This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

January 2000
Former Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman P.K. Iyengar has separate meetings with India's National Security Advisor, Brajesh Mishra, Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh, and Chief of Army Staff, Ved Malik. Iyengar advises them against signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and makes a case for the resumption of nuclear testing. Iyengar makes the case that additional tests are necessary to validate the devices tested in 1998. Further, India's thermonuclear test was most likely a dud; without tests, Indian scientists will be unable to rectify the design flaws, or modify or refine it. Neither would Indian scientists be able to improve the thermonuclear device's 'power-to-yield' characteristics, or upscale the design to generate larger yields. Iyengar also argues that in the absence of further testing, India will also be unable to design newer types of nuclear warheads; now would it have sufficient data for benchmarking computer simulations.
—Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), p. 423.

Early January 2000
The Director General, Defense Planning Staff, in the Ministry of Defense, produces a paper for the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, which casts doubts on the government's proposed move to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The paper questions whether India has the capability to produce a fission device of more than 50kt yield; and if this were indeed the case, then it would have negative repercussions on the credibility of India's proposed nuclear deterrent. The paper outlines the military's requirement for a 200-250kt thermonuclear device; which should be tested to as proof of an "effective" credible minimum deterrent. The military also doubts whether nuclear weapons can be deployed in the absence of further testing. The military's misgivings are conveyed by to the defense ministry.
—Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), pp. 431-432.

1 January 2000
India and Pakistan exchange lists of nuclear installations under the agreement signed in 1988.
—"Pakistan, India Exchange Lists on Nuclear Installations," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 1 January 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 1 January 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 January 2000
Defense Minister George Fernandes announces India's doctrine of fighting 'limited conventional wars under nuclear conditions' at a seminar in New Delhi. According to Fernandes, "Nuclear weapons have not made war obsolete; they simply imposed another dimension on the way warfare was conducted...elementary reading would tell us that 30-years ago two nuclear armed neighboring countries – China and the Soviet Union – had fought a bitter war across their borders. So the issue is...that conventional war remained feasible, though with definite limitations, if escalation across the nuclear threshold was to be avoided." Drawing on China's doctrine of "local border wars," Fernandes emphasizes that henceforth limited conventional wars would be the wars of the future and the Indian military should prepare to fight and win such wars. Fernandes warns Pakistan against continuing its "proxy war" in Kashmir and threatens that Islamabad's nuclear weapons will not deter India from fighting back.
—Inaugural Address by Raksha Mantri at Habitat Center, New Delhi, "The Challenges of Limited War: Parameters and Options," National Seminar organized by IDSA, 5 January 2000.

7 January 2000
The Congress Working Committee asks the BJP-led government to clarify its position on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) before it searches for national consensus on the issue.
—"Indian Government Asked to Clarify Position on CTBT," Times of India (Mumbai), 7 January 2000, in FBIS Document FTS20000107000141, 7 January 2000.

11 January 2000
Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Mikio Aoki urges India's Defense Minister George Fernandes to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) so that Japan can consider resumption of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) to India.
—"ODA Loans Only after India Signs CTBT: Japan," Hindu (Chennai), 12 January 2000, <http://www.hinduonline.com>; "Japan Urges India to Join CTBT," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 11 January 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 11 January 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 January 2000
In an interview to the Hindu (Chennai), US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott says that the United States "fully" recognizes that it is "a sovereign right [of the Indian government] to make decisions on what sort of weapons and force posture are necessary for the defense of India and Indian interests." He remarks that Washington needs an assurance that New Delhi is not going to seek "an open-ended arms competition, but only the minimum necessary to ensure Indian security." Yet Talbott underscores that a state can sign both the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) "without giving up the ability to possess nuclear weapons." Strobe Talbott and India's Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh are to restart the security dialogue in London on 18 and 19 January.
—"US Recognizes Reality of Nuclear India: Talbott," Agence France Presse, 14 January 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 14 January 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; K.K. Katyal, "India: Jaswant, Talbott Talks to Focus on South Asia," Hindu (Chennai), 14 January 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 5 March 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Raja Mohan, "Early Solution to Nuclear Issues Will Help: Talbott," Hindu (Chennai), <http://hinduonline.com>.

18-19 January 2000
US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and India's Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh meet in London to resume the dialogue "on security, nonproliferation, disarmament and related issues."
—Press Release Issued at the End of the 10th Round of Indo-US Talks, 19 January 2000, Embassy of India, Washington, DC, <http://www.indianembassy.org>.

