This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

Early 1993
According to a report released by the Russian Federal Intelligence Service, Iran establishes the "industrial production...of sarin."
—Gregory F. Giles, Iranian Approaches to Chemical Warfare, 15 December 1997, p. 14.

1993
Iran increases chemical defensive and offensive warfare training.
—Anthony H. Cordesman, The Military Balance in the Middle East – WMD: Part XIV, 6 October 1999, p. 39.

1993
Rafsanjani reportedly creates a chemical weapons-related entity, the Special Industries Organization (SIO). This 250-man agency is independent of the Council of Ministers.
—Gregory F. Giles, Iranian Approaches to Chemical Warfare, 15 December 1997, p. 13.

1993
According to the Israeli Supreme Court's ruling, Nahum Manbar signs a memorandum of understanding with Iran to provide the know-how and a list of equipment necessary to build a factory to produce binary shells filled with VX. [Note: Binary shells for VX would pose some tricky engineering problems, which probably wouldn't be solved until they actually produce VX itself and arm shells. After that stage is the issues of fuzing, and designing a system to combine a liquid (QL) with solid sulfur and expect it all to react the way one would want, with the short time involved in ballistic trajectory.]
—Dan Izenberg, "Court Releases Ruling on "Murky" Manbar Dealings," Jerusalem Post, 10 January 2001.

[Note: For background information concerning this case and the involvement of Nahum Manbar in alleged UK/Israeli intelligence operations to ship chemicals to Iran, see the chronology for the Early 1990s.]

6 January 1993
The Bush administration denies the company BP Chemical export licenses to sell Iran a large chemical plant. The sale was primarily denied because of concerns that hydrogen cyanide, a CW agent, can be produced by the plant during the manufacturing process.
—Alan Friedman, "US Stops Technology Sale to Iran," Financial Times (London), 6 January 1993.

13 January 1993
Iran signs the Chemical Weapons Convention.
—SIPRI, "Signatories to the CWC," <http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/docs/cw-cwc-sig.html>.

15 January 1993
Title XVI of the US Department of Defense Authorization Act places Iran under the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (PL 101-513). Under this act, the United States opposes, and seeks that other states oppose, transfers of goods or technology to Iran that would contribute to its acquisition of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, or destabilizing numbers of advanced conventional weapons.
—"Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992," Arms Sales Monitor, 15 January 1993, p. 3.

29 March 1993
According to Western intelligence sources, North Korea and Iran are engaged in a cooperative effort to develop a ballistic missile system capable of carrying nuclear and chemical warheads. Iran reportedly provided North Korea $500 million for the missile program.
—"Iran Funds North Korea's Drive to Build Nuclear Bombs," US News & World Report, 29 March 1993, p. 18.

April 1993
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Piruzi-4, at the Northern Persian Gulf. The exercise involves "chemical, biological, and radiological operations."
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 94.

19 April 1993
US intelligence sources confirm that Iran is now capable of delivering CBW using ballistic and short-range missiles, due to advances in "packaging technology." It is believed that anthrax and sarin warheads have been fitted to Iran's Scud-Cs or other ballistic missiles. The Semnan missile facility reportedly produces five tons of nerve gas per month, which is then shipped to the main missile assembly plant at Isfahan, where it is assembled in warheads and fitted onto Iranian-built Scud-Bs.
—"Iran's CW Programs," Mednews, 19 April 1993, p. 4.

May 1993
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Arvand-6, at Shiraz. Participating forces in the exercise carry out "anti-chemical activities."
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 94.

20 May 1993
The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (FSB) reports that Iran has the industrial production capability for sarin and mustard gas. According to the FSB reported quoted in Jane's Information Group, "a plant for the production of pesticides which could be used as precursors in the manufacture of nerve-paralyzing and blister producing toxic substances operates not far from the capital."
—"Iran's Mustard and Nerve Gas," Janes' Foreign Report, Vol. 000, Issue No. 2256.

