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Chemical Facilities

Parchin

Other names: Suspected facilities are the Parchin Chemical Complex, one of the Defense Industry Organization's (DIO) chemical factories, and the Chemical Industries Group's plant in Parchin (also known as Parchin Chemical Industries, Parchin Chemical Industries Group, and Chemical Industries Group of Sasad).
Address(es): The addresses of the Parchin Chemical Complex and the DIO's factory are unknown.
Chemical Industries Group (Central Office):
P.O. Box 16765-358 
2nd floor, Sanam Bldg.
Nobonyad Square
Tehran, Iran

Chemical Industries Group (Parchin Factory):
Km. 35th of Parchin Rd.
Khavaran Rd.
Tehran, Iran
 
Location: 35°31'N, 51°46'E. Located approximately 30km southwest of Teheran.
Phone Number:
Chemical Industries Group:
Central Office: +98 21 2546602
Parchin Factory: +98 21 3130670, 3130626, 3130719 
(The phone numbers of the Parchin Chemical Complex and the DIO's factory are unknown.)
Subordinate to: At least one of the suspected facilities is under the control of the Defense Industry Organization.
Size: The size of the Parchin Chemical Complex and the DIO's factory is unknown. The Chemical Industries Group's chemical plant in Parchin has a workforce numbering in the thousands.
Primary Function: Suspected chemical weapons production

History: Reports that Iran had a chemical weapons plant in operation at this location as early as March 1988 are uncorroborated. US Intelligence sources suspect a chemical weapons facility began operation in 1989 to produce CW agents for ballistic missile warheads.

The history of the Parchin Chemical Complex and the DIO's factory is unclear. The Chemical Industries Group's chemical plant in Parchin is the oldest gunpowder plant in the Middle East. Built initially in Germany, it was expanded and modernized in the 1970s by SNPE of France. During the embargo years of the early 1980s, the German chemical company Fritz Werner added new production lines to the Parchin plant for the production of nitrocellulose, gun cotton, and other explosive products.

Primary Function(s): The Federal Association of Scientists claims that reports published in Russia described Parchin as the center of the Defense Industries Organization's chemical industry for the production of explosives, fuel, etc. The city of Parchin is also suspected of housing one of Iran's major chemical weapons facilities. In April 1997 the German paper Welt am Sonntag reported that, according to the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), Iran could produce "primary products for chemical warfare agents" in the defense factories in Parchin.

Reportedly, on 25 August 1999, Iran's Defense Ministry inaugurated a new "...colour [sic] and chemical manufacturing plant" at the Parchin Chemical Complex, capable of producing previously imported explosives with a daily production capacity of two tons. There is no firm evidence that the Parchin Chemical Complex is engaged in CW activity, however.

In 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran asserted that the Hungarian company Lampert has refurbished Parchin Chemical Industries, described as an aging CW plant. Headed by S.J. Seyyedi, this plant legitimately produces chemical intermediates as well as explosives, including sulfuric acid, ethyl alcohol, dynamite, gun powder, nitrocellulose, acetic acid, acetic anhydride, diethyl ether, ethyl acetate, nitric acid, and anti-freeze. The plant has reportedly resumed production of chemical weapons agents.

Key Sources: Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/facility/parchin.htm>; Author's conversation with Kenneth Katzman, an analyst at the Congressional Research Service (CRS); Ivan Safranchuk, "Scientific Notes No. 8: The Nuclear and Missile Programs of Iran and Russian Security—The Framework of Russian-Iranian Collaboration," Nauchnyye Zapiski 8, 5 May 1999, pp. 1-36; in "Russia, Iran Nuclear Program Cooperation," FBIS Document FTS19990701001333, 5 May 1999; Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," p. 96; Cordesman, Iran's Military Forces in Transition: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 234; Heinz Vielain, "Intelligence Service Warns: Iran Is Developing Nuclear Weapons," Welt am Sonntag, 27 April 1997, p. 4; in "BND Says Iran 'Stepped Up' Arms Programs 'Considerably'," FBIS Document FTS19970428000303, 27 April 1997; "Iran To Manufacture Previously-Imported Explosive," IRIB Television Fourth Program Network; in FBIS Document FTS19990825001643, 25 August 1999; Iran Yellow Pages, <http://www.iranyellowpages.net/>; "Iranian Defense Companies," Middle East Defense News (Mednews), Proliferation Section, vol. 6, no. 10-11, 1 March 1993; "Hungary Reportedly Helped Iran Repair Parchin Chemical Weapons Facility," Jerusalem Middle East Newsline E-mail Text in English, 22 August 2002, in FBIS document GMP20020822000212; "U.S. Suspects Iranian CW Facility Damaged in Quake," Middle East Newsline vol. 4, no. 234, 24 June, 2002; Iran Yellow Pages, <http://www.iranyellowpages.net/Database/CoDetails.asp?PicCode=497&PicCount=1>; Tehran International Trade Fair, <http://www.tehraninternationaltradefair.com/eIRCompanyDetail.php3?ID=1153>.



 

Updated September 2003



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CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

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