This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.
Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.
Summer 1996
According to US press accounts citing a top secret CIA report dated 2 October 1996, China sells Iran nearly 400 metric tons of carbon disulfide, a nerve and riot control gas precursor. The Iranians deny the charge: "This is a baseless accusation and we categorically deny it," says Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati at a news conference.
—Bill Gertz, "China Sold Iran Missile Technology," Washington Times, 21 November 1996, p. 1; "Iran Denies Buying Military Technology From China," Reuters, 23 November 1996; Leonard S. Spector, "US Efforts to Halt Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Programs in Iran," Testimony before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 17 April 1997, <http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/SenateTestimony41797.asp?p=8>; "Chinese WMD Deliveries," Iran Brief, 5 December 1996.
1996
The Chinese corporation SinoChem reportedly delivers 500 tons of phosphorous pentasulfide (potential precursor of VX) to Iran.
—Shirley A. Kan, Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief IB92056, 18 July 2000, p. 8.
1996
Iran and India conclude a contract for construction of a pesticide plant outside Tehran.
—"Tehran Buys Arms," Moscow News, 24-30 April 1997, p. 4.
5-10 March 1996
Iran conducts the Zafar (Victory) military exercise in the Sistan-Baluchestan province near the Pakistan border, which includes simulated chemical weapons attacks on Iranian forces and "defensive operations including repelling chemical attacks."
—James Bruce, "Iranian Manoeuvres Keep West on Alert," Jane's Military Exercise & Training Monitor, January-March 1996, p. 13; Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 94.
8 March 1996
It is reported that "US intelligence officials have concluded that companies in China are providing Iran with several factories suited for making deadly poison gases...." In addition, Iranian "military-related organizations" are allegedly buying glass-lined vessels for mixing chemical precursors, special air-filtration equipment, and the technology to manufacture these items indigenously from China.
—R. Jeffrey Smith, "Chinese Firms Supply Iran with Gas Factories, US Says," Washington Post, 8 March 1996, p. A26.
29 March 1996
According to a paper published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Iran possesses the "largest stockpile of chemical weapons in the third world." The paper cites several intelligence agencies and claims that it is unlikely Iran will pursue any aggressive military ground maneuvers.
—Michael S. Lelyveld, "Report: Iran Has Huge Weapons Stockpile," Journal of Commerce, 29 March 1996, p. 3A.
22-25 April 1996
Iran holds its first Regional Seminar on the National Implementation of the CWC in Tehran in order to familiarize governments with their rights and obligations under the treaty. The 15 countries represented at the seminar are Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Oman, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Yemen. Along with the various workshops presented, the participants are also invited to a "trial inspection" to see how the procedure was conducted under CWC regulations. The mock inspection is conducted at the Shahid Razkani chemical factory in Tehran. Senior officials from two NGOs—SIPRI and the Harvard-Sussex Program—also attended the seminar.
—"Regional Seminar on National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (22-25 April 1996, Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran)," Press Release No. 96, External Relations Division, Preparatory Commission for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 7 May 1996.
April 1996
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Fateh, in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz: "Exercise participants completed systematic and nonsystematic air defense of chemical, microbic, and nuclear exercise."
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 94.
6 May 1996
In a written response to questions posed by the United States Senate, the Defense Intelligence Agency states, "Iran has an active chemical warfare program. It produces a variety of agents and may have s much as 2,000 tons of agent in its stockpile. It has continued to upgrade and expand its chemical production infrastructure and chemical munitions arsenal since signing the CWC in 1993. As part of this expansion, Iran is making long-term capital improvements to its CW program, suggesting that it intends to maintain a CW capability well into the future." The report goes on to say that: while there is a danger of state sponsors of terrorist groups "provid[ing] such weapons to terrorists if they wish....we have no conclusive information that any sponsor has the intention to provide these weapons to terrorists."
—"Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States and its Interests Abroad," Defense Intelligence Agency written responses to questions before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, Hearing 104-510, <http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_hr/s960222d.htm>.
