrine with the United States. Singh refutes the possibility of a nuclear conflict with Pakistan. He says that restraint is "the hallmark of India's international conduct." Commenting on the draft nuclear doctrine released by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) on 17 August 1999, Singh says the document is not a "contentious issue." He emphasizes that the released document is a discussion document that lays out the broad parameters from which successor Indian governments could draw up a nuclear doctrine.
—"Jaswant Rejects US Concerns," Hindu (Chennai), 20 August 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

20 August 1999
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee publicly states that the draft nuclear doctrine submitted by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) is "not a final paper" and it does not contain anything that the government did not say earlier. Vajpayee states that India is "prepared to discuss the draft and there has been no change in our policy of no-first-use and no use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states." Vajpayee reiterates India's call on nuclear weapon states to "come forward for destruction of their arsenals" indicating that "India would take a lead towards making this world a nuclear-free one."
—"N-Doctrine Mere Draft: Vajpayee," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 21 August 1999, <http://www.hindustantimes.com>.

August 1999
India opens negotiations with Dassault Aviation of France to explore the possibility of acquiring an additional 16 to 18 Mirage 2000-D fighter aircrafts at a price of $11.62 million each. The deal includes an option to add another batch of this aircraft later. The deal is expected to be finalized by October 1999.
—Amir Mateen, "India Buying Mirage 2000 Nuclear Squadron," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 30 August 1999, <http://www.hindustantimes.com>.

22 September 1999
In the statement in the General Debate in the UN General Assembly, the Minister of External Affairs of India Jaswant Singh states that the objective of global nuclear disarmament "still beckons us." Singh says India "was obliged to acquire nuclear weapons because of the failure of the existing nonproliferation regimes to address [India's] primary security concerns." Despite this fact, Singh reiterates that India's "commitment to global nuclear disarmament stands undiluted," emphasizing that India is "the only nuclear weapon state" ready to negotiate a Nuclear Weapons Convention to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. According to Singh, elimination of the nuclear weapons is "a step-by-step process." The first step, he says, is technical: "for all countries possessing nuclear weapons to undertake measures that will reduce the dangers of and provide added safeguards against any unintended or accidental use." The next step is political: re-orienting nuclear doctrines towards no-first-use, later leading to the non-use of these weapons thus delegitimizing them globally. Singh notes that with respect to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), India's position remains consistent and India is "ready to bring these discussions to a successful conclusion" provided that "a positive environment" is created and other countries agree to the treaty unconditionally. Singh mentions that India's "readiness" to discuss the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) even though the Conference on Disarmament is deadlocked on this issue.
—Statement by Shri Jaswant Singh, External Affairs Minister in the General Debate of UN General Assembly, 22 September 1999, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, http://www.meadev.nic.in

24 September 1999
The Unit 2 reactor of the Kaiga Atomic Power Project goes critical. The 220MWe reactor is later synchronized to the Southern grid on 2 December 1999.
—Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report:1999-2000, p. 1.3, Executive Summary available at <http://www.vigyan.org.in/annual/atomic.html>.

6 October 1999
Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Karl F. Inderfurth speaks at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, DC. Inderfurth talks of the dangers of nuclear and missile proliferation in South Asia and about the tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998, which have dominated the US "approach, thinking, and activities in South Asia for the past 16 months." He also mentions the Kargil crisis and the necessity for India and Pakistan to resume a dialogue along the lines of the Lahore Summit. Inderfurth states that President Clinton "has pledged his 'personal interest' in seeing the bilateral efforts of the two countries accelerated and intensified in the search for resolving their long-standing and fundamental differences, including Kashmir." Inderfurth says that the failure of the United States to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) could jeopardize its interests in South Asia and encourage the countries for further nuclear tests at some point in the future. This failure could also encourage other countries to acquire nuclear weapons, he says. Inderfurth emphasizes that the CTBT is "one means to prevent that." He talks about the importance of developing trade and investment, cooperation on science and technology, environment, health, stabilizing the population growth. He notes that there is a real opportunity for the United States to restructure its relations with the countries of South Asia and focusing only on the disagreements is unlikely to be conducive to promoting cooperation with the region.
— Karl F. Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, "Engaging South Asia," Remarks at Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Washington, DC, 6 October 1999, US Department of State, <http://www.state.gov>.

