Iran is one of the few countries in the world that has encountered chemical warfare (CW) on the battlefield since 1918. Iranian troops and civilians suffered tens of thousands of casualties from Iraqi chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88. As a result Iran has adopted a very public stance opposing the use or possession of chemical weapons. In international forums, Iran frequently draws attention to Iraq’s past use of chemical weapons and the assistance that Iraq received from Western governments and corporations in the 1980s. Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997. Nevertheless several Western governments regularly accuse Iran of developing and maintaining its own arsenal of chemical weapons with which it threatens its neighbors. Although Israeli and US intelligence agencies continue to insist that Iran maintains a stockpile of chemical weapons, no effort has been made to take advantage of the challenge inspection mechanisms provided by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to inspection Iranian facilities. Furthermore, none of the allegations made regarding the stockpiling of CW can be verified using information available in the unclassified domain.

US officials have frequently stated that Iran has the capacity to produce several hundred tons of chemical agent annually, sometimes specifying plants near Qazvin, Parchin, and Isfahan as chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs). On several occasions US officials have also alleged that Iran may have produced and stockpiled as much as 2,000 tons of CW agents along with significant quantities of filled munitions such as aerial bombs and artillery rounds. US officials also claim that Iran can probably deploy chemical warheads on its long-range ballistic missiles. Iran’s stockpile of CW agents reportedly includes cyanide, mustard, phosgene and possibly sarin nerve agent. Iran is alleged to have developed this capability with aid from individuals and companies in the West, as well as India and China. In the past there have also been suggestions of active aid and support from the Chinese government. Iran’s extensive CW program is allegedly masked using its relatively sophisticated pharmaceutical and agro-industrial companies as plausible cover. It is further claimed that these companies serve as a front for importing important chemical precursors and related equipment, which are then diverted to the Iranian CW program. Ongoing efforts to increase the size and sophistication of the Iranian chemical industry are viewed with great suspicion in many western capitals.

Although information on WMD programs for many countries is often limited, this is not the case when it comes to assessing Iran’s alleged CW program. Instead the analyst must sift through a mountain of information, much of which is long on allegation and short on facts or specific, verifiable evidence. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that much of the information can be directly traced back to just a handful of sources, little if any of which can be independently corroborated. Most of the sources have a pre-existing bias against Iran, potentially leading to doubts about the veracity of their information and rendering non-factual interpretations or analysis somewhat suspect. Doubts about the validity of information publicly released by Western intelligence agencies, openly or otherwise, have been increased by revelations of selective reporting, the use of unreliable or biased sources, politically motivated leaks and ineffective analysis that emerged in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. On the other hand, revelations since 2003 regarding the extent of Iran’s previously concealed civilian nuclear power program must raise the question of whether there are indeed secret CBW programs. The following profile attempts to piece together an objective overview of allegations surrounding Iran and its CW capabilities by mining through reports in open source literature while taking into consideration the problems and limitations mentioned above.

History

Iran’s modern involvement with CW began with the Iran-Iraq War of 1980 to 1988. Beginning in 1983 Iran suffered the effects of increasingly effective Iraqi CW attacks, initially using blister (mustard) but later including nerve agents such as Tabun (GA) and Sarin (GB). By the end of the War, Iran may have suffered as many as 100,000 chemical warfare casualties, of whom perhaps 5,000 died with many others suffering debilitating long-term health effects. [1]

The weak international response, particularly by the United Nations, to Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces left Iran increasingly bitter about what it perceived to be a double standard in the enforcement of international agreements. Many Iranian officials concluded that their country had to develop the ability to retaliate in kind in order to deter chemical weapons use against it. In a 1987 interview, the Iranian representative to the United Nations, Rajai’e Korassani, stated that “…if the Iraqi regime does not take any steps in putting an end to the crimes of the Iraqi regime, we will retaliate in kind, and in that case, we will certainly announce it.”[2] There are some reports suggesting that during its war with Iraq Iran employed CW agents on a small scale between 1984 and 1988; however, an intensive review of the open literature (including UN reports from that era) have failed to verify such claims.[3] Despite near-constant Iranian rhetoric during the 1980s, invoking the threat of CW in retaliation if the world community failed to take any action against Iraq it seems that Iran lacked the ability to act upon its threats. Furthermore, many Iranian officials have repeatedly highlighted their abhorrence of CW use against military forces or civilians and it is likely that even in the 1980s, proposals for the production and use of chemical weapons did not enjoy universal support in the Iranian leadership.