10 May 1996
In a written response to questions posed by the US Senate, the CIA states, "Iran's CW program is already among the largest in the third world, yet it has continued to expand and become more diversified, even since Tehran's signing of the CWC in January 1993. Iran's stockpile is comprised of several thousand tons of CW agents, including sulfur mustard, phosgene, and cyanide agents, and Tehran is capable of producing an additional 1,000 tons of these agents each year. In addition, Iran is developing a production capability for the more toxic nerve agents and is pushing to reduce its dependence on imported raw materials. Iran has various dissemination means for these agents, including artillery, mortars, rockets, aerial bombs, and possibly, even Scud warheads." The report goes on to say that while there is a danger of countries such as Iran, Libya, and Syria aiding terrorists in creating chemical or biological weapons, the CIA currently has "no evidence of state sponsors providing chemical or biological weapons, or the technologies to produce them, to terrorist groups..."
—"Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States and its Interests Abroad," Central Intelligence Agency written responses to questions before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, Hearing 104-510, <http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_hr/s960222c.htm>.
June 1996
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Velayat, at Qom. The exercise involves "utilization of tactics to combat the use of chemical weapons."
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 95.
23 June 1996
A report appears that Iran has concluded a "secret multi-million pound deal with the Indian government which will supply banned materials used to manufacture poison gas." Under the agreement, India will reportedly build a sophisticated chemical plant at Qazvin, which will be used to produce phosphorous pentasulfide, a dual-use chemical that could be used in CW production. [Note: At some point, the deal collapsed and was never fulfilled].
—Con Coughlin Chief, "Iran in Secret Chemical Weapons Deal With India," Sunday Telegraph, 24 June 1996.
July 1996
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Falaqh-5. The exercise performed operations to thwart a hypothetical enemy's chemical attacks.
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 95.
July 1996
While responding to questions by the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, the DIA and CIA presented their latest estimates on the Iranian CW program. It is estimated that Iran holds over 2,000 tons of sulfur mustard, phosgene and cyanide agents, and is currently working on developing nerve agents. The agents are most likely to be delivered through artillery shells, mortars, and bombs.
—Laurie H. Boulden, "CIA, DIA Provide New Details on CW, BW Programs in Iran and Russia," Arms Control Today, Vol. 26, August 1996, pp. 32-33.
July-December 1996
According to a DCI report from June 1997, during this period, China provides "considerable CW-related assistance" to Iran, including production equipment and technology.
—Shirley A. Kan, Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief IB92056, 18 July 2000, p. 8.
November 1996
During war games, Iranian naval forces hold mine exercises in the Persian Gulf and defensive/simulative exercises to address potential CW attacks in the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.
—"Third Russian Submarine Being Delivered," Reuters, 26 November 1996.
November 1996
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Piruzi-7, in the Persian Gulf: "Among the programs carried out...were...chemical attack and detoxification."
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 95.
4-10 November 1996
Cypriot and US officials are calling for greater scrutiny at Cypriot ports so that materials that can possibly be used from the Iranian WMD program are not shipped through Cyrus.
—Steve Rodan,"Cyprus, US Team to Block Flow of nonconventional Arms to Iran," Defense News, 4-10 November 1996, p. 15.
21 November 1996
According to a classified document cited in the Washington Times, Iran reportedly acquired about 400 tons of chemical weapons precursors from China (probably the aforementioned phosphorus pentasulfide). Iran claims any such accusations are unfounded.
—"World in Brief: Chinese Missile Technology Sales to Iran Reported," Atlanta Journal and Constitution 21 November 1996, p.04B; "Iran: Official Denies Deal," Plain Dealer, 24 November 1996, p. 7A.
December 1996
Iran is allegedly developing a 3,500km-range ballistic missile that could carry a 700kg chemical or biological warhead.
—"Secret Iranian, Iraqi #Missile Programs Reported," Die Bild (Hamburg), 20 December 1996; FBIS, Document FTS19961220000623, 20 December 1996;
For analysis see,Center for Defence and International Security Studies, "Iran 'Developing 3,500 km-range Ballistic Missile'," Missile Resources, January 1997, <http://www.cdiss.org/96dec12.htm>.
1997
Japanese companies make direct sales of chemicals to Iran worth more than $73 million. In addition, transfers of Japanese chemicals to Iran through intermediaries and trading companies located in Hong Kong, China, Singapore, and Malaysia are made.
—"Japan Hopes to Reverse Trade Nightmare," Iran Brief, 2 November 1998.