14 October 1999
Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh states that the military coup in Pakistan and US rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) notwithstanding, India will not change its stand on the CTBT issue and will not block the treaty's entry into force. Singh says India remains committed to the voluntary moratorium announced after the nuclear tests last year. The official spokesperson for India's Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) states that proceeding with the treaty requires "building a national consensus in the countries concerned, including India."
—"Jaswant Singh Rules Out Any Change in Stand on CTBT Issue," 14 October 1999, Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 14 October 1999, <http://www.hindustantimes.com>; "India to Help Evolve Consensus on CTBT: Jaswant," Rediff On The Net, 14 October 1999, <http://www.rediff.com>; "Senate Debate Vindicates India's Position on CTBT," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 14 October 1999, <http://www.hindustantimes.com>.

20 October 1999
The Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister and National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra leaves for the United States to discuss bilateral issues, including the developments in Pakistan and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
—"Brajesh Mishra Leaves for Washington," Rediff On The Net, 20 October 1999, <http://www.rediff.com>.

21 October 1999
During a video-conference from New Delhi, the US Ambassador to India Richard Celeste says India may follow the US example and sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) without ratification. Celeste says that India should not sign the treaty just "to please the United States" but "because the treaty helps to secure India's national interest."
—"India May Sign, not Ratify CTBT: Celeste," Times of India (Mumbai), 21 October 1999, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>.

21 October 1999
Former Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) Chairman A. Gopalakrishnan says, "India is likely to face a serious nuclear accident in not too distant future." According to Gopalakrishnan, a report prepared by AERB in 1995 listed 130 defects in various nuclear installations that "did include some identified problems related to reprocessing plants." Gopalakrishnan says the report had "urgently called for modification of emergency core cooling systems (ECCS)" vital to prevent melting of the reactor core in the event of breakdown in the circulation of the primary coolant. According to Gopalakrishnan, excessive secrecy in the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and inability of AERB to function independently hampered the safety of nuclear installations in India. He says, the people may not be aware of an accident taking place "unless the roof of a plant blows out or a visible fire rages there." Thus far India has experienced a burst of the primary coolant pipe in Tarapur reactor in 1979, explosion at the turbine building in Narora due to the leakage of hydrogen in 1993, cable fire at Rajasthan atomic power plant in 1985, the leakage of the heavy water at Madras reactor in June 1986, August 1988 and March 1999, the collapse of the concrete dome at Kaiga atomic plant in May 1994, "an incident which could have been a disaster had it happened while the reactor was running."
—"India May Face Nuclear Accident, Warns Expert," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 22 October 1999, <http://www.hindustantimes.com>.

23 October 1999
The US Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson is to visit India between 26-28 October. He says that while the United States continues to believe "that India is better off without nuclear weapons," it recognizes "that India feels it needs such capability." Richardson says the United States is disappointed with the lack of concrete steps undertaken by India on her pledges. According to Richardson, the United States is "encouraged that India plans to proceed with efforts to build a consensus for the test ban treaty, despite the failure of the US Senate to ratify it." Richardson says he plans to discuss with the Indian government "a number of energy cooperation ventures" and plans to reach "some agreements in several areas." Richardson suspects "there will be some discussions on nuclear power development."
—C.K. Arora, "US Links Clinton Visit to Nonproliferation Dialogue," Rediff On The Net, 23 October 1999, <http://www.rediff.com>.

