This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

Early 1998
China sends about 1,000 tons of specialty steel to Iran.
—Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs," Study conducted for the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey, CA), October 1998, p. 35.

1998
The U.S. Congress passes the Iranian Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act, though President Clinton vetoes it.
—Gerald M. Steinberg, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Developments in the Middle East: 1998-99 (Ramat Gan, Israel: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, September 2000), p. 18.

1998
Iran most likely has more than 60 North Korean Scud-Cs. Other sources indicate the number at 100, or even 170. The North Korean Scud-C has a range of 500km. Iran also reportedly tests a sea-launched ballistic missile.
—Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000), pp. 36, 41.

1998
The International Institute for Strategic Studies reports that Iran has more than 400 surface-to-surface missiles, including about 25 CSS-8 launchers with 200 missiles, and about 10 Scud launchers with 210 Scud-B and Scud-C missiles. Iran reportedly tests a short-range surface-to-surface missile from a barge in the Caspian Sea. This test may indicate that Iran plans to launch missiles from merchant ships, thereby allowing it to threaten Israel or the United States with its Scud missiles.
—W. Seth Carus, "Iran and Weapons of Mass Destruction," Cited 3 July 2000, <http://www.ajc.org/InTheMedia/Publications.asp?did=148>.

1998
Austria intercepts a Russian vessel traveling to Iran with material to coat ballistic missile warheads.
—"Russia Uses Caspian For Missile Run," Times (London), 25 October 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19991025000, 25 October 1999.

1998
Iran reportedly carries out the test of a sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).
—Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000), pp. 39-40, <http://www.csis.org>.

1998
China provides Iran's medium-range missile program with test equipment. They also report that the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 are derived from North Korea's new Nodong missile. [Note: This report contradicts other claims that the Shahab-4 is based on Russian designs.]
—Bill Gertz, "Russia Conspiring with Iran on Missiles," Washington Times, 23 February 1998, pp. 1-4.

1998
Under pressure from the United States and Israel, the Moscow Aviation Institute (MAI) began discouraging its scientists from traveling to Iran and eventually stopped Iranian students from studying at the institute. To circumvent the restrictions, Vadim Vorobei, now head of the faculty of engine production at MAI, and several other missile experts created a private business to continue their work with the Iranian Ministry of Energy. The United States claims that Iran's Ministry of Energy is used for missile procurement activities. Vorobei claims to have ended his work with Iran in the summer of 2000, after being issued an ultimatum from MAI.
—Michael Dobbs, "Collapse of Soviet Union Proved boon to Iranian Missile Program," Washington Post, 13 January 2002, via Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

January 1998
Yuri Koptev, head of the Russian space agency, says that 11 of the 13 cases of illicit technology transfer to Iran raised by the United States have nothing to do with weapons of mass destruction. The other two cases involve suspected dual-use items, both of which were stopped by the Russian government. Russia is investigating one of those two cases. An Israeli intelligence report accuses Koptev of involvement in the transfers.
—Stuart D. Goldman, Kenneth Katzman, Robert D. Shuey, and Carl E. Behrens, "Russian Missile Technology and Nuclear Reactor Transfers to Iran," CRS Report for Congress, 29 July 1998, p. 9.

7 January 1998
Alireza Jafarzadeh, a member of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, states that Iran has spent $1.2 billion trying to develop the Shahab missile, including $300 million in the last year. He also states, "Presently, dozens of North Koreans and Chinese missile experts are stationed at the Hemat complex. Russians were helping Iran with thermodynamic problems and wind-tunnel tests but North Korean involvement is substantial."
—Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs," Study conducted for the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey, CA), October 1998, p. 41.

16 January 1998
The United States receives concrete promises by the Russian government to stop Russian companies and scientists from assisting Iran's ballistic missile program. Some Israeli officials and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee believe that Iran is within months of having the ability to manufacture a missile called the Shahab-3 (which is based on the North Korean Nodong missile), capable of carrying a one-ton warhead about 850 miles. Iran has made a series of engine tests on the missile, and a first test-flight could come later this year or early next year. Iran also gets help on its missile program from China, North Korea, "and other countries," American officials say.
—Steven Erlanger, "U.S Gets Russia's Firm Vow To Halt Missile Aid to Iran," New York Times, 16 January 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 January 1998
Vice President Al Gore urges Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to help contain Iran's missile development.
—"Gore Urges Russia to Halt Involvement in Iran's Arms Program," Sun (Baltimore), 18 January 1998, p. 2A, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 January 1998
Israel and the United States receive information revealing Iran's plans to develop a long range missile capable of hitting any target in the United States. Iran's missile efforts focus on acquiring technical information and equipment, especially from Russia. Previous assessments indicate that Iran is focusing on developing a 1,200km-range missile. The intercontinental missile would have a range three times greater. Israeli Labor Knesset Member Hagay Merom notes the congruity between Israeli and U.S. assessments. "The Americans realize now that the Iranian threat is not only aimed at Israel's cities but is a U.S. and worldwide problem. This is the reason behind a series of very urgent steps taken up by Washington in a bid to block any additional transfer of Russian know-how and equipment to Tehran," he states.
—Hayim Shibi, Yediot Aharonot (Tel Aviv), 7 January 1998, p. 8; in "Iran Developing Long-Range Missiles Capable of Hitting U.S." FBIS Document FTS19980107000792, 7 January 1998.

