March 1995
US officials say that nuclear cooperation was discussed when South African Energy Minister Pik Botha led a delegation to Iran in March 1995, although intelligence sources have indicated that South Africa has not given Iran any nuclear technology or information. [Note: See 19 and 20 August 1995 entries for Botha's admission that discussions included a plan to supply Iran with uranium.]
—James Adams, "US Fears South Africa Will Sell Nuclear Technology To Tehran," Sunday Times, 23 April 1995.

2 March 1995
A senior Israeli military official says that Iran tried to buy centrifuges, heavy water, and other parts needed to start a nuclear weapons program, from Argentina. A diplomat from the Argentine embassy in Tel Aviv confirms that Argentina was negotiating to sell such items, but agreement was never reached due to the "political situation." The Argentine diplomat would not confirm that Iran had an agreement to buy fuel rods and then negotiated for the heavy water. Iran also tried to obtain other components for uranium enrichment, including uranium hexafluoride; this pattern of acquisition and Iran's drive to self-sufficiency for nuclear production signals military intent, says the Israeli official. Iran has organized a network of front organizations throughout Europe to buy nuclear and missile technology. Purchases are often made in the name of Sharif and Amir Kabir universities. The Israeli official says, "We have to ask ourselves why Iran needs its own production of heavy water and an enrichment capability when it is provided by the supplier."
—"Iran Tried to Buy Nuclear Weapons Materials from Argentina," The Jerusalem Post, 2 March 1995, p. 2; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>; Daniel Blumenthal, "Syria Said to Keep Trying To Purchase Nuclear Reactor," Ambito Financiero (Buenos Aires), 16 December 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19961216000408, 16 December 1996.

2 March 1995
Russian Atomic Energy Ministry spokesman Georgy Kaurov complains of US "double standards" concerning the Russian proposal to furnish Iran with a nuclear reactor. He says that the dispute may turn into a contentious issue at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference in April 1995. Kaurov compares the $800 million Russian-Iranian deal with the US plan to supply North Korea with a light water reactor. He also claims that production of weapons-grade material from a light water reactor is not possible. US officials argue that no nuclear technology should be supplied to Iran on the grounds that it could aid Iran in becoming a "nuclear-armed terrorist state." According to a Western diplomat, Iran "has an extremely low level of technology. By giving them nuclear reactors, you are putting them a step up the ladder." Kaurov notes in response that many Iranian nuclear experts were trained in the United States.
—"Russia Attacks US Effort Against Reactor In Iran," Wall Street Journal, 2 March 1995, p. A10.

6 March 1995
Ali Akbar Velayati, Iran's Foreign Minister, warns an arms race in the Middle East could precipitate a global war. Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reports Iran has remarked on its adherence to the principles of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, stating it is Israel not Iran that is suspected of having a nuclear arsenal of 200 warheads, and it is Israel, because of its arsenal, that creates tension in the region.
—"Iran Warns Against Nuclear Arms in Region," The Jerusalem Post, 6 March 1995, p. 2; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

6 March 1995
The Italian authorities intercept crates of "ultra-sonic equipment for the testing of nuclear reactors" on a ship believed bound for Iran. The ship carrying the crates is owned by the Milan-based freight forwarder, Rondine, and was stopped due to discrepancies regarding the ship's export licenses.
—"Nuclear Gear Seized in Italy," The Iran Brief, 6 March 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

8 March 1995
Israel threatens to impose sanctions on Russia if it does not halt plans to build a nuclear plant in Bushehr. Evet Liebermann, head of the Likud party of Israel, says, "Israel will prevent, by all means possible, Russia from building a nuclear plant in Iran." He further states correspondence between Israel and Russia is underway on what actions should be taken against Iran.
—"Israel Threatens Russia with Sanctions over Iran Nuclear Plant," Agence France Presse, 8 March 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

10 March 1995
The Middle East Economic Digest reports that senior Russian officials say Russia will continue its relationship with Iran over nuclear reactors in Iran despite threats by the United States to halt economic aid to Russia. Sergei Karaganov, a member of the Russian Presidential Council, says the West need not be worried by the sale of a nuclear reactor to Iran, which is something that can not be connected to arms manufacture.
—"Iran: Russian Nuclear Deal 'will go ahead'," Middle East Economic Digest, 10 March 1995, p. 10; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

12 March 1995
Reza Amrollahi, head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, calls "baseless" US accusations that Iran will use Russian help to develop nuclear weapons. Amrollahi points out that as a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has the right to receive assistance in the development of peaceful nuclear technologies. Amrollahi says that the first unit of a power plant at Bushehr will be completed in four years, and would have a generating capacity of 1,000MW. He said that 200 Russian and 500 Iranian experts and technicians are working to complete the plant.
—"Iran Stresses Peaceful Use Of Nuclear Plant," Executive News Service, 12 March 1995; Reuters, 12 March 1995.

15 March 1995
The New York Times reports that, according to Western intelligence officials, Iran uses dozens of locations in Europe to smuggle nuclear weapons-related technology into Iran. Iran seeks to obtain equipment from several sources, and then dismantles it into small pieces to be shipped on different circuitous routes to Iran. Iran uses small aircraft to ship parts to Poland and other Eastern European countries, sometimes via Vienna or Brussels, to be trucked to cargo ships or put on cargo planes to Iran. Pakistan and Syria also reportedly receive items to transship to the Iranian nuclear program. The officials indicate that Iran uses many of the same smuggling routes and contacts that Pakistan and Iraq used to develop their nuclear weapons programs. Intelligence officials believe the small Hartenholm airport, located north of Hamburg in Germany, is used by its Iranian owners as part of this Iranian nuclear smuggling network [Note: See 1993 entry.]
—Chris Hedges, "Nuclear Trail—A special report; A Vast Smuggling Network Feeds Iran's Arms Program," The New York Times, 15 March 1995, p. A1.

15 March 1995
The Iran Brief reports that, according to Iranfax, Iran is capable of producing uranium hexafluoride, or "hex," which can be used for fuel in the centrifuge uranium enrichment process that produces weapon-grade fuel. Hex is created by combining a fluorification agent and processed uranium, the fluorification agent in the case of Iran being hydrogen fluoride. The latter ingredient was supposedly obtained from German and China in large amounts. Iranfax reports that European export control officials have been investigating purchases of dual-purpose technologies by Iran that can be used in centrifuge enrichment programs. Semi-permeable membrane technology from European sources and Japan, Iranfax states, can be used to make uranium hexafluoride gas.
—"Iran Now Capable of Producing Nuclear Weapons Material," The Iran Brief, 15 March 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

16 March 1995
Alexei Yablokov, chairman of the Russian Security Council's commission on environmental security, says rumors of energy shortages are fabrications to justify the building of reactors such as the one at Bushehr. Yablokov asserts that Iran is rich with "immense oil and gas resources, so it could have only military reasons for wanting the power station."
—"Russian Official Warns Against Nuclear Cooperation with Iran, China," Agence France Presse, 16 March 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

16 March 1995
The US Senate votes 97-3 to cease funding a nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia if Russia provides Iran with a nuclear reactor. The Senate bill will have to be harmonized with one already passed in the US House of Representatives.
—Bill Gertz, "Senate Sends Tough Message To Russia," Washington Times, 17 March 1995, pp. A1, A16.