While several Iranian leaders felt that developing a CW program would counteract the Iraqi threat and prove to be a strong deterrent, others within the clerical Islamic regime publicly condemned any use of chemicals on moral grounds, calling them un-Islamic. Disagreement over a course of policy action led to several contradictory published reports whether or not Iran decided to pursue a CW program. Although the status of its offensive capability is somewhat ambiguous, one can definitely conclude that Iran has a defensive program that can be re-engineered into offensive production, if Iranian national security is threatened.

Agents and Delivery

Though there is no concrete evidence that Iran is currently developing CW, there have been several instances where CW precursors were purchased from foreign sources in the past. Throughout the 1980s, the United States accused Germany of selling dual-use materials and technology to Iran. In 1989 U.S. authorities found Alcolac International Inc., a pharmaceutical firm based out of Baltimore, Maryland, guilty of illegally shipping almost 120 tons of thiodyglycol (a mustard gas precursor) to Iran. The same year, the U.S. Department of Commerce put export controls on 23 specific chemicals that could aid CW proliferation. Also in 1989, the State Trading Corporation of India admitted that it had sold Iran over 60 tons of thionyl chloride (a nerve agent precursor) and that its supplier was planning to ship an additional 257 tons of the chemical to Iran. In 1997, under a reported multi-million dollar deal, India agreed to construct a "sophisticated chemical plant at Qazvim, on the outskirts of Tehran."[4] India also agreed to sell Iran phosphorous pentasulfide, a dual-use chemical used in the production of pesticides as well as the nerve agent VX. The deal eventually fell apart and a similar deal was eventually concluded with China in 1998. China reportedly agreed to sell Iran 500 tons of phosphorus pentasulfide.[5]

China has also been involved in several other sales to Iran, involving CW technology; as a result, several Chinese companies and individuals have faced American sanctions. One example was the 1997 sale by China to Iran of 40,000 barrels of calcium-hypochlorite, a chemical and biological decontaminating agent. Other defensive material purchased by Iran includes respirators from Spain, protective gear from South Korea, and atropine autoinjectors from the Netherlands.[6] In 1995, Asian-Ways, Ltd. World Co (Hong Kong) Ltd. and Mainway International Ltd. were sanctioned by the U.S. State Department for supplying Iran with "nerve gas technology."[7] According to U.S. press accounts citing a top secret CIA report dated 2 October 1996, China sold Iran nearly 400 metric tons of carbon disulfide, a nerve and riot control gas precursor.[8] In 1997, two more Chinese companies and were sanctioned by the U.S. State Department for selling Iran CW related precursors and equipment. The companies involved were Nanjing Chemical Industries Group and Jiangsu Yongli Chemical Engineering and Technology Import/Export Corporation. They were accused of exporting thionyl chloride, dimethylamine, and ethylene chlorohydrin.

Some of the CW agents Iran has allegedly developed include CS gas (a riot control agent), mustard gas, hydrogen cyanide, and phosgene.[9] Some sources, citing U.S. intelligence officials, also claim that Iran has developed sarin, tabun, and V-series nerve agents.[10] There are several delivery routes Iran could take for its chemical agents. Iran is said to have developed 155mm artillery shells, mortar rounds, aerial bombs for chemical fill, and possibly chemical warheads for Scuds.[11] There have also been rumors of using mines to deliver CW agents (120mm).[12]

Iran's well-known Shahab missile is also believed to be capable of carrying chemical warheads, although it is uncertain whether warheads have been developed or tested.[13] In 2002, Iran tested a new version of its Muajar-4 (Mohajer) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), which some experts claim could be used for potential CBW delivery.

