This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

1993
The Iranian Instrumentation Factories Plant (IFP) obtains dual-use technology and materials used for a gyroscope production plant.
—Mikhail Kirillin, "Several U.S. Firms Engaged in Developing Missile Equipment Have Links with Iranians," Yadernyy Kontrol (Moscow), March-April 1998, No. 2, Vol. 38, pp. 37-43; in "Iran's Missile Industry, U.S. Missile Development Firms with Iranian Links," FBIS Document FTS19980605000876, 1 March 1998.

1993
The Iranian Defense Industries Organization reportedly offers the Nazeat (Iran-130) rocket system for sale to foreign customers, as well as the Noor and Hadid 122mm rocket and the Fajr 107mm rocket.
—Dr. Andrew Rathmell, "Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction," Jane's Intelligence Review-Special Report, June 1995, No. 6, p. 19; Duncan Lennox, "Iran's ballistic missile projects: uncovering the evidence," Jane's Intelligence Review, June 1998, No. 6, p. 24.

1993
Iran has a $7 billion arms import plan which includes the purchase of supersonic SS-N-22 Sunburn or Sunburst anti-ship missiles and SA-10 (S-300) surface-to-air missiles. Most experts agree that Iran has succeeded in purchasing SA-5 surface-to-air missiles from Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union during 1991-1993. Evidence indicates that deliveries and orders from China included versions of the SA-2 surface-to-air missile.
—Anthony H. Cordesman, Threats and Non-Threats from Iran (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 January 1995), p.14.

1993
Iran takes delivery of an unspecified number of Scud-C missiles and launchers as part of a deal with North Korea. This shipment is in addition to about 250 Scud-B missiles that North Korea supplied to Iran before the Gulf War. [Note: The delivery in question may have been from the ship reported in late October 1992.]
—Jerusalem Israel Television Network, 9 February 1993, in "North Korean Scud-C Missiles Delivered," JPRS-TND-93-006, 5 March 1993, pp. 13-14.

1993-1994
Iran has ballistic missiles of the Scud variety, possibly with an extended range. Iran's Army possesses Frog-7 SSMs, more than 100 Scud-Bs, and some Scud-C SSMs, with local manufacture of SSMs reported. Iran also possesses SA-7 and HN-5 SAMs.
—"Iran: Middle East and North Africa," Middle East Military Balance, 1993-1994, pp.109, 115.

January 1993
Iran has established a procurement agency for military goods in London, managed by former diplomat Jamal Haj Esmaili.
—Alan George, Flight International, 20 January 1993, p. 4, cited in "Ballistic, Cruise Missile and Missile Defense Systems: Trade and Significant Developments, November 1992-April 1993," Nonproliferation Review, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Winter 1994, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 157.

January 1993
Iranian officials travel to China to conclude a deal begun in late 1991 for the purchase of 10 Hega class fast attack missile ships. Iran is also seeking a ship armed with the Ying Ji anti-ship missile, which has a range of 40km.
—Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 February 1993, p. 48, cited in "Ballistic, Cruise Missile and Missile Defense Systems: Trade and Significant Developments, November 1992-April 1993," Nonproliferation Review, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Winter 1994, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 158.

5 January 1993
Federal agents arrest Reza Zandian of Tehran and Charles Reeger of Huntington Beach for attempting to illegally export a $2 million IBM ES 9000 computer. The ES 9000 is IBM's most powerful computer and can be used for military purposes.
—Michael Flagg, "Two Accused of Illegal Export Attempt; Crime: The Men, One an Iranian, Allegedly Tried to Ship the Most Powerful IBM Computer to Iran," Los Angeles Times, 5 January 1993, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 January 1993
Western diplomatic sources claim that China is purchasing an unknown number of MiG-29s from Iran in exchange for Chinese missile technology and a nuclear power station.
—"Iran to Supply MiGs in Exchange for Missile Technology," Kyodo (Tokyo), 8 January 1993; in Proliferation Issues, 15 January 1993, p. 3.

12 January 1993
Iranian Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohsen Rezai travels to Pyongyang from Beijing to finalize new agreements regarding weapon systems including ballistic missiles. Shortly before Rezai's departure from Iran, a member of the Iranian parliament reveals that North Korea has demanded a cash payment of $2.4 to $2.7 billion for the 200 to 300 Scud-B missiles delivered to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. [Note: The number of missiles mentioned may be excessive given North Korean production capabilities and the level of Iranian Scud-B use during the two "Wars of the Cities." During that stage of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran fired approximately 91 Scud-B missiles. Also, it is unlikely that North Korea would demand a cash payment given the financial arrangements already in place with Iran.]
—Kenneth Timmerman, "Iran Seeks Missiles From China, North Korea," Mednews, Vol. 6, No. 8, 25 January 1993, pp. 3-4.

13 January 1993
Israeli defense analysts claim that Iran may obtain the North Korean Nodong-1 missile when it becomes operational between 1995 and 1998. Iran and Libya both provide funding to North Korea for the Nodong missile project. Iran reportedly may try to upgrade the Nodong-1 with technology from outside sources.
—"Iran/Libya seek North Korean missile," Flight International, 13 January 1993, p. 14.

15 January 1993
Title XVI of the U.S. Department of Defense authorization act places Iran under the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (PL 101-513). Under this act, the United States opposes, and seeks that other states oppose, transfers of goods or technology to Iran that would contribute to its acquisition of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, or destabilizing numbers of advanced conventional weapons.
—"Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992," Arms Sales Monitor, 15 January 1993, p. 3.

16 January 1993
Saudi and French authorities report that since 1988, Iran has spent more than $7 billion on fighter jets, missiles, tanks, and other weapons from China, North Korea, Russia, and Eastern Europe.
—Paul Gillespie, "Iran Could Become Clinton's Obsession," Irish Times, 16 January 1993, p. 8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 January 1993
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin warns that Iran, which is receiving Scud-C missiles and technology to develop longer-range missiles from North Korea, presents a greater threat to Israel than Iraq. Rabin adds that Iran is also working in cooperation with other countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa to manufacture its own long-range ground-to-ground missiles that could hit Israel.
—Dan Izenberg, "Rabin: Iran Potentially Greater Threat Than Iraq," Jerusalem Post, 21 January 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

February 1993
The U.S. Defense Department reports that between 2000 and 2010, Syria, Iran, and China will possess cruise missiles with stealth capabilities and chemical and biological warheads.
—Aviation Week & Space Technology, 1 February 1993, pp. 26-72, cited in "Ballistic, Cruise Missile and Missile Defense Systems: Trade and Significant Developments, November 1992-April 1993," Nonproliferation Review, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Winter 1994, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 157.

February 1993
The Central Intelligence Agency reports that Iran, Syria, and Libya have already deployed precision guided cruise missiles that threaten U.S. naval forces. The CIA says, however, that Iran's missile program faces a shortage of skilled personnel, technology, materials, and financing. North Korea is becoming the main supplier of Iran and Syria's missile programs, and "is willing to sell to any country with the cash to pay."
—David Fulghum, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 1 March 1993, p. 25, cited in "Ballistic, Cruise Missile and Missile Defense Systems: Trade and Significant Developments, November 1992-April 1993," Nonproliferation Review, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Winter 1994, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 157; John J. Flalka, Wall Street Journal, 25 Feb. 1993, p. A10, cited in "Ballistic, Cruise Missile and Missile Defense Systems: Trade and Significant Developments, November 1992-April 1993," Nonproliferation Review, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Winter 1994, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 158.