16 March 1995
Kenneth R. Timmerman, the Director of the Middle East Data Project, testifies before the US Senate that in 1993, US companies exported dual-use technologies to Iran, including "toxins, turbojet engines, air or vacuum pumps, machinery for liquefying gas, centrifuges and centrifuge parts, machine-tool holders, gas separation equipment, hydraulic presses, and laboratory furnaces," without proper Department of Commerce (DOC) licensing or inspection. An official from the Department of Commerce calls Timmerman's testimony "inaccurate and without foundation."
—Bill Gertz, "Senate Sends Tough Message To Russia," Washington Times, 17 March 1995, pp. A1, A16.

17 March 1995
The International Atomic Energy Agency commends the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran for its cooperation with inspections made by the IAEA. The IAEA's press office says, "The Islamic Republic of Iran's cooperation with those who had visited--and visit--Iran to inspect its atomic energy industries on behalf of the IAEA has been extraordinary and much more than expected of a member of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty."
—"IAEA Praises Iran's Atomic Energy Organization for its Cooperation," British Broadcasting Corporation, 17 March 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

17 March 1995
Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee, states that the nuclear deal between Russia and Iran does not violate a single international law, but he says President Clinton's decision to prevent the US oil firm Conoco from implementing a deal with Iran will make it more difficult for Russia to go ahead with the lucrative contract.
—Michael Mihalka, "Harsh Russian Reaction To US Senate Vote To Block Russian- Iranian Deal," OMRI Daily Digest, No. 56, Part 1, 20 March 1995.

18 March 1995
Reuters reports that Yuri Kotov, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry department that deals with Iran, said that Russia does not plan to concede to US pressures and will go ahead with the $1 billion nuclear reactor agreement with Iran. Kotov stresses that the Russian-Iranian deal is based on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, much like the US-North Korean agreement. The Russian contract includes one reactor, with the possibility of three additional reactors to be constructed at a later date.
—"Russia's Not Willing To Halt Deal With Iran," Washington Times, 18 March 1995, p. A6.

21 March 1995
According to a US government source, Iran is interested in setting up a consulate in Aktau (formerly Shevchenko), Kazakhstan. The United States is concerned about Iran's intentions, since Aktau houses Kazakhstan's fast breeder reactor, which can produce at least 110kg of plutonium a year. [Note: The Aktau reactor is used to generate electricity and to desalinate water. Russia was discussing the supply of a water desalinization reactor to Iran.]
—Information provided by William C. Potter from personal interview with a US government official (name withheld) 21 March 1995. For information on the Aktau reactor, see William C. Potter et al., Nuclear Profiles of the Soviet Successor States, Monograph No. 1, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, May 1993, pp. 17-18.

22 March 1995
Interfax reports that Russian experts have begun to examine the condition of the Bushehr nuclear power station. A spokesman for the Russian company that builds nuclear facilities abroad, Zarubezhatomenergostroy, says that some of the equipment that had been specially stored shows "almost no signs of corrosion" and adds that the "devices kept in zinc containers filled with nitrogen are in an ideal state and can be used at any moment." The Russian experts however say that the plant's "electrical equipment requires complete replacement 'because it doesn't function or meet the requirements of designers'." A complete report will be submitted to Iran in September.
—Interfax, 22 March 1995; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu>.

22-23 March 1995
Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and US Secretary of State Warren Christopher meet in Geneva to discuss US opposition to the pending Russian sale of two light water reactors (LWRs) to Iran. The only agreement reached during the meetings between two parties is a decision to meet again before Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton meet on 9 May 1995 in Moscow. US officials have admitted that the sale of Russian LWRs, worth between $800 million and $1 billion, would not directly assist the Iranians in building a nuclear bomb. The agreement would include the training of Iranian experts in Moscow. Russia has already sent 200 of its own experts to Iran. Iran will reportedly return spent fuel to Russia. The US has argued that the sale would be "counterproductive" to nonproliferation efforts and "could provide cover for Tehran to acquire other technology and materials useful in a weapons program." The US has pointed to a tightening of its trade embargo with Iran; including the cancellation of an agreement worth $1 billion between Iran and Conoco, as evidence of US willingness to accept economic loss.
—John J. Schulz, "Washington Unable To Derail Russian-Iranian Nuclear Accord," Arms Control Today, April 1995, p. 20; Michael Mihalka, "...And Presses Ahead With Reactor Deal," OMRI Daily Digest, 5 May 1995.

23 March 1995
Yevgeniy Primakov, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service Director, says the United States need not worry about Iran's supposed nuclear weapons program. According to Primakov, "After considering voluminous material, we have concluded that Iran at present does not possess nuclear weapons...nor any evidence of the existence in that country of a coherent military nuclear program." US concerns stem from growing reports of Iranian attempts to procure nuclear technology. Primakov counters such assertions by saying Iran would have great difficulty in developing a weapons program even if its supply to information went "unimpeded."
—"Russia Describes Iranian Nuclear Potential," United Press International, 23 March 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

23 March 1995
Reuters reports that Lieutenant-General Gennady Yevstafyev, a senior official of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), says that Russia will proceed with the nuclear reactor sale because the SVR officials "have no grounds for changing our assessment vis-a-vis Iran."
—"Russia's Not Willing To Halt Deal With Iran," Washington Times, 18 March 1995, p. A6; "Russia Dismisses US Fears Over Deal With Iran," Executive News Service, 23 March 1995; A. Peslyak, "Iran Reactor Cannot Produce Weapon-Grade Plutonium," Russian Television Network (Moscow), 16 April 1995 in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV- 95-082.

28 March 1995
In an effort to convince Russia to end its nuclear cooperation with Iran, the United States temporarily ends plans to sign an agreement with Russia on the peaceful use of nuclear power. Hazel O'Leary, the US Energy Secretary, believes the threat from Iran is serious, stating Washington is resolute in its desire for Russia to end its assistance to Iran. But Washington's action has not provided the desired response, and Russia continues to deal with Iran, adhering to a $1 billion contract with Iran to complete a nuclear reactor in Bushehr within four years, with stipulations for a further three in the future.
—Jim Mannion, "US Puts off Nuclear Agreement with Russia over Iranian Nuclear Deal," Agence France Presse, 28 March 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

30 March 1995
In response to US objections to Russian nuclear assistance to Iran, Georgiy Kaurov, head of the information directorate of the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy, says that the nuclear cooperation between the Iran and Russia is in line with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that Iran's nuclear facilities has been inspected by the IAEA without any violations.
—"Russian-Iranian Reactor Deal Defended Atomic Energy Official Comments," Voice of Russia (Moscow), 30 March 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970508000812, 30 March 1995.

April 1995
The United States says Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov is planning to sell Iran uranium-enriching gas centrifuges. Sometime afterward, perhaps in May, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev says he did not know about a deal for gas centrifuges. [Note: For more on the alleged centrifuge deal see 4, 5, 11, 12, 17, and 18 May 1995 entries.]
—Vladimir Abarinov, "Moscow and Washington Have Held Their Own; The Presidents Have Managed Not to Worsen Relations," Segodnya (Moscow), 12 May 1995; in "Summit Said Successful Amid Modest Expectations," FBIS Document FTS1995051200350, 12 May 1995.