24 January 2000
India's Defense Minister George Fernandes says that US Senate's rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has "resulted in a treaty sliding to coma." He reiterates that India is not going to use its nuclear arsenal against non-nuclear weapon states.
—"Indian Defense Minister Says CTBT in a 'Coma'," Agence France Presse, 24 January 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 24 January 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 January 2000
In an interview with the Russian newspaper Izvestia, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee says that rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the US Senate "has had an impact on domestic opinion in India." He adds that India expects all 44 countries required to sign the treaty to do so unconditionally, adding that India will not block the treaty's entry into force. He remarks that NPT is "discriminatory and flawed" and that India cannot join it as a non-nuclear weapon state.
—"NPT Discriminatory: PM," Hindu (Chennai), 27 January 2000, <http://hinduonline.com>.

6 February 2000
Addressing a conference in Munich, India's National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra underscores that India has a no-first-use nuclear policy and does not intend to match China's nuclear arsenal.
—"21st Century Will Be the Asian Century: Indian Official," Agence France Presse, 6 February 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 6 February 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "India Won't Play Nuclear Catch-up with China, Official Says," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 6 February 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 6 February 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "We're Not Trying to Catch up with China," Times of India (Mumbai), 7 February 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 5 March 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 February 2000
In an interview to the Hindu (Chennai), French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine says that France is ready "to increase cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear technology." Yet to move in this direction, India has to "show it is ready to go along with the international (nuclear) regimes."
—Raja Mohan, "Signing CTBT Will Help," Hindu (Chennai), 15 February 2000, <http://hinduonline.com>.

15 February 2000
India's Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh says that prior to making a decision on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the government intends to hold a referendum.
—"India's Stand on CTBT Not Linked with Clinton's Visit," Pakistan Newswire, 15 February 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 5 July 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 February 2000
The Indo-French Forum concludes its two-day session in New Delhi today. The French co-chairman Jean Francois Poncet says "there was already some work going on" the bilateral cooperation in the field of nuclear safety and basic atomic research. The project under discussion is the sale of French nuclear reactors to accelerate nuclear power generation in India. Yet he remarks that there are "difficulties" along the way.
—Raja Mohan, "India, France Explore N-Cooperation," Hindu (Chennai), 16 February 2000, <http://hinduonline.com>.

24 February 2000
US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott says that while the United States is ready for a new phase of relations with India, it sees four "unfinished" issues: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), India's defense posture of a credible minimal deterrence, and Indo-Pakistan relations. Talbott remarks that until the United States and India are able to "find more common ground on the nonproliferation area, there is going to be some significant, necessary limitations, notably including the military sphere and we hope that is not going to be permanent condition."
—N.C. Menon, "Talbott: Clinton's India Visit to Open New Chapter in Ties," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 26 February 2000, <http://www.hindustantimes.com>; Sridhar Krishnaswami, "N-Issue at the Center of Indo-US Ties: Talbott," Hindu (Chennai), <http://hinduonline.com>.

29 February 2000
While announcing a budget for 2000-2001, Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha says there will be a 28.2 percent increase in military spending in the new fiscal year.
—Barry Bearak, "India Increases Its Military Budget by 28 Percent," New York Times, 1 March 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 1 March 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Atul Aneja, "Army Gets Lion Share of Funds," Hindu (Chennai), 1 March 2000, <http://hinduonline.com>; "India: Defense Allocations Higher, But Necessary," Business Line (Chennai), 8 March 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

