As a result of joint Iran-DPRK committees established in 1988 and 1989 and agreements signed between the two nations in 1990, Iran received its first shipments of Shahab-2s ("meteor" or "shooting star") and related equipment in January 1991. These shipments were tracked being flown from the DPRK capital of Pyongyang to Iran by Iranian Boeing 747 aircraft.[1] These shipments consisted of prefabricated "knockdown" kits, which were reassembled at the Esfahan facility. The exact number of missiles acquired is not known, but U.S. officials believe that approximately 100-170 Shahab-2s may have been ordered as part of several arms packages totaling $3 billion. Funding for the Shahab-2s was provided for, in part, by a barter agreement in which Iran would provide $120 million of crude oil during 1991 and a pledge to provide under certain conditions an additional $300 million worth of crude oil a year going forward.[2] That month, the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics announced that it would begin mass-producing "...powerful long-range surface-to-surface missiles..." in February.[3]

During the middle of May, Iran test-fired a Shahab-2. The missile was launched from a mobile transporter-erector launcher (TEL) located near the city of Qom and impacted more than 500km to the East in the Dasht-e Lut desert.[4] Despite this success, the Iranians were experiencing a variety of quality control issues with the Shahab-2s provided by the DPRK.[5] This ongoing problem was to become a contentious issue between the two nations.

Four months later, reports surfaced that Iran and Syria had agreed to jointly produce the Hwasong-6/Shahab-2. Iran would provide the majority of the financing for the $250 million project in Syria. While construction of two factories near the towns of Hamah and Aleppo would be overseen by the DPRK and PRC, which would also provide a majority of the technology and equipment. These factories would initially be responsible for the assembly of Hwasong-6 missiles. They would then progress into the manufacture of the missiles and possibly development of newer systems.[6] Interestingly, Syria is also reported to have engaged Pakistan in an effort to gain access to ballistic missile technology.[7] The agreement between Iran and Syria concerning this project was apparently reached during a visit to Iran by Major General Hekmat Shahabi, Chief-of-Staff of the Syrian Army.[8] During General Shahabi's week-long visit, he held meetings with Iran's senior military and political leaders, including Major General Ali Shabazi, Chief-of-Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces. The reported purpose for the trip was to coordinate the exchange of military expertise and was considered a key step in strengthening bilateral relations. General Shabazi accompanied General Shahabi and his delegation on the inspection of various Iranian military complexes, including missile production facilities.[9]

As part of this three-way agreement, Iran agreed to function as an intermediary, transshipping an estimated $100 million worth of missiles, components, and technology to Syria by air that it received by sea from the DPRK. In exchange for this service, Syria allowed Iran to deliver small arms and ammunition to Hezbollah groups in Lebanon. This transshipment of missile-related components by Iran would spark international crises in late 1991 and early 1992. During late 1991, the DPRK cargo vessel Mupo aborted its delivery of an estimated eight Hwasong-6 TELs and missile-related components and technology to Syria when press reports revealed its activities. These reports led to not-so-veiled threats from Israel and the United States to stop the vessel. The following year, in March 1992, the DPRK cargo vessel Dae Hong Ho succeeded in reaching Iran with its missile related cargo (believed to be primarily manufacturing equipment for Hwasong-6 missiles). This occurred against a background of considerable U.S diplomatic pressure, extensive surveillance by the U.S. Navy, and threats to seize the vessel. The missiles and equipment aboard the Dae Hong Ho were subsequently flown to Syria by Iranian cargo aircraft.[10] There is some suggestion that Iran was also used as an intermediary for deliveries to Egypt and Libya; however, this remains to be confirmed.[11]

During July-August 1992, DPRK Deputy Premier-Foreign Minister Kim Yong-Nam traveled to Syria (27-30 July), Iran (30 July-3 August), and Pakistan (4-7 August) to discuss matters concerning bilateral cooperation. High on the list of matters discussed is believed to have been mutual missile cooperation, sales of Hwasong-6 and Nodong missiles, the joint Syria-Iran-DPRK missile project in Syria, and the increasingly active international counter-proliferation efforts.[12]

Sometime during September-December 1992, the DPRK-assisted conversion of the missile maintenance facility was reportedly completed. It would commence assembly of the Shahab-2 from DPRK supplied components soon thereafter.[13] During the first week of December, Deputy Premier and Chairman of the External Economic Commission Kim DaI-hyon led a delegation to Iran to discuss cooperation in economic, scientific, and technological fields. Included within this discussion was further ballistic missile cooperation.[14]