7 February 1993
The CIA alleges that Iran is spending $2 billion per year on high-tech weaponry and that it will have a nuclear bomb by the end of the decade. According to these agencies, Iran is buying submarines, planes, and tanks from Russia, jet fighters and tactical missiles from China, and medium-range missiles from North Korea.
—Bob Hepburn, "Iran Resurgent: A Military Buildup and Support for Extremist Groups Have Mideast States and West Wary of Tehran," Toronto Star, 7 February 1993, p. F2, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 February 1993
Iran has received a number of launching pads as well as Scud-C SSMs with a range of 500km as part of a deal Iranian authorities previously signed with North Korea. Iran had received 250 Scud-B missiles before the Gulf War.
—"Delivery Reportedly Taken of DPRK Scud-C," Israel Television Network, 9 February 1993; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-93-026, 10 February 1993, p. 47; "North Korean Scud-C Missiles Delivered," Israel Television Network, 9 February 1993; in Proliferation Issues, 5 March 1993, pp. 13-14.

16 February 1993
Iran reportedly is working with North Korea on the development of a long-range missile. Military sources at the United Arab Emirates Arms Show identify the missile system as the North Korean Nodong-1 and claim that it could be ready for production by 1996.
—"I Quarter 1993: February," Gulf/2000 Project (New York: School of International and Public Affairs [SIPA], Columbia University, February 1993).

24 February 1993
The Army of Iran has North Korean-made Scud missiles with a 300km range and Chinese-made Silkworm missiles with an 800km range. Iran is also developing missiles domestically: the Ujab (Oghab) with a 40km range, the Thandar with a 48km range, the Nazeat with a 90km range, the Shaheen with a 130km range, the Iran with a 130km range, and the Mushak with a 160km range.
—"Iran, Iraq, Syria Busily Expanding Their Arsenals," Jerusalem Post, 24 February 1993, in Lexis-Nexis <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 February 1993
An unnamed Middle Eastern military source states that Iran is working with North Korea on developing a long-range missile capable of traveling 621 miles and carrying a 1760-pound conventional warhead.
—Alan Lupo, "The Iran Threat," Boston Globe, 24 February 1993, p. 13, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 February 1993
CIA head James Woolsey states that North Korea has agreed to sell ballistic missiles to Libya, having already sold extended-range Scud rockets to Syria and Iran.
—"Iran Stockpiling Arms, CIA Director Testifies," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 25 February 1993, p. 1C, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

March 1993
A group of 21 Iranian officials travels to Pyongyang, North Korea to discuss cooperation on ballistic missile programs. The discussions include Iranian involvement in North Korea's upcoming test of its Nodong missile, as well as negotiating purchase of the Nodong. The Iranian group is led by Brigadier General Hossein Mantequei, director of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO). The DIO, through a project known as "Department 140," is responsible for Iran's ballistic missile development and production activities.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 22.

March 1993
Western intelligence sources claim that Iran is providing $500 million for North Korea's ballistic missile program, which would be capable of striking Japan with nuclear and chemical warheads. In return, North Korea will provide Iran with nuclear bombs and technical plans for nuclear weapons manufacturing. North Korea's Central News Agency denied these allegations.
—US News & World Report, 22 March 1993, p. 18; Reuter (Tokyo), 18 April 1993; Washington Times, 19 April 1993, p. A2; all cited in "Ballistic, Cruise Missile and Missile Defense Systems: Trade and Significant Developments, November 1992-April 1993," Nonproliferation Review, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Winter 1994, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 158.

1 March 1993
A report indicates that the Chemical Industries Group handles Iran's weapons industry. U.S. intelligence sources say that Iran's Chemical Industries Group is producing solid-fuel propellant powders for Iran's ballistic missile and artillery rocket programs. The Missile Industries Group oversees all missile-related activities in Iran. Prior to the U.S. embargo in February 1988, Iran obtained ammonium perchlorate for solid-rocket propellant from the United States, Pakistan, and Holland. After the embargo, Iran is believed to have obtained its ammonium perchlorate from China through Brazil as an intermediary. According to Iranian engineers, the Nazeat-10, which is under development, is an unguided rocket variant of the Nazeat-6. Iranian engineers confirmed that production of solid- and liquid-fueled missiles is done separately. The Semnan facility jointly produces solid-fueled rockets with China and the Isfahan facility produces liquid-fueled ballistic missiles with North Korea.
—"Special Report: The Iranian Defense Industry," Mednews, 1 March 1993, p. 1.

1 March 1993
Iran is interested in acquiring the Russian S300V anti-missile system, which Russia claims is capable of intercepting high-altitude Scud-type ballistic missiles.
—"Iran Cancels Russian Deals," Mednews, 1 March 1993, pp. 4-5.

19 March 1993
Dr. Martin Navias, lecturer at the Department of War Studies at King's College, London, asserts that because North Korea has few allies and is so indebted to Iran, it is likely that North Korea has sold all of its secrets to Iran. He claims that the North Koreans acquired a Scud missile from Egypt in the 1980s, copied it, and sold the first products to Iran. Later agreements between North Korea and Iran include a new missile dubbed "Tondar-68."
—"N Korea given atom inspection deadline," Daily Telegraph (London), 19 March 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 March 1993
The "most impressive" missile in the Iranian arsenal—the Nodong—has been manufactured in North Korea, and was jointly financed by Libya and Iran. North Korea reportedly received ￡350 million from Iran to build two secret plants for ballistic missile production. The Nodong has twice the range of the Scud-B missile.
—Con Coughlin, "Why Tehran is the Real Threat to West's Safety as Saddam Hussein Dominates the Headlines, Iran Goes Shopping to Become Middle East Superpower," Sunday Telegraph (London), 21 March 1993, p. 24, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 March 1993
Citing US News & World Report, Iran has paid North Korea $500 million to develop ballistic missiles that could reach targets as far away as Japan.
—"US Weekly: N.Korea, Iran to Build Nuclear Weapons," Jerusalem Post, 22 March 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 March 1993
A 21-member Iranian delegation, headed by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) commander in charge of the Iranian SSM force Brig. Gen. Hossein Mantequei and officials from the Iranian Defense Industries Organization and the missile division of the IRGC, visits Pyongyang in the fifth such visit in the past year. The delegation is to observe the final tests of the Nodong-1 missile and be trained in its use. According to the People's Mujahedeen of Iran, some of the delegation will stay in North Korea for at least one month. The delegation's presence indicates that a final deal, which may include the purchase of fixed and mobile launchers, could be imminent. The delegation may also have established a timetable for the testing of Nodong-2 in Iran. U.S. officials believe that Iranian oil may be exchanged for the missiles; Iran supplies approximately 40% of North Korea's oil needs. According to the Chosun Ilbo, the Iranian delegation is seeking to purchase 150 Nodong missiles.
—Douglas Jehl, "Iran Is reported Acquiring Missiles," New York Times International, 8 April 1993, p. A9; Kevin Rafferty, "Iran and N Korea 'To Test Missile'," Guardian (London), 26 October 1993, p. 20; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 24-25; "Puk Missile Nodong 1 Ho/Sajŏng 1 Ch'ŏn km Tongpug'a Anbo 'Bisang'," Chosun Ilbo, 10 April 1993, <http://www.chosun.com>.

29 March 1993
According to Western intelligence sources, North Korea and Iran are engaged in a cooperative effort to develop a ballistic missile system capable of carrying nuclear and chemical warheads. Iran reportedly provided North Korea $500 million for the missile program.
—"Iran Funds North Korea's Drive to Build Nuclear Bombs," US News & World Report, 29 March 1993, p. 18.

Spring 1993
Iran receives 10 Nodong-2 surface-to-surface missiles, with a range of 1300-1500km.
—Yossef Bodansky and Vaughn S. Forrest, "Iran, North Korea, and the Threat of the New Korean War," Task Force on Terrorism & Unconventional Warfare, House Republican Research Committee, US House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 7 February 1994, p. 3.