Status

Despite its acquisition of precursors from abroad, Iran is allegedly working to develop an indigenous CW production capability. The CIA believes that "Teheran is rapidly approaching self-sufficiency and could become a supplier of CW-related materials to other nations."[14] As of 1996, the U.S. Department of Defense claimed that Iran had stockpiled almost 2000 tons of toxic chemical agents and was continuously working on expanding its CW program. Iran has several advanced research institutions employing various chemicals for a variety of reasons, including pesticide production, pharmaceutical research, and other medical studies. Iran has also conducted several military exercises to date that have included defensive chemical and biological weapons maneuvers.

Iran continues to deny any allegations that it is actively pursuing an offensive CW program. In 1996, it held the first regional seminar on the national implementation of the CWC in Tehran so that government authorities could familiarize themselves with their duties and obligations under the treaty. It also held a mock "trial inspection" at the Shahid Razkani chemical factory to allow inspectors to see how such a procedure was conducted. Iran submitted a declaration on its chemical facilities and its past CW stockpile, it has destroyed chemical weapons production equipment in the presence of OPCW inspectors, and it has undergone a number of OPCW inspections of its chemical industrial facilities. Iran continues to play an active role at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), is recognized as a member in good standing, and currently serves on its executive council. Although U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies continue to insist Iran maintains a stockpile of chemical weapons, no challenge inspections of Iranian facilities have been requested, and none of the allegations made regarding the stockpiling of CW can be verified in the unclassified domain.

Major Suppliers/Major Exporters

The following summary lists key Iranian imports within the realm of its CW program. Several chemicals are dual-use in nature and imported under the umbrella of pesticide, petrochemical, and various pharmaceutical ventures. These sales do not necessarily indicate the presence of an offensive CW capability, but are worth noting due to their potential diversion to an illicit Iranian CW program.

Britain

• Early 1990s, According to the British Observer, the British government exported chemicals to Iran that can be used to manufacture weapons.[15]

China

• Chinese companies have been key suppliers for Iran's chemical weapons program.
• The Chinese corporation SinoChem reportedly delivered 500 tons of phosphorous pentasulfide in 1996 (primary precursor of VX, controlled by the Australia Group; China and Iran are not party to this organization).[16]
• According to U.S. press reports citing a top secret CIA report, China sold Iran nearly 400 metric tons of chemicals used to produce nerve agents and riot control gas.[17]
• China is a key supplier of CW equipment and technologies to Iran according to the U.S. Department of Defense. In an unclassified report to Congress, the DCI said that "Chinese firms had supplied CW-related production equipment and technology to Iran," prior to July 1999, and that evidence during the second half of 1999 "suggests Iran continues to seek such assistance from Chinese entities, but it is unclear to what extent these efforts have succeeded."[18]
• China has been Iran's main source for chemical weapons precursors, manufacturing equipment, and technical expertise since 1994.[19]
• In June 1997, the DCI reported that China, during July-December 1996, provided "considerable CW-related assistance" to Iran, including production equipment and technology.[20]
• According to an intelligence report, cited by the Washington Times on 30 October 1997, China completed construction in June 1997 of a dual-use plant in Iran for making glass-lined equipment used in producing chemical weapons.[21] The Chinese firm was Nanjing Chemical and Industrial Group.[22]
• A classified U.S. intelligence report identified a Chinese individual, Q.C. Chen, as "a major supplier of glass-lined equipment and chemicals to Iran's chemical weapons program." Chen is linked to Nocinco (the North Chemical Industries Corp.), a company that was identified by the CIA as "having delivered several hundred tons of carbon disulfide, an ingredient in nerve agents."[23] Nocinco is affiliated with the China North Industries Corp., Norinco.[24]
• In 1995, orders paid for by Razak Laboratories in Teheran and Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industries in Tabriz, and brokered by Iran's International Movalled Industries Corporation (Imaco) with the North Chemical Industries Corp. (Nocinco), were not delivered. They consisted of 49 metric tons of alkyl dimethylamine, used in making detergent, and 17 metric tons of sodium sulfide, a chemical that could be used in making mustard gas.[25]
• In January-February 1997, China supplied Iran with 40,000 barrels of calcium hypochlorite, a chemical-biological-radiological decontamination agent.[26]
• In 1997, Rex International Development Company Ltd., a company affiliated with the Chinese company Norinco, supplied Iran with high-grade seamless steel pipes, suitable for handling corrosive materials, and associated with chemical weapons production.[27]
• In 1997, two Chinese companies, Nanjing Industries Group and Technology Import/Export Corporation, supplied Iran with thionyl chloride, dimethylamine (tabun nerve gas precursor), ethyl chlorohydrin (possible mustard precursor), and glass-lined mixing vessels.[28]
• On 8 March 1996, the Washington Post reported, "US intelligence officials have concluded that companies in China are providing Iran with several virtually complete factories suited for making deadly poison gases," and that Iranian "military-related organizations" are buying from China glass-lined vessels for mixing precursors, special air-filtration equipment, and the technology to manufacture these items and others indigenously.[29]
• In May 1998, the London Daily Telegraph reported that "Iran has concluded a secret deal with China to purchase banned chemicals that will enable it to become self-sufficient in producing large stockpiles of advanced nerve gas." Under the deal, concluded last month, China supplied Iran with 500 tons of phosphorus pentsulfide, material banned under the terms of the CWC if known to be used in a CW program. The delivery was made in 10 consignments of 50 tons each, for an estimated $924,000. The deal was negotiated by Iran's Defense Industry Organization and China's SinoChem Agency. Previously in 1997, a statement submitted by the office of Madeline Albright—then U.S. Secretary of State—concluded that SinoChem had not been involved in any dual-use shipments to Iran.[30]