26 October 1999
US President Bill Clinton signs the Defense Appropriations Act for the fiscal year 2000. The bill empowers him to waive economic sanctions contained in sections 101 and 102 of the Arms Export Control Act (except for sub-sections (B), (C), and (G) dealing with the technologies directly contributing to the development of nuclear weapons and dual-use items), section 2(b)(4) of the Export Import Bank Act or section 620E(e) of Foreign Assistance Act, imposed on India and Pakistan in the aftermath of May 1998 nuclear tests. The waiver of the sanctions under sub-sections (B), (C), and (G) of section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act is possible if the president certifies that such a waiver will be in the national security interests of the United States. The waiver shall be terminated if India or Pakistan "detonates a nuclear explosive device after the date of enactment of this Act or otherwise takes such action which would cause the president to report pursuant section 102(b)(1) of the Arms Control Act." The Act stipulates that the president submits "both classified and unclassified report" listing the amended list of Indian and Pakistani entities to remained sanctioned within 60 days of enactment of this Act.
—Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2000, Section 9001, "Waiver of Certain Sanctions Against India and Pakistan," Thomas Legislative Information on the Internet, http://thomas.loc.gov; "Clinton gets the Authority to Waiver Sanctions," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 27 October 1999, <http://www.hindustantimes.com>; Sridhar Krishnaswami, "US Economic Sanctions Against India Waived," Hindu (Chennai), 29 October 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

29 October 1999
The Safety Review Committee of Operating Plants (SARCOP) of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) rules that accidents at nuclear power plants, like the one that took place in Japan recently, are unlikely in India. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) chairman R. Chidambaram says the AERB has nevertheless called for re-examination of relevant plants as "a measure of abundant caution." Addressing the scientists and technologists at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), Chidambaram says the safety record of Indian nuclear plants has been internationally recognized and "no directive of the AERB has ever been violated." Referring to a report (by A. Gopalakrishnan) stating that "India is likely to face a nuclear accident in not too distant future," Chidambaram says that "such a statement made without any scientific basis is a symptom of the technological diffidence in some persons who consider that, as a nation, India is not capable of dealing with high technology." According to Chidambaram, "safety is a matter of culture and our continuous and strong emphasis on it, both in design and operation, has paid rich dividends." Chidambaram says AERB "stringently monitors the safety record of India's nuclear facilities" and Nuclear Power Corporation "has the track record of 150 reactor years of safe operation."
—"Panel to Re-examine N-Plants for Safety," Hindu (Chennai), 29 October 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

Late October 1999
External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh says that India determines its policy based on its national interests and its attitude towards the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is not dependent on the US Senate vote. This is not the reason for India to resume testing. However, the US rejection of the treaty proves the complexity of this issue. Singh reiterates that for India to proceed with the CTBT, "a widespread national consensus" is necessary. According to Singh, India's voluntary testing moratorium is "not bound by time or conditions." Speaking of Indo-US dialogue, Singh says that the eighth round was "the most intense, in-depth" the United States and India "had in the past many decades" and it "must resume at the earliest."
—V. Shankar Aiyar, "They Must Move the Bus Back to Lahore," India Today, 1 November 1999, <http://www.india-today.com>.

November 1999
India and the United States resume bilateral military contacts. India's Ambassador to the United States Naresh Chandra visits the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.
—"India, US Resume Military Contacts," Hindu (Chennai), 6 November 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

10 November 1999
Senior Advisor for Arms Control and National Security in the US Department of State John Holum says India and Pakistan must adhere to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) despite the failure of the US Senate to ratify the treaty. Holum adds that the United States will continue its efforts to "encourage signature and ratification of the Treaty by both countries."
—"US Wants India, Pakistan to Accede to CTBT," News Today, 10 November 1999, <http://www.india-today.com>.

16 November 1999
The ninth round of Indo-US talks begins at the Indian High Commission in London. The agenda for the meeting is not made public. The Indian delegation consists of the Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh, Foreign Secretary K. Raghunath, Foreign Secretary-designate Lalit Mansingh, and the Ministry of External Affairs Secretaries Alok Prasad and Rakesh Sood. The US delegation includes Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Karl Inderfurth, and other officials.
—Thomas Anraham, "Jaswant, Talbott Hold Talks," Hindu (Chennai), 17 November 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

17 November 1999
The ninth round of Indo-US talks concludes. The Joint Press Statement indicates that no progress was made during the talks. The two sides concentrated on the four "benchmarks": Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), export controls, and defense posture. The two sides agreed on the importance of these issues and "the need to make tangible progress." They have also agreed that "the purpose of the talks is to lay the foundation of the broad-based forward looking relationship between the United States and India." The statement indicates the hope that the visit of the President Clinton to India next year will "provide the occasion to significantly improve mutual understanding and cooperation." According to the Joint Statement, the next round of Indo-US talks shall take place in January 2000.
—"Joint Statement on the Conclusion of Indo-US Bilateral Talks," 17 November 1999, Embassy of India, Washington, DC, <http://www.indianembassy.org>.

