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Nuclear Chronology

1972-1973

1972
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi approves the nuclear explosive device experiment; work intensifies on all elements of the experiment: the electrical system within the device, the neutron initiator, the shape charges to implode the plutonium, the diagnostic equipment and instruments, etc. The experiment is supervised by a team of scientists including Raja Ramanna--the director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), Dr. B.D. Nag Chaudhri--scientific advisor to the minister of defense and director of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDOO), P.K. Iyengar, and R. Chidambaram.
--George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999) p.172.

22 January 1972
H.N. Sethna, Director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) takes over as Secretary of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), in addition to his responsibility with BARC.
--Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, "Annual Report: 1971-1972.," p. 3.

February 1972
H.N. Sethna takes over as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). He succeeds Vikram Sarabhai who died on December 31, 1971.
--Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace-The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi, India: Harper Collins Publishers India, 2000) p. 154.

Spring 1972
Concentrated work on building the vital components for a nuclear explosive device begins.
--George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p.172.

17 March 1972
Debates concerning nuclear policy resurface in the Indian parliament. In the Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament), the government is asked in writing whether the war with Pakistan "brought out the necessity for India to have more modern weapons" and, if so, "whether Government proposes to embark upon the manufacture of nuclear bombs."
--George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p.169.

17 March 1972
Indian Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram, responds to the Lok Sabha's questioning by stating that "army modernization was an ongoing process and that the Government's policy with regard to production of nuclear weapons...is to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only." The government believes that the defense of the borders can be best ensured by adequate military preparedness based on conventional weapons. Moreover, the possession of nuclear weapons is no substitute for such military preparedness.
--George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p.169.

April 1972
The Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC's) Heavy Water Board (HWB) decides to build the country's fifth heavy water plant at Talcher, Orissa. The plant will be constructed by the West German company-UHDE GmbH.
--K.K. Pathak, Nuclear Policy of India-A Third World Perspective (New Delhi, India: Gitanjali Prakashan, 1980) p.248; India Profile: Nuclear Facilities-Talcher Heavy Water Plant. (NTI website-India Nuclear Profile. www.nti.org).

3 May 1972
During a debate concerning military affairs in parliament, Indian Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram states that "India is studying technology for carrying out underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes;" and adds that "India is still opposed to making nuclear weapons, though she is keeping her options open."
--The New York Times, Informational Bank Abstracts, 3 May 1972, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 3 May 1972, web.lexis-nexis.com.

22 May 1972
The Purnima-I research reactor is commissioned at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) in Trombay. Purnima is a zero energy fast reactor. It is designed, fabricated, and commissioned entirely by scientists and engineers of BARC. It is fueled by 21.8 kgs of plutonium. This reactor is different from existing reactors and holds the promise of fast breeder reactors. Its operation signifies a valuable achievement in the development of reactor technology in India.
--Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi, India: Harper Collins Publishers India, 2000) p.125; K.K. Pathak, Nuclear Policy of India-A Third World Perspective (New Delhi, India: Gitanjali Prakashan, 1980) p.46.

May 1972
Pressure continues to build within parliament for a more robust nuclear posture than Jagjivan Ram offered in March. During two days of debate over the Ministry of Defence's budget, speakers from the majority of political parties call for developing nuclear weapons, or at least greater preparation of relevant elements of nuclear explosives.
--George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 169.

23 July 1972
The United Nations Association of the United States issues a report by a panel of Americans on the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The report says that "India has enough plutonium not subject to safeguards against weapons production to make as many as 19 atomic bombs."
--The New York Times, Information Bank Abstracts, 23 July 1972, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 23 July 1972, web.lexis-nexis.com.

11 August 1972
The first pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR-Unit 1) of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS) attains criticality. This reactor was built with Canadian assistance.
--K.K Pathak, Nuclear Policy of India: A Third World Perspective (New Delhi, India: Gitanjali Prakashan, 1980) p.248; The New York Times, Information Bank Abstracts, 12 August 1972, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 12 August 1972, web.lexis-nexis.com; India Profile: Nuclear Facilities-Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS) (NTI website-India Nuclear Profile. www.nti.org">www.nti.org.)

7 September 1972
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi authorizes the fabrication of a device for a peaceful nuclear explosion. It is also the day of the tenth convocation of the Indian Institute of Technology, Powai (Bombay).
--George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 171-172.

