This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

Early 1990
Iran reportedly receives 20 North Korean Scud-B missiles.
—Steven Emerson, "The Postwar Scud Boom," The Wall Street Journal, 10 July 1991, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

1990
North Korea sells Iran 170 Scud missiles. Iran is possibly manufacturing Nodong-1 missiles under North Korean license.
—Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 September 1992, p. 31, cited in "Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles and Missile Defense Systems: Trade and Significant Developments (July-November 1992)," Nonproliferation Review, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Fall 1993, Vol. 1 No. 1, p. 109.

1990
Iran is able to produce local versions of North Korean Scud-B missiles.
—Duncan Lennox, "Co-operation boosts missile proliferation," Jane's Intelligence Review, January 2002, p. 41.

1990
Iran reportedly purchases 130-150km-range CSS-8 (converted SA-2) surface-to-surface missiles from China.
—Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000), p. 39.

1990
Sales to Iran by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) amount to less than $1 billion.
—"Arms to Iran," Jane's Defence Weekly, 18 January 1992, p.71.

Early 1990s
Iran shifts away from purchasing to indigenously producing missile systems. Iran develops its own longer-range versions of North Korea's Nodong missile, with North Korean, Russian, and Chinese assistance. One of the Chinese firms helping Iran is Great Wall Industries. The Russian companies include the Russian Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute, which supplies Iran's Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) with wind tunnels, technical equipment, and software for designing and testing missiles. Other Russian companies that allegedly help Iran's missile programs include the arms-exporter Rosvoorouzhenie, rocket engine manufacturer NPO Trud, the Bauman Institute, and Polyus (Northstar), a laser test and manufacturing equipment firm.
—Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000), p. 39.

Early 1990s
American and Israeli officials say that in the early 1990s, Iran began efforts to acquire Russian missile technology, including fuel and oxygen turbo-pumps, special steels to lighten missile airframes, wind tunnels for aerodynamics tests, and ablative materials designed to withstand high temperatures. It is not known how much of this technology Iran possesses.
—Michael Dobbs, "A Story of Iran's Quest for Power: A Scientist Details The Role of Russia," Washington Post, 13 January 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

Early 1990s
For several years following the end of the Gulf War, Iran allows North Korea to access wreckage from BGM-109 Tomahawk missiles that landed in Iran or that it had obtained from Bosnia. North Korea is likely unable to obtain sufficient design or operational knowledge from the missiles, but examining the wreckage "may have provided some insight into possible counter-measures or served as a design catalyst."
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 33.

1990-1991
Jane's Defence Magazine (Yearbook 1990-1991) reports that the Ministry of Defense of Iran develops a missile named Oghab (Eagle). It looks like a Chinese 272mm rocket, but is made indigenously in Iran. It has "a length of 4.82 metres, diameter of 230mm, with a body weighing 360kg and its warhead weighing 70kg. (It contains high explosives.)" A tripod launching system is used to launch this missile. The launchers have two pads on which to put the missiles.
—Staff Colonel Yaqub Aslan, "World Strategic Rockets and Missiles: Iran's Surface to Surface Missiles," Saff (Tehran), No. 229, 22 May-21 June 1999; in "Saff on Iran's Surface-to-Surface Missiles," FBIS Document FTS19990904000330, 4 September 1999.

1990-1991
Iran supposedly begins its indigenous manufacture of the Silkworm missile after China ends its supply of complete missile systems to Iran. These are believed to be produced at a facility in Isfahan, overseen by the Chinese.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Iran's Missile Development," The International Missile Bazaar: the New Suppliers Network (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994),William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., p. 60.

1990-1991
The U.S. Commerce Department approves the sale of $59 million worth of high-technology equipment to Iran, including computers, gyroscopes, and oscilloscopes. A separate list indicates that, during the same period, the U.S. government rejected $1.49 billion worth of contracts.
—Keith Bradsher, "US Allowed Some High-Tech Sales to Iran in '90," New York Times, 31 January 1992, p. A3.

January 1990
Iranian Defense Minister Ali Akbar Torkan reaches an agreement with the Chinese for the transfer of production technology of a wide variety of systems including the M-11, referred to as Tondar-68 and M-9.
—Kenneth R. Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction The Case of Iran, Syria and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 27.

20 February 1990
Said Asefi Inanlou, an Iranian who masterminded a scheme to smuggle sophisticated U.S. military hardware to Iran, is sentenced to three years in federal prison. Inanlou says that he was motivated by patriotism: "When I did this act, I didn't think I was doing anything wrong. I was helping my country." Inanlou acted in cooperation with Franklin and Edgardo Agustin, who received 13 and 18 years of federal prison time, respectively. Inanlou is the last of seven defendants to be sentenced for their participation in a scheme to steal parts for the F-14 Tomcat fighter, including inertial navigation aids and guiding mechanisms for the Phoenix air-to-air missile for shipment to Iran. U.S. Customs agents claim that the ring operated between January 1981 and July 1985. Investigators have traced 26 shipments made by the Agustins to Inanlou, but only eight of those shipments were seized.
—H.G. Reza, "Iranian given three years in the theft scheme; Crime: Surprise greets sentence for mastermind of plot to smuggle sophisticated US military hardware to his homeland," Los Angeles Times, 21 February 1990, p. B1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

March 1990
Iranian Defense Minister Akbar Torkan states that the Fajr-3 missile with a 45km range is now in large-scale production.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Iran's Missile Development," The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers Network (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., p. 64.