March 2000
The report "Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and Options for India," prepared by Bangalore-based National Institute of Advanced Studies, states that India's current capacity to produce plutonium is limited and "there is a need to augment this capacity quickly to hold enough plutonium stockpile." The report notes, however, that India will be unable to reach stockpile level held by nuclear weapon states. Further, the report mentions that India has been successful in "not classifying spent fuel as waste under the nuclear waste convention. This position should not be changed until there is evidence of true disarmament and global access for India to sources of natural uranium is made possible without unacceptable conditions." Finally, the report states India's nuclear program is targeted at China, not Pakistan.
—Srinivas Laxman, "India Lacks Plutonium to Maintain N-Deterrent: Report," Times of India (Mumbai), 7 March 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 11 March 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 March 2000
Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) chairman Y.S.R. Prasad says that Koodankulam project with Russia is a part of NPC's effort to accelerate nuclear power generation capacity to 7,000MW by 2007. He notes that Koodankulam project has an estimated cost of USD 2.5 billion, 60 percent of which will be financed by a long-term loan from Russia.
—"India: Russian Loan Package for Nagarjuna Power Co. Project," Business Line (Chennai), 2 March 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 10 March 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 March 2000
In an interview to the Times of India (Mumbai), former Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman M.R. Srinivasan says that India should conduct more nuclear tests, if needed, so that its nuclear scientists could "design more compact nuclear weapons with improved yields." He argues that India should not foreclose its nuclear options because it carried out only one thermonuclear test. Yet Srinivasan admits that the scientists accumulated sufficient data from the six nuclear tests.
—Srinivas Laxman, "India Must Continue N-Weapon Tests, Says Ex-chief of AEC," Times of India (Mumbai), 3 March 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 11 March 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 March 2000
Inaugurating the second unit of Kaiga nuclear power station, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee says that India is committed to a timebound elimination of nuclear weapons. Yet he adds that India will "continue to be guided by the imperative of the country's strategic autonomy and the need to maintain a credible minimum deterrent" until all nuclear weapons are dismantled.
—"India to Have Minimum Nuclear Deterrent: Vajpayee," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 5 March 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 5 March 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6-7 March 2000
Concluding the first Sino-Indian security dialogue, Chinese Foreign Minister Zhu Bangzao asks India to comply with the UN Security Council Resolution 1172 and end its nuclear weapons program. A senior Indian government official says India used the security dialogue to explain its nuclear posture to China and "the Chinese side listened."
—"China Asks India to Renounce Nuclear Weapons as Security Talks Conclude," BBC Monitoring South Asia, 7 March 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 7 March 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "India Rejects China's Call for Rollback," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 9 March 2000, <http://www.hindustantimes.com>.

8 March 2000
The spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs R.S. Jassal says that the Indian government has "conveyed our concerns that China's assistance to Pakistan's nuclear and missile program has an adverse impact on regional stability to which [India has] been obliged to respond in a responsible and restrained manner."
—"India Conveys Concern to China," Dawn (Karachi), 9 March 2000, <http://www.dawn.com>.

10 March 2000
Unit 3 of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS) is synchronized to the Northern grid. It later begins commercial operations on 1 June 2000.
—Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report: 2000-2001, Executive Summary available at <http://www.dae.gov.in/ar2001/execsum.htm.>.

11 March 2000
Speaking at the Indian Institute of Technology, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) chairman R. Chidambaram says that there was a perfect match between an estimated and actual yield of a 15kt device India exploded in May 1998 due to prior "rigorous computer simulation." According to Chidambaram India can achieve 20,000MW of nuclear power by 2020 "due to an increase in budgetary support in the Ninth Plan and increasing plant load factor."
—"India: Nuclear testing Has Become Less Necessary," Business Line (Chennai), 11 March 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 7 September 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 March 2000
US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright says that the United States does not consider India a direct threat, yet it regards "proliferation as number one security concern."
—"India Hopes to Resolve Nuclear Differences with US," News International (Islamabad), 16 March 2000, <http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/>.

15 March 2000
Responding to a statement by the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the spokesperson for India's Ministry of External Affairs R.S. Jassal says that India and the United States "are now aware of each other's security concerns and naturally some residual differences remain... We have been engaged in a high-level intensive dialogue which was focused on nonproliferation and disarmament and was meant to harmonize the views of India and the United States on these issues. And obviously our dialogue has been predicated on India having a credible minimum deterrent."
—"India Hopes to Resolve Nuclear Differences with US," News International (Islamabad), 16 March 2000, <http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/>.

16 March 2000
Unit 2 reactor of the Kaiga Atomic Power Station is declared commercial. This declaration follows successful physics experiments that were conducted at 50 percent and 100 percent power level capabilities.
—Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report: 2000-2001, Executive Summary available at <http://www.dae.gov.in/ar2001/execsum.htm>.

19 March 2000
Hours prior to US President Bill Clinton's arrival in New Delhi, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee says that his government "will not take any decision under pressure so far as national security is concerned" and will make independent decisions.
—"No Decision Under Duress: PM," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 20 March 2000, <http://www.hindustantimes.com>.