April 1993
Western officials report that Libya sold the design of the Al-Fatah missile to Iran. Western officials say the Al-Fatah has a range of 950km, but other sources state a range of only 500km. Iran and Libya are likely cooperating to upgrade the Al-Fatah. Iran also may be developing its own cruise missiles and long-range rockets of at least 2,000km. It is also reported that Iran's procurement agents have been showing keen interest in German satellite-launch expertise. There is reportedly also considerable Iranian interest in Japanese satellite-launch expertise and in the SSM-1 and ASM-2 subsonic, turbojet-powered missiles.
—Alan George, "Libya Sells Al-Fatah Design to Iranians," Flight International, April 1993, p. 4.

April 1993
Officials at the Abu Dhabi arms show state that North Korea is receiving funding from Libya and Iran for the development of the Nodong-1 liquid-propellant ballistic missile, which could be production-ready within three years.
—"Iran, North Korea Working on Long-Range Missile," Asian Defence Journal, April 1993, p. 91.

April 1993
North Korea and Iran are participating, with Chinese technology and assistance, in the construction of underground factories near Aleppo and Hama in Syria for the joint-production of North Korean Scud-C missiles and Chinese M-9 missiles.
—Michael Eisenstadt, "Syria's Strategic Weapons," Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1993, pp. 168-173.

7 April 1993
A U.S. official suggests that the March 1993 Iranian delegation to North Korea may have explored the possibility of assembling the Nodong-1 in Iran from components produced in North Korea in order to more easily conceal the delivery of the missiles. Officials say that Iran hopes to acquire up to 150 Nodong-1 missiles.
—Douglas Jehl, "Iran Is Reported Acquiring Missiles," New York Times International, 8 April 1993, p. A9.

8 April 1993
According to the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), there have been five military delegation teams sent to North Korea in the past year. The last delegation arrived in Pyongyang in March 1993 with 21 members headed by Brigadier General Husayn Mantequei of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC). The prominence of missile experts in the last delegation suggests that they observed the final tests of the Nodong-1 and were trained in its use. U.S. Pentagon spokesman Bob Hall says, "We are very concerned about the Iranian effort in this area to acquire this type of [Nodong-1 missile] weaponry, considered to be destabilizing in the region." The CIA has claimed that the new North Korean missile represents a threat to the stability of both Asia and the Middle East. The visit by a high-level Iranian military delegation to Pyongyang has prompted U.S. concern that full-scale production of the missile may be closer than previously thought. Although it has been known that Iran was seeking such a weapon from China and North Korea, the visit to Pyongyang by its top missile experts appears to indicate for the first time that a final deal was imminent. Secretary of State Warren Christopher says that the Iranian military delegation is in North Korea to complete the purchase of 150 missiles. The United States believes that the delivery of the 600-mile-range missile could begin "certainly by the end of the year," according to a Pentagon official. The Nodong-1 missile would double the range of Iranian and North Korean military payloads, putting Japan within North Korea's range and Israel within Iran's.
—Douglas Jehl, "Iran Nears Deal to Buy Israel-Range Missiles from North Korea," Houston Chronicle, 8 April 1993, p. 23, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Douglas Jehl, "Iran is Reported Acquiring Missiles," New York Times, 8 April 1993, p. A9; "Report of Iran-N.Korea Missile Deal Stirs Alarm," Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 8 April 1993, p. 2, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Alan Elsner, "US Concerned About North Korean Missile Sale to Iran," Executive News Service, 9 April 1993; "Iranian Missile Purchase Alleged," Plain Dealer, 9 April 1993, p. 7A, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 April 1993
Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi sells Iran the plans to the Al-Fatah intermediate-range surface-to-surface missile. All of Libya's test launches of the Al-Fatah have failed; it is likely that Iran will try to develop the Al-Fatah as a joint venture with Libya.
—"Iran Buying Libyan Missile Plans," Der Standard (Vienna), 11 April 1993, p. 3; in "Iran Said to Cooperate with Libya on Missile Program," FBIS Document FBIS-NES-93-069, p. 45.

12 April 1993
U.S. intelligence sources confirm that China has sold key missile components to Iran.
—Lally Weymouth, "Thinking Out a China Policy," Washington Post, 12 April 1993, p. A19.

17 April 1993
North Korea denies allegation made by Western news sourced that it intends to export medium-range missiles to Iran.
—Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 17 April 1993, in "Pyongyang Denies Exporting Missiles to Iran," FBIS-EAS-93-073, 19 April 1993, p. 21.

18 April 1993
North Korea denies allegations by Western intelligence that North Korea and Iran are engaged in a cooperative effort to develop a ballistic missile system capable of striking Japan with nuclear and chemical warheads. Iran is allegedly providing North Korea $500 million for missile development in exchange for an unknown number of nuclear bombs and plans for nuclear weapons reprocessing plants. [Note: While North Korea may be able to offer some assistance in the area of nuclear weapon development, it is doubtful that it is in a position to provide any working models.]
—Charles Fenyvesi, ed., "Washington Whispers," US News & World Report, 29 March 1993, p. 18; "Fear of N. Korea Fuels Arms Race," Washington Times, 19 April 1993, p. A2.

19 April 1993
U.S. intelligence sources confirm that Iran is now capable of delivering chemical and biological weapons using ballistic and short-range missiles due to advances in packaging technology. It is believed that anthrax and sarin warheads have been fitted to Iran's Scud-Cs or other ballistic missiles. The Semnan missile facility reportedly produces five tons of nerve gas per month, which is then shipped to the main missile assembly plant at Isfahan where it is placed in warheads and fit onto Iranian-built Scud-Bs.
—"Iran's CW Programs," Mednews, 19 April 1993, p. 4.

May 1993
Iran begins producing a new man-portable air-defense system (MANPADS) called the Misagh-1. The Shahid Shah Abady Industrial Complex based in Tehran developed the system. The "fire and forget" surface-to-surface missile is claimed to have the capability to engage fixed-wing and helicopter targets from all angles. The new Misagh-1 looks similar to the China National Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation's QE-1 Vanguard. The missile is also similar in some ways to the Stinger missile. Pakistan's AQ Khan Research Laboratories also builds a similar missile system, called the Anza MK II.
—Christopher F. Foss, "Iran fields manportable SAM System," Jane's Defence Weekly, 3 May 2000, p. 16.

1 May 1993
North Korea is developing the Nodong-1, a missile with twice the range of the Scud-C. Iran currently possesses the 300km Scud-C, which was acquired from North Korea in 1991. American officials believe that the Nodong may be in the hands of Iran by the end of 1993. Since the end of its war with Iraq, Iran has embarked on an extensive arms-purchasing spree. Tehran's ayatollahs have spent tens of billions of dollars to buy advanced weapons from all available sources. The bulk of this money has paid for efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction in a program that resembles that of Iraq.
—"Nuclear Weapons Must Not Spread," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 1 May 1993, p. 2B, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Gerald Steinberg, "War and Peace: Mixed Signals from Iran," Jerusalem Post, 5 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 May 1993
Iran conducts extensive naval exercises in the Persian Gulf to include live firing of missiles.
—"Submarines Included in Iranian Exercise," Jane's Defence Weekly, 8 May 1993, p. 11.

11 May 1993
Iran reportedly receives a delivery of eight supersonic sea-skimming cruise missiles, known as the Sunburst, from Ukraine. The purchase of the Sunburst missiles is the latest acquisition in Iran's arms procurement program aimed at making it the regional superpower. The Sunburst missiles have been purchased as part of a $1.5 billion barter agreement between Tehran, Moscow, and Kiev. However, Ukraine's Ministry of Defense has denied any Ukrainian involvement. The disclosure of the missile deal follows the delivery to Iran last year of the first of two kilo-class diesel submarines from Russia, which the United States tried to block, and up to 100 North Korean Scud-C missiles. The scale of Iranian military purchasing is also tied to the reconstruction of the domestic arms industry, which this year showed its battlefield missile systems for the first time at an arms fair in Abu Dhabi.
—Paul Beaver, "Iran Missiles Could Control Tanker Route," San Diego Union-Tribune, 11 May 1993, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; "Iranian Beefing Up Their Arms Muscle," Star Tribune (Minneapolis), 16 May 1993, p. 19A, in Lexis-Nexis, <http//www.lexis-nexis.com>; "Kiev Denies Rumor of Arms Sales to Iran," Demokratychna Ukrayina (Kiev), 18 May 1993, p. 2; in JPRS-TND-93-015, 24 May 1993, p. 27.