April 1995
While on a trip to the United States, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak says that Iranian nuclear weapons would threaten Arab security. But he says, "We do not think the Iranians are seeking that goal. We got clear assurances from the Russians, during the recent visit of the Russian Foreign Minister to Cairo, that the nuclear reactors Iran wants to buy from Moscow would not be aiding Iran in the production of a nuclear bomb."
—Makram Muhammad Ahmad, "Daily Claims Relations With US Improved," Al-Musawwar (Cairo), 14 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950414000012, 14 May 1995.

3 April 1995
During a Moscow visit, US Secretary of Defense William Perry says the United States might be willing to compromise with Russia on the reactor deal with Iran. He suggests that if the deal must go through, several steps there could be taken to reduce proliferation risks, such as strict control over the type of fuel to be generated. Perry admits that the imposition of constraints on the reactor sale is "a very poor second choice," and states that the United States will continue to push Russia to abandon the deal. However, Perry says that aid to Russia, especially aid for defense conversion, should not be cut off regardless of the outcome of the Russian-Iranian reactor deal. At a meeting between Perry and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, Russia rejects the US request that it cancel its contract to supply Iran with nuclear technology and equipment. US officials reveal that the United States has promised Russia "tens of millions of dollars" and a leading membership in the Korean Peninsula Development Organization if it suspends its nuclear agreement with Iran.
—Bill Gertz, "Senate Sends Tough Message To Russia," Washington Times, 17 March 1995, pp. A1, A16; Fred Hiatt, "Perry Hints At Iran Compromise," Washington Post Foreign Service, 4 April 1995; in Executive News Service, 4 April 1995; "Although US Defence Secretary ...," Sankei Shimbun, 4 April 1995.

4 April 1995
An unattributed official of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry says Russia will not cancel its contract to build the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran, because it "will in no way enable that country to accumulate weapons-grade nuclear materials."
—"Russian-Iranian Reactor Deal Defended; Moscow to Proceed With Plans," Kommersant Daily (Moscow), 4 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970508000816, 8 May 1997.

5 April 1995
News reports say Germany was unsuccessful in attempts to persuade the United States to reconsider its opposition to the Russian-Iranian reactor deal. A senior Western official revealed that in the past few months, the United States and Germany had been involved in "an informal exchange of views" on this matter, but the United States declined to openly renew consideration of the deal. One Executive Branch official contends that Secretary of State Warren Christopher is the driving force behind US opposition, and that there are US officials who "see virtue in holding nuclear talks with Teheran; in part because Washington is willing to provide power reactors to the DPRK." Although the United States and Israel have claimed that Iran has a secret nuclear program, an International Atomic Energy Agency official states that "no new information has come forth which would justify a return non-routine visit [to Iranian facilities]." Reshetnikov states that US opposition to the Russian reactor sale is based on "considerations of economic competition." A Western source indicates that Moscow will go through with the deal because the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. Russia hopes to "exert some influence" in the Middle East and Central Asia. Moreover, Russia itself has 30 million Muslim citizens. Spain is reportedly also considering selling nuclear technology and supplies to Iran. An effort in the late 1980s by a Spanish Siemens' licensee to establish a supply link with Iran was unsuccessful.
—Mark Hibbs, "US Rebuffed German Initiative To Reconsider Iran Nuclear Deal," Nucleonics Week, 30 March 1995, pp. 10-11; Galina Penenkova, , "Sale Of Nuclear Reactors To Iran Assessed," Voice of Russia World Service (Moscow), 5 April 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-066; Veronika Romanenkova, "Iran Reactor 'Ballyhoo' Said Due To Competition" ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 5 April 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-066.

6 April 1995
A senior official from the South Korean government characterizes as "groundless" press reports in Japan and the United States that the United States was trying to include Russian participation in the North Korean project in an effort to persuade Russia to cancel its deal with Iran. The official says that the reports were meant to upset the system of cooperation that South Korea has with its allies on the nuclear reactor deal. Vyacheslav Sychev, an expert from the information department of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy says that "reports on Russia's possible participation in KEDO is a smokescreen for a large-scale operation to torpedo the Russo-Iranian contract on the delivery of Russian reactors to Tehran."
—Andrey Kirillov and Vladimir Solntse, "Panov Comments On Supplying Reactors To DPRK," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 5 April 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-066, 5 April 1995.

10 April 1995
A Russian official says the United States opposes the Iran-Russia nuclear deal because the United States does not want commercial competition. "Americans are ready to strangle any potential competitors in the market of advanced technologies," says Georgiy Kaurov, head of the information directorate of the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy. He notes that the reactors Russia plans to supply to Iran are the same type the United States plans to supply to North Korea.
—"Iran Nuclear Pullout Would Be 'Disgrace' Russian Ministry Says US Jealous of Competitors," RIA (Moscow), 10 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950410000009, 10 April 1995.

11 April 1995
The Islamic Republic News Agency reports that Boris Shikhmyradov, Turkmenistan's Foreign Minister, supports Iran-Russian nuclear cooperation. Shikhmyradov says the relationship between Iran and Russia would be beneficial for Turkmenistan, which he believes is ready "to play the role of transit territory between Russia and Iran."
—"Turkmenistan Backs Iran-Russia Nuclear Cooperation - IRNA," British Broadcasting Corporation, 11 April 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

11 April 1995
Russia denies that CIA-provided intelligence information proves that Iran's nuclear program has a military dimension, and says it will never give in to US pressure. The Iranian deal will be extremely profitable for Russia, and US pressure is regarded in Moscow as the result of economic competition, because the net profit from the nuclear deal with Iran can bring Russia $7 to $8 billion. Only the United States and Russia have capabilities to produce absolutely safe reactors, and Russia argues that the VVER-1000 [1000MW] light water reactors (LWRs) it will sell to Iran are safe and cannot be used for military purposes. Russia is afraid that there will be a repeat of the deal with North Korea, when US pressure led to the replacement of Russian contractors with US contractors. According to Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the State Duma International Relations Committee, there is a remote possibility that Russia will be allowed to join the North Korean project and sell nuclear reactors to North Korea.
—Sergey Tsekhmistrenko "Russians Do Not Listen To Americans," Kommersant, 11 April 1995, p. 11.

17 April 1995
During Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani's state visit to India; Indian officials say that a 1975 India-Iran agreement lays the groundwork for future nuclear cooperation between the countries, although India recently gave in to US pressure and refused to sell Iran a nuclear reactor.
—Martin Walker, "Iran Upstages US With Nuclear Co-Operation Deals," Guardian (London), 18 April 1995.