10 August 1993
US intelligence officials are concerned about a Chinese ship—the Yinhe—in Iranian waters, which they believe is loaded with precursors for Iran's chemical weapons program. Chinese officials deny that the ship's cargo is carrying anything that violates international laws on chemical weapons. The ship left the Chinese port of Dailan [probably Dalian] on 15 July and one US intelligence official was quoted as saying, "we know these chemicals are bound for Iran's chemical weapons plants and it is a lot of tonnage, tens of tons." Also, according to Lt. Commander Bruce Cole from the US Navy's Central Command, the Yinhe is specifically carrying thiodiglycol and thionyl chloride.
—"Chemicals on Chinese Ship Usable for Arms, US Says," Los Angeles Times, 10 August 1993, p. A6.

15 August 1993
Representatives from the Hong Kong-based Guanzhou Ocean Shipping Company state that US allegations regarding their ship, the Yinhe (Milky Way), carrying chemical weapons precursors are completely false. They are also calling upon inspectors from a neutral third company to inspect the ship's cargo for any illicit materials. The company's spokesman, Mr. Cao Zang, also corrects US allegations that the ship was loaded in Dalian. He claims that the voyage of Yinhe originated from the port of Xingang (near Beijing) and that the ships regular route includes Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore, Jakarta, Dubai, Damman [sic Dammam], and Kuwait.
—Chris Dobson, "'Blockade' Ship's Cash Call," South China Morning Post, 15 August 1993, p. 5.

September 1993
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Sahand-1, at Marand. Participating forces in the exercise include "antichemical forces."
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 94.

3 September 1993
Mr. Wu Jianmin from the Chinese Foreign Ministry states that initial Sino-Saudi (joint) inspections of the Yinhe reveal no traces of CW precursors of thiodiglycol or thionyl chloride as accused by the United States. Several US inspectors are acting as technical advisors to the Saudi members of the inspection team. Saudi Arabia allowed the Iran-bound ship to dock at Dammam after other Gulf ports refused to let it enter their territory for inspections.
—Lena H. Sun, "China: No Suspect Cargo Found; Official Says Iran-Bound Shipment Carried No Chemicals," Washington Post, 3 September 1993, p. A33; Patrick E. Tyler, "China Says Saudis Found No Arms Cargo on Ship," New York Times, 3 September 1993, p. A3.

6 September 1993
China accuses the United States of acting as a "self-styled world cop" after members of a joint Sino-Soviet inspection team found no CW precursor on the Yinhe. A certificate designating the fact that the ship was not carrying any such materials was signed by representatives from China, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Officials from the US government refuse to issue an apology because they believe that their government was acting in good faith on the intelligence provided.
—Patrick E. Tyler, "No Chemicals Aboard China Ship," New York Times, 6 September 1993, p. A4.

9 September 1993
Arab and Kurdish opposition sources in London report that Iraq has sold large amounts of arms and ammunition to Iran, including missiles and chemical weapons, in exchange for foreign currency.
—"Chemical Weapons, Missiles Allegedly Sold to Iran," Voice of the Iraqi People, 9 September 1993; in Joint Publications Research Service Document JPRS-TND-93-030, 27 September 1993.

November 1993
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Wa al-Fajr-1, in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Participating forces in the exercise include "chemical, biological, and radiological units."
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 94.

Mid-1990s
Anthony Cordesman states, "Iran's efforts to equip plants to produces V-agent nerve gases seem to have been delayed by US, British, and German efforts to limit technology transfers to Iran, but Iran may have acquired the capability to produce persistent nerve gas during the mid-1990s."
—Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Military Balance in the Middle East – WMD: Part XIV," 16 March 1999, p. 35.

1994
Japanese companies reach their highest level of chemical sales to Iran, when they record direct sales worth close to $100 million.
—"Japan Hopes to Reverse Trade Nightmare," Iran Brief, 2 November 1998.

1994
Iran reportedly initiates nerve agent production.
—Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies,<http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/iran.htm>.

1994
Iran purchases mustard and nerve gas precursors from China. The deal is reportedly brokered by Nahum Manbar, the Israeli businessman implicated in a UK/Israeli intelligence operation to penetrate the Iranian chemical procurement network.
—Gregory F. Giles, Iranian Approaches to Chemical Warfare, 15 December 1997, p. 10.

1994
Reports surface that Syria is cooperating with Iran in the development of ballistic missiles designed to carry chemical warheads.
—Ahmed S. Hashim, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Deterrence, Case Study 1: Syria, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998, p. 9.

1994
Anthony Cordesman states that Iran begins "production of nerve gas weapons...no later than 1994."
—Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Military Balance in the Middle East – WMD: Part XIV," 16 March 1999, p. 35.