23 May 1993
Officials claim that Washington expresses concern to Russia, Ukraine, and other countries about the potential sale to Tehran of submarines, advanced anti-ship missiles, and other conventional arms. Washington also plans to renew a Bush administration initiative—rebuffed by Japan and Western Europe—to halt sales to Iran of "dual-use" technologies capable of both civilian and military application.
—Jeffery Smith and Daniel Williams, "White House to Stop Up Plans to Isolate Iran, Iraq; Administration to Try 'Dual Containment'," Washington Post, 23 May 1993, p. A26, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 May 1993
Israeli diplomatic sources reveal that China has "sworn" to Israel that it is not selling missiles to Iran or Syria.
—"China Makes Missile Pledge to Israel," Interavia Air Letter, 24 May 1993, p. 5; in Dialog Databases, <http://www.dialog.com>.

29 May 1993
A delegation of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) travels to North Korea to watch the first launch of the Nodong-1 missile. The Nodong is a liquid-fueled missile with a range of 1,000 to 1,300km.
—Konstantin Eggert, "'Meteor' for the Ayatollahs. Iran Needs Ballistic Missiles in Order To Become a World Power," Izvestiya (Moscow), 21 October 1998, p. 5; in "Iran's Missile Program Viewed," FBIS Document FTS19981021001050, 21 October 1998.; Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000), p. 37.

29-30 May 1993
North Korea successfully launches four missiles from the Musudan-ri Test Facility in Hwadae-kun, North Hamgyŏng Province, two of which are thought to be Nodong-1 missiles. Later reports confirm that only one of the missiles was a Nodong. The missiles were reportedly fired in the direction of the Japanese Noto Peninsula at target buoys in the Sea of Japan. One missile traveled 500km; another traveled 100km; the remaining two fell short of 100km. Two North Korean naval vessels, a Najin-class frigate and a minesweeper, are positioned 30km apart about 350km off Noto, reportedly to monitor the launch. Israel's Mossad reportedly warned the United States and Japan of the test weeks in advance. Iranian and Pakistani observers are present for the tests.
—Kyodo (Tokyo), 14 June 1993, in " DA: DPRK 'Appears' to Have Tested Missile," FBIS-EAS-93-112, 14 June 1993, p. 5; David E. Sanger, "Missile is Tested by North Koreans," New York Times, 13 June 1993, p. 7; Kim Yong Kol, Hankook Ilbo, 16 June 1993, p. 4, in "Israel Makes Gesture to North Korea for Improvement of Relations," FBIS-EAS-93-114, "Possible Israeli Aid to DPRK Viewed," 16 June 1993, p. 20; "Defense Ministry: May Nodong-1 Test Successful," Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 24 June 1993, in FBIS-EAS-93-120, 24 June 1993, p. 19; "North Korea Seen Successful in Test of Nodong-1 Missile," Aerospace Daily, 29 June 1993, pp. 538-539; Lee Jŏng Hun, "FROGesŏ Taepodong Kkaji: Pukhan Missile Game," Shindonga, August 1999, p. 203; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 17, 21; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing," Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1995, pp. 186-189; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 283-286; 291.

June 1993
A meeting between senior Israeli and North Korean officials is scheduled in Beijing. Israeli officials are pressuring North Korea not to sell Iran Nodong-1 missiles, which are reportedly based on the Scud-D.
—Neal Sandler, "Israel voices concern over missile for Iran," Jane's Defence Weekly, 24 July 1993, p. 7, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

June 1993
Iranian Revolution Guards Commander General Mohsen Rezai holds talks with North Korean defense chiefs in Pyongyang, and urges closer ties between the two nations. [Note: This visit is most likely the same as that mentioned on 16 June 1993.]
—"Alarm Sounded Over Missile Plans Involving Tehran and North Korea," Mideast Mirror, Vol. 7, No. 237, 7 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 June 1993
Japan's Sankei Shimbun quotes Itamar Rabinovitch, Israel's ambassador to the U.S., as saying that North Korea's Nodong missile has a range of 1,300km and that North Korea is exporting the missile to Iran. Rabinovitch claims the Nodong can be modified to extend the range from 1,000km to 1,300km. [Note: This report does not explain how the range is extended. It does not say if it is simply from a reduction in the payload, or other modifications.]
—"Pukhan, Nodong 1 Ho Missile Sajŏnggŏri 1 Ch'ŏn 3 Paek KM Ro Yŏnjang," Joongang Ilbo, 8 June 1993, <http://www.joins.com>.

9 June 1993
European nations agree to consider economic sanctions against the Tehran regime to force it to abandon clandestine nuclear, chemical, and missile weapon programs. After a meeting with the 12 EC foreign ministers, Secretary of State Warren Christopher states to a news conference, "Iran must understand that it cannot have normal commercial relations...on the one hand while trying to develop weapons of mass destruction on the other." Christopher specifically has called for a ban on the sale of dual-use technology that has both civilian and military applications.
—Norman Kempster, "U.S., EC to Study Sanctions Aimed at Iran Arms Buildup; Diplomacy: Europeans Get Briefing From Christopher. Talk of Tehran's Programs Gives Foreign Ministers a Break From Bosnia," Los Angeles Times, 10 June 1993, p. A8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 June 1993
Recent American intelligence reports estimate that North Korea is expected to begin delivery of new ballistic missiles with a range of 600 miles in about six months.
—Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Asks Europe to Ban Arms-Linked Sales to Iran," New York Times, 10 June 1993, p. A5, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 June 1993
Israel wants Pyongyang to abandon its plans to sell Iran a newly developed missile, the Nodong-1, whose 1,000km range brings Israel within Iran's reach. According to an Israeli Foreign Ministry official, an Israeli delegation will meet with North Korean officials in the next few days to try to convince them not to sell medium-range missiles to Iran. Israel's Industry and Trade Minister Micha Harish states, "The purpose of establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea is to prevent its sale of surface-to-surface missiles to Iran."
—Abraham Rabinovich, "Israel Appears Suddenly as New Player on North Korean Scene," Straits Times (Singapore), 19 June 1993, p. 20, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; "Israel Meets North Koreans to Discuss Missile Sale to Iran," Jerusalem Post, 24 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Michael Parks, "Fearing Its Foes May Buy N. Korean Missiles, Israel Gets Down to Business; Jerusalem Hopes Economic Incentives Will Dissuade Pyongyang From Arms Sales," Los Angeles Times, 26 June 1993, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 June 1993
Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, a Saudi paper based in London, reports that there is a tripartite deal between Iraq, Iran, and North Korea in which Iran will transship Iraqi oil to North Korea through the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. The deal is worth $120 million, and its proceeds are to be divided equally between Iran and Iraq. The Iranian portion will be transferred to the North Korean firm Changgwang Shinyong, and is to finance the purchase of "long-range" missiles from North Korea. Iranian Deputy Defense Minister Ahmad Wahedi is handling the Iran-North Korean negotiations with the assistance of the head of the defense ministry's missile department, Montaqi, and the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) representative in Pyongyang, Tabaqi. The Iranian foreign ministry advisor is conducting negotiations between Iraq and Iran. Under the agreement, North Korea is to receive 15,000 barrels of crude oil per day.
—Walid Abi-Murshid, "In Three-Way Trade Operation, Korean Missile Deal for Iran to Be Financed by Iraqi Oil Exports," Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), 17 June 1993, p. 1, in FBIS-NES-93-118, "DPRK Missiles for Iran in Secret Deal with Iraqi Oil," 22 June 1993, p. 53.

