This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

1990s
According to former US Senator Sam Nunn, "...Iranian intelligence officers began making recruiting trips to Russia, offering biological weapons scientists many times their pay to move to Iran."
—Quoted in Martin Schram, "Nunn's Somber Warning," Washington Times, 6 April 2001.

1990s
Iran allegedly conducts covert operations linked to BW research and development in Germany and Switzerland.
— Anthony H. Cordesman and Ahmed S. Hashim, Iran: Dilemmas of Dual Containment (Westview Press, 1997), p. 293.

Early 1990s
Iran reportedly acquires 120 tons of castor beans, used in the production of the toxin ricin.
—Michael Eisenstadt, The Deterrence Series: Chemical and Biological Weapons and Deterrence, Case Study 4: Iran, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998, p. 2.

Early 1990s
The Washington Times states that mysterious explosions at factories in Germany and Switzerland that destroyed biological fermentation equipment destined for Iran are reported to have adversely impacted Iran's BW program. The program is reported to be hidden in Iran's biotech and pharmaceutical industries.
—Bill Gertz, "Albright Concedes 'Concern' over China-Iran Transfers; Cites Items that could be used to Make Biological Arms," Washington Times, 24 January 1997, p. A6.

21 December 1992
According to US, French, and German officials, Germany is enjoying an export "bonanza" to Iran. Germany's Federal Export Agency reports an 80 percent approval rate for licenses to ship dual-use equipment on the C-list of controlled technology to Iran. Critics of Germany's export control policy complain that much of the equipment on the C-list can be used for nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile applications.
—"Germany's Iran Bonanza," Mednews, 21 December 1992, p. 1.

January 1993
US President George Bush, in his last arms control compliance report to Congress, states that Iran probably has produced a small amount of biological weapons. CIA Director James Woolsey states that Iran's BW ability "could be operational now."
—Lois Ember, "Chemical, Biological Arms Pose Grave Threat," Chemical and Engineering News, 1 March 1993, p. 9.

15 January 1993
Title XVI of the US Department of Defense Authorization Act places Iran under the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (PL 101-513). Under this act, the United States opposes, and seeks that other states oppose, transfers of goods or technology to Iran that would contribute to its acquisition of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, or destabilizing numbers of advanced conventional weapons.
—"Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992," Arms Sales Monitor, 15 January 1993, p. 3.

April 1993
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Piruzi-4, at the Northern Persian Gulf. The exercise involves "chemical, biological, and radiological operations."
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 94.

Spring 1993
Reports suggest that Iran has succeeded in obtaining advanced technology that can be applied to BW from companies in Switzerland, as well as containment equipment and technology from Germany.
—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iranian Chemical and Biological Weapons," CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment, 30 July 1997, p. 33; Andrew Rathmell, "Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction," Jane's Intelligence Review – Special Report No. 6, June 1995, p. 17.

1 April 1993
Michael Eisenstadt, writing for Jane's Intelligence Review, states that Syria and Iran have developed a relationship in the field of military cooperation and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). He states that the cooperation may include work in the nuclear arena (where Iran enjoys a technological lead) and perhaps the development of chemical and biological warheads (where Syria enjoys a technological lead). [Note: Eisenstadt, as the excerpt above shows, emphasizes "may" and "perhaps," and offers no concrete examples to back up his speculation.]
—Michael Eisenstadt, "Syria's Strategic Weapons," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 April 1993, p. 168.

20 May 1993
The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service reports that "it is possible to speak confidently of a military-applied biological program" in Iran. It states that military-applied biological research has been conducted for about three years and that there is an "initial program of research, development, and purchases in the sphere of biological weapons." The report continues by stating that "it cannot be ruled out that small stocks of biological agents have already been created. Western countries have recorded attempts by Iranian representatives to purchase unofficially equipment and biological material suitable for the production of biological weapons, mycotoxins particularly."
[Note: The three year time period and the reference to Western countries might refer to the attempts to purchase the two strains of fusaria from Canada and the Netherlands in 1988/1989.]
—"Iran's Mustard and Nerve Gas," Jane's Foreign Report, 20 May 1993, volume/issue: 000/2256.

November 1993
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Wa al-Fajr-1, in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Participating forces in the exercise include "chemical, biological, and radiological units."
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 94.