April 1994
According to analysis conducted by Jane's International Defense Review, Iran possesses several chemical agents as well as the capability to mass produce mustard gas, blood agents, and some nerve agents. Modes of delivery include artillery, missiles, and aircraft and Iranian forces are also reported to have trained for chemical warfare.
—Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Iran's National Strategy Striving for Regional Parity or Supremacy," Jane's International Defense Review, Vol. 027, No. 004, 1 April 1994, p. 28

July 1994
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Fajr-7, in the northern Persian Gulf. Participating forces in the exercise include "chemical, biological, and radiological units."
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 94.

September 1994
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Kheybar-73, in the Persian Gulf. Troops "carried out special operations to neutralize enemy chemical attacks."
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 94.

September 1994
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Falaq-2, in the Persian Gulf. The exercise entails the "implementation of a chemical offensive and counteroffensive."
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 94.

15 November 1994
Peter Walascheck is arrested by Croatian officials for making illegal attempts to supply chemical weapons to Iran in the late 1980s. Walascheck, a German national, fled to Croatia in 1988 after he pled guilty to trying to organize a deal with the Baltimore-based Alcolac Inc. to ship thiodyglycol (a known mustard agent precursor) to Iran.
—"Fugitive Involved in Illegal Export of Chemical is Caught," The Baltimore Sun, 15 November 1994, p. 2B.

17 November 1994
German Customs Intelligence (ZKA) reports that Iran is making attempts to buy peripheral items, such as heating units, which as well as being used in pesticide plants, have applications in the development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering CBW. The ZKA documents also warn companies to be on their guard against Iranian inquiries regarding chemicals that can be used to produce rocket fuel. Iran supposedly seeks fine-grained aluminum powder, ammonium perchlorate, and hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene (HTPB). Exporters are warned to be on the alert for direct or indirect approaches from two Iranian state enterprises, believed to be acting as procurement agencies for Iran's Defense Industries Organization.
—"Secret German Documents on Iran," Jane's Foreign Report, 17 November 1994, <http.//www.janesonline.com>.

Late 1994
The IRGC begins to deploy 155mm guns to Abu Musa and reportedly possesses CW there as well. [Note: The 155mm was the typical artillery round used in the West for chemical agent fill during the US offensive CW program.]
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 89.

By 1995
"...Most outside experts [believe] Iran [is] able to mass produce sarin and tabun nerve gases, and persistent nerve gas in the form of V-agents."
—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iranian Chemical and Biological Weapons," CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment, 30 July 1997, p. 25.

1995
Orders from the Chinese firm Nocino paid for by Razak Laboratories in Tehran and the Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industries company in Tabriz, and brokered by Iran's International Movalled Industries Corporation (Imaco), are not delivered. The orders consisted of 49 metric tons of alkyl dimethylamine, used in making detergent, and 17 metric tons of sodium sulfide, a chemical used in a variety of chemical processes, but also in making mustard gas.
—Bill Gertz, "China Aided Iran Chemical Arms," Washington Times, 30 October 1997.

January 1995
A circulated CIA report to US administration officials reportedly claims that Iran is working on a binary nerve gas warhead and is trying to acquire the capability to deliver CBW agents with ballistic missiles. The United States is concerned with the increased contact between Iran and North Korea, and Iran's recent $40 billion arms buying spree, which included the purchase of tanks, artillery, fighters, and Scud-B and Scud-C missiles from North Korea. Iran also develops its own ballistic missiles and encourages North Korea to develop a new generation of ballistic missiles.
—James Adams, "Iran Making Chemical Arsenal," Sunday Times (London), 5 February 1995.

30 January 1995
A German intelligence report claims that Iran is close to creating a chemical weapons factory with the help of three Indian companies. Tata consulting engineering, Transpek, and Rallis India were all involved in approaching German companies for "corrosion-resistant enamel reactors, pipes and pumps, all crucial in the chemical production process of sarin and tabun." The companies claim that they are involved in pesticide production research in Iran. Although the report does not identify the location of this new chemical weapons complex, it does state that until date Iranian CW production has developed around factories in Qazun, al-Razi, Bashwir, and Damghan.
—Jamie Dettmer, "Tehran Building Deadly Gas Plant," Washington Times, 31 January 1995.