Early 1997
With Hong Kong still under British control, government customs officials raid the offices of Rex International, a local company allegedly jointly controlled by the Chinese government and Iran's military-industrial complex. Documents seized show that the firm handled a shipment to Iran of high-grade steel pipes manufactured in China, which were suitable for use in CW manufacturing processes. The consignment was sent to a plant in Tehran run by the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), Iran's main weapons procurement agency.
—Con Coughlin, "Hong Kong Used as Conduit For Iran Arms Sales," Sunday Telegraph (London), 14 September 1997, p. 27.
January 1997
Two men are arrested on charges for attempting to ship a dual-use chemical, impregnated alumina, to Iran, in violation of the US trade embargo. The chemical can be used to make phosphorus-oxychloride, a precursor for nerve agents (e.g., tabun).
—"2 Charged Over Iran Chemical Shipment," Chicago Tribune, 26 January 1997, p. 18; "Iran Conspiracy Alleged," ASA, January 1997; "Smuggling Attempts Blocked," Iran Brief, 5 February 1997.
January 1997
Iran reportedly supplies Sudan with CW to use against the rebels in its conflict.
—Miral Fahmy (in Cairo), "Sudan Rebels Say Iran Gave State Army Weapons," Reuters, 26 January 1997.
January 1997
Israeli officials tell the United States that Russian institutes and firms provide equipment and technology to Iran's missile programs. The Israelis report that this assistance helps Iran in developing medium-range ballistic missiles that could be equipped with chemical warheads and be capable of striking throughout the Middle East. US intelligence agencies allegedly confirm the assessment.
—Stuart D. Goldman, Kenneth Katzman, Robert D. Shuey, and Carl E. Behrens, "Russian Missile Technology and Nuclear Reactor Transfers to Iran" CRS Report for Congress, Washington, DC, 29 July 1998, p. 3.
January-February 1997
China supplies Iran with 40,000 barrels of calcium hypochlorite, a chemical-biological-radiological decontamination agent (it actually is only useful for CB decontamination). The shipment is likely destined for Iran's Engineering Research Centre of the Construction Crusade, the government department responsible for chemical development facilities.
—Robert Karniol, "China Supplied Iran with Decontamination Agent," Jane's Defense Weekly, 30 April 1997, p. 17.
27 January 1997-3 February 1997
A Sudanese government official denies that Iran supplied Sudan with "chemical-tipped" missiles and other weapons to aid in the ongoing civil war.
—"Sudan Denies Charges of Iran Arms Shipment," Defense News, 3 February 1997, p. 2.
11 February 1997
In answering questions posed by the US Senate, Secretary of State Albright states that Iran possesses chemical weapons and that it is likely Iran possesses biological weapons and that those weapons pose a threat to US military personnel in the Gulf. According to her responses, the State Department has no knowledge that the China National Chemical Import-Export Corporation (Sinochem), or its affiliates, has transferred chemical or biological weapons technology to Iran. The State Department refused to name at an unclassified level any companies that may have transferred chemical or biological weapons technology to Iran. The State Department also has no evidence that Poly Group or Polytechnologies, or the Chinese Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (or any of their affiliates) have transferred chemical or biological weapons technology to Iran. The State Department would not respond at the unclassified level as to whether the Iranian Revolutionary Guard is involved in producing biological weapons in Iran. The State Department also has no evidence to suggest that Iran has transferred biological weapons to terrorist groups.
—"China-Iran Biological Weapons," Question for the Record Submitted by Chairman Solomon to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright – United States Senate, 11 February 1997.
11 March 1997
Iran's parliament ratifies the Chemical Weapons Convention. [Note: According to an Iranian official delivering a statement at Columbia University on 4 October 1999, Iran ratified the CWC on 27 July 1997.]
—SIPRI, "Ratifications to the CWC," <http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/docs/cw-cwc-rat.html>.
April 1997
Germany's Bundesnachtrichtendienst (BND) (Federal Intelligence Service) reports that Iran's chemical and missile programs are some of the most advanced in the Middle East. The BND also reports that Iran is building defense factories in Parchin, 40km south of Tehran, with Chinese assistance.
—Heinz Vielain, "BND Says Iran 'Stepped Up' Arms Program Considerably," Welt am Sonntag (Berlin), 27 April 1997, p. 4; FBIS, Document FTS19970428000303, 28 April 1997.