1 April 1994
Jane's reports that "Iran's biological weapons capability is also quite substantial...but little accurate knowledge of this capability of the Iranian armed forces is available."
—Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Iran's National Strategy Striving for Regional Parity or Supremacy?," Jane's International Defense Review, 1 April 1994, p. 28.

July 1994
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Fajr-7, in the Northern Persian Gulf. Participating forces in the exercise include "chemical, biological, and radiological units."
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 94.

1 July 1994
Jane's reports that "biological weapons production is also reportedly under way" in Iran.
—Andrew Rathmell, "Iran's Rearmament – How Much a Threat?" Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 July 1994, p. 317.

Fall 1994
International Review states that an official with Germany's Economic Ministry recently warned a meeting of Frankfurt industrialists that Iran was trying to buy chemical products for chemical weapons under the guise of benign-sounding company names. He further warned the group that Iran could do the same thing in the biological field by purchasing antibiotics.
—Bakhtyar Nasser, "Iranian Submarines Alarms Neighbors," International Review, Autumn 1994.

1995
The US DOD believes that Iran probably accelerated its biological weapons development efforts after the 1995 revelations about the scale of Iraq's BW program prior to the Gulf War.
—US Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, 25 November 1997, <http://www.defenselink.mil>.

1995
The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency states in its 1995 Annual Report to Congress that, "The Iranian BW program has been embedded within Iran's extensive biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries so as to obscure its activities. The Iranian military has used medical, education and scientific research organizations for many aspects of BW agent procurement, research, and production. Iran has also failed to submit the data declarations called for in the CBM's." The report's finding is that, "The United States reiterates its previous finding that Iran probably has produced biological warfare agents and apparently has weaponized a small quantity of those agents."
—US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "1995 Annual Report – Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements," <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/reports/complian.htm>.

1 January 1995
Jane's states that while Iran is classified as a nation with a biological weapons development and delivery capability, "there is no firm indication that it currently holds stocks of such weapons." However, Jane's cautions, "it must be assumed that [Iran] has either acquired or will seek to acquire the technology to place [biological weapons] in production in the event of a major CBW threat." The report continues by stating that, "We believe that research work into the means of biological warfare has been in progress since 1990 and that an initial program of development and the associated procurements is in place. This work is believed to be taking place at a research establishment in Damghan. It may be that this work has already led to the creation of small stocks of biological agents. We are aware of attempts to acquire the means of producing mycotoxins."
—"Section 6 – Middle East & North Africa, 6.4 Iran," Jane's Strategic Weapons – De-Militarisation Markets, 1 January 1995, p. 66.

February 1995
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Shahamat-73, in the Persian Gulf. The exercise involves "defense operations against chemical and microbiological attacks."
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 94.

1 June 1995
Jane's reports that Iran "already has chemical and probably biological weapons and the strategic means to deliver them... and is believed to have a biological weapons capability, but the details are sketchy. A chemical and biological production facility is located at Damghan." Jane's also states that, "Iran unquestionably has chemical weapons and strategic delivery systems. It is alleged to be working on biological and nuclear warfare capabilities." Later in the report, Jane's states that Iran is "pursuing research into biological weapons."

Jane's believes that Iran "initially regarded chemical and biological weapons as 'the poor man's atomic bomb' but [that Iranian leadership] may now have modified their views and downgraded their perception of the strategic effectiveness of these weapons." Later, the article states that, "There is evidence that Iran has pursued an offensive biological warfare program, but little hard information has been verified. According to the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Iran does not have an offensive BW capability, but has a 'military-applied biological program.' The regime appears to see these weapons in the same light as chemical weapons, namely as deterrents to Iraq's possible use of such weapons. Since 1982, there have been rumors of Iranian efforts to 'weaponize' mycotoxins. During the 1980s, there were reports that Iran had carried out research on anthrax and biotoxins. In 1989, it emerged that Iran had previously purchased from Germany growth cultures suitable for the production of mycotoxins. In 1993, reports suggested that Iran had obtained bio-weapons technology from companies in Switzerland and Germany, but these remain unconfirmed. Reports indicate that the plant at Damghan conducts biological as well as chemical weapon research. Work may also be conducted at a pesticide plant near Tehran."