22 March 2000
During his visit to India, US President Bill Clinton addresses the Indian parliament. Broaching the subject of nuclear proliferation, Clinton says, "...only India can determine its own interests. Only India can determine if it will benefit from expanding its nuclear and missile capabilities, if its neighbors respond by doing the same thing. Only India knows if it can afford a sustained investment in both conventional and nuclear forces while meeting its goals for human development." Clinton further adds, "...India's nuclear policies, inevitably, have consequences beyond your borders: eroding the barriers against the spread of nuclear weapons, encouraging others to keep their options open. But if India's nuclear tests shook the world, India's leadership for nonproliferation can certainly move the world." Urging India to join the United States in signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Clinton also makes the case that New Delhi and Washington should "work to launch negotiations on a treaty to end the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, and strengthen export controls."
—Remarks by the US President Clinton to the Joint Session of Indian Parliament, 22 March 2000.

23 March 2000
US Commerce Secretary William Daley says that India needs to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) if it wants to have the sanctions removed completely.
—"Sign CTBT, Curbs Will Go: US," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 23 March 2000, <http://www.hindustantimes.com>.

28 March 2000
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman R. Chidambaram says India will not use its nuclear program against any country. He remarks that it will utilize nuclear energy for power generation, agriculture, industry and medicine. He adds that for a developing country the nuclear tests are "a blessing in disguise."
—"India's Nuclear Power Only for Self-Defense: Chidambaram," Press Trust of India, 28 March 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 7 September 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 April 2000
In a report presented to the Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament), the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Energy states that the goal of 20,000MW of nuclear power by 2020 is not feasible due to the cost of the nuclear program, "limited operating base and ability of the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPC) to raise internal resources." The committee recommends that "long-term maturity loans be made available to NPC at reasonable rates of interest [due to the latter's] difficulty in substantial market borrowings short maturity period [of NPC's bonds] compared to the gestation period [of nuclear power projects], which varies between 54 and 150 months for building a nuclear power plant."
—"India: 'Nuclear Target Not Realistic'," Business Line (Chennai), 19 April 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 10 March 2001, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 April 2000
In an address to the Aeronautical Society of India at Hyderabad, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) chairman R. Chidambaram says that in developing countries like India "there is a big shortfall between demand and supply of [power]. Only nuclear energy can bridge this gap." He remarks that nuclear energy is "imperative" for such countries and demand for it is likely to surge "very soon."
—"Bigger N-Energy Thrust Soon: R. Chidambaram," Times of India (Mumbai), 24 April 2000, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>.

23 April 2000
The Asian Age (New Delhi) reports that Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) has begun an investigation of "irregularities and misuse" at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center's (BARC) facilities. The report mentions complaints by scientists that apart from nuclear tests at Pokhran, BARC has no other significant achievements to its credit and "most of scientific, technical and administrative staff are promoting their own personal businesses. The quality of research degenerated totally." Commenting on the issue, BARC director Anil Kakodkar dismisses the allegations as "baseless and untrue."
—Haima Purushottam, "CBI to Investigate 'Misuse' of BARC Labs," Asian Age (New Delhi), 23 April 2000, <http://www.asianage.com>.

25 April 2000
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman R. Chidambaram signs an order placing the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) outside the scope of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board's (AERB) monitoring. According to the order, an Internal Safety Committee to be constituted by BARC Director Anil Kakodkar will perform safety and regulatory functions for BARC. Former AERB Chairman A. Gopalakrishnan remarks that "in one stroke, the safety assurance and regulation of the mostly dilapidated BARC facilities has been made the responsibility of those who are managing these installations, defeating the very principle of independent external scrutiny which is at the core of any safety regulation." According to Gopalakrishnan, removing BARC facilities from AERB supervision is the only way the government can avoid "external scrutiny" of dismal safety conditions at these installations. The AEC decision contradicts the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which India signed in 1994, regarding the separation of nuclear regulatory organization from the government organizations that have a stake in promoting nuclear power.
—Ramola Talwar Badam, "BARC Now Freed of Regulatory Control," Asian Age (New Delhi), 30 May 2000, <http://www.asianage.com>; A.S. Paneerselvan, "Radioactivity," Outlook, 19 June 2000, <http://outlookindia.com>.

30 April 2000
India's National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra says that the government is determined to have a survivable deterrent for India, yet it does not intend to match China's capabilities.
—Manoj Joshi, "India Must Have Survivable N-Arsenal," Times of India (Mumbai), 30 April 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 10 March 2001, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

May 2000
Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) director Anil Kakodkar forms an "unnamed safety panel" to monitor BARC's operations. The panel is to replace the AERB oversight, which was eliminated by the AEC order on 25 April 2000.
—"N-Arms Programme off AERB Jurisdiction," Hindu (Chennai), 2 June 2000, <http://hinduonline.com>.