17 April 1995
The US Secretary of State Warren Christopher calls for a cancellation of a Chinese plan to sell two 300MW reactors to Iran. Iran has reportedly sent an initial payment to China, while China has done seismic surveys of the Esteqlal site, located near the Bushehr complex. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen tells US Secretary of State Warren Christopher that China's decision to sell Iran two 300MW pressurized water reactors (PWRs) was consistent with international law.
—Gregory Polyanichko, "On Russia's Nuclear Reactor Sale To Iran, Ukrainian Relations," Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, 12 June 1995, pp. 12-15; Evan S. Medeiros, "Clinton, Yeltsin Continue Debate Over Russia-Iran Nuclear Deal," Arms Control Today, June 1995, pp. 20, 23; Evan S. Medeiros, "China, Russia Plan To Go Ahead With Nuclear Reactor Sales To Iran," Arms Control Today, May 1995, p. 23; Martin Walker, "Iran Upstages US With Nuclear Co-Operation Deals," Guardian (London), 18 April 1995.

17 April 1995
Russia's ambassador to Iran, Sergey Tretyakov, says Russia will continue to cooperate with Iran in the nuclear field despite US pressure. He says, "Moscow will not accept any advice from the United States about its relations with other countries; in particular with the Islamic Republic of Iran."
—"Envoy to Iran Comments," IRIB Television First Program Network (Tehran), 17 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003069, 17 April 1995.

18 April 1995
The Guardian reports that Republicans leaders in the United States "suspect the Russian deal includes providing Iran with reprocessing facilities." [Note: It is likely that the article is referring to enrichment facilities, not reprocessing facilities.]
—Martin Walker, "Iran Upstages US With Nuclear Co-Operation Deals," Guardian (London), 18 April 1995.

18 April 1995
Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres says, "We know...[Iran] works very hard in various ways to attain a nuclear option. That not only means that it will attain a nuclear capability, but it says publicly that it plans or demands the destruction of another people."
—"Peres on NPT, Talks with Syria," IDF Radio (Tel Aviv), 18 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950418000033, 18 April 1995.

19 April 1995
On a trip to Washington, DC, a Russian official hints that Russia might reconsider its nuclear deal with Iran if the United States were to buy Russian uranium. "If the issue of uranium shipments is solved, then the Russian-Iranian agreement can be considered from another point of view," says Oleg Davydov, foreign trade minister and deputy premier. "We are strategic partners of the United States and therefore can hold talks on the 'nuclear deal' issue," he says, adding "one may understand the US concern over the possibility that Russia can provide technologies for Iran which would allow it to accelerate the creation of nuclear weapons." He adds that Russia is committed to non-proliferation, and says "we are not going to transfer nuclear technologies to anyone; including Iran."
—Andrey Surzhanskiy, "Official Links Deal to US Uranium Purchase," ITAR-TASS, 19 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003065, 19 April 1995.

19 April 1995
Iranian President Rafsanjani reiterates Iran's determination to develop nuclear power capabilities despite US opposition. He adds that he believes Russia will follow through with its deal to supply reactors to Iran. Rafsanjani also says he supports what he called "a conditional extension" of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
—"Iranian Chief Adamant On Russian Atom Deal," New York Times, 20 April 1995, p. A6.

20 April 1995
Nucleonics Week reports that Arab diplomatic sources do not believe the United States can substantiate its accusation that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. Arab officials noted that the International Atomic Energy Agency has found no evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. The officials add that because the Arab states could be threatened by Iran, they cannot support US efforts to isolate Iran.
—Mark Hibbs, "Iran's Arab Neighbors Don't Believe US has Proof Of Weapons Ambitions," Nucleonics Week, 20 April 1995, p. 10.

20 April 1995
Sabah Al-Khayr of Cairo reports that according to secret documents allegedly smuggled out of Iran and obtained by the United States, Iran has secretly obtained nuclear material that could be used for a nuclear weapon. The documents allege that Iran imported the material through a nearby country with the cover story that the uranium would be used for medical purposes. Instead, however, it was intended to be "chemically processed" for use in a nuclear weapon, according to the secret documents. The documents also allege that Iran has secretly cooperated with Pakistan on nuclear issues. [Note: According to Sabah Al-Khayr, the documents were reportedly smuggled out of Iran by six defecting Iranian intelligence officials; reportedly including intelligence Chief Ali Fallahian. See July 1995 entry on the reported defection of Fallahian. Fallahian ran against President Khatami for the presidency of Iran in 2001 and as of 9 August 2002 was still in Iran.]
—Ahmad Nasr, "Intelligence Chief Reportedly Defects to US," Sabah Al-Khayr (Cairo), 20 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950420000066, 20 April 1995.

21 April 1995
Deutsche Presse-Agentur reports Iran will not sign an indefinite extension to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) unless the five nuclear powers agree to reduce and eventually eliminate its nuclear arsenals. The treaty ends in a year, and Ali Akbar Velayati, Iran's foreign minister, demands the nuclear states end production of weapons-grade nuclear material, and make accommodations to allow the transfer of nuclear energy technology to other states in need of other forms of energy production.
—"Iran Reject NPT Unless all Nuclear Weapons are Scrapped," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 21 April 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

22 April 1995
London-based Arabic periodical Al-Majallah publishes a report based on an interview with an unnamed former Iranian nuclear scientist, offering an insider's look at Iran's nuclear program. According to the scientist, who reportedly lives in Europe and held an "important position" in Iran's Nuclear Energy Organization prior to the Iranian Revolution, Iran needs at least 10 years to build a nuclear weapon because construction of the Bushehr and Darkhovin reactors has been dormant for so long--17 years. According to the scientist, in 1979 Iran had a plan to create the technology to build nuclear weapons. Iran expected to have a weapon within ten years of completion of the reactors--the late 1980s. The scientist, however, says reports that Iran has acquired or attempted to acquire nuclear warheads from former Soviet republics and other countries are not true and are part of the US-led propaganda campaign against Iran. But the scientist says Iran has large amounts of uranium, enriched uranium, and plutonium, obtained from sellers in Sierra Leone and Chad. [Note: This seems to corroborate part of a report in Sabah Al-Khair that Iran illicitly brought nuclear material into the country. [Note: See 20 April 1995. The Al-Majallah report does not clearly state if the scientist worked for Iran's nuclear program after the Iranian Revolution, and if so, for how long, which raises the question of what he knows first-hand about Iran's nuclear program versus what he is conjecturing based on his past experience.]
—"Ali Nuri Zadah, "Khomeyni Abolished Nuclear Reactor Projects and Considered Them Idolatrous; Iranian Nuclear Capability: Reality or Propaganda," 22 April 1995; in "Article Views Quest for Nuclear Power;" FBIS Document FTS19950422000078, 22 April 1995.

23 April 1995
The Sunday Times of London reports that, according to US intelligence sources, Iran may be seeking nuclear information and assistance from South Africa. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) says a delegation of South Africans led by Pik Botha, South Africa's Energy Minister, visited Tehran in March, and Iran is believed to have asked about establishing a relationship between the two nations to provide Iran with nuclear technology. South Africa's now defunct nuclear program is reported to have produced at least six nuclear weapons, and its now unemployed nuclear scientists may find Iran to be financially attractive. The Sunday Times reports South Africa has continued to seek new arenas of profit to halt its financial downturn and has aggressively pursued the export of munitions and small arms.
—James Adams, "US Fears South Africa Will Sell Nuclear Technology to Tehran," Sunday Times, 23 April 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

23 April 1995
In New York for the Non-Proliferation Review and Extension Conference, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev says, "We are prepared to discuss the Iranian issue," referring to Russia's nuclear deal with Iran.
—"Kozyrev 'Prepared to Discuss' Supply of Reactors to Iran," Russia Public Television First Channel Network, 24 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003064, 22 April 1997.