Jane's states that an area "of concern for Iran's neighbors is the prospect of mounting chemical or biological warheads onto its missiles. There is no hard evidence concerning this question, but it seems likely that Iran has the capability." [Note: Of interest in this special report is that despite alleging that Iran conducts biological weapons research at a facility in Damghan, the section of the report dedicated to Damghan makes no mention of biological weapons—only chemical weapons.]
—"Special Report, Executive Summary," Jane's Intelligence Review – Special Report, 1 June 1995, pp. 3, 7, 15, 18.

3 June 1995
Jane's cites a recently available CIA report to Congress, which concludes that Iran has a biological weapons research and development program.
—Barbara Starr, "Feature, Nightmare in the Making," Jane's Defence Weekly, 3 June 1995, p. 23.

July 1995
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Piruzi-6, at the Northern Persian Gulf. The exercise involves "dealing with injuries from chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks." IRGC helicopters equipped with spray tanks overfly Iranian naval vessels in the military exercise, "evidently simulating a chemical or biological attack against ships at sea."
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 94, 96.

13 July 1995
It is reported that Iran, along with Pakistan, India, and China, is obstructing the establishment of a verification mechanism for the BWC.
—"Pointers," Jane's Foreign Report, 13 July 1995.

9 November 1995
During testimony before the US House of Representatives International Relations Committee, Michael Eisenstadt states that Iran is "developing biological weapons. It probably is researching such standard agents as anthrax and botulin toxin and it has shown interest in acquiring materials which could be used to produce ricin and mycotoxins. At this time, Iran can probably deploy biological weapons, and disseminate them via insect vectors, terrorist saboteurs, or spray tanks on aircraft or ships, although more advanced means of dissemination—by unmanned aircraft or missiles for instance—may currently be beyond its means."
—Michael Eisenstadt, "Iran's Military Capabilities and Intentions: An Assessment," Transmitted by Federal News Service, 9 November 1995.

1996
According to press reports, Iran has developed a BW aerosol for terrorist use, which the Iranian leaders have allegedly deployed to assassinate three opponents of the regime.
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 98.

1996
The Centre for Defence and International Security Studies says that "Iran reportedly has both CW production facilities and a BW research laboratory at Damghan, near a dry lake 300 km east of Tehran. Iran has tried to buy from European countries biological agents for anthrax and toxins that could be used to develop BW weapons."
—"Devil's Brews Briefings: Iran," Centre for Defence and International Security Studies (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 98.

April 1996
The United States Department of Defense states that "Iran began its biological warfare program in the early 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War...The Iranians are conducting research on toxins and organisms with biological warfare applications...With their biotechnical support structure, the Iranians are capable of producing many different biological warfare agents. Iran has evolved from piecemeal acquisition of bioprocessing equipment and is now pursuing complete biological production plants that could be converted to producing biological warfare agents. Some of its major universities and research organizations may be linked to its biological warfare program."
—"Iran: Objectives, Strategies and Resources," Proliferation: Threat and Response, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 1996) p. 16, <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif/>.

6 May 1996
In a written response to questions posed by the United States Senate, the Defense Intelligence Agency states that, "Iran has maintained an offensive BW program since the mid-1980s, with the intent of developing BW weapons. Iran has the requisite scientific and technical infrastructure needed to develop and field BW weapons. Like other proliferants in the region and elsewhere, Iran has been successful in acquiring necessary dual-use equipment for biological agent R&D and production. Efforts are underway to conceal the location(s), pace, and direction of the offensive program. Iran's BW program has the momentum to mature into a weapons capability and to pose a regional threat during the next decade." The report goes on to say that while there is a danger of state sponsors of terrorist groups "provid[ing] such weapons to terrorists if they wish...we have no conclusive information that any sponsor has the intention to provide these weapons to terrorists."
—"Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States and its Interests Abroad," Defense Intelligence Agency written responses to questions before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, Hearing 104-510, <http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_hr/s960222d.htm>.