February 1995
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Shahamat-73, in the Persian Gulf. The exercise involves "defense operations against chemical and microbiological attacks."
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 94.

March 1995
The United States imposes sanctions on three Chinese front companies in Hong Kong for having shipped nerve gas precursors and production equipment to Iran. The three companies are identified as Asian Ways Limited, WorldCo Limited, and Mainway International.
—"Iranian Oil Pays Chinese Arms and CW," Iran Brief, 2 June 1997, p. 9; "Firms Linked in Sale of Technology to Iran," Hong Kong South China Morning Post, 26 April 1995; FBIS, Document HK2604050295.

March 1995
US Secretary of Defense William Perry announces that Iran has deployed CW on islands near the Strait of Hormuz. Although Iran acknowledges the military build-up at the entrance to the Persian Gulf, it denies the assertions that CW are involved.
—George Graham, "US Warns of Iranian Weapons Build-Up," Financial Times, 23 March 1995, p. 5; Barbara Starr, "CW Stockpile 'a Threat to Straits of Hormuz'," Jane's Defense Weekly, 1 April 1995, p. 3; Lisa Burgess and Janet Porter, "Iran's Arming of Islands Fails to Upset Markets," Journal of Commerce, 24 March 1995, p. 1B; "Iran Denies Comment On Chemical Arms," New York Times, 24 March 1995, p. A6; David Fairhall, "Gulf Build-Up 'Defensive' Says Teheran," Guardian, 24 March 1995; "Kharazzi Refutes 'Baseless' US Claims on CW Deployment," IRNA, 25 March 1995; FBIS, Document JPRS-TAC-95-011-L, 9 May 1995.

7 March 1995
Peter Walaschek, arrested in Croatia, for selling 90 tons of CW precursors from a Baltimore company to Iran in the late 1980s, will not face charges for his crimes in the United States. Walaschek was arrested on a warrant issued by the Interpol and was consequently extradited to his native Germany. German authorities are not obligated to extradite their own citizens and as a result Walascheck will not face US authorities. He claims that the thiodiglycol he arranged to be shipped was not used for chemical weapons and was instead used for textile production.
—Michael James, "Mustard Gas Fugitive Escapes Extradition," Baltimore Sun, 7 March 1995.

22 March 1995
The Iranian mission at the UN rejected any US claims that Iran was deploying chemical weapons in its military buildup in the islands on the Straits of Hormuz. It admitted to a military buildup that started in October 1993 for "defensive purposes." The Iranian military was deployed as a response to increasing American troops in Gulf to keep Iraq in check.
—"Iran Denies Positioning Chemical Arms on Islands," Washington Post, 23 March 1995, p. A22; "Gulf Build-Up 'Defensive' Says Iran," Guardian (London), 24 March 1995, p. 17.

1 April 1995
According to Western intelligence agencies, Iran and Libya agree to cooperate in the development of long-range ballistic missiles. Libya allegedly offers to pay Iran $31 million for material and know-how that Iran received from North Korea, China, and various Western sources. This could include equipment for a liquid fuel plant. Supposedly, the two countries will work together to increase the range of the Scud-B missile, as well as to develop Libya's al-Fatah missile. The Western intelligence report was issued after a visit to Tripoli by an Iranian Ministry of Defense delegation, and the sources cite past cooperation between the two countries. During the Iran-Iraq War, Libya allegedly supplied missiles to Iran in exchange for CW, which the Libyans then used in their conflict with Chad.
—Michael Evans, "Libya and Iran 'Plan Joint Missile Project'," Times (London), 1 April 1995.

May 1995
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Nasr-3, in the northern Persian Gulf. Troops "repulsed the enemy's chemical attack."
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 94.

May 1995
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Fajr-4, at Beyt ol-Moqaddas. The exercise involves "units responsible for countering chemical attacks."
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 94.

1 June 1995
Jane's Intelligence Review claims that Iran "already has chemical and probably biological weapons and the strategic means to deliver them....Tehran has invested considerable resources in both offensive and defensive CW capabilities. Its current program may be able to produce several hundred tons of various agents [including sarin and V agents] per year. Iran is also believed to have a biological weapons capability, but details are sketchy. A chemical and biological facility is located at Damghan."
—"Special Report, Executive Summary," Jane's Intelligence Review – Special Report, 1 June 1995, p. 3.