25 April 1995
At a meeting of ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Indonesia, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati says the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty should not be extended indefinitely without conditions, but only if the treaty is completely implemented, presumably a reference to Israel's nonparticipation in the treaty. Velayati calls on NAM to "take necessary measures against those governments which allowed Tel Aviv to develop and keep nuclear weapons." He says the only way to achieve a nuclear-free world is by expanding nuclear-weapon-free zones.
—"Velayati Comments on Implementation of NPT," IRNA (Tehran), 27 April 1995, FBIS Document FTS19950427000048, 27 May 1995; "Velayati on NPT Expansion," Kyodo (Tokyo), 25 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950425000040, 25 April 1995.

27 April 1995
The United States accuses Russia of initiating talks with Iran about the sale of weapons-grade uranium to Iran, despite assurances from Russia that it has no plans to provide Iran with uranium for nuclear weapons manufacture. Viktor Mikhailov, the Russian minister of atomic energy, is reported to be responsible for starting the rumor of a uranium sale to Iran, an admission Andrey Kozyrev, Russia's Foreign Minister, says was not within the purview of Mikhailov to make. Russia asserts it will not "back down" to US pressure to end its dealing with Iran in the field of nuclear technology, though it provides assurance that no uranium deal will be made. US pressure includes Russia's exemption from a deal that will provide Russia with a share of $4.5 billion US-North Korea nuclear deal.
—Robin Wright, "US Report Casts New Doubt on Russia-Iran Deal," Los Angeles Times, 29 April 1995, p. 13; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

28 April 1995
Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev says that, with respect to nonproliferation, it would be safer for Iran to purchase a nuclear reactor from Russia than to seek nuclear technology from another source. Kozyrev reiterates that Russia will not assist Iran in manufacturing nuclear weapons, but will build the reactor for peaceful purposes. In a speech at the Johns Hopkins International Research Center, Kozyrev says, "I do not see any reasons why we should abandon the sale of reactors which is being conducted in compliance with international guarantees." It will take Russia 55 months to bring the reactor on line.
—"Further Reportage On Kozyrev Visit To Washington" FBIS-SOV-95-083, 28 April 1995;
Vladimir Kikilo, Viktor Khrekov and Vitaliy Chukseyev, "Further Reportage On Kozyrev Visit To Washington" ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 29 April 1995 in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-083; Gennadiy Yezhov and Andrey Serov, "'Absolutely No Changes' To Contract With Iran" ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 11 May 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-091; "Russian Official Defends Reactor Sale To Iran." Xinhua (Beijing), 29 April 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-CHI-95-083.

29 April 1995
US newspapers report Russia has promised to provide Iran with a centrifuge that will allow it to make nuclear weapons. The New York Times and Washington Post report that an agreement was reached in January 1995 in which Russia will sell Iran a centrifuge plant. Andrey Kozyrev, Russia's foreign minister, says such allegations are completely false, stating, "We will not give Iran or any country nuclear weapons capability or technology." The Washington Post reports that the United States is strongly opposed to all aspects of the secret protocol between Russia and Iran, but is especially concerned about the inclusion of uranium enrichment technology. Reports say that meetings on the subject with high-level Russian diplomats, including Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, have revealed that the centrifuge plant sale was still under consideration in Moscow. According to US officials, the Russian government seems divided between the Atomic Energy Ministry, which expects a large profit from the roughly $1 billion sale, and the Foreign Ministry, which is anxious to improve US-Russian relations.
—"Russia Promised Iran Centrifuge, Useful in Making Nuclear Weapons," Agence France-Presse, 29 April 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>; R. Jeffrey Smith and Michael Dobbs, "Russia Promised To Sell Centrifuge Plant To Iran," Washington Post, 29 April 1995, p. A8.

29 April 1995
Komsomolskaya Pravda reports that Russian officials claim to have drafted the reactor agreement with Iran only after reviewing Iran's nuclear capabilities and finding them non-threatening. Potential profits from the deal exceed proposed US economic assistance to Russia.
—"Iran Reactor Issue To Be Discussed When Clinton...," in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-083, 29 April 1995; "US Says G-7 Nations Reviewing Ties With Iran," Xinhua (Beijing), 2 May 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-CHI-95-084.

30 April 1995
In an address to the World Jewish Congress, US President Bill Clinton announces that he will ban all US trade with Iran, including purchases of Iranian oil by US firms, which last year accounted for over 20% of Iran's oil exports and totaled almost $4 billion. Also banned will be $326 million of direct US exports to Iran. The executive order is to take effect in the first week of June. Clinton also said he would press US allies to impose similar sanctions. In his speech, Clinton cites Iranian agreements with Russia to buy nuclear reactors and gas centrifuge equipment as proof that Iran is seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. The embargo is reportedly a demonstration of US determination to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, and is imposed on the basis that Iran is a terrorist state and is seeking weapons of mass destruction.
—Ann Devroy, "President Will Ban All Trade With Iran," Washington Post, 1 May 1995, p. A1; Todd S. Purdum, "Clinton To Order A Trade Embargo Against Teheran," New York Times, 1 May 1995, p. A1; Martin Walker, "US Draws Up Tough Sanctions On Iran," The Guardian, 6 April 1995; Fahmi Huwaydi, "Drums of War Between Washington and Tehran," Al-Ahram (Cairo), 9 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950509000330; "Iran Reactor Issue To Be Discussed When Clinton...," in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-083, 29 April 1995; "US Says G-7 Nations Reviewing Ties With Iran," Xinhua (Beijing), 2 May 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-CHI-95-084.

Early May 1995
Russian officials were sending mixed signals on the question of whether Russia will provide the Iranians with gas centrifuges. Lev Ryabev, the First Deputy Minister for Atomic Energy, denies that Russia will provide centrifuges to Iran. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigory Karasin says, "Moscow will not risk any steps which could facilitate the development of technology for the production of nuclear weapons by Tehran," but added that the question of selling the centrifuges was a "separate issue."
—Michael Mihalka, "Russia Sends Mixed Messages On Centrifuges To Iran," OMRI Daily Digest, 5 May 1995.

May 1995
In an interview with a US television station, Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani says that Iran "neither had nuclear weapons nor was it seeking to acquire or develop them."
—Al J. Venter, "Iran's Nuclear Ambition: Innocuous Illusion Or Ominous Truth?," Jane's International Defense Review, September 1997, pp. 29-31.

1 May 1995
US News and World Report reports that, according to Iranian exiles residing in Europe, Iran has constructed a clandestine site to develop nuclear weapons inside a mountain tunnel, close to the city of Chalus on the Caspian Sea. The exiles claim that Iran has employed technicians from the former Soviet Union, China, and North Korea at the site. [Note: The article contains a small map indicating the location of the alleged nuclear weapons facility.]
—"Tehran's Magic Mountain," US News and World Report, 1 May 1995, p. 24.