Throughout 1991 and 1992, the issues of poor quality control and to a lesser degree the failure to meet agreed upon delivery schedules for missiles, components, and technology became a major issue between Iran and the DPRK. The Iranian displeasure led to significant decreases in crude oil deliveries, which dropped from 980,000 tons in 1990 to 220,000 tons in 1992. Another example of the Iranian displeasure with the DPRK occurred during 1992, when an enraged senior member of Iranian parliament publicly stated that the DPRK had demanded a cash payment of between $2.4 billion and $2.7 billion for missiles provided during the war. This was made all the more painful for the DPRK because of its deepening economic crisis.[15]

Iran continued to receive DPRK produced missiles, components, and technology for the Shahab-2 program throughout the 1990s. During late 1994, Iran received at least four Shahab-2 TELs from the DPRK, bringing the total number of Shahab-1/-2 TELs in Iranian inventory to approximately 14-18.[16] Reports indicate that these were shipped by air primarily using An-124s leased from the Bulgarian airline Air Sofia.[17] By early 1995, the Shahab-2s assembled by Iran were utilizing a significant proportion of indigenously manufactured parts and components. This localization of production would continue through 1990s although Iran would continue to depend upon the DPRK for an engines and guidance system components. Iranian missile specialists are believed to have been present in Syria in November 1994 when that country conducted a flight-test of the Hwasong-6. Iran has also continued to collaborate with Syria to produce the Scud-C and has probably been involved in the development of the Scud-D.[18]

Initially, it is believed that Shahab-2 TELs, missiles, and equipment were organized as a separate battalion within Iran's existing missile brigade. During the early 1990s, this Shahab-2 unit is believed to have been separated and formed into a new brigade. This was apparently done to facilitate its operational deployment and to prepare for the introduction of the Shahab-3 (see separate entry). A component of the new brigade was tasked with operational test and evaluation of the new system.

As cooperation with the DPRK slowed in 1994, Iran expanded efforts to acquire missile-related technology and components from Russia, the PRC, and a wide variety of sources. For example, in July 1995, Belarus and Iran signed a military cooperation agreement through which Iran would buy conventional weapons and the two sides would consult on "technological processes." Unconfirmed reports indicate that during late 1996 or early 1997, Iran and Syria discussed the transfer of 50 Shahab-2 missiles with support personnel to Syria. Such a transfer does not appear to have occurred and these reports may have confused the transshipment of DPRK-manufactured systems or the Iranian shipment of Shahab-2 components to assist the Syrian missile program.[19]

By the late 1990s, Iran had reached the point at which it had moved from the simple assembly of DPRK-provided components to actual production of both the Shahab-1 and -2. During 1997, cooperation with the DPRK and deliveries of components and technologies had resumed. Much of this assistance went into the Shahab-3 program; however, it is believed that some components for the Shahab-1 and -2 were still purchased from the DPRK. In November 1999, a published report indicated that Iran had sold "Scud-B and Scud-C" (Shahab-1 and Shahab-2) missiles to the Democratic Republic of Congo (see above). This report appears to be highly speculative and may be confusing conventional arms sales by Iran.[20]

The Shahab-2 program has undeniably been of significant benefit to both Iran and the DPRK. In relation to the Shahab-2 program, Iran's cooperation with Syria and probably Libya has been beneficial to all the countries involved, including the DPRK. For the foreseeable future, cooperation between Iran and the DPRK in the Shahab-2 program will continue, as is suggested by the continued exchange of high-level political and military delegations.

Shahab-Attacks on the MKO

On 6 November 1994, Iran fired three Shahab-1/-2 missiles into Iraq, striking at the Ashraf base of the anti-Iranian Mojahedin-e Khalq (MKO) guerrilla group.[21] Ashraf is the MKO's main military base and is located 80km from the border with Iran and 120km northeast of Baghdad. This was the first time that Iran had employed ballistic missiles since the end of the war. Iran stated that the attack was in response to a clash the previous week with MKO guerrillas who had infiltrated into Iran to attack oil installations in the Musian region. The first missile impacted at 0035 [2135 GMT], the second at 0040 [1940 GMT], and the third at 0130 [2030 GMT]. All three missiles are believed to have been launched from the Kermanshah area. A MKO spokesman stated that there were no casualties and that only buildings were damaged. One missile reportedly impacted near a training area forming a crater seven meters wide and 3.5 meters deep. A second missile landed within the camp and the third impacted one kilometer away.[22]