10 May 1996
In a written response to questions posed by the United States Senate, the CIA states that, "Iran has had a biological warfare program since the early 1980s. Currently, the program is mostly in the research and development stages, but we believe Iran holds some stocks of BW agents and weapons. For BW dissemination, Iran could use many of the same delivery systems—such as artillery and aerial bombs—that it has in its CW inventory. We are concerned that in the future, Iran may develop a biological warhead for its ballistic missiles, but we would not expect this to occur before the end of the century. Tehran most likely has investigated both toxins and live organisms as BW agents. Iran has the technical infrastructure to support a significant BW program and needs little foreign assistance. It conducts top-notch legitimate biomedical research at various institutes, which we suspect provide support to the BW program. Because of the dual-use nature of biomedical technology, Iran's ability to produce a number of both human and veterinary vaccines also gives it the capability for large-scale BW agent production." The report goes on to say that while there is a danger of countries such as Iran, Libya, and Syria aiding terrorists in creating chemical or biological weapons, the CIA currently has "no evidence of state sponsors providing chemical or biological weapons, or the technologies to produce them, to terrorist groups..."
—"Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States and its Interests Abroad," Central Intelligence Agency written responses to questions before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, Hearing 104-510, <http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_hr/s960222c.htm>.

11 August 1996
The Sunday Times cites an Israeli analysis that states that Iran has a stockpile of Bacillus anthracis and botulinum toxin in the northwest city of Tabriz. The newspaper says that "both the CIA and the Israelis believe that military scientists working for the Islamic regime in Tehran have developed a deadly BW aerosol that can be carried by a terrorist." The newspaper continues to say that Israel believes that while Iran will not be able to deliver biological weapons via long-range ballistic missiles before the turn of the century, they can deliver such weapons with Scud missiles. It also states that they can deploy them from Sukhoi aircraft. The article adds that Israel's defense ministry warned the CIA last week that if Iran were attacked by the United States, "it will respond with a terrible escalation of terror, including the poisoning of water resources in Western Europe and America with a biological pollutant." [Note: When reviewing the original text of the CIA and DIA responses, there does not appear to be any mention of "military scientists having developed a deadly BW aerosol that can be carried by a terrorist." Therefore, it is not clear where this information is coming from, unless it is from the Israeli report.]
—Uzi Mahnaimi and James Adams, "Iran Builds Biological Arsenal: Israelis Warn of Teheran Plan To Poison Europe's Water Supplies," Sunday Times, 11 August 1996.

4-10 November 1996
For the past two years, Cypriot officials have been attempting to clamp-down on the practice of transshipping nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons materials to states such as Iran and Syria. Western diplomats claim that Russia is the largest supplier of these materials.
—Steve Rodan, "Cyprus, US Team to Block Flow of Nonconventional Arms to Iran," Defense News, 4-10 November 1996.

December 1996
A report in the German newspaper Bild claims that Iran is developing a 3,500km-range ballistic missile that could carry a 700kg chemical or biological warhead.
—"Secret Iranian, Iraqi Missile Programs Reported," Die Bild (Hamburg), 20 December 1996; FBIS, Document FTS19961220000623, 20 December 1996.

January 1997
An analysis of the article notes, "Commenting on the Bild story, Klaus Rose, chairman of the German Parliamentary Defence Committee, said that the reports may be true. 'It is a genuine threat,' Rose told Saar radio. 'The reports are credible.' Rose adds that the Iranian missile could carry a conventional High Explosive warhead as well as chemical and biological warheads. He also suggested that key technologies for the programme were being obtained from North Korea and Russia."
—Center for Defence and International Security Studies, "Iran 'Developing 3,500 km range Ballistic Missile'," Missile Resources, January 1997, <http://www.cdiss.org/96dec12.htm>.

1 February 1997
Jane's suggests that Iran and other countries are opening up trade offices in Moscow so that they may recruit former Soviet scientists and weapons experts to work on their weapons of mass destruction programs. Jane's cites the US Defense Department's publication Proliferation Threat and Response, April 1996 as evidence of the existence of Iran's WMD program.
—R. Adam Moody, "Strategic & Security Issues, Armageddon for Hire," Jane's International Defense Review, 1 February 1997, p. 21.