25 June 1993
In Beijing, Israeli Foreign Ministry Deputy Director-General Eitan Bentsur meets with North Korean officials in an attempt to dissuade them from concluding a reported deal to provide Iran with 150 Nodong-1 missiles in exchange for oil and cash. The meeting reportedly ends with the North Korean officials demanding cash for compliance. [Note: There are additional reports that place Bentsur in Pyongyang at about this time performing the same mission. It is uncertain whether this visit was in conjunction with, or confused with the Beijing visit.]
—Asher Wallfish, "Israel 'Cannot Ignore Missile Sales to Iran'," Jerusalem Post, 30 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Jon B. Wolfsthal, "U.S. Prods Israel to Halt Talks With North Korea on Missile Sales," Arms Control Today, September 1993, p. 24; Clyde Haberman, "Israel Again Seeks a Deal With an Outcast," New York Times, 11 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Leslie Susser, "Peres: Korea-Bound?," Jerusalem Post, 15 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Steve Rodan, "All Eyes Are On Israel's North Korean Connection," Jerusalem Post, 25 March 1994, p. 3B, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 June 1993
Deputy Director General of Israel's Foreign Ministry meets with a ranking official of the North Korean Communist Party to discuss Israel's concerns that North Korea might sell missiles to Iran that could reach Israel.
—"Israeli Media Report N. Korea Missile Tests," Los Angeles Times, 4 July 1993, p. A14.

29 June 1993
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin states, in front of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, that Iran poses a greater danger to the world than Iraq. Rabin also voices his regret that Russia and China are each selling two nuclear reactors to Iran and that North Korea's has already sold Scud-3 medium-range missiles to Iran.
—Asher Wallfish, "Iran Greater Threat Than Iraq," Jerusalem Post, 29 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 June 1993
An Associated Press dispatch from Seoul, South Korea, states that North Korea has been earning $1 billion a year from missile sales to Iran, even though North Korea denies this fact.
—Asher Wallfish, "Israel 'Cannot Ignore Missile Sales to Iran'," Jerusalem Post, 30 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 July 1993
Aero Systems Inc. of Miami is fined $160,000 after pleading guilty to two federal charges of selling missile and fighter jet parts to Iran from 1984-1986.
—"Aero Systems is Fined $160,000 for Selling Fighter Parts to Iran," Miami Herald, 1 July 1993, p. C1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 July 1993
Iran may possess an unexploded U.S. cruise missile, which was fired over Iran at an Iraqi industrial site in January 1993.
—"II Quarter 1993: July," Gulf/2000 Project (New York: School of International and Public Affairs [SIPA], Columbia University, July 1993).

14 July 1993
The 21-member Iranian delegation of April 1993 was to sign a contract for the purchase of 150 Nodong-1 missiles, which reportedly have a circle of equal probability (CEP) of 2,000m. [ Note: the 150 missiles conflicts with the 30, July report of 100 missiles.] The missile was originally designed with a range of 1,000km in 1991, but, at Iranian request, this was increased to 1,300km so that the missile could reach Israel. Iran reportedly supplied financial support to extend the range. According to the Joongang Ilbo, the Iranian delegation signed a contract with North Korea for the purchase of 150 Nodong missiles and part of the delegation is still in North Korea.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 14 July 1993, in "Iran Said to Place Order for 150 DPRK Missiles," FBIS-EAS-93-134, 15 July 1993, p. 18; "Pukhan Nodong 1 Ho Pan'gyŏngmyŏngjungbŏmwi 2 Ch'ŏn M—Sankei Shinmun Podo," Joongang Ilbo, 15 July 1993, <http://www.joins.com>.

19 July 1993
The Wall Street Journal reports that North Korea is assisting Libya establish a Scud production facility near Tripoli known as the "Central Repair Workshop." The report also says that North Korea is selling Scud-B and Scud-C missiles to Iran, Libya, and Syria.
—Robert S. Greenberger, "Washington Insight: North Korea's Missile Sales in Mideast, Along With Nuclear Issue, Raise Concern," Wall Street Journal, 19 July 1993, p. A6.

30 July 1993
When questioned, State Department officials do not confirm the report that Syria received a delivery of missiles from Iran and transported them from Damascus to Hizbullah forces in Lebanon as recently as two weeks ago.
— H. Kuttler, "US Denies Cease-Fire Efforts State Department Underlines Need for Halt to Hostilities," Jerusalem Post, 30 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 July 1993
Israel failed to persuade North Korea to refrain from selling Tehran 100 Nodong-1 missiles capable of reaching Tel Aviv from western Iran. [ Note: the 100 missiles conflicts with the 14, July report of 150 missiles.] The Iranian purchase of these missiles will cost $1 billion. [Note: South Korea has claimed that North Korea has been earning $1 billion yearly on missile sales to Iran. The source is not clear on how many years the transactions have been occurring, but implies more than one year. See entry for 30 June 1993.]
—Douglas Davis, "N. Korean Missile Sales to Iran not Prevented," Jerusalem Post, 30 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 August 1993
The second Russian-built kilo-class diesel-electric submarine arrives in Iran at the Persian Gulf port of Bandar Abbas. Another submarine has been there since late 1992. The submarines are armed with 18 torpedoes and possibly missiles. The complete transaction costs Iran $750 million.
—"Second Sub for Iran," Washington Post, 4 August 1993, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 August 1993
Syria receives Scud-C missiles from North Korea via Russian aircraft, and that Iran may also have received Scud-Cs in this fashion. [Note: Rabin says the shipment was on 8 August, but it is not clear if this could be the 5 August 1993 delivery of MAZ 543 transporter-erector launchers (TELs) to Syria or if this is a second delivery.]
—KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 15 August 1993, in "DPRK Shipped Scuds to Syria on Russian Airplanes," JPRS-TND-93-027, 26 August 1993, p. 9; "'Pukhan, Nodong 1 Ho Syria'e Such'ul'—Rabin Israel Ch'ongni P'ongno," Joongang Ilbo, 16 August 1993, <http://www.joins.com>; "Iran Will Soon Have Korean Missiles Able to Hit Israel: Report," Agence France Presse, 20 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 August 1993
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin announces that Russian planes have transported Scud-C missiles from North Korea to Syria, and possibly Iran, during the previous week. In recent discussions with North Korea, Israel attempted to persuade the DPRK to halt its sale of long-range missiles to countries like Iran and Syria.
—"Claims Scuds Sent to Syria, Possibly Iran," IDF Radio (Tel Aviv), 15 August 1993; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-93-156, 16 August 1993, p. 32.

15 August 1993
Some senior government officials of Israel state their conviction that Pyongyang will agree to a "package deal" including a commitment not to sell Nodong-1 intermediate-range missiles to Iran. The same officials note, "We see the issue of North Korean participation in the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] as being totally unrelated to its sale of missiles to Iran."
—David Makovsky, "Israel Faces Hour of Decision on N.Korea Talks Could Lead to Canceling of Missile Sale to Iran, Israeli Officials Believe," Jerusalem Post, 15 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 August 1993
At the behest of the United States, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin announces that Israel will break off discussions with North Korea designed to halt the sale of North Korean missiles to Iran and Syria. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres had told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that North Korea wants $500 million to stop the sales.
—Dan Izenberg and Batsheva Tsur, "Israel Heeds US Request To Stop Talks With N. Koreans on Missile Shipments, Jerusalem Post, 17 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Jon B. Wolfsthal, "U.S. Prods Israel to Halt Talks With North Korea on Missile Sales," Arms Control Today, September 1993, p. 24.