1 May 1995
US Secretary of State Warren Christopher says, "Based upon a wide variety of data, we know that since the mid-1980s, Iran has had an organized structure dedicated to acquiring and developing nuclear weapons." He says that in the "organization, programs, procurement, and covert activities, Iran is pursuing the classic route to nuclear weapons which has been followed by almost all states that have recently sought a nuclear capability."
—David Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January 1995, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1995/ja95/ja95.albright.html>.

2 May 1995
In an interview with a Swiss news outlet, an Iranian nuclear official says Iran wants to develop its nuclear sector "for the production of energy, not for bombs." "Our power is not based on nuclear weapons," says Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. "We do not want them [nuclear weapons] because we believe that they are no longer useful in today's world," he says. Asked why Iran needs nuclear energy with its vast oil reserves, Amrollahi says, "It is nothing but reasonable to develop all possible energy sources: water, solar energy, and wind....We cannot burn all our fossil fuel reserves in power plants. This would cause additional environmental pollution. In 20 years we want to produce 20% of our energy by nuclear means. There is something else: Why were the Americans not against it when the Shah built the nuclear power plant of Bushehr in those days? He was able to complete 85% of it without any objection....Why is the United States putting pressure on Russia, while it spares no effort to help North Korea get new nuclear reactors?." Amrollahi says 200 Russian engineers and 500 Iranian experts have been working on the Bushehr plant since last year. Amrollahi calls "absolutely wrong" reports that Iran sought from Russia a heavy water reactor, which would be more useful than light water reactors for weapons production. As for US assertions that Iran has tried to buy plutonium from Central Asian republics, Amrollahi responds: "What for? The Americans like to assert wrong things. If they have proof, I call on them to submit it to the IAEA. The IAEA has also called on the Americans, but so far without success." Amrollahi denies that Iran has recruited nuclear experts in the former Soviet Union. "Russia is our contracting party," he says. "It is its task to take scientists and engineers to Iran. We do not interfere there." Amrollahi says Iran has a 5MW research reactor in Tehran and a "small research reactor" in Isfahan, which he says is used for the training of staff. As for nuclear contracts with China, Amrollahi says China is to build two nuclear power plants, each with a capacity of 300MW. "We are in the final stage of the technical preparation," Amrollahi says of the Chinese deal. "We have not yet started with the work on the spot." [Note: The date of the interview is not known.]
—"Iranian Official Denies Existence of Nuclear Weapons Program," Neue Zuercher Zeitung (Zurich), 2 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950502000035, 2 May 1995.

2 May 1995
White House spokesman Mike McCurry stated that the strengthened US embargo against Iran will help to persuade Russia to cancel the reactor deal. Moreover, McCurry says that since the announcement of the trade embargo, other G-7 nations have begun reviewing their policies toward Iran.
—"Iran Reactor Issue To Be Discussed When Clinton," in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-083, 29 April 1995; "US Says G-7 Nations Reviewing Ties With Iran Xinhua (Beijing), 2 May 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-CHI-95-084.

2 May 1995
The Washington Post reports that President Clinton's call for a multilateral trade embargo against Iran fell on deaf ears in Europe and received a lukewarm reception from Japan. Many European countries have refused to participate, arguing that political dialogue is the only way to influence Iranian behavior. Japan may consider again suspending its loans to Iran, but its dependence on Iranian oil is likely to keep Japan from going much farther. Without the cooperation of other major trading nations, the US embargo is unlikely to have much effect on Iran.
—Fred Barbash, "Clinton's Call For Boycott Of Iran Drawing Little Support Abroad," Washington Post, 3 May 1995, p. A27.

4 May 1995
A Russian official denies reports that Russia has agreed to sell Iran a uranium-enriching gas centrifuge facility. "No contracts or agreements on this question have been signed," says Georgiy Kaurov, head of the information directorate of the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy. "And you can have discussions on any subject, and in this instance these are just empty words." Another Russian nuclear official says Russia is discussing with Iran the training of Iranian nuclear physicists, but no agreement has been signed. "Most of the Iranian nuclear physicists have undergone training in the West," explains Lev Ryabev, Russia's first deputy minister for atomic energy. "It would be natural if they learned to operate Russian-made equipment which will be installed in Bushehr. Ryabev says Russia has started no construction yet at the unfinished nuclear power plant: "We have not laid a single brick in Bushehr yet."
—"4 May Russian TV Commentary," Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network, 4 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003038, 22 April 1997; "No Dual-Purpose Nuclear Equipment for Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 4 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003054, 22 April 1997.

4 May 1995
A Russian official refutes the suggestion of US ambassador to the United Nations Madeline Albright that Russia might forgo the sale of nuclear reactors to Iran. "Russia will not cancel its decision, even in the face of threats from foreign countries," says Grigoriy Karasin, spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry.
—"Russia Will Not Cancel Nuclear Deal With Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 4 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003044, 22 April 1997.

4 May 1995
Uzbek President Islam Karimov says he disapproves of Russia's deal to sell nuclear reactors to Iran.
—Vilor Niyazmatov, "Uzbek President Opposes Sale," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 4 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003058, 22 April 1997.

4 May 1995
Iran's representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency affirms Iran's intention to return spent fuel to Russia. This prompts speculation that Iran is willing to compromise on some aspects of its nuclear deal with Russia in order to soften US resistance. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher welcomes the Iranian statement, which was made at the New York conference on the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Christopher adds, however, that the Russian-Iranian nuclear deal would be a major topic of discussion at the upcoming Clinton-Yeltsin summit meetings in Moscow, and that Clinton would share "very sensitive information concerning Iran's true intentions" with his counterpart in hopes of convincing Yeltsin to cancel the agreement. Evgenii Mikerin, head of the Fuel Cycle and Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities Directorate at Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy, says that the plutonium from the Bushehr type of light water reactor does not readily lend itself to such applications. Although Iran has expressed an interest in acquiring centrifuge technology for uranium enrichment, Russia has never considered delivery of such technology, Mikerin says.
—Gregory Polyanichko, "On Russia's Nuclear Reactor Sale To Iran, Ukrainian Relations," Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, 12 June 1995, pp. 12-15; Evan S. Medeiros, "Clinton, Yeltsin Continue Debate Over Russia-Iran Nuclear Deal," Arms Control Today, June 1995, pp. 20, 23; Evan S. Medeiros, "China, Russia Plan To Go Ahead With Nuclear Reactor Sales To Iran," Arms Control Today, May 1995, p. 23; Steven Greenhouse, "Iran Says It Would Return Nuclear Fuel To Russia," New York Times, 5 May 1995, p. A4.