1 May 2000
Addressing scientists in Mumbai, former Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) chairman P.K. Iyengar says that further testing is required if India is to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. Iyengar further notes that India must test a neutron bomb prior to considering signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
—"India Should Test Neutron Bomb, Says AEC Ex-Chief," Times of India (Mumbai), 1 May 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 11 March 2001, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "India Must Test N-Bomb Before Signing CTBT," Hindu (Chennai), 2 May 2000, <http://hinduonline.com>.

8 May 2000
US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Karl Inderfurth says that the United States will recommend "immediate removal" of sanctions imposed on India by G-8 countries if India signs Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
—"US to Unfreeze Loans if India Signs CTBT," News International (Islamabad), 8 May 2000, <http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/>.

9 May 2000
Addressing the Indian Parliament, Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh says that India's nuclear arsenal is defensive and India will not forego minimum credible deterrent, yet it will not engage in an arms race. He adds that India cannot join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. Singh remarks that India is working on a number of initiatives calling for "de-alerting nuclear weapons as a means of reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use."
—"India Rejects Demands for Rollback of Nuclear Weapons," Xinhua News Agency, 9 May 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 10 May 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 May 2000
In an interview to Doordarshan television network, India's National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra says that the main objective of the nuclear tests in May 1998 was "to ensure India's security [and] to give a sense of self-confidence to the nation." He adds that the effort to build a consensus on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) issue will continue but notes that "it would be impossible to give [a] specific timeframe" for this development. According to Mishra, the NPT is "not relevant at all" for India. He remarks that India nevertheless followed some objectives of the NPT such as maintaining rigid export controls on nuclear technology and materials.
—"India to Go Ahead with Minimum Credible Nuclear Deterrence," BBC Monitoring South Asia, 11 May 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 15 May 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 May 2000
In a statement on the anniversary of India's nuclear tests, India's ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA) states that the tests made the country "stronger, more self-confident and [gave it] a higher global status than before." According to the statement, the economic sanctions had no impact on India and the world "has accepted the view that India has the right to defend itself the way we think best."
—"India's Nuclear Power Status Has Given It High Global Standing," Press Trust of India, 12 May 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 5 July 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 May 2000
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee says that despite numerous meetings between the nuclear weapon states, no tangible results have been achieved so far. He remarks that India will continue to struggle towards universal nuclear disarmament while maintaining a credible minimum deterrent. He reiterates that India's nuclear tests were purely defensive in nature. According to Vajpayee, his government authorized the tests "with full knowledge" that if India did not test at that time, its "neighbor" would have proceeded with the tests anyway.
—"India: Minimum N-Deterrent Vital: PM," Hindu (Chennai), 13 May 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 5 September 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 May 2000
A Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) statement on the performance of the industrial and public sector units during 1999-2000 indicates a "five-year high" production levels for heavy water plants at Tuticorin, Kota, Thal, Hazira and Manuguru.
—"DAE Units Achieve Record Production," Press Trust of India, 30 May 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 5 July 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 May 2000
Russian Atomic Energy Ministry's official Mikhail Ryzhov says that the recognition of the nuclear status of India and Pakistan is "inevitable." He remarks that "India and Pakistan can no longer be considered non-nuclear weapon states, even though they still have this status under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This situation is very unnatural and must be redressed." He points out that nuclear status recognition is crucial for involving India and Pakistan in export control regimes. He adds, however that nuclear status of both countries "has to be recognized in such a way that it does not promote and encourage further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world."
—"Recognize India as Nuclear Weapon State: Russian Nuke Official," Press Trust of India, 30 May 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 5 July 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Vladimir Radyuhin, "Legalize India's N-Status, Says Russia," Hindu (Chennai), 31 May 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 4 September 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 June 2000
The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) authorizes the Nuclear Power Corporation NPC to operate Unit 3 of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS) for three months. The unit will become fully operational after the AERB assesses the reactor's performance during this period. The unit has a 220MW capacity.
—"Indian Nuclear Power Plant Goes Fully Commercial," Xinhua General News Service, 1 June 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 2 June 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 June 2000
Speaking in Singapore, India's Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh says that India has no intention of engaging in an arms race and intends to have only a minimum credible deterrent. He says that India's nuclear tests helped "to remove potentially dangerous strategic ambiguities in the region [and] enhanced the strategic space of the country and granted it the needed strategic autonomy." Singh assures that India will respect the South-East Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and is ready to undertake a legal commitment.
—"India Will Not Be the First to Use Nukes," Strait Times (Singapore), 3 June 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 5 June 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 June 2000
During the meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono, India's Defense Minister George Fernandes says that India supports universal nuclear disarmament. He adds that it is "just a matter of time" that India signs the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and it is not "so far in the future."
—"Signing CTBT 'a Matter of Time'," Hindu (Chennai), 8 June 2000, <http://hinduonline.com>.