Five years later, MKO guerrillas again accused Iran of launching a Shahab missile attack against its Ashraf base. The attack reportedly occurred on 10 June 1999 and consisted of four missiles—two struck the camp landing in a training area, one hit a nearby village, and one exploded in the air. A guerrilla spokesman stated that there were no casualties among the guerrillas, but six civilians were wounded outside the camp. They further stated that the missiles had been launched from the Kermanshah area. Iran denied any involvement.[23] Five months later, MKO guerrillas again accused Iran of another Shahab missile attack. This time six guerrillas and eleven civilians were reported killed.[24] The validity of the MKO reports concerning the second and third attacks is called into question by a number of facts and sources, and remains to be verified.

During the first week of July 2001, Kurdish sources indicated that the MKO was going to relocate its bases in Jalawla, Basra, and on the Iranian border due to the continuing threat from Iranian missile attacks.[25]

Available information suggests that Iran has a current inventory of 100-150 Shahab-2 missiles. The numbers of Shahab-2 systems will increase if Iran undertakes to upgrade Shahab-1 missiles to Shahab-2 configuration. These systems are capable of being armed with conventional high explosive, submunition, chemical, biological and radiological dispersion warheads.

Key Sources:
[1] Wyn Bowen, Tim McCarthy, and Holly Porteous, "Ballistic Missile Shadow Lengthens," International Defense Review, 1 February 1997, p. 1; Ruth Sinai,. "Gulf-Iraqi Scuds," Associated Press, 30 January 1991; Ed Blanche, "Gulf-Iran Missiles," Associated Press, 29 January 1991; "The Gulf War Briefing: Iran's Arsenal Worries Analyst," Newsday, p. 16.
[2] "N. Korea, Iran Swap Arms for Oil, S. Korea Says," Reuters, 19 November 1992.
[3] "Increase in Egypt's 'Scuds' Leads to BAe Pull-out," Jane's Defense Weekly, 5 September 1992, p. 31; "DPRK Scuds Said to Arrive in Iran," KBS-1 Television, 13 October 1991, as cited in FBIS; Bill Gertz, "Iran Fired Ballistic Missile," Washington Times, 24 May 1991, p. A5; Knut Royce, "The Gulf War Briefing: Iran's Arsenal Worries Analysts," Newsday, 30 January 1991, p. 16; Ed Blanche, "Gulf-Iran Missiles," Associated Press, 29 January 1991. Some sources state that the contract was for 200 Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 missiles. While the report of a combination of Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 missiles seems plausible, the 200 figure appears excessive. Several months later, during October, reports surfaced that indicated that the DPRK had exported 20 Scud missiles to Iran and that some of them already have arrived there and were fully assembled.
[4] Bill Gertz, "Iran Fired Ballistic Missile," Washington Times, 24 May 1991, p. A5.
[5] "N. Korea, Iran Swap Arms for Oil, S. Korea Says," Reuters, 19 November 1992.
[6] "Syria-Iran-Missiles," Associated Press, 1 October 1991.
[7] Lally Weymouth, "In Israel, a New View Of Syria," Washington Post, 6 July 1992.
[8] "Syria and Iran Pool SRBM Resources," Flight International, 16-22 October 1991, p. 15.
[9] "Iran-Syria," Associated Press, 1 October 1991.
[10] Bill Gertz, "N. Korean Ship Hugged Coast to Avoid Blockage," Washington Times, 18 May 1992, p. A6; "Pentagon Can't Say if Ship had Scuds," Washington Times, 18 March 1992, p. A2; "Cheney-Scuds," Associated Press, 17 March 1992; "General Admits U.S. Missed Korean Ship," Washington Times, 12 March 1992, p. A2; John Lancaster, "Suspected Scud Shipment Reaches Iran," Washington Post, 11 March 1992; Bill Gertz, "N. Korean Freighter Arrives in Iran with Scuds for Syria," Washington Times, 11 March 1992, p. A3; Department of Defense, Regular Briefing, 10 March 1992; Bill Gertz, "Iran-Syria Deal Revealed as Scuds Near Gulf Ports," Washington Times, 10 March 1992, p. A3; Bill Gertz, "U.S. Eyes Syria as Recipient of Scuds," Washington Times, 9 March 1992, p. A1.