9 September 1993
Arab and Kurdish opposition sources in London report that Iraq has sold large amounts of arms and ammunition to Iran, including missiles and chemical weapons, in exchange for foreign currency.
—"Chemical Weapons, Missiles Allegedly Sold to Iran," Voice of the Iraqi People, 9 September 1993; in JPRS-TND-93-030, 27 September 1993.

20 September 1993
An Israeli press report quotes Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin in response to questions regarding the use of Russian aircraft to transport North Korean missiles to Iran. During the interview, Adamishin said, "To my knowledge there were no ballistic missiles...you cannot check them all, but to my knowledge there were no military equipment [sic] in these flights."
—Jack Katzenell, Qol Yisra'el (Jerusalem), 20 September 1993, in "Russia Did Not Transport Missiles from DPRK to Iran," JPRS-TND-93-032, 12 October 1993, p. 34.

October 1993
Japanese Foreign Minister Tsutomu Hata meets with Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati in New York. Although Velayati denies any Iranian involvement in North Korea's missile program, Hata claims that the Iranian presence at the May 1993 North Korean missile test indicates that they were involved. Hata warns Velayati that Iran will find itself isolated if it persists in this relationship with North Korea.
—Lally Weymouth, "Shadow Over Japan," Washington Post, 1 November 1993, p. A17.

4 October 1993
Iran signs a long-term deal with China worth $5 billion, which covers the sale of M-11 missiles with a 965km range. China reportedly has also delivered significant numbers of HY-2 Silkworm anti-ship missiles and is also assisting Iran with its indigenous defense industry. It is also reported that Iranian engineers are developing the 40km-range Oghab, 40km-range Tondar-68, 90km-range Nazeat, 100-300km-range Shaheen-2, 130km-range Iran-130, and the 160km-range Mushak. Iran reportedly has also made deals with North Korea worth $3 billion, which includes 170 Scud-B missiles. In 1994, North Korea will also begin to deliver 965km-range ballistic missiles to Iran.
—James Kraska, "Iran Flexes Maritime Muscles in Gulf," Defense News, 4 October 1993, pp. 25-26.

6 October 1993
Israel has embarked on a five-year secret project to develop and deploy an Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile (ATBM) system. The move was prompted by Israeli concern over Iran's acquisition of the Nodong missile.
—Steve Rodan, "Secret Project for Enhanced Arrow Launched," Jerusalem Post, 6 October 1993, pp.1, 2; in JPRS-TND-93-034, 27 October 1993, pp. 29-30.

22 October 1993
The Saudi Arabian newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat reports that Iran and North Korea are planning a test of the Nodong-2 missile in the Lut desert in southeastern Iran in late October. A North Korean military delegation is currently in Iran to prepare for the Nodong-2 test. The Iranians have a missile-testing site at a large military complex at Sharoud, east of Tehran. The missile-testing site is linked to a monitoring facility south of Tabas. Iran reportedly has negotiated the purchase of 150 Nodong-1 missiles, which they expect to receive by the end of 1993. [Note: The first shipment of at least 12 missiles did not actually occur until May 1995; see entry for 2 May 1995.] The Nodong-2, also known as the Scud-E, is an improved version of the Nodong-1 and has a range of 1,500-2,000km. For the past few years, Iran has been funding the development of the Nodong-1, and also appears to be funding the Nodong-2, according to Al-Sharq al-Awsat.
—"IV Quarter 1993: October," Gulf/2000 Project (New York: School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), Columbia University, October 1993); "Iranians, N.Koreans Set to Test Missile," Plain Dealer, 23 October 1993, p. A6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.; Yomirui Shimbun, "Paper: N. Korea, Iran to Test Missile; With Range of About 2,000 Kilometers," Daily Yomiuri, 24 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

23-30 October 1993
Iran conducts a week-long "Missile War Game" named Sa'eqeh-3 (Lightening-3) in a 1000km area around the Straits of Hormuz. The exercise aims to "establish command, control, communication, and intelligence distribution between Tehran and its main strategic headquarters, including the activation of missiles on orders from Tehran." The Khatam ol-Anbia 1 strategic headquarters is activated to coordinate Iran's surface-to-surface ballistic missile units. The communication system successfully reacted to a simulated missile launch. Shore to sea missile units from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Navy participate in the exercises on Abu Mussa, Kishm and other islands off Hormuzgan Province. This is the first of a regular set of IRGC exercises involving the regular military. Offensive and defensive chemical weapons units are also employed in the exercise.
—Yossef Bodansky and Vaughn S. Forrest, "Iran, North Korea, and the Threat of the New Korean War," Task Force on Terrorism & Unconventional Warfare, House Republican Research Committee, US House of Representatives, Washington DC, 7 Feb. 1994, pp. 2-4.

26 October 1993
North Korea denies claims in the Western press that it intends to test a ballistic missile in Iran stating, "It is inconceivable that the DPRK, making consistent efforts for world peace and security, intends to conduct a missile launching test in a far-off foreign country."
—Kevin Rafferty, "Iran and N Korea 'To Test Missile'," Guardian, 26 October 1993.

26 October 1993
Not much is known in the West about the Nodong-2, but it is understood to be a more powerful and longer-range version of the Nodong-1, a two-stage liquid-fueled weapon, based on the Soviet Scud-C. This missile can be adapted to carry nuclear or chemical warheads, has a range of about 600 miles, and can carry a 790kg payload.
—Kevin Rafferty, "Iran and N.Korea 'To Test Missile'," Guardian, 26 October 1993, p. 20, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 October 1993
Iran buys high-tech equipment, including powerful computers, from Germany, which also has provided a two-month training course for Iranian intelligence agents over the past two years. Officials in Europe and Washington note that German companies are the most important suppliers of components for Iraq's non-conventional weapons program, and there is widespread concern that its exports to Iran involve dual-use equipment that is destined for the development of Iran's non-conventional weapons. In 1992, German exports to Iran totaled $5 billion.
—Douglas Davis, "Iran Tests Missile Capable of Hitting Israel," Jerusalem Post, 26 October 1993, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 October 1993
Pentagon officials say that China, Iran, and India are attempting to incorporate U.S. navigation technology, such as global positioning system (GPS) computer components, into their newest missiles.
—Lisa Burgess and Neil Munro, Defense News, 29 Nov. 1993, pp. 8, 10, cited in "Ballistic, Cruise Missile and Missile Defense Systems: Trade and Significant Developments, September 1993-January 1994," Nonproliferation Review, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Spring-Summer 1994, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 164.

28 October 1993
North Korea denies claims made in the Western press that it intends to test a ballistic missile in Iran, stating, "It is inconceivable that the DPRK, making consistent efforts for world peace and security, intends to conduct a missile launching test in a far off foreign country." The Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) also denies these claims.
—Kevin Rafferty, "Iran and N Korea 'To Test Missile'," Guardian (London), 26 October 1993, p. 20; Korean Central News Agency, 28 October 1993, in "Japanese, U.K. Reports on DPRK Missile Test in Iran Denied" ["Groundless Rumor of 'Missile Launching Test'—KCNA Headline], JPRS-TND-93-035, 10 November 1993, p. 13.

Late October 1993
Iran may have deployed North Korean Scud-C missiles during the Saeqer-3 (Thunderbolt-3) military exercises.
—Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000), p. 36.

November 1993
China sold SS-2 missiles to Iran and attempted to sell a Silkworm missile variation to Iran and other Gulf states.
—"US Moves to Shore-Up China Ties," Arms Trade News, November 1993, pp. 1-2.

