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Nuclear Facilities

Natanz Enrichment Plant

Location: 40km SEof Kashan and 150km north of Isfahan (Esfahan)
Subordinate to: AEOI
Size: 1000 sq km
Primary Function: Uranium enrichment

Description:

The Natanz Enrichment Plant is a large facility holding a pilot plant (PFEP) and commercial enrichment plant (FEP). Both of these use gas centrifuge technology to enrich uranium. Iran's centrifuges use an aluminium rotor with a diameter of approximately 100 millimeters. When inspectors visited the facilities in June, they observed that the centrifuges at PFEP were possibly of "an early European design." Analysts theorize that they are thought to be an improved version of the G2-type aluminium-rotor centrifuge built by Gernot Zippe in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Iran's centrifuges are of a similar design to the centrifuges that Pakistan acquired clandestinely in the mid-1970s from the German company Urenco. According to media reports, Pakistan assisted Iran with the design of their uranium centrifuges. According to Western officials, Iran's centrifuges have a separative capacity of two separative work units (SW) per year. Another theory may be that the Chinese passed on technical information about Russian centrifuges to the Iranians. These centrifuges may ultimately have the same origins as the early German machines, since the Russians used German technicians to develop their centrifuges in the 1950s. Questions remain as to how the Iranians tested their centrifuges.

In a report to the IAEA, the authorities stated that, beginning in 1997, Iran conducted extensive modelling and simulations at the Amir Khabir University and the AEOI in Tehran, without the existence of any uranium material. However, the IAEA and the international community are skeptical of this claim.

The Natanz facility is believed to be the third stage in the three stages of Iran's centrifuge enrichment program. The program is believed to have begun in 1985 on the AEOI's premises in Tehran, before moving to the second stage at the Kalaye Electric Company, also in Tehran, in 1997. In 2002, assembly activities were moved to Natanz.

The Natanz Enrichment Plant comprises at least three main areas: an above-ground area, three large underground structures, and one large building standing alone. The above-ground area consists of six large buildings. Two of these are twin 2,500 meter halls. The function of the above-ground buildings is to assemble gas centrifuges. The underground structures are primarily centrifuge halls. The first two buildings each measure 190 meters by 170 meters, with a surface area of approximately 32,000 square meters. The third structure is smaller, with a gross ground area of approximately 7,700 square meters. It is intended to provide support and administrative services to the two larger structures.

Key Sources:
[1]
"Mullahs' Top Secret Nuclear Sites and WMD Projects Exposed at NCRI Press Conference" Iran Liberation, 19 August 2002.
[2] Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 6 June 2003, p. 6, 8.
[3] Mark Hibbs, "Iran Says it Has No plans to Acquire Enriched Program or Plan," Nuclear Fuel, 23 November 1992, p. 5.
[4] "U.S. Suspicious But Can't Substantiate Sensitive Aluminum Left Russia For Iran," Nuclear Fuel, Vol 26, 25 June 2001.
[5] David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Iran, Player or Rogue," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2003.
[6] Vasily Lata and Anton Khlopkov, "Iran's Missile and Nuclear Challenge: A Conundrum for Russia," The Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR), 8 May 2003, http://www.pircenter.org/report/lata_05-08-2003.pdf.
[7] V.I. Seergeev, "History of Development of Centrifugal Separation Methods in Russia," Separation Phenomena in Liquids and Gases, Moscow, 2000.
[8] Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 26 August 2003, p. 6.
[9] David Albright and Corey Hindertein, "The Iranian Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant at Natanz: Drawing from Commercial Satellite Images," Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), 14 March 2003.



 

Updated January 2006



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CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.

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