2 March 1990
The Fajr-3 missile is tested and is ready for mass production. The missile is reported to be of the rapid reaction type and covers a 45km area.
—"Fajr-3 Missile Reaches Mass Production Stage," Tehran International, 3 March 1990; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-90-046, 8 March 1990, p. 51.

28 March 1990
Western military experts report that a large contingent of Chinese ballistic missiles has been transported to Tianjin port, in all probability to be shipped to the Middle East. The experts place Iran and Iraq at the top of the possible recipient list. On 25 and 26 March, two convoys of missiles, launchers, and other equipment were transported at night across Beijing under police escort and bound for the port of Tianjin. A Western expert estimated the number of missiles, lashed onto a flatbed truck and covered by tarps, at more than 24. Experts suggest that because many of the missiles bore markings, with shipment specifications in Chinese giving the dimensions of each load, the missiles were intended for export. The consignment is believed to have included short-range M-1B surface-to-surface missiles and anti-aircraft missiles, most likely the SA-2. A diplomat in Beijing claims, "They certainly weren't big tubes of toothpaste." A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, Li Zhaoxing, argues, "Don't believe in rumors." The convoys apparently originated in an armaments factory west of Beijing.
—Andrew Higgins, "Chinese poised to resume missile exports," The Independent (London), 29 March 1990, p. 11, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

Late March 1990
U.S. intelligence reveals that China is ready to supply Iran with at least 50 of its 8610 short-range, surface-to-surface missiles. The missile's range is 120-130km. The 8610 seems to be the surface-to-surface version of its HQ-2 surface-to-air missile.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Iran's Missile Development," The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers Network (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., p. 64.

May 1990
China delivers 48 of its 8610 short-range surface-to-surface missiles to Iran.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Iran's Missile Development," The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers Network (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., p. 64. [Note: It was reported in late March 1990 that China was ready to supply Iran with at least 50 short-range, surface-to-surface missiles.]

October 1990
Mohammad Danesh and Reza Amiri of a Newport Beach, California computer consulting firm, end their exports of a portable oscilloscope and other sensitive electronic equipment to Iran. These exports began in April 1989.
—Cristina Lee, "Pair Charged with Illegal Exports to Iran," Los Angeles Times, 13 September 1991, p. D2, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Cristina Lee, "Executive Gets Prison Term for Exports to Iran; Courts: Computer Consulting Firm Manager Shipped Restricted Equipment and Misled Customs Officials About It. His Employer Faces Sentencing Next Month," Los Angeles Times, 26 August 1992, p. D5, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 November 1990
Despite denials of missile cooperation between Iran and North Korea, Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohsen Rezai meets with a senior North Korean delegation, headed by Oh Jin U, in Tehran. The two countries forge an agreement for Iran to purchase North Korea's Scud-C missiles and for North Korea to provide assistance in converting a missile maintenance site in eastern Iran to be used for the assembly of the Scud-C. North Korea is exporting the missiles through its Lyongaksan Import Corporation.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Iran's Missile Development," The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers Network (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., pp. 57-58; Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000), p. 36, <http://www.csis.org>.

December 1990
Iran sends officials to North Korea for on-site training in the production and launching of ballistic missiles, while North Korea sends technical advisors to Iran to rework a missile maintenance facility into a missile production factory. Since January 1991, Iran has also been receiving Scud-C missile parts from North Korea.
—"The Post-War Scud Boom," Wall Street Journal, 10 July 1991, p. A12.

December 1990
In Iran, North Korean technical experts start the conversion of a missile maintenance facility into a missile assembly and production site. At the same time, members of Iran's military are trained in North Korea in making and operating the Scud-C.
—Steven Emerson, "The Postwar Scud Boom," Wall Street Journal, 10 July 1991, p. A12.

27 December 1990
The air force unit of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) adds the SAM-6 surface-to-air missile to its arsenal. In a brief speech, IRGC Deputy Commander Rahim Yahya Safavi states that the Iranian combat units are to be protected by SAM-6 anti-aircraft missiles.
—"Air Force Adds SAM-6 Missiles to Arsenal," Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), 27 December 1990; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-90-250, 28 December 1990, p. 37.

Late 1990
In Semnan, 175km east of Tehran, the building of a launch range and test site appears to have been completed.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Iran's Missile Development," The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers Network (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., p. 59.

	Updated February 2006