Back to Country Index COUNTRY PROFILE
Nuclear Biological Chemical Missile
Access Newswire
Country Information
 
Nuclear Facilities

Suspected Additional Enrichment Sites

Location: Lashkar-Abad; Ramandeh, near Hashtgerd
Subordinate to: AEOI; Lashkar- Abad is part of the Research and Development Division; Ramandeh is part of the Karaj Agricultural and Medical Centre.
Size: Smaller than Natanz
Primary Function: Uranium enrichment

Description:

On 27 May 2003, the People's Mojedin Organization (MKO) revealed that two additional secret uranium enrichment facilities were being constructed by the Iranian government. The first is at Lashkar-Abad, which is close to Hashtgerd, and the second is at Ramandeh.

The MKO asserted that construction at both facilities is complete and there may already be "a number" of centrifuges installed there. The MKO also stated that the additional facilities are "complimentary" to the larger Natanz site, and may support the larger facility or even take over for Natanz if it were destroyed. The MKO claims that these additional sites may be under the management of the front company, "Noor-Afza-Gostar." In July 2003, the IAEA sought permission to take environmental samples at these two sites, but the Iranian authorities refused their access.

IAEA inspectors were permitted visits to these locations on 13 August 2003. During that visit, they determined that the Lashkar-Abad facility was operating a laser laboratory. Iranian officials claim that the facility was originally devoted to laser fusion research and laser spectroscopy, but that its focus has since changed. The IAEA inspectors noted that the facility was engaging in the production of copper vapour lasers of up to 100 watts, but that no experiments involving laser spectroscopy or enrichment appeared to be underway.

The officials claimed that in the past, the laser division of the AEOI had cooperated with a university student to write a thesis in laser spectroscopy of SF6. The IAEA noted in its August 2003 to its board of governors, that, "While the study could be seen as relevant to laser enrichment, the underlying experiments appear not to have involved nuclear material." IAEA inspectors were not able to take environmental samples at Lashkar-Abad.

Key Sources:
[1] "Iran: MKO Website Carries Statement on secret Nuclear Sites Near Tehran," Iran Mohahedin, 28 May 03, FBIS, Doc ID: IAP2003052800014.
[2] Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 26 August 2003, p. 8.



 

Updated January 2006



Overview
Conversion
Enrichment
Fuel Fabrication
Heavy Water Production
Milling
Mining
Nuclear Power Reactors
Reprocessing
Research and Development
Research Reactors, Critical and Sub-Critical Assemblies
Waste Management
Weaponization


Maps
U.S. and Hostile Powers: Iran
IAEA Board Welcomes EU-Iran Agreement: Is Iran Providing Assurances or Merely Providing Amusement?
IAEA Board Deplores Iran's Failue to Come into Full Compliance: Is Patience with Iran Running Out?
Iran and the IAEA: A Troubling Past with a Hopeful Future?
The Second NPT PrepCom for the 2005 Review Conference
WMD in the Middle East
Treaties and Organizations
Iranian Regime Defiant in Face of Aug. 31 Nuclear Deadline (2006)
Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments (2006)
In Focus: IAEA and Iran (2005)
Iran's Game of Nuclear Poker: Knowing When to Fold (2005)
FAS: Iran Special Weapons Guide (2005)
For Tehran, Nuclear Program Is a Matter of National Pride (2005)
Curbing the Iranian Nuclear Threat: The Military Option (2004)
Iran: Countdown to Showdown (2004)
Shahab-3 (2004)
A Preemptive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Facilities: Possible Consequences (2004)
The Role of WMD in Iranian Security Calculations (2004)
Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions (2003)
Iran, Player or Rogue? (2003)
Iranian Missiles: The Nature of the Threat (2003)
Iran and Nuclear Weapons (2000)
Iran's Nuclear Facilities: A Profile (1998)
Iran and CBW (1998)



GO
Match:
 


Country Information
Argentina
Belarus
Brazil
China
Cuba
Egypt
France
India
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Japan
Kazakhstan
Libya
North Korea
Pakistan
Russia
South Africa
South Korea
Syria
Taiwan
United Kingdom
United States
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Yugoslavia
Other


Research Library
Country Information Glossary
Issues & Analysis Source Documents
Databases Warheads & Materials
 

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.

HOME   | CONTACT US   | GET INVOLVED   | SITE MAP