26 November 1999
Speaking at Japan Institute of International Affairs, the Minister of External Affairs of India Jaswant Singh says that India's unilateral voluntary nuclear testing moratorium announced after a series of nuclear tests in May 1998 is a "de-facto acceptance of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)." He says that "India's national identity and security could not be negotiated nor could it be lost to globalization." Singh asserts that India conducted the tests due to the nuclear developments in Pakistan.
—"India's Moratorium is De-facto Acceptance of CTBT," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 26 November 1999, <http://www.hindustantimes.com>.

29 November 1999
In an interview with the Hindu, Foreign Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh reiterates the key points behind India's nuclear policy and doctrine. Singh says India "shall maintain a minimum nuclear deterrent and shall undertake necessary measures to ensure its credibility...the principal role of nuclear weapons is to deter their use by an adversary. For this India needs only that strategic minimum which is credible. With the policy of 'retaliation only,' survivability becomes critical to ensure credibility. This 'minimum,' however, cannot be a fixed physical quantification; it is a dynamic concept rooted in the strategic environment, technological imperatives...." Addressing concerns that India is seeking a triad nuclear force, Singh says, "...it is premature to talk of an Indian 'triad.' R&D programs will certainly continue, aimed at enhancing survivability and thus, credibility," but a 'triad is not a pre-requisite for credibility. Singh also elaborates on India's 'no-first-use' doctrine explaining that "...our nuclear assets are limited and consistent with 'no-first-use;' we have ensured that these procedures do not tempt an adversary to pre-emption but strengthen deterrence by underlining the political resolve for effective retaliation." Singh adds, "...we have rejected notions of 'launch on warning postures' that lead to maintaining hair trigger alerts, thus increasing the risks of an unauthorized launch." With regard to the question of tactical nuclear weapons, Singh adds, "...we do not see nuclear weapons as weapons of war fighting. In fact, India sees them only as strategic weapons, whole role is to deter use by an adversary."
—"India Not to Engage in a N-Arms Race: Jaswant," Hindu (Chennai), 29 November 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

December 1999
After having worked on the development of an indigenous nuclear-powered submarine or Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) for about two decades, the Indian defense scientific establishment initiates preliminary discussions with France and Russia on possible assistance in the design and development of the nuclear reactor for the ATV. The Asian Age reports that the response from France was not very enthusiastic. This issue was discussed during the meeting of the Indo-Russian group on military-technical cooperation in November 1999. According to the Asian Age report, the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and the Indian Navy estimate that the construction and testing of a "compact and lightweight nuclear reactor with a power output of about 90MW" cannot be completed before 2004, the target year for the induction of nuclear-powered submarine.
—Rezaul H. Laskar, "India Expediting Advanced Technology Vehicle," Asian Age (New Delhi), 10 December 1999, p. 1-2; FBIS Document FTS19991210000106, 10 December 1999.

9 December 1999
Senior Advisor for arms control and national security in the US Department of State John Holum says India's security requirements are "best served without a nuclear capability." He says the United States does not accept India's nuclear capability. According to Holum, even though the United States does not have "the ability to judge" India's security requirements, its assessments of the regional situation do not imply that New Delhi needs to have a nuclear capability. Holum says the United States is still looking for progress on the four benchmarks specified in the course of the Indo-US dialogue. The lifting of the remaining sanctions depends on this progress. Holum states the benchmarks "remain integral to US policy." According to Holum, India is an "indispensable party" to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
—Ramesh Chandran, "US Hasn't Accepted India's Need for N-Deterrent: Holum," Times of India (Mumbai), 11 December 1999, <http://timesfindia.indiatimes.com>.