5 May 1995
Aleksey Yablokov, chairman of the Russian Federation Security Council's Interdepartmental Commission for Ecological Safety, says Russia had agreed to deliver gas centrifuges to Iran in a protocol to the Russian-Iranian agreement to build a nuclear power station. "According to the protocol, delivery of centrifuges to Iran is not an immediate task but will happen in six months or so," Yablokov says. But another Russian official, Georgiy Kaurov, head of the information directorate of the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy, contradicts Yablokov on the centrifuge deal. Kaurov says "there is nothing about the installation of centrifuges or the transfer of centrifugal technology" in the Russian-Iran nuclear agreement. [Note: Yablokov refers to the protocol to the agreement, not the agreement itself, while Kaurov is speaking about the actual agreement, so both could be speaking correctly.] Yablokov says a centrifuge deal would raise many questions about Iran's intentions: "It is the military atom that Iran wants to develop....If Iran has a nuclear station, it won't need a uranium enrichment [gas centrifuge] facility at all. It is a thousand times cheaper to buy fuel, which is necessary for the power station, from the same country which is building the station." Yablokov also raises questions about why Iran needs nuclear energy at all: "According to the protocol to the agreement, we will train 20 Iranian scientists in our classified facilities. But why does Iran need so many specialists for one power station? Iran, with its enormous supplies of gas and oil, should also explain to the world community why it needs to develop nuclear power engineering at all, as it is much cheaper to obtain energy from gas and oil. The enrichment of uranium, large-scale training of scientists, modern nuclear technologies which Russia will inevitably pass on to Iran together with the power station--this is very dangerous."
—"Nuclear Technology Sale to Iran 'Dangerous'," Informatsionnoye Agentsvo Ekho Moskvy (Moscow), 5 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950505000132, 5 May 1995; Anatoliy Yurkin, "Russian Ministry Denies Gas Centrifuge Deal With Iran," ITAR-TASS, 5 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003034, 22 April 1997.

5 May 1995
A Russian atomic energy official says Russia intends to sign contracts to build another three reactors at Iran's Bushehr nuclear energy plant. One would be the 1000MW VVER-1000 light water reactor and the other two would be the 440MW VVER-440 reactors, says the unnamed official of Russia's Ministry for Nuclear Energy. The official also says there is an understanding between Iran and Russia to train Iranian nuclear experts to use the Russian-made reactors at Bushehr, but he says "the understanding is only verbal and no documents have been signed on this score." [Note: See 4 May 1995.]
—"Russian Official Claims More Energy Units to be Built For Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 5 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003040, 22 April 1997.

5 May 1995
In a television interview, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov says Russia has received about $5 million so far for its work on the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran. The work has consisted of inspecting the equipment left by the German contractor that stopped construction in 1979 and reviewing what reconstruction needs to be done to the cement foundation. Mikhailov says this stage should be finished by the end of October.
—"Russian Officials Interviewed," Russian Public Television First Channel Network (Moscow), 15 June 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003032, 22 April 1997.

5 May 1995
The Egyptian newspaper al-Akhbar criticizes US pressure on its allies to join it in on imposing a trade ban on Iran. The United States is further criticized by the newspaper for exercising a double standard in the Middle East by condemning and isolating Iran for possible nuclear aspirations without taking any actions against Israel.
—"Paper: US 'Double Standards' On Iran, Israel," MENA, 5 May 1995 [based on an article in Al-Akhbar]; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-087, 5 May 1995; "Paper: Clinton 'Wrong Decision' On Iran Embargo," Agence France Presse (Paris), 4 May 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-087, 4 May 1995.

7 May 1995
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Albert Chernyshev tells Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmud Vaezi that Russia will honor its commitments to Iran, including the deal for the Bushehr nuclear power station. Chernyshev says Russia opposes sanctions against Iran. The Russian official also says US President Bill Clinton is expected to raise US opposition to the Bushehr deal in a pending visit with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, but that Russia intends "to remain as assertive as before."
—"Official Says Moscow Respects Its Commitments to Iran," IRNA (Tehran), 7 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003030, 7 May 1995.

8 May 1995
US President Clinton signs an executive order imposing an even tighter embargo against Iran, "banning virtually all US trade and investment" with Iran. [Note: See 30 April 1995 entry for Clinton's announcement of the embargo.]
—"Iran Warns Russia Not to Cancel Nuclear Deal," Xinhua (Beijing), 9 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950509000069, 9 May 1995.

8 May 1995
Iran's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Dr. Kamal Kharazi, says many countries in the Middle East are watching whether at a summit between the two leaders Russian President Boris Yeltsin "will succumb to US President Bill Clinton's demands or fulfill his country's commitment to Iran," referring to US pressure on Russia to cancel the deal for the nuclear energy plant at Bushehr. Kharrazi says he believes Russia will "honor" the deal. Kharrazi goes on to say that "Iran supports one of the groups which believes the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] should be extended subject to the condition that there be a built-in mechanism which will ensure a review of the commitments made by the five major nuclear powers....This mechanism should be able to eradicate deadly weapons from the globe forever."
—"Views on Russian Relations, Nuclear Cooperation Envoy on Commitment, Regional Issues," Tehran Times (Tehran), 9 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950509000328, 9 May 1995.

8 May 1995
US Secretary of State Warren Christopher says Russian President Boris Yeltsin does not know the details of the agreement between Russia and Iran for construction of a nuclear power plant. Christopher says Yeltsin has been misled by his advisors about the deal. [Note: Christopher may be referring to the additional protocol to the agreement, which included provisions besides construction of the plant.]
—"Press Officials Consider Relations with Russia, Radio Views Christopher's Remarks," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 8 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950508000255, 8 May 1995.

8 May 1995
Russian Ambassador to Iran, Sergey M. Tretyakov, says Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran is peaceful, reiterating that Iran is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and has been monitored by inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
—"Russian Ambassador on Relations with Tehran," IRNA (Tehran), 9 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003028, 22 April 1997.

9 May 1995
In a Kremlin meeting, Russian President Boris Yeltsin tells German Chancellor Helmut Kohl that Russia will supply equipment to Iran for its nuclear power station, but that it can be used only for peaceful purposes. [Note: Yeltsin's statement that it can be used only for peaceful purposes may refer to his imminent "cancellation" of the "military elements" of the nuclear deal with Iran. See 11 May 1995.]
—"Yeltsin Confirms Delivery of Equipment," Interfax (Moscow), 9 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS 19970422003024, 22 April 1997.

10 May 1995
US President Bill Clinton tells Russian President Boris Yeltsin that Iran is following a blueprint for acquiring nuclear weapons provided by Pakistan more than four years ago.
—David Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January 1995, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1995/ja95/ja95.albright.html>.

10 May 1995
The Natural Resources Defense Council discloses details of the secret protocol between Russia and Iran, which calls for 10 to 20 Iranian nuclear technicians to be trained in Russia each year.
—"Russia-Iran Protocol Provides Evidence of Discussions, But No Firm Agreement On Sale Of Centrifuge Plant For Uranium Enrichment," Natural Resources Defense Council News Release, 10 May 1995; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998.

10 May 1995
Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres says Israel believes Iran is trying to obtain nuclear weapons as soon as possible by importing scientists and technology.
—"Peres Discusses Russian Nuclear Aid to Iran," Qol Yisrael (Jerusalem), 10 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950510000349, 10 May 1995.

10 May 1995
The Russian ambassador to the United States, Yuliy Vorontsov, says Russia will most likely not sell uranium-enriching centrifuges to Iran, nor will it train Iranian nuclear scientists. He says such a deal could be seen as a "military program" contrary to Russian policy. According to Vorontsov, the deal was not authorized by the Kremlin, but rather was set up by the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy. By cancelling these portions of Russia's nuclear deal with Iran, the $1 billion deal will lose half of its value, he says. The sales of the light water reactors to Iran, however, are "intended for peaceful purposes," he says. "I have repeatedly told the Americans, pay us $500 million and we will cancel the supplies of light water reactors to Iran," he says. "They only smiled." [See 4 and 5 May 1995.]
—"Russia May Call Off Training Iranian Physicists," Interfax (Moscow), 10 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS 19970422003022, 10 May 1995.