[11] Jack Anderson and Michael Binstein, "North Korea: Loose Nuclear Cannon," Washington Post, 29 March 1992.
[12] "North Korea Strengthens Ties With Syria, Iran and Pakistan - Foreign Minister Makes Official Tours," pp. 5-6; "Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam Visits Syria, Iran and Pakistan," p. 5; "Kim Yong-nam Leaves For Syria, Iran, Pakistan;" and "In Israel, a New View Of Syria," p. A1.
[13] "Scuds-Mideast," Associated Press, 3 March 1992.
[14] "Deputy Premier Kim Dal-hyon Visits Iran," North Korea News, No. 661, 14 December 1992, pp. 5-6.
[15] "Iranian Defense Minister Visits North Korea," Reuters, 6 December 1993; "'Sources:' DPRK Oil Supply Decreasing Annually," Yonhap, 19 April 1993, as cited in FBIS.
[16] Some sources suggest the total may have been as high as 24. Tony Cappaccio, "North Korea Has Transferred Mobile Scud Launchers To Iran," Defense Week, 1 May 1995, p. 1; "Air Sofia Denies Shipping SCUD Launchers," Kontinent, 8 December 1994, p. 7, as cited in FBIS; "Dailies Report Arms Shipment to Syria 'Foiled'," BTA, 8 December 1994, as cited in FBIS; and Starr, Barbara. "Iran gets 'Scud' TELs from North Korea," Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 May 1995, p. 5.
[17] The An-124 can carry eight MAZ-543P TELs. These TELs consisted of MAZ-543 trucks purchased by the DPRK and subsequently modified into TELs using a commercial components from around the world (e.g., a Mitsubishi APU, etc.).
[18] "Israeli Report on Nuclear Targeting Priorities," Davar, 13 January 1995, p. 15, as cited in JPRS; and "Iran Will be Able to Make its Own short-range Scud...," BMD Monitor, 2 December 1994, p. 425.
[19] "Intelligence Sources Report Growing Iran-Syria Cooperation," Yedi'ot Aharonot, 27 March 1997, p. 19, as cited in FBIS.
[20] "Iran-Scuds," Associated Press, 22 November 1999; Bill Gertz, "Iran Sold Scud Missiles To Congolese," Washington Times, 22 November 1999, p. 1.
[21] The MKO is composed of exile Iranians (primarily Arabs) and fought on Iraq's side during the Iran-Iraq war. Following the war, it conducted raids and terrorist bombings within Iran. It is sometimes known by the acronym MEK. For a short background of the MKO see, Douglas Jehl, "Mullahs, Look! Women, Armed and Dangerous," New York Times, 30 December 1996, p. A4; Sean Boyne, "Tehran Targets Iraq-Based Rebel Forces," Jane's Intelligence Review, April 2000, pp. 20-23.
[22] "Rebel Radio on 'Failed' Air Attack," Voice of Mojahed, 9 November 1994, as cited in FBIS; "UN Ambassador Criticizes Iran's 6 November Attack," INA, 8 November 1994, as cited in FBIS; "Iran Fires Rockets at Mojahedin Base," Washington Times, 7 November 1994, p. A16; "Iran and Iraq," Mideast Mirror, 7 November 1994, p. 18; "Scud Missiles Fired at MKO Camp in Iraqi Envoy Summoned," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 7 November 1994, as cited in FBIS; "Scud Missiles Fired at MKO Camp in Mojahedin Radio Reports Attack," Voice of Mojahed, 6 November 1994, as cited in FBIS; "Camp on Alert After Attack," AFP, 6 November 1994; and "Spokesman Denounces Iranian 'Aggression'," INA, 6 November 1994, as cited in FBIS.
[23] "Iran Denial of MKO Base Strike 'Ridiculous'," Space Channel Television, 11 June 1999, as cited in FBIS; "Iraq-Iran," Associated Press, 11 June 1999; "Iraq Says Iran Hits Exile Base With Missiles," Reuters, 11 June 1999.
[24] "Iraq-Iran," Associated Press, 14 November 1999.
[25] "Iraqi Authorities Reportedly Move Iranian MKO Bases To Kurdish Region," Regay Kurdistan, 2 July 2001, p. 1.

	Updated February 2006