East Germany

• In 1984, East Germany (GDR) supplied Iran with 5,000 "respirators," which turned out to be industrial half-masks with goggles, which are unsuitable for chemical defense.[31]

The Netherlands

• Iran purchased atropine autoinjectors for antidotes to nerve gas from a Dutch company.[32]

India

• Report by German intelligence on Iranian efforts to acquire production equipment for tabun and sarin, using three Indian companies as fronts. "With the aid of Indian companies, Iran is nearing the completion of a secret poison-gas plant, which was claimed by the Indian companies to be a pesticide factory." The Indian companies named in the classified report include Tata Consulting Engineering, Transpek, and Rallis India. The Iranian companies involved in the building of the poison-gas complex are Defense Industries, Shahid, Bagheri Industrial Group, and Shahid Hemat Industrial group.[33]
• On 23 June 1996, the Sunday Telegraph reported about a "secret multi-million-pound deal with the Indian government which will supply banned materials used to manufacture poison gas." Under the deal, India will build a sophisticate chemical plant at Qazvin, which will be used produce phosphorous pentasulfide, a dual-use chemical that could be used to produce chemical weapons.[34] According to the Sunday Telegraph, Melli Agrochemicals negotiated the deal on behalf of the Iranian regime. But security experts believe that the deal was authorized by Dr. Majid Tehrani Abbaspur, Iran's chief security adviser and a close associate of President Rafsanjani.[35] The deal eventually fell through and Iran sought China as a replacement for India.
• In early 1989, Iran purchased 60 tons of thionyl chloride, a nerve agent precursor, from India.[36]

Israel

• Israel has maintained military-industrial ties with Iran, according to an internal report, prepared for the Israeli defense ministry establishment in January 1998. The report mentions the sale of 58,000 gas masks by Shalon Chemical Industries after the Iran-Iraq War as well as the supply of gas detectors by Elbit for the identification of chemical warfare agents.[37]

Libya

• Iran allegedly supplied Libya with chemical agents in 1987 in exchange for naval mines. Libya used these agents against Chadian troops later that year.[38] This allegation was brought forth mostly by US government sources and cannot be verified.