14 June 2000
The spokesperson for India's Ministry of External Affairs R.S. Jassal says that India's security concerns go beyond South Asian confines. He adds that soon after India's nuclear tests Prime Minister Vajpayee referred to the China threat.
—"India Rejects Pak Offer," Times of India (Mumbai), 15 June 2000, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>.

13 June 2000
In an official statement, Pakistan offers India "a strategic restraint regime for avoidance of an arms race, nuclear and conventional, and confidence-building in the region." According to the statement, Pakistan is "willing to consider any restraint arrangement on a reciprocal basis with India."
—Amit Baruah, "Pakistan Proposes Nuclear Restraint Regime," Hindu (Chennai), 14 June 2000, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

21 June 2000
The Indian government issues a statement, stating that India's nuclear power generation during 1999-2000 reached "a record high of more than 13,200 million units... [and] the nuclear power sector has grown at an average compounded rate of about 14 percent per year since 1995-1996 even though no additions were made to the nuclear power generating capacity during the period. Nuclear power reactors achieved plant load factor of nearly 80 percent." The statement also indicates that heavy water production at Tuticorin, Thal, Hazira and Kota reached a "five-year high" during 1999-2000.
—"Record N-Power Output in 1999," Times of India (Mumbai), 21 June 2000, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>.

28 June 2000
Addressing the media after signing the Joint Declaration with the European Union, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee says that political consensus on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) issue will be reached after parliament convenes in July.
—K.A. Badarinath, "Consensus on CTBT in Monsoon Session: PM," Times of India (Mumbai), 29 June 2000, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>.

30 June 2000
Talking to the media upon completion of his visit to Italy and Portugal, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee says that he expects that a consensus on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) will be achieved by the end of the year. He does not say whether the consensus will be in favor of or against the treaty.
—"Indian Consensus in Favor of CTBT Expected by Year End, PM Says," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 30 June 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 30 June 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 July 2000
India's Department of Science and Technology and Russia's leading nuclear research institute, Kurchatov Center, sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to expand cooperation in the field of nuclear physics. The MoU will be effective for the period of three years.
—Vladimir Radyuhin, "India, Russia Sign Pact on Nuclear Cooperation," Hindu (Chennai), 6 July 2000, <http://hinduonline.com>.

24 July 2000
Delivering a lecture on the subject of "Role of Physics in National Security" in Mumbai, former Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) chairman P.K. Iyengar underscores the importance of a white paper that would compare India's nuclear capabilities with its adversaries. Further he says that a "peer review" of Pokhran tests is necessary for the development of a credible minimum deterrent. Iyengar adds that a research and development review mechanism should be in place in India. He remarks that "the entire system of nuclear deterrence should be put at the disposal of the armed forces to ensure near-instant retaliation in case of an attack." Talking to reporters after lecture, Iyengar says that the peer review should be "entrusted only to scientists." The AEC Chairman R. Chidambaram says that India has "the capability to design and fabricate a range of nuclear weapons from sub-kiloton yield to 100 kilotons." He reiterates that India's nuclear tests were "carefully planned and all scientific objectives were fully achieved." Chidambaram remarks that nuclear physics can contribute to national defense in other areas such as cyber-warfare and bio-terrorism.
—Arunkumar Bhatt, "'Peer Review' of Pokhran Tests Sought," Hindu (Chennai), 25 July 2000, <http://hinduonline.com>.

30 July 2000
Former Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman P.K. Iyengar says that if the Indian government wants to develop a credible minimum deterrent, it cannot sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) now. He says that "many more tests will be needed to try out different designs like boosted fission device, the two-stage fusion device and the neutron bomb which India is yet to test." Iyengar remarks that India's fusion device burned only partially during the test and he doubts whether "complete burn wave was established." Therefore he is skeptical of claims that the scientists have collected sufficient data from only one test of a fusion device. Iyengar adds that the government must address the issue of "safe and reliable command and control" system before it proceeds with signing the CTBT.
—"Govt Warned Against Signing CTBT in Haste," Hindu (Chennai), 31 July 2000, <http://hinduonline.com >.

