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Nuclear Facilities

Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)

Location: Isfahan (Esfahan)
Subordinate to: Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (INTC); Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
Size: Large scale
Primary Function: Uranium conversion

Description:


Declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2000, as per a statement by the head of the AEOI in February 2003, the purpose of the proposed Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) was to facilitate the conversion of yellowcake into uranium oxide, uranium hexafluoride, and uranium metal at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (INTC). In July 2003, Iran revealed to the IAEA that it had obtained the designs for the UCF from abroad, and that this information was sufficient to complete a more detailed design of the facility and manufacture conversion equipment indigenously. The facility was planned with the intention of supplying UO2 (Uranium dioxide) as fuel to the 40 MW Heavy Water Reactor under construction at Arak and to meet the needs of UF6 (Uranium hexafluoride) for the Natanz enrichment facility.

Completed in 2004, in August 2004 Iran introduced 37 tonnes of uranium ore concentrate (UOC or yellowcake) into the process area of the UCF as feed material for facility testing. However, all operations at the facility were suspended in November 2004 following the "Paris Accord" an agreement between the EU-3 and Iran to suspend all uranium related enrichment and conversion activities. Following the suspension, the facility was brought under IAEA seals and other tamper indicating devices to verify no additional feedstock was introduced into the process and that there was no further production of UF6. On 1 August 2005, Iran informed the IAEA of its decision to resume uranium activities at UCF. Following installation of additional surveillance equipment and the removal of IAEA administered seals from the process line, Iran started to feed UOC into the first part of the process line on 8 August 2005. At present, Iran has declared the production at Isfahan UCF of approximately 118 tonnes of UF6, along with some intermediate products between August 2005 and April 2006. All UF6 produced at the UCF remains under IAEA containment and surveillance measures. A new conversion campaign was started at the UCF on 6 June 2006.

On a separate note, in a letter dated 19 August 2003, Iran acknowledged that it had performed "bench scale" experiments of uranium conversion in the early 1990s. This was in contradiction to several statements made between February and July 2003 claiming that no R&D on conversion or production involving nuclear material had been conducted, even at a laboratory scale.

Key Sources:
[1] Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran's Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction," Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 7 August 2003, p. 58.
[2] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 6 June 2003, p. 4.
[3] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 26 August 2003, p. 4, 8.
[4] "Implementation of NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2 September 2005, p. 12, 13.
[5] "Implementation of NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 27 February 2006. p. 8, 9.
[6] "Implementation of NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 8 June 2006. p. 2, 3.



 

Updated November 2006



Overview
Conversion
Enrichment
Fuel Fabrication
Heavy Water Production
Milling
Mining
Nuclear Power Reactors
Reprocessing
Research and Development
Research Reactors, Critical and Sub-Critical Assemblies
Waste Management
Weaponization


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CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.

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