November 1972
The Indian parliament expresses interest in developing India's nuclear strength once again. A pointed query is made in the Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament) regarding "progress...in feasibility study and other preparations for the experimental nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes."
--George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999) p. 170.

15 November 1972
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi responds, in writing, to the pointed query made in the Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament). She states that "the Atomic Energy Commission is constantly reviewing the progress in the technology of underground nuclear explosions both from the theoretical and experimental angles and also taking into account their potential economic benefits and possible environmental hazards."
--George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999) p.170.

1973
According to Raja Ramanna, architect of the nuclear project, "all the necessary technical problems have been solved (by 1973)." A site is found in the Indian army's test range in the Rajasthan desert, in the north-west of India, a 'closed area with a sparse human population.'
--Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State (London, UK & New York, NY: Zed Books Ltd, 1998) p.142.

January 1973
Raja Ramanna, director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and coordinator of the nuclear project, orders the shutdown of the Purnima-1 reactor in order to makeup for the shortage of plutonium required for the nuclear test. Ramanna's team follows up by melting the Purnima-1 reactor's plutonium oxide fuel rods in order to get enough pure plutonium for the test.
--Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi, India: Harper Collins Publishers India, 2000) p.185.

March 1973
The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) reportedly tests the non-nuclear explosives system in the forests of Andhra Pradesh. The system is detonated using chemical explosives.
--George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley,CA: University of California Press, 1999) p. 172; Shyam Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb (Ghaziabad, UP India: Vikas Publishing House PVT LTD, 1979) p.144.

April 1973
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Homi Sethna estimates that India will have a total installed capacity of 43 million MW of nuclear power by the end of the century.
--K.K. Pathak, Nuclear Policy of India - A Third World Perspective (New Delhi, India: Gitanjali Prakashan, 1980) p.248.

June 1973
A secondary control valve vibration is noticed in the boiling water reactor (BWR) unit-1 of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS). The oil piping and operating linkages are observed to be heavily vibrating and the vibrations are severe near the servo system. The long push pull rods on the control system, originally made of aluminum pipes, are found to be subject to stretch and deformation. These aluminum push pull rods are replaced by heavy carbon steel pipes. Furthermore, while testing the bypass system for operability during load rejections on Unit-1, the bypass system does not operate; it is discovered that the control system linkage has snapped.
--Dhirendra Sharma, India's Nuclear Estate "Problems Associated with Nuclear Turbines at Tarapur," (Report submitted by K.P. Rao and K. Nanjundeswaran, two senior engineers at TAPS (in 1975), TAPS/Report/1059) (New Delhi, India: Lancers Publishers, 1983) p. 67.

11 July 1973
The operating oil supply line to the secondary control valve servo motor on the boiling water reactor (BWR) unit-2 at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) fails due to the severing of a socket weld elbow joint on a horizontal run.
--Dhirendra Sharma, India's Nuclear Estate "Problems Associated with Nuclear Turbines at Tarapur," (Report submitted by K.P. Rao and K. Nanjundeswaran, two senior engineers at TAPS (in 1975), TAPS/Report/1059) (New Delhi, India: Lancers Publishers, 1983) p. 68.

31 July 1973
Boiling water reactor (BWR) unit-2 of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) is operating at 159MW when there are sudden disturbances in the hydraulic oil lines as a result of the cycling of the turbine stop valves. Temporary repair is carried out as the unit is put on the system grid.
--Dhirendra Sharma, India's Nuclear Estate "Problems Associated with Nuclear Turbines at Tarapur," (Report submitted by K.P. Rao and K. Nanjundeswaran, two senior engineers at TAPS (in 1975), TAPS/Report/1059) (New Delhi, India: Lancers Publishers, 1983) p.68.

September 1973
Physical preparations for the peaceful nuclear explosion begin at the Rajasthan test site. The preparation work is carried out by the Indian army.
--George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999) p. 172.

15 November 1973
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi is asked in writing during a parliamentary debate in the Rajya Sabha (upper house) "whether any final decision has been taken to conduct experiments to develop nuclear blast technology for utilization for peaceful purposes; and... if not, whether any time schedule has been set for the purpose."
--George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999) p.173.

15 November 1973
Gandhi responds to this question by denying that a final decision has been made and a schedule set for an explosion. Furthermore, she adds that "it is only after satisfactory answers to all these problems are available [theoretical and experimental questions; economic questions; environmental and ecological effects] that the question of actual underground tests for peaceful purpose can be undertaken."
--George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999) p.173.

 

Updated June 2006


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CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

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