August 2000
In a meeting arranged to clear the Indian military's doubts about the credibility of the nuclear warhead designs tested in May 1998, nuclear scientists Kakodkar and Chidambaram assure senior military officers that the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) is capable of designing high-yield, even megaton fusion weapons, and 'enhanced radiation' or neutron weapons without further testing. However, the Indian military remains unconvinced.
—Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), p. 432.

9 August 2000
Former Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) chairman P.K. Iyengar says the Indian government should not rush to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and conduct further tests "to improve the yield of thermonuclear device." He adds that the military "will not accept the weapons that are not sophisticated enough." He says that an independent peer review committee has to review the results of Pokhran-II nuclear tests.
—"News from Our World Resources: Urge for More Nuclear Explosions in India," Gulf News, 10 August 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 17 March 2001, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 August 2000
Former Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Director P.K. Iyengar makes the case that the thermonuclear device tested in May 1998 most likely attained partial burn; less than "10 percent" of the fusion core was burnt, which led to a lot of tritium being produced. The presence of tritium in the collapsed test shaft is one of the surest indicators of partial thermonuclear burn. Iyengar further argues, "The crucial question is not what the total yield of the device was, but what was the ratio of fission to fusion energy...for a given total yield, the greater the fraction of the fusion energy, the more efficient is your thermonuclear device." In India's case however, the estimated ratio was "around 1:1, and no one has so far, to my knowledge either publicly or privately disputed that number."
—Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), p. 407.

25 August 2000
Japan's Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori says he "strongly expects India to sign the CTBT [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty]" so that both countries can take initiatives in nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, as well as promote their "amicable relations."
—"Sign CTBT for Better Ties: Mori," Times of India (Mumbai), 25 August 2000, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>.

2 September 2000
Prime Minister's Principal Secretary and National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra says the government has "no plans to sign the CTBT [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty] in the immediate foreseeable future." He adds that any decision on the issue will be made only after consensus is achieved in India, and this "has not happened so far."
—"No Plan to Sign CTBT," Hindu (Chennai), 3 September 2000, <http://hinduonline.com>.

20 September 2000
Addressing United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), India's External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh says that India's moratorium on nuclear testing "meets basic obligation of the CTBT." Singh adds that India "remains ready to participate in agreed and irreversible steps such as de-alerting of nuclear forces... [and] global agreement on no-first-use and non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states."
—"India Meets Basic Obligations of CTBT: Jaswant," Rediff on the Net, 20 September 2000, <http://rediff.com>.

19 September 2000
Russia's Vice Prime Minister Ilya Khlebanov says Indo-Russian nuclear cooperation will not be limited to the Koodankulam project. He remarks that Russia intends to have "at least 50 percent share in nuclear power generation target set by India."
—"Russia Deputy Premier in India; Nuclear Cooperation to Be Expanded," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 September 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 20 September 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 September 2000
Addressing the 44th International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conference, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) chairman R. Chidambaram says that the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) is working on the design and development of an advanced heavy water reactor (AWHR), which will use plutonium and U233 as fuel. The reactor is expected to utilize thorium and "is an effort towards developing innovative reactor and fuel cycle designs for sustainable development."
—"India's Nuclear Power Plan is Progressing," Times of India (Mumbai), 21 September 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 21 March 2001, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 September 2000
India's National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra says that India reserves the right to reverse the moratorium on nuclear testing if its national security interests are jeopardized. He adds that the government will continue to work on building consensus on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) issue.
—"India Can Withdraw Moratorium on N-Tests: Mishra," Hindu (Chennai), 22 September 2000, <http://hinduonline.com>.

26 September 2000
Unit 1 of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS) is shut down in order to seal a light water leak from one of its end shields. In addition to repairing the leak, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) claims that the reactor's coolant channels will undergo a partial replacement.
—Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report: 2000-2001, Executive Summary available at <http://www.dae.gov.in/ar2001/execsum.htm>.

October 2000
The Heavy Water Board (HWB) exports "16 megatons" of heavy water to South Korea. The shipment reportedly meets the technical specifications of the purchaser.
—Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report: 2000-2001, Executive Summary available at <http://www.dae.gov.in/ar2001/execsum.htm>.