5 February 1997
The Iran Brief reports that some of Iran's "major universities and research organizations may be linked to its biological warfare program. Hints of the Iranian program have emerged in bits and pieces in recent years, as mysterious explosions have occurred in Switzerland and Germany at warehouses where biological fermenters were being prepared for shipment to Iran. The main alleged supplier was a subsidiary of Bayer in Germany....On July 8, 1996, the Commerce Department announced that it had fined one US supplier, Sigma Chemical Company of St. Louis, Missouri, $480,000 for having made 48 shipments of biotoxins to various destinations since 1991. Many of those shipments went to Iran. On two occasions, the company applied for licenses to ship biological materials and enzymes to Iran in 1990 and 1991, but was refused. Sigma's client on those occasions were the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and the Biochemistry Institute of Tehran."
—Iran Brief, 5 February 1997, p. 10.

11 February 1997
In answering questions posed by the US Senate, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright states that Iran possesses chemical weapons, that it is likely Iran possesses biological weapons, and that those weapons pose a threat to US military personnel in the Gulf. According to her responses, the State Department has no knowledge that the China National Chemical Import-Export Corporation (Sinochem), or its affiliates, has transferred chemical or biological weapons technology to Iran. The State Department refuses to name, at an unclassified level, any companies that may have transferred chemical or biological weapons technology to Iran. The State Department also has no evidence that Poly Group or Polytechnologies, or the Chinese Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (or any of their affiliates) have transferred chemical or biological weapons technology to Iran. The State Department would not respond at the unclassified level as to whether the Iranian Revolutionary Guard is involved in producing biological weapons in Iran. The State Department also has no evidence to suggest that Iran has transferred biological weapons to terrorist groups.
—"China-Iran Biological Weapons," Question for the Record Submitted by Chairman Solomon to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright—United States Senate,", 11 February 1997.

April 1997
Paula DeSutter writes that "Iran is aggressively pursuing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, ballistic missiles and other means of delivery and its use of its NBC weapons will be particularly difficult to deter....The IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] has the lead in Iran for the production and employment of NBC weapons and is well organized, coherent, and virulent in their hatred of the United States....The United States believes that Iran has some weaponized biological weapons and a large chemical weapons stockpile, some of which are deployed on Abu Musa Island in the Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz....Iran, and the Iranian Navy in particular, has exercised its BW and CW capabilities in tactical maneuvers that explicitly train the IRGC's 'Shin-mim-re' or 'chemical, biological, and radiological' units. Most of these exercises involve offensive assaults on fixed enemy positions. Thus, they are not strictly defensive..."
—Paula DeSutter, "Deterring Iranian NBC Use," National Defense University Strategic Forum," number 110, April 1997.

May 1997
Seth Carus states that Iran has a growing chemical and biological weapons arsenal.
—Seth Carus, "Iran as a Military Threat," National Defense University Strategic Forum," number 113, May 1997, p. 4.

August 1997
The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reports that the "Iranian BW program has been embedded within Iran's extensive biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries so as to obscure its activities. The Iranian military has used medical, education, and scientific research organizations for many aspects of BW agent procurement, research, and production. Iran has also failed to submit the data declarations called for in the CBMs. The United States reiterates its previous finding that Iran probably has produced BW agents and apparently has weaponized a small quantity of those agents.
—United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "1996 Annual Report, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements" <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/reports/annual/comp.htm>.

30 September 1997
According to the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad, Iran is developing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The Mossad states, "Massive Russian assistance and close cooperation with Iran are enabling the Iranian regime to develop independent capabilities to produce medium-range ballistic missile systems within a very short time." Technical and HUMINT sources reveal that the Shehab-3 and -4 missiles have ranges up to 1,240 miles. The US DIA confirmed the Mossad's information.
—William Safire, "Russia Caters to Iran's Taste for Arms; Tehran is Developing Midrange Ballistic Missiles," New York Times, 30 September 1997.

12 November 1997
Jane's reports that, "Over the last few years, Iran has embarked on what the CIA calls an 'unrelenting' program to acquire nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technology. The US intelligence community is watching closely to determine Iranian acquisition methods, which range from outright purchases on the world market to developing technology programs domestically."
—"Countering WMD," Jane's Defence Weekly, 12 November 1997, p. 40.

3 December 1997
United States Secretary of Defense William Cohen states that the United States "is now concerned Iran may have produced up to 200 tons of VX nerve agent and 6,000 gallons of anthrax."
—"The Americas: USA Needs Gulf Hosts to Sanction BW Detectors," Jane's Defence Weekly, 3 December 1997, p. 6.