November 1993
The scheduled test of a Nodong missile in Iran is postponed due to problems with the missile telemetry equipment. [Note: See entry for 22 October 1993.] The test was to have been part of the Saeqer-1 "Missile War Game" involving Iran's "national communication system to order the firing of a ballistic missile acquired specifically as a platform for nuclear warheads." A U.S. Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare says that the test is cancelled because of North Korea's concerns over increased U.S. monitoring of the Persian Gulf. Iran and North Korea are worried that the United States would learn about their "strategic assets already functioning in Iran."
—"N. Korea's Air Force Chief Visits Iran for Closer Ties," Washington Times, 25 February 1994; Ed Blanche, "North Koreans Visit Iran To Step Up Military Cooperation," Associated Press, 24 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Yossef Bodansky and Vaughn S. Forrest, "Iran, North Korea, and the Threat of the New Korean War," Task Force on Terrorism & Unconventional Warfare, House Republican Research Committee, US House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 7 February 1994, p. 7.

November 1993
Syria and Iran are reportedly cooperating to develop a cruise missile with Chinese and North Korean technology as well as technology from Germany and other European nations. The development of the missile is centered on Iranian Ministry of Heavy Industries plants.
—Paul Beaver, "Flash Points," Jane's Defence Weekly, 11 December 1993, p. 18.

Mid-November 1993
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Iran's regular military co-conduct the Val-Fajr 1 and Nasr 1 military exercises. Val-Fajr 1 involves the Iranian Air Force, and takes place around Bandar Abbas. Nasr 1 is a naval exercise in the northern Persian Gulf, operating under the Fat'h command center in Ahwaz. The exercises are intended to develop stronger cooperation between the IRGC and the military. [Note: See entry for 23-30 October 1993. These exercises are significant as they signal stronger ties between the IRGC and the military, which traditionally have operated independent of each other. The IRGC is believed to maintain control of Iran's ballistic missile arsenal.]
—Yossef Bodansky and Vaughn S. Forrest, "Iran, North Korea, and the Threat of the New Korean War," Task Force on terrorism & Unconventional Warfare, House Republican Research Committee, US House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 7 February 1994, p. 4.

11 November 1993
South Korea's KBS-1 Radio cites the Russian newspaper Izvestiya as having reported that North Korea has provided Iran with the technology to manufacture Nodong-1 missiles in exchange for Western technology and equipment.
—KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 12 November 1993, in "DPRK Reportedly Transfers Missile Technology to Iran," JPRS-TND-93-037, 8 December 1993, p. 22.

12 November 1993
The Times of London reports that Iran is assembling Scud-C missiles supplied by North Korea, and funding the development of the Nodong-1. The report also claims that Iran and Syria are cooperating on the development of a cruise missile.
—Michael Evans, "Iran and Syria 'Plan Missile'," Times (London) 12 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 November 1993
Iran and Syria are said to be cooperating to develop a cruise missile using technology obtained from Japan and Europe. Syria has not developed a large-scale defense manufacturing industry, and is increasingly cooperating with Iran. Intelligence sources claim that Iran's procurement agency recently sought remotely piloted vehicles, or components to assemble them, perhaps to adapt as cruise weapons. Iranian agents are reported to have been trying unsuccessfully to buy components from British suppliers. German companies, however, are said to be increasing their sales of dual-use, high-technology equipment to Tehran. Experts at the Dubai aerospace exhibition claimed that it would be possible to develop the guidance system of remotely piloted vehicles with satellite-linked navigation to produce a relatively accurate cruise missile. According to reports in Tehran, Iran's Heavy Industries Ministry has earmarked more than $2 billion to acquire sophisticated machine tools for high-precision weapons manufacture. Tehran is already building its own tactical surface-to-surface missiles and assembling Scud-C ballistic missiles supplied by North Korea.
—Michael Evans, "Iran and Syria 'Plan Missile'," Times (London), 12 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 November 1993
Iran denies claims made in the Times of London on 12 November 1993 that it is financing the North Korean production of the Nodong-1. Iran also denies allegations that it is jointly producing an advanced cruise missile with Syria.
—"Iran Denies Report on Missile Production," Moneyclips, 15 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; "Iran Denies Missile Production," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 13 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Islamic Republic News Agency (Tehran), 13 November 1993, in "Report on Missile Production Denied," FBIS-NES-93-21815, November 1993, p. 75.

20 November 1993
North Korea and Libya sign a special agreement on "Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation" in Misrata, the location of Libya's surface-to-surface missile development plants. Part of the agreement is to provide North Korea and Iran with access to Libya's missile launch sites in Misrata and Sabha. Missile tests from these sites target an impact site near Gat, 500km from Sabha and 1000km from Misrata. North Korea may be increasing missile cooperation with Libya because Pyongyang is "becoming increasingly apprehensive about U.S. monitoring of their activities in Iran, and especially of the various planned missile test launches." [Note: See entry for November 1993, when a planned test in Iran of North Korea's Nodong missile was cancelled.]
—Yossef Bodansky and Vaughn S. Forrest, "Iran, North Korea, and the Threat of the New Korean War," Task Force on terrorism & Unconventional Warfare, House Republican Research Committee, US House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 7 February 1994, p. 7.

23 November-3 December 1993
A Czech business delegation led by the General Director of Skoda Plzen, Lubomir Soudek, meets with Riza Amoralahi, head of Iran's nuclear energy department. In this meeting, Skoda reportedly offers to sell Iran weapons, including a new generation of anti-aircraft missiles. However, the Czech Republic has denied that Skoda signed such an agreement with Iran.
—Leo Pavlat, "Nuclear Reaction," Jerusalem Post, 16 December 1993, p. 6; William Safire, "Is It Be-Nice-To-Iran Time Again?," Plain Dealer, 3 January 1994, p. 7B; Jan Obrman, "Did Czechs Offer Weapons to Iran?" RFE/RL News Briefs, 10 January 1994, pp.19-20.

28 November 1993
Chinese authorities believe that a number of companies involved in channeling banned military items to Iran have worked with Hong Kong as part of Iran's weapons procurement program. Hawker Pacific, Jet Power Industrial, Seaconsar Far East, Hierax, and Faisun have all come under scrutiny for sales of weapons and aircraft parts to Iran.
—"Major Conduit to Iran Severed," South China Morning Post, 28 November 1993, p. 6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

December 1993
Middle Eastern intelligence sources claim that North Korea is expected to deliver Nodong intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) to Iran "within months." A full test of the missile is expected to take place under North Korean supervision in the southern Iranian desert by early 1994.
—"No-Dong Delivery," Flight International, 8 December 1993, p. 14, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

December 1993
Iran has at least three Silkworm missile sites, with three to six missiles at each site.
—Philip Finnegan, Robert Holzer and Neil Munro, Defense News, 17 January 1994, pp. 1, 29, cited in "Ballistic, Cruise Missile and Missile Defense Systems: Trade and Significant Developments, September 1993-January 1994," Nonproliferation Review, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Spring-Summer 1994, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 163.

December 1993
Syria and Iran are reportedly co-developing a new cruise missile based on Chinese and North Korean technology. The project is allegedly based at Iran's Ministry of Heavy Industries factories, and utilizes German and other European technologies.
—Jane's Defence Weekly, 11 December 1993, p. 18, cited in "Ballistic, Cruise Missile and Missile Defense Systems: Trade and Significant Developments, September 1993-January 1994," Nonproliferation Review, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Spring-Summer 1994, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 165.

December 1993
U.S. government officials believe that North Korea has postponed a missile sale to Iran. One explanation is that North Korea is doing it for diplomatic reasons in regard to U.S. demands for nuclear inspections. Another possible reason is that there have been production problems or a snag in the terms of the export contract. North Korea's Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, Hŏ Jong, says that North Korea never had any intention of selling missiles to Iran, stating, "There is no sale. It is entirely false."
—Associated Press, "US Officials Welcome Delay In N. Korean Missile Sale," in Christian Science Monitor, 27 December 1993, p. 4.