April 1997
Paula DeSutter states, "The United States believes that Iran has some weaponized biological weapons and a large chemical weapons stockpile, some of which are deployed on Abu Musa Island in the Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz." She also states ,"Iran is aggressively pursuing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons..."
[Note: No evidence is offered to substantiate these claims.]
—Paula DeSutter, "Deterring Iranian NBC Use," Strategic Forum (National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies), April 1997, number 110.
17 April 1997
Dozens of Iranian war veterans who claim they were disabled by chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War staged a protest in front of the German embassy in Tehran to protest the assistance Iraq received from German companies in developing its chemical weapons programs. The protest developed after Iran accused 24 German companies of giving Iraq chemical weapons technology in the 1980s.
—"Iranian War Veterans Hold Overnight Sit-In in front of German Embassy," Agence France-Presse, 17 April 1997.
May 1997
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Salman Fateh, in the Persian Gulf. The exercise includes "operations against possible attacks with...chemical weapons...containing the impacts of such agents."
—Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 95.
5 May 1997
It is reported that Rex International Development Company Ltd., a company affiliated with the Chinese company Norinco, supplies Iran with high-grade seamless steel pipes, suitable for handling corrosive materials, and associated with CW production.
—"Hong Kong Company Caught in CW Deal," Iran Brief, 5 May 1997.
22 May 1997
The United States imposes sanctions, under the Chemical and Biological Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, on two Chinese companies, five Chinese citizens, and a Hong Kong company for providing Iran with CW precursors and manufacturing technology. The firms are Nanjing Chemical Industries Group and Jiangsu Yongli Chemical Engineering and Import/Export Group. The Hong Kong-based firm is Cheong Yee Limited. The precursors involved were thionyl chloride, dimethylamine, and ethyl chlorohydrin (nerve and mustard agent precursors), and the equipment included special glass-lined vessels. The United States makes it clear that it has "no evidence that the Chinese government was involved." Iran rejects the US charges that Chinese companies provided it with CW equipment and technology. IRNA quotes Iran's representative at the United Nations, Kamal Kharazi, as saying, "The Islamic Republic rejects all allegations of any plan to produce chemical weapons in Iran." The Chinese also reject the charges, "contending that its control of such trade is strictly enforced."
—"Iranian Oil Pays Chinese Arms and CW," Iran Brief, 2 June 1997, p. 9; Director of Central Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July through 31 December 1999, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_aug2000.htm>; Steven Lee Myers, "US, Asserting Iran Link, Bars 2 Chinese Firms," New York Times, 23 May 1997, p. 1; Steven Mufson, "China Demands US Lift New Embargo," Washington Post, 24 May 1997, p. A25; Kenneth Katzman, Iran: Arms and Technology Acquisitions, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 97-474, Updated 1 September 1999; Anthony H. Cordesman, The Military Balance in the Middle East – WMD: Part XIV, 6 October 1999, p. 40; "Iranian Oil Pays Chinese Arms and CW," Iran Brief, 2 June 1997, p. 9; Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iranian Chemical and Biological Weapons," CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment, 30 July 1997, p. 25; "Iran Rejects US Charges on Chemical Arms," New York Times, 26 May 1997, p. A4; Robert Karniol "China Clamps Down On Its CW Tradings," Jane's Defense Weekly, 7 January 1998, p. 5.
May 1997
Nahum Manbar, an Israeli national living in France, is convicted in an Israeli court for providing Iran with $16 million worth of production equipment for mustard and nerve gas between 1990 and 1995.
—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iranian Chemical and Biological Weapons," CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment, 30 July 1997, p. 25.
May 1997
In addition, Manbar had reportedly signed a contract with a representative of the Iranian government to supply Iran with the know-how and equipment to build a plant to produce a chemical used in the production of poison gas, and to make four other types of poison gas.
—Moshe Reinfeld, "Court Rejects Appeal by Manbar," Ha'aretz, 6 December 2000; "Israeli Court rejects Appeal by Manbar Over Chemical Sales, Information to Iran," 6 December 2000; FBIS, Document GMP20001206000089, 6 December 2000.
[Note: For background information concerning this case and the involvement of Nahum Manbar in alleged UK/Israeli intelligence operations to ship chemicals to Iran, see entries in the chronologies for Early 1990s, 1993, and 1994.]