10 May 1995
An unnamed high-ranking Russian diplomat says Russia's nuclear deal with Iran does not pose a military threat. "This deal is being strictly controlled by the Russian special services, whose duty is to ensure the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons," he says. "Naturally, Moscow does not intend to tolerate any loopholes for the spreading of nuclear threat."
—"Iran Deal Strictly Controlled by Special Services," Interfax (Moscow), 10 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950510000373, 10 May 1995; "Moscow To Leave No Loophole for Nuclear Spread," Interfax (Moscow), 10 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950510000416, 10 May 1995.

10 May 1995
The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy will not cease work on the Bushehr nuclear power plant while the deal is reviewed by the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, says ministry spokesman Georgiy Kaurov. [See 11 May 1995 for more information on the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission.] The commission "will thoroughly analyze the contract details and not find a single rotten thing in it," Kaurov says. "The contract on the construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran does not violate either international or Russian-US agreements."
—"No Plans to Halt Iran Deal During Commission Talks," Interfax (Moscow), 10 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950510000372, 10 May 1995.

10 May 1995
A Russian delegation led by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and a US delegation lead by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher begin discussions on Russia's nuclear deal with Iran. Russian National Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev are also members of the Russian delegation. Foreign Economic Relations Minister Oleg Davydov says that Russia is compelled to cooperate with Iran because of its geographic location and because it is not in Russia's interest to have another "unfriendly neighbor in the vicinity of its southern border." Davydov denies reports that the United States had shown Russian officials an Iranian "blueprint" for nuclear weapons development. Instead, Davydov characterizes the report as an analysis which points toward Iran's intentions to "be closer to development of nuclear weapons." A senior Russian Foreign Ministry official said that there was no substantiated evidence that Russian nuclear reactors in Iran were going to be used for non-peaceful purposes. The official said that Russian agencies "in charge of nuclear nonproliferation have the deal under their firm control" and that Russia has resolved "to leave no loophole for proliferation of nuclear weapons." The Russian-Iranian reactor deal calls for the completion of a nuclear power plant with a 1,880MW capacity. The Bushehr facility will likely have four reactors, the first with a 1,000MW capacity, the second with an unspecified capacity, the third and fourth reactors each with a 440MW capacity.
—"Moscow 'Determined To Leave No Loophole'," Interfax (Moscow), 10 May 1995; in "No Plans To Suspend Deal During US-Russian Commission Discussions," JPRS Document JPRS-TAC-95-002, 10 May 1995.

11 May 1995
At a joint press conference with US President Bill Clinton, Russian President Boris Yeltsin announces that Russia will not sell a gas centrifuge to Iran and will eliminate all "military" aspects of Russia's nuclear deal with Iran. Yeltsin says the "military element" includes "the creation of nuclear weapons-grade fuel and a centrifuge and the construction of silos" [presumably for uranium storage]. The Russian-American Commission for Economic and Technological Cooperation (Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission) will review the military components of the nuclear deal, as well as other matters of Iranian-Russian military relations. In particular, the commission will review the protocol to the Iran-Russia nuclear agreement, which, among other things, deals with how to handle spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste from the reactors. [Note: For more information on the secret additional protocol, see 5, 11, 17, and 18 May and 2 June 1995.] Iranian deputy foreign minister Mahmud Vaezi says: "Since this [Gore-Chernomyrdin] committee will deal with military issues, it is not likely to be at odds with our agreement with the Russians." Vaezi also says Russian officials gave him "definite assurances" that the contract for the construction of the Bushehr plant will be fulfilled. "Clinton has achieved no success," Vaezi says, in convincing Russia not to go ahead with "the transfer of nuclear technology to Iran." Russia's Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov refuses to rule out the sale of a centrifuge to Iran in the future, but says the agreement signed with Iran does not include a centrifuge. Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says in a radio interview that Iran did not seek centrifuges and they are not part of the agreement with Russia. [Note: See 17 and 18 May and 2 June for apparently contrary reports.] Amrollahi says, "Anyone who knows about these things knows there can be no centrifuge in the nuclear power plant agreement....In our agreement, we made no mention of centrifuge, and have never sought this. I think this is nothing but childish hostility started by the United States." Amrollahi also denies that Iran seeks nuclear energy for military purposes; the International Atomic Energy Agency agrees with this assessment. Iran has spent $10 to $12 billion on the Bushehr power plant, according to Amrollahi, and could produce electricity from it if it spends less than $800 million more. "It is logical," Amrollahi says, "for our country to complete this plant as soon as possible so that we do not waste the investment and so that we can end the energy shortage in the country, giving us a reliable source of energy for at least 30 years, the lifespan of a power plant, and making the most of our investment." In a separate interview, Amrollahi denies that Iran bought 500kg of uranium--or any uranium--from Kazakstan.
—Stanislav Kucher and Ravil Zaripov, "Deal Which Never Was," Komsomolskaya Pravda (Moscow), 12 May 1005; in "Clinton Stand on Iran Seen as Gesture to Republicans," in FBIS Document FTS19950512000306, 12 May 1995; "Views on US-Russian Talks on Ties to Iran Envoy Stresses No Military Motives," IRNA (Tehran), 11 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950511000292, 11 May 1995; "Clinton Achieved No Success," Agence France Presse (Paris), 11 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950511000290, 11 May 1995; "Views on Russian Relations, Nuclear Cooperation, Russia Said Committed to Cooperation," IRNA (Tehran), 12 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950512000271, 12 May 1995; Vladimir Abarinov, "Moscow and Washington Have Held Their Own; The Presidents Have Managed Not to Worsen Relations," Segodnya (Moscow), 12 May 1995; in "Summit Said Successful Amid Modest Expectations," in FBIS Document FTS19950512000350, 12 May 1995; "Views on Russian Relations, Nuclear Cooperation Interview With Atomic Energy Head," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 11 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950511000316, 11 May 1995; "Russia Withstands US Pressure on Nuclear Deal," 11 May 1995, IRNA; in FBIS Document FTS19970422002977, 22 April 1997; Bernard Cohen, "Bite-Sized Concession From Yeltsin to Clinton," 11 May 1995, Liberation (Paris); in "Articles Review Clinton-Yeltsin Summit Meeting Seen 'Hardly Reassuring'," 11 May 1995; Gennadiy Yezhov and Andrey Serov, "Russian Minister Explains Tasks of Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission," 11 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422002979, 22 April 1997; "Iran's Vaezi Gives Statement in Almaty," IRNA, 1 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422002994, 22 April 1997.

11 May 1995
Georgiy Kaurov, spokesman for the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, says there were never plans to sell centrifuges to Iran. Nor has a decision been reached as to whether Iranian spent fuel will be transferred to Russia or left in Iran under International Atomic Energy Agency supervision. Mikhail Kokeev, a deputy in the Russian Foreign Ministry, adds that Russia would not advocate projects which would improve Iran's military posture, but admitted that several entities within the Russian bureaucracy had contemplated supplying dual