Poland

• In the mid-1980s, Mana International Investments, a company registered in Poland and controlled by Nachum Manbar, an Israeli businessman, supplied Iran with NBC protective suits.[39]

Russia

• According to an unclassified report to Congress by the DCI from early 2000, "Russian entities remain a significant source of biotechnology and chemicals for Iran."[40]

South Korea

• In 1984, South Korea supplied Iran with copies of the Finnish Kemira respirators, which proved to be deficient.[41]

Spain

• In 1988, Spain supplied Iran with 200,000 respirators.[42]

Syria

• In 1985, Syria reportedly agreed to supply Iran with chemical weapons, but apparently later backed away from the offer.[43]
• In 1994, reports surfaced that Syria is cooperating with Iran in the development of ballistic missiles designed to carry chemical warheads.[44]

Ukraine

• On 18 December 1997, the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reported that the Eastern railroad network, run by the Bonyad-e Mostazafan va Janbazan, has purchased 100 tank cars from Ukraine, specifically designed to transport highly toxic chemicals.[45]

Several countries

• According to Michael Eisenstadt, Iran initially obtained chemical agent precursors from the United States, Germany, and Japan. When stricter export controls were imposed by these countries in the mid to late 1980s, Iran had to find alternative sources, such as India. In recent years, China has been the principal source of CW precursors, as well as production technology. Iran is currently working on becoming self sufficient in the production of these materials.[46]