1 December 1993
A Japanese Foreign Ministry official states that Japan has made repeated overtures to Iran not to assist North Korea in the testing of the Nodong missile. He suggests that Japan could suspend a yen credit of about $38.6 million in economic aid to Iran if such a test occurs in Iran.
—"Japan Mulls Halt in Iran Loans," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 2 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Igor Shchogolev, "ITAR-TASS Foreign News Summary," ITAR-TASS, 1 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; "Puk Nodong 1 Ho Shilhŏmjangso ChegongDdaen/Il, Iran'e Ch'a'gwanch'wiso Kyŏnggo," Joongang Ilbo, 2 December 1993, p. 6, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

2 December 1993
An informed source in Iran denies Western media claims that Iran has concluded a long-range missile test treaty with North Korea. Recent U.S. and European media reports suggest that North Korea plans to sell Iran long-range Scud missiles and test the Nodong-1 missile in Iran.
—"Reports of Missile Test Agreement with DPRK Denied," Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), 2 December 1993, p. 46; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-93-231.

5 December 1993
Iran will receive and test-fire the North Korean intermediate range surface-to-surface Nodong ballistic missile this month. The Nodong, which is being developed in two versions, will have a range of from 1,000-1,300km.
—David Makovsky, "North Korean Missiles 'Due to Arrive in Iran this Month'," Jerusalem Post, 5 December 1993, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 December 1993
As part of the sixth high-level delegation to North Korea in 15 months, Iranian Defense Minister Mohammad Fourouzndeh visits North Korea to discuss technological cooperation. The visit is for a meeting of a joint commission on economic, scientific, and technical cooperation established in 1992. According to reports, there is extensive cooperation between the two countries in the areas of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Fourouzndeh is allegedly seeking unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and North Korean assistance in building 18 underground missile silos in Iran.
—"N. Korea's Air Force Chief Visits Iran for Closer Ties," Washington Times, 25 February 1994; Ed Blanche, "North Koreans Visit Iran To Step Up Military Cooperation," Associated Press, 24 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; "Alarm Sounded Over Missile Plans Involving Tehran and North Korea," Mideast Mirror, Vol. 7, No. 237, 7 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 December 1993
Iranian Defense Minister Mohammad Foruzandeh leads a delegation of defense officials and ballistic missile scientists to North Korea. Sources believe that Foruzandeh and North Korea discuss the possibility of joint production of the Nodong ballistic missile, along with constructing underground missile shelters at 18 sites across Iran. North Korea and Iran also discuss the co-development of chemical and nuclear weapons, with funding to be provided by Tehran.
—Hiroshi Kano, International Review, Autumn 1994, cited in "Ballistic, Cruise Missile, and Missile Defense Systems: Trade and Significant Developments, October 1994-February 1995," Nonproliferation Review, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Spring-Summer 1995, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 175; Yossef Bodansky and Vaughn S. Forrest, "Iran, North Korea, and the Threat of the New Korean War," Task Force on Terrorism & Unconventional Warfare, House Republican Research Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 7 February 1994, p. 6.

6 December 1993
Iran's naval buildup includes the possible purchase of Silkworm anti-ship missiles.
—Philip Finnegan, "Iran Navy Buildup Stirs US-Arab Response," Defense News, 6 December 1993, pp. 1, 28.

9 December 1993
North Korea and Iran sign an agreement that stipulates the co-development in Iran of nuclear capable ballistic missiles with ranges between 1500 and 3000km. North Korea agrees to build underground missile bunkers at 18 locations "to serve as Iran's doomsday military infrastructure." The agreement also aims to increase Iran's production and assembly of Scud-C missiles from North Korean supplied kits and components. Tehran agrees to provide Pyongyang with money, oil, and dual-use technology obtained in Europe and Asia. Iran is also interested in acquiring cruise missiles capable of carrying non-conventional warheads.
—Yossef Bodansky and Vaughn S. Forrest, "Iran, North Korea, and the Threat of the New Korean War," Task Force on Terrorism & Unconventional Warfare, House Republican Research Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 7 February 1994, p. 7.

10 December 1993
American officials report that the United States warns Ukraine against selling weapons to Iran. These officials claim that the Clinton administration is worried in particular about the possible sale of missiles to Iran. Ukraine denied allegations that it sold weapons to Iran in exchange for oil.
—"U.S. Urges Ukraine to Forgo Sales of Weapons to Iranians," New York Times, 10 December 1993, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Aleksandr Sychev, Izvestiya (Moscow), 14 December 1993, p. 3, cited in "Ballistic, Cruise Missile and Missile Defense Systems: Trade and Significant Developments, September 1993-January 1994," Nonproliferation Review, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Spring-Summer 1994, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 164.

Mid-December 1993
Iran's Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, visits Libya to discuss "ways of boosting and strengthening cooperation," to establish a mutual "stance against the plots of world arrogance in the various parts of the world, including the Persian Gulf," and towards "resisting the global conspiracy against Islam." Velayati and Libyan President Qaddafi discuss ways to "make it politically difficult for the United States and its allies to threaten military intervention against states like North Korea, Libyan, and Iran." Velayati's visit comes at a period of increased North Korean-Libyan missile development cooperation. [Note: See entry for 20 November 1993.]
—Yossef Bodansky and Vaughn S. Forrest, "Iran, North Korea, and the Threat of the New Korean War," Task Force on Terrorism & Unconventional Warfare, House Republican Research Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 7 February 1994, p. 8.

20 December 1993
An Israeli "Colonel A" says, "Iran will have [North] Korean Nodong missiles in a year which could be deployed in the west of the country and reach Israel." "Colonel A" further states, "There is no doubt that Iran is trying to obtain the capacity to produce chemical and nuclear warheads," which could be delivered by the Nodong.
—"Iran Will Soon Have Korean Missiles Able to Hit Israel: Report," Agence France Presse, 20 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 December 1993
Ukrainian arms negotiator Borys Tarasyuk denies allegations that Ukraine sold tactical missiles to Iran. Tarasyuk says that Ukraine would never engage in weapons deals with countries under UN sanctions, such as Yugoslavia, Libya, Iraq, and South Africa.
—Reuter, 22 December 1993, cited in Executive News Service, 23 December 1993, cited in "Ballistic, Cruise Missile and Missile Defense Systems: Trade and Significant Developments, September 1993-January 1994," Nonproliferation Review, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Spring-Summer 1994, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 165.

24 December 1993
Syria and Iran will have missile production capabilities in the not too distant future.
—David Makovsky, "Israel Said not Pushing US to Stop N.Korean Missile Sales to Iran," Jerusalem Post, 24 December 1993, p. A2, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 December 1993
The CIA concludes that Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya have the "political support of motivation" to develop long-range missiles that could strike the United States and that all but Libya have the "technical capability" to do so within 15 years.
—Thomas Lippman, "ICBM Threat to U.S. is Called Slight; Iran, Iraq, N. Korea Capable but Aren't Building Such Missiles, CIA Says," Washington Post, 24 December 1993, p. A9, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 December 1993
Officials in Washington say that North Korea has delayed plans to sell Iran the Nodong-1 missile. The reason for the delay is unclear, but officials have a number of theories, among them diplomatic maneuvering linked to nuclear inspections, production problems, or final arrangement problems with Iran.
—Associated Press, "US Officials Welcome Delay In N. Korean Missile Sale," Christian Science Monitor, 27 December 1993, p. 4; "Korea (DPRK): Missile Sale Off," Asian Recorder, 15-21 January 1994, p. 23686.

27 December 1993
Clinton administration officials believe that North Korea has deferred plans to sell Iran new missiles. U.S. officials say that it is unclear why the sale has been put off, or for how long, but reports indicate that North Korea delayed delivery of the Nodong missiles at the request of Washington.
—"US Officials Welcome Delay in N.Korean Missile Sale," Christian Science Monitor, 27 December 1993, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; "The North Korea-Iran Threat," Jerusalem Post, 28 December 1993, p. 6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

	Updated February 2006