3-4 October 2000
India and Russia sign 11 agreements for cooperation in military, nuclear, science and technology areas. Further, they issue a declaration on "Strategic Partnership," stating that cooperation is based "upon the principles of sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity..., noninterference in internal affairs, mutual respect and mutual benefit." The sides underscore "consolidating defense and military-technical cooperation in a long-term perspective, deepening service-to-service cooperation, [and] cooperating in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the peaceful use of outer space" among other issues.
—Declaration on Strategic Partnership between Republic of India and the Russian Federation, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, <http://www.meadev.nic.in>; David Gardner, "India, Russia Sign 'Strategic Partnership'," Financial Times (London), 4 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 3 October 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "India, Russia Sign 11 Pacts, to Further Cooperation," Business Line (Chennai), 4 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 15 March 2001, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 October 2000
Russian President Vladimir Putin visits the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC). He says Indo-Russian cooperation in the nuclear energy sector will not be limited only to the Koodankulam project. He expresses confidence that bilateral cooperation in this field "will grow further and rapidly in the coming years."
—Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report: 2000-2001, Executive Summary available at <http://www.dae.gov.in/ar2001/execsum.htm>; "Vladimir Putin's Visit to BARC Boosts India's Nuclear Status," Times of India (Mumbai), 6 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 15 March 2001, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Russia is Not Going to Quit India's Nuclear Energy Market – Vladimir Putin," Russian Economic News, 6 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 21 March 2001, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 October 2000
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov proposes an agreement on "mutual security of secret materials" to India to ensure safety of bilateral secret documents. The Federal Security Service in Russia and Interior Ministry in India will be responsible for enforcement of this agreement's provisions.
—Vladimir Radyuhin, "Secrecy, Defense, Nuclear Deals," Hindu (Chennai), 6 October 2000, <http://hinduonline.com>.

8 October 2000
India's Chief of Air Staff Anil Yashwant Tipnis says the Indian Air Force has worked out a strategy to respond to nuclear threat. He remarks that given India's nuclear no-first-use policy, "the only option then is to develop a second strike capability."
—"IAF Draws up Nuclear Strategy," Times of India (Mumbai), 8 October 2000, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>.

30 October 2000
Speaking at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman R. Chidambaram says the May 1998 nuclear tests provided India with "the capability to design and fabricate nuclear weapons [in the range] of low-yields up to 200 kilotons."
—"Scientist Boasts of India's Nuclear Capability," United Press International, 30 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 21 March 2001, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Indian Can Make Nuke Bomb of up to 200 Kt Yield: Chidambaram," Rediff on the Net, 30 October 2000, <http://www.rediff.com>.

12 November 2000
In a televised interview, India's National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra says the government discussed the possibility of nuclear tests "two weeks or so" upon coming to power. The final decision was made after Pakistan began talking of war, he adds. Mishra remarks that he was a part of a team involved in the secret nuclear test plans.
—"War Threats from Pakistan Prompted India's Nuclear Tests," Agence France Presse, 10 November 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 10 November 2000, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 November 2000
Addressing the Rajya Sabha (India's upper house of parliament), India's Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh says that the issue of further nuclear testing "is an inherent right and it is not foreclosed or foregone." He adds, however, that India will not prevent the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) from coming into force.
—"Right to Conduct More N-Tests Not Closed: Jaswant," Times of India (Mumbai), 25 November 2000, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>.

23 December 2000
The Unit 4 reactor of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS) is declared commercial. It first reached criticality on 3 November 2000 and was synchronized to the Northern grid on 17 November 2000.
—Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report: 2000-2001, Executive Summary available at <http://www.dae.gov.in/ar2001/execsum.htm>.

Late 2000
The technical problems related to the miniaturization of the 100MW nuclear reactor for the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) are resolved with the help of Russian experts, and the final design is frozen. The proposed vessel will have a top speed of 35 knots. It will be equipped with torpedo tubes to carry nuclear tipped cruise missiles, and incorporate 12 vertical launch tubes for ballistic missiles. The ATV is expected to enter trials in 2005 and enter the Indian Navy's (IN) fleet by 2012. The IN expects to order three ATV-class vessels. Indian naval officers reportedly claim that the ATV will be superior to the Chinese Xia-class nuclear submarines.
—Bharat Karnad, "The Perils of Deterrence by Half Measures," Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan India Limited, 2002), p. 658.

	Updated October 2003