Notes and Sources:
[1] Gregory F. Giles, Iranian Approaches to Chemical Warfare, 15 December 1997, p. 5; Anthony Cordesman, "Creating Weapons of Mass Destruction, Armed Forces Journal International 126 (February 1989), p. 54. According to the Mostazafan and Janbazan (Veterans) Foundation of Iran, over 100,000 were exposed to chemical agents. See also Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2 July 2000.
[2] "Envoy to UN interviewed on Chemical Weapons Issuese," Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 22 April 1987, translated in FBIS-SAS-87-078, 23 April 1987, p. 11.
[3] U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, 25 November 1997, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/
meafrica.html#middle.
[4] Con Coughlin Chief, "Iran in Secret Chemical Weapons Deal With India," Sunday Telegraph, 24 June 1996.
[5] Con Coughlin, "China Helps Iran to Make Nerve Gas," London Daily Telegraph, 24 May 1998, p. 1.
[6] Robert Karniol, "China Supplied Iran with Decontamination Agent," Janes Defense Weekly, Vol 27, No. 17, p. 17.
[7] Nicholas Ionides, Untitled, South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 27 April 1995, p. 2.
[8] Bill Gertz, "China Sold Iran Missile Technology," Washington Times, 21 November 1996, p. 1.
[9] Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/iran.htm; Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/cw/index.html; Andrew Rathmell, "Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction," Jane's Intelligence Review – Special Report No. 6, June 1995, p. 16.
[10] Bill Gertz, "China Aided Iran Chemical Arms," Washington Times, 30 October 1997, p. 1; Eric Croddy with John Hart and Clarissa Perez-Almendariz, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen, (New York: Copernicus Books), p. 42; Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/cw/index.html.
[11] Barbara Starr, "Iran Has Vast Stockpiles of CW Agents, Says CIA, " Jane's Defense Weekly, 14 August 1996, p. 3.
[12] Bill Gertz, "China Aided Iran Chemical Arms," Washington Times, 30 October 1997, p. 1; Andrew Rathmell, "Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction," Jane's Intelligence Review – Special Report No. 6, June 1995, p. 17.
[13] Bill Gertz, "Iran Tests Medium-Range Missile," Washington Times, 23 July 1998, p. 1; Bill Gertz, "Teheran Increases Range On Missiles," Washington Times, 22 September 1999.
[14] Statement by Deputy Director, DCI Nonproliferation Center, A. Norman Schindler, on Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction programs to the International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 21 September 2000, http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2000/
schindler_WMD_092200.htm..
[15] "Iran Daily Views Current Events," Teheran Iran Daily; in FBIS Document, 16 June 1999.
[16] Shirley A. Kan, Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief IB92056, 18 July 2000, p. 8.
[17] Charles Aldinger, "US Says Iran Tests Air-launched Missiles in Gulf," Reuters, 1997; Bill Gertz, "China Sold Iran Missile Technology," Washington Times, 21 November 1996, p. 1.
[18] Director of Central Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July through 31 December 1999.
[19] See more details in Gregory F. Giles, Iranian Approaches to Chemical Warfare, 15 December 1997, p. 9.
[20] Shirley A. Kan, Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief IB92056, 18 July 2000, p. 8.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Anthony H. Cordesman, The Military Balance in the Middle East – WMD: Part XIV, 6 October 1999, p. 38.
[23] Bill Gertz, "China Aided Iran Chemical Arms," Washington Times, 30 October 1997, p. 1.
[24] Shirely A. Kan, Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues, CRS Issue Brief IB92056, 18 July 2000, p. 8.
[25] Bill Gertz, "China Aided Iran Chemical Arms," Washington Times, 30 October 1997, p. 1.
[26] Robert Karniol, "China Supplied Iran With Decontamination Agent," Jan's Defense Weekly, 30 April 1997, p. 17.
[27] "Hong Kong Company Caught in CW Deal," The Iran Brief, 5 May 1997.
[28] Steven Lee Myers, "US, Asserting Iran Link, Bars 2 Chinese Firms," New York Times, 23 May 1997, p. 1.
[29] R. Jeffrey Smith, "Chinese Firms Supply Iran With Gas Factories, US Says," Washington Post, 8 March 1996, p. A26.
[30] Con Coughlin, "China Helps Iran To Make Nerve Gas," London Daily Telegraph, 24 May 1998, p. 1; "Iran Denies Report of Chemical Arms Shipment from China," Agence France Presse, 27 May 1998.
Note that the CWC does not ban P2S5 per se, unless it is being shipped to specifically assist a country to develop chemical weapons. The Australia Group, on the other hand, does control P2S5. Since the reported deal, China has added P2S5 to its voluntary export control lists.
[31] Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 251.
[32] Andrew Rathmell, "Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction," Jane's Intelligence Review – Special Report No. 6, June 1995, p. 15.
[33] The Arms Control Reporter, 707.E-2.175, 10-98; Jamie Dettmer, "Teheran Building Deadly Gas Plant," Washington Times, 30 January 1998, p. A1.
[34] Con Coughlin, "Iran in Secret Chemical Weapons Deal With India," Sunday Telegraph, 23 June 1996.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Gregory F. Giles, Iranian Approaches to Chemical Warfare, 15 December 1997, p. 9.
[37] "Defense Ministry Report Confirms Weapon Deals With Iran," Ha'aretz; in FBIS Document, 20 July 1998, p. A4.
[38] Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/cw/index.html; U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, April 1996, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif/me_na.html.
[39] "CW Deliveries from China," The Iran Brief, 6 July 1995.
[40] Director of Central Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July through 31 December 1999.
[41] Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 251.; Andrew Rathmell, "Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction," Jane's Intelligence Review – Special Report No. 6, June 1995, p. 15.
[42] Andrew Rathmell, "Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction," Jane's Intelligence Review – Special Report No. 6, June 1995, p. 15.
[43] Victor A. Utgoff, The Challenge of Chemical Weapons: An American Perspective, (New York: St. Matin's Press, 1991), p. 83.
[44] Ahmed S. Hashim, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Deterrence, Case Study 1: Syria, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998, p. 9.
[45] "Bonyad Buys Special Rail Cars," The Iran Brief, 6 January 1997, p. 5.
[46] Michael Eisenstadt, Deterring Chemical or Biological Weapons Use by Iran: Rational Actor or Undeterrable Rogue?, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, Workshop on "The Challenge of Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Need to Reconceptualize Deterrence?" 25-26 September 1997, p. 2.

	Updated December 2007