NTI: Country Overviews: Iran: Nuclear Facilities

Nuclear Facilities

Bushehr-2

Location: Bushehr
Subordinate to: AEOI
Size: VVER 1000
Primary Function: Nuclear power generation

Description:

On 14 August 2003, Iran's First Vice President Mohamad Reza Aref authorized the AEOI to sign contracts for the construction of a second reactor at the Bushehr nuclear power plant, with a capacity of 1,000MW.

Key Source:
IRNA, 14 August 2003.


	Updated January 2006

	Overview
	Conversion
	Enrichment
	Fuel Fabrication
	Heavy Water Production
	Milling
	Mining
	Nuclear Power Reactors
	Reprocessing
	Research and Development
	Research Reactors, Critical and Sub-Critical Assemblies
	Waste Management
	Weaponization

	Maps
	U.S. and Hostile Powers: Iran
	IAEA Board Welcomes EU-Iran Agreement: Is Iran Providing Assurances or Merely Providing Amusement?
	IAEA Board Deplores Iran's Failue to Come into Full Compliance: Is Patience with Iran Running Out?
	Iran and the IAEA: A Troubling Past with a Hopeful Future?
	The Second NPT PrepCom for the 2005 Review Conference
	WMD in the Middle East
	Treaties and Organizations
	Iranian Regime Defiant in Face of Aug. 31 Nuclear Deadline (2006)
	Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments (2006)
	In Focus: IAEA and Iran (2005)
	Iran's Game of Nuclear Poker: Knowing When to Fold (2005)
	FAS: Iran Special Weapons Guide (2005)
	For Tehran, Nuclear Program Is a Matter of National Pride (2005)
	Curbing the Iranian Nuclear Threat: The Military Option (2004)
	Iran: Countdown to Showdown (2004)
	Shahab-3 (2004)
	A Preemptive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Facilities: Possible Consequences (2004)
	The Role of WMD in Iranian Security Calculations (2004)
	Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions (2003)
	Iran, Player or Rogue? (2003)
	Iranian Missiles: The Nature of the Threat (2003)
	Iran and Nuclear Weapons (2000)
	Iran's Nuclear Facilities: A Profile (1998)
	Iran and CBW (1998)


Match:

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.

HOME | CONTACT US | GET INVOLVED | SITE MAP