17 December 1999
The US Department of Commerce removes 51 organizations from the list of 200 Indian entities sanctioned in November 1998. These entities will now be able to import non-sensitive products that do not require an export license from the United States. Roger Majak, Assistant Commerce Secretary for Export Administration, says the action was based on a consensus decision to focus the sanctions more narrowly "on those Indian entities most directly involved in proliferation activities of concern." Mr. Majak states that "the US policy of denial for dual-use items, controlled for nuclear and missile technology reasons to all Indian and Pakistani entities, remains unchanged." Ordinary computers are not treated as dual-use items anymore and will be taken off the list. Majak also says there will be further revisions of the list of both the entities and the products. The spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs welcomes the decision expressing hope for the "complete abolition of this restrictive list."
—"US Lifts Curbs on 51 Indian Entities," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 18 December 1999, <http://www.hindustantimes.com>.

20 December 1999
The Times of India, citing an official from the US Department of State, reports that over a period of time, the United States will make further "adjustments to the entities list both in terms of the numbers as well as coverage of the licensing elements."
—T.V. Parasuram, "US Will Reduce Entities List Further," Times of India (Mumbai), 22 December 1999, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>.

21 December 1999
A spokesperson for the Ministry of External Affairs says India will have a credible minimum nuclear deterrent "at the level it chooses" even if it signs the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The spokesperson says India's "dialogue with key interlocutors is predicated on the fact that India will have a credible minimum deterrent" and this issue "needs no further explanation" being a "self-evident truth."
—"Indian Government Says to Have Credible Nuclear Deterrent Even if It Signs CTBT," Indian Express (Mumbai), 22 December 1999, <http://expressindia.com>; "India Reserves the Right to Determine Deterrent," Hindu (Chennai), 22 December 1999, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

24 December 1999
The Unit 3 reactor of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Project (RAPP) achieves criticality. The DAE claims that the 220MWe reactor will be synchronized to the grid "in the near future."
—Government of India Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report: 1999-2000, pp. 1.3, 3.6, Executive Summary available at <http://www.vigyan.org.in/annual/atomic.html>.

1999
According to the Department of Atomic Energy's (DAE) annual report, India's 10 nuclear power facilities performed at nearly 80 percent of maximum generating capacity; up from 75 percent during the 1998-99 period.
—Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report: 1999-2000, p. 1(2).

1999
The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) reports that the prototype fast breeder reactor (PFBR) is making significant progress in the design and the development of its components. The fast breeder test reactor (FBTR) operated successfully at 8MW with its plutonium-carbide fuel.
—Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report: 1999-2000, p. 1(3).

1999
The Heavy Water Board (HWB) reports the overall performance and safety record of India's heavy water facilities were "excellent." The heavy water production facilities at Tuticorin, Baroda and Kota completed more than 8.6, 9.6, and 5.3 million hours of continuous production, respectively.
—Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report: 1999-2000, p. 1(4).

1999
The Nuclear Fuel Complex (Hyderabad) commissions three new facilities: the New Uranium Oxide Fuel Project, the New uranium Fuel Assembly Project, and the New Zircaloy Fabrication project.
—Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report: 1999-2000, p. 1(5).

1999
The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) reports that a facility for the reprocessing of uranium-233 from thorium rods irradiated at CIRUS and DHRUVA research reactors is reaching completion.
—Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report: 1999-2000, p. 1(5).

1999
India opens its first Solid Storage Surveillance Facility (S3F) at Tarapur. A S3F allows for the long term storage of high-level radioactive waste in a deep geographical repository. India is the fourth country to possess such a facility. The Waste Immobilization Project (WIP) at Trombay commissions an indigenously designed and manufactured vitrification furnace. A vitrification furnace allows for the immobilization of highly active radioactive waste into glass. The WIP at Trombay is scheduled to be completed soon, and the WIP at Kalpakkam also makes progress.
—Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report: 1999-2000, p. 1(5).