1 June 1995
Jane's goes on to report, "Iran unquestionably has chemical weapons and strategic delivery systems....Iran is unquestionably doing its utmost to deploy a substantial force of long-range ballistic missiles and to stockpile chemical weapons."
—"Special Report, Portrait of a Proliferator," Jane's Intelligence Review – Special Report, 1 June 1995, p. 7.

1 June 1995
Jane's states,"Iran's developing NBC facilities are in non-descript buildings in cities," but several sites such as Bushehr are visible to commercial satellites. The image displayed by Jane's shows F-4 Phantom aircraft parked near the facility. Jane's states that while F-4s can carry chemical weapons, the lack of "indications of chemical weapon bunkers at Bushehr" and "since there are no railroads leading into the town, moving chemical munitions to prepare for an attack would require an airlift."
—"Special Report, Bushehr," Jane's Intelligence Review – Special Report, 1 June 1995, p. 12.

1 June 1995
Jane's believes that although Iran's leadership once highly regarded the strategic capabilities of chemical weapons, it now appears to have downgraded this perception. Nonetheless, Jane's reports that Iran continues to heavily invest in chemical weapons: "Defenses against chemical attack were initially poor. In 1984, UN inspectors found that even specialized Iranian CW defensive teams had only respirators, thin rubber gloves, and plastic laundry bags for protection." Iran was able to purchase respirators from South Korea and Spain, and atropine injectors from the Netherlands.
—"Special Report, Chemical and Biological Warfare Programmes," Jane's Intelligence Review – Special Report, 1 June 1995, p. 15.

1 June 1995
Jane's claims Damghan "is the location of a chemical warhead production facility... It has several characteristics of chemical weapons plants: isolation, links to transportation lines and security. The facility at Damghan is hidden by trees, downwind from town, surrounded by fallow fields, and linked to the railroad by a spur. The perimeter road lies just outside the grove of trees. There are no signs of bunkers, so munitions are probably moved by rail to arsenals on a regular basis. Although reports state that 155mm artillery shells are the major product, the plant reportedly also loads other weapons with nerve gas. According to Critical Mass, by Burrows and Windrem, Scud-B warheads have been loaded with nerve gas at this facility. Since the missiles are assembled 130km to the southwest in Semnan, which lies on the same rail line, it would take little effort to ship the missiles to Damghan before they are deployed."
—"Special Report, Damghan," Jane's Intelligence Review – Special Report, 1 June 1995, p. 16.

1 June 1995
Jane's reports that while "there is no hard evidence" that Iran can deliver chemical or biological weapons on its missiles, "it seems likely that Iran has the capability. A report that Iran tested a chemical warhead in the late 1980s cannot be confirmed."
—"Special Report, Strategic Delivery Systems," Jane's Intelligence Review – Special Report, 1 June 1995, p. 18.

July 1995
According to Iranian opposition elements, a fire breaks out at the Chemical National Koshavarz factory near Qazvin. The unidentified sources claim that the facility was a CW production site, and that some 2,500 people were poisoned from the fire's emissions.
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 102.

July 1995
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Piruzi-6, at the Northern Persian Gulf. The exercise involves "dealing with injuries from chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks."
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 94.

July 1995
IRGC helicopters equipped with spray tanks overfly Iranian naval vessels in a military exercise, "evidently simulating a chemical or biological attack against ships at sea."
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 96.

August 1995
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Beyt ol-Moqaddas, at the Kermanshah Province. The "Shim-Mim-Re defense units" participate in the exercise.
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 94.

1 November 1995
In Congressional testimony, Dr. Gordon Oehler, director of the CIA's Nonproliferation Center, alleges that Iran is "spending large sums of money on long-term capital improvements to its chemical weapons program." He also says that Iran "is developing a production capability for precursor chemicals it needs to support chemical agent production, and within several years may be virtually independent of imported raw materials."
—"Iranian Oil Pays Chinese Arms and CW," Iran Brief, 2 June 1997, p. 9.

27 December 1995
The CIA accuses Iran of inflating its WMD capabilities and claims that it is soliciting help in such endeavors from countries like China.
—"The Iran Brief, USA," Jerusalem Post, 27 December 1995, p. 5.

	Updated October 2003