18 January 1998
The Iranian government will soon begin production of the 1,400km-range (875 miles) Zelzal missile, capable of carrying a one-ton warhead. The Zelzal was also known as the Shahab-2 and Shahab-3 at different stages in its development, and is modeled after the Scud-E. [Note: The Zelzal is a different missile from the Shahab.] The missiles are currently equipped with conventional warheads, but Tehran reportedly seeks chemical warhead capability. Guards Corps Brigadier Manteqi of the missile section of the Department of Defense Industries, based at Hemmat Industrial Complex outside Tehran, leads the missile project. More than 400 personnel work on the project, including dozens of Korean and Chinese experts. Iran reportedly spends $1.2 billion on this missile project, and sends more than 350 missile personnel to receive training in North Korea.
—"Mullahs' regime about to mass produce long-range missiles," Iran-e-Azad , 9 January 1998; in "Opposition: Tehran to Begin Long Range Missile Production," FBIS Document FTS19980112001179, 12 January 1998. [Note: Iran-e-Azad is the website of the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MKO) opposition group, which is violently opposed to the current Iranian government.]

18 January 1998
The threat posed by Iran to Israel increases due to Iran's acquisition of conventionally armed, long-range, surface-to-surface missiles and its attempts to acquire non-conventional arms.
—Amir Rappaport, "Intelligence Branch Assesses Iranian Threat Growing," Yediot Aharonot (Tel Aviv), 4 January 1998; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-98-004, 4 January 1998.

18 January 1998
Iran introduces an entirely "new" air-to-air missile on its F-14A Tomcat aircraft. The missile is a modified HAWK surface-to-air missile (SAM).
—"Iran modifies HAWK for air-to-air role," Jane's Defence Upgrades, 5 January 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 January 1998
The United States continues to pressure Russia to halt proliferation to Iran. "Iran is taking advantage of Russia's economic woes and large reservoir of defense technology and scientific talent to accelerate development of an indigenous ballistic missile capability," states Stephen R. Sestanovich, the State Department's senior specialist on the former Soviet republics. As Iran is believed to be rapidly approaching missile self-sufficiency, Russian assistance to Iran's ballistic missile program is one of the most sensitive issues in the U.S.-Russia relationship and a source of anxiety in Israel.
—Thomas W. Lippman, "U.S. Keeps After Russia to Halt Flow of Missile Technology to Iran," Washington Post, 18 January 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 January 1998
British intelligence uncovers a trail from England through Europe to Iran of materials intended to help Iranian missile and nuclear weapons production. Steel used for missile castings and centrifuges is acquired disguised as other items. An export-controls case in Britain against an Iranian businessman is linked to a company in Dusseldorf, which is known to be a front for the Defense Industries Organization of Iran.
—Nicholas Rufford, "Britain at The Centre of Iran Bomb Web," Sunday Times (London), 18 January 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 January 1998
A two-year investigation by Britain's MI-5 intelligence agency and its European counterparts uncovers a sophisticated supply network from Britain through Germany and Austria to its final destination in Iran. British customs officials report that Iran was planning to use Britain as a "conduit for acquiring high-strength steel of a quality used in missile casing and centrifuges for weapons-grade uranium."
—Douglas Davis, "Iran Using Britain as Center of its Weapons Network," Jewish Telegraph Agency, 19 January 1998, <http://www.jta.org>.

19 January 1998
Chinese Defense Minister Gen. Chi Haotian reassures U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen that China will not export anti-ship cruse missiles or nuclear technology to Iran.
—"China Told Not to Deal with Iran Cohen Warns Beijing of Risks in Arms Sales," Cincinnati Post, 19 January 1998.

20 January 1998
China has stopped sales of anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran. Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen had earlier promised President Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to cut off the sales. Cohen seems to be assured that the sales to Iran are now stopped after his meeting with China's Defense Minister Chi Haotian.
—Rone Tempest, "China Vows Missile Sales to Iran Have Been Halted; Asia: U.S. Defense Chief Uses Beijing Visit to Clear Up 'Ambiguities' Over Previous Assurances that Arms Shipments Would End. White House Says Weapons Deals Endangered American Ships in Persian Gulf," Los Angeles Times, 20 January 1998, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis,<http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 January 1998
Chinese President Jiang Zemin tells Defense Secretary William Cohen that the sale and transfer of anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran has ended, including those that Iran and China already have a contract for.
—Tom Korski, "Iran Missile Deals Over, US Envoy Assured," South China Morning Post, 21 January 1998, p. 8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 January 1998
The Baltic State Technical University in St. Petersburg is receiving payment from an Iranian official identified as M. Akhlagi, head of Iran's "Sanam" College. The first payment, intelligence officials allege, is for the first installment for the Persepolis joint missile education center. "Sanam" [likely Semnan] is also called the "Sanam" Industries Group, Department 140 and the Missile Industries Group, which is in charge of Iran's solid-fueled missile program. The group is part of Iran's Defense Industries Organization, the government procurement agency. "Sanam" was reportedly set up as part of a February 1997 agreement between the Baltic Technical University and Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, also part of Department 140. Both organizations jointly created the center known as Persepolis as part of an agreement concluded in 1996.
—Bill Gertz, "Russia Conspiring with Iran on Missiles," Washington Times, 23 February 1998, pp. 1-4.

27 January 1998
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu states that Iran is posing an existential threat to the State of Israel because its missiles have the capability of reaching Israel. Netanyahu also states that Israel is prepared in case diplomatic efforts to halt Iran are unsuccessful. According to Knesset member Ephraim Sneh, the Iranian missiles would be ready in a year.
—Batsheva Tsur, "PM: Iran Poses Most Serious Threat Since 1948," Jerusalem Post, 27 January 1998, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 January 1998
The Iranian foreign ministry issues a statement calling Israeli claims that "Iran is seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles" just a ploy to divert attention from its own nuclear program. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu says that Israel is preparing "other measures to prevent Iran from acquiring long-range missiles or weapons of mass destruction in case diplomatic efforts fail."
—"Iran Dismisses Israeli Claims As Ploy to Cover Own Nuclear Program," Agence France-Presse, 28 January 1998.

30 January 1998
After Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin signs the decree "On Stepping Up Export Controls for Dual Purpose Goods and Services Relating to Mass Destruction Weapons and Delivery Vehicles for Them," a decision is made today to stop any SANAM operations in Russia.
—Konstantin Eggert, "'Meteor' for the Ayatollahs. Iran Needs Ballistic Missiles in Order To Become a World Power," Izvestiya (Moscow), 22 October 1998, p. 5; in "Part II of Iran's Missile Program Article," FBIS Document FTS19981022001488, 22 October 1998.

February 1998
According to Russia's Defense Ministry, Iran is interested in purchasing high-speed ships capable of carrying anti-ship missiles from Russia. Iran also wishes to extend its military cooperation with Russia from land- and sea-based systems to outer space systems. The two countries have reportedly started discussions on developing in Russia a dual-use communication satellite for Iran. During upcoming meetings in Moscow between the Iranian and Russian foreign ministries, Iran is expected to discuss purchasing Yakhont anti-ship missiles.
—Yuriy Chubchenko, "Russia Will Help Iran Look Down on Neighbors," Kommersant Daily (Moscow), 26 February 1998, p. 5; in "Russia Building Ties With Iran to Restore Clout in Caspian," FBIS Document FTS19980226000588, 26 February 1998; "Russia Seeking to Develop Arms Sales, Nuclear Power in Iran," Russian Public Television First Channel Network (Moscow), 25 February 1998.

10 February 1998
Russia's scientists are selling their expertise to other countries. Last year, officials arrested people involved in three different incidents for trying to sell military equipment and knowledge to Iran. Parts for missile systems and information on missile engine and jet production were some of the materials for sale. The Russian Federal Security Service states that it is more difficult to keep the scientists from leaving or from sharing their expertise than to hinder the movement of material.
—Judith Matloff, "Danger from Russia's Scientists: Selling Weapons Know-How," Christian Science Monitor, 10 February 1998, p. 8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 February 1998
Iran displays a variety of missiles and related equipment at its 10th annual air industry exhibition at the First Hunter Air base in the Mehrabad region. The exhibition highlights the Iranian Air Force's technological achievements, including the Sattar-1 and Sattar-2 (Project Asr 69) laser guided air-to-surface missiles. The Sattar-1 has a range of 15 to 20km, and is based on the propellant system of the surface-to-air Hawk missiles. The Sattar-2 is an improved version, and is equipped with a balanced guide mechanism. The missiles are fired from F-4 and F-5 fighter-bombers. The exhibition also features systems for the installation of Chinese air-to-air, heat-seeking PL-7 missiles, with a special mounting placement manufactured by China. Rapier and Hawk surface-to-air missile systems and short-range surface-to-surface Zelzal-2 ballistic missiles are also on display. The Zelzal has a range equal to that of the Scud-B, and is equipped with small throttling engines to increase precision.
—Farzin Nadimi, "Reporting on the Tenth Ten Days of Dawn Air Force Exhibition," Sanaye-ye Havai (Tehran), 20 February 1998, pp. 2-4; in "Article Describes Iranian Air Show Exhibits," FBIS Document FTS19980505001581, 5 May 1998.

23 February 1998
Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) is cooperating with the Iranian intelligence service to coordinate exchanges under a joint Russian-Iranian missile research program. U.S. intelligence officials report that in the coming weeks, three Russian missile experts are expected to arrive in Tehran to teach subjects ranging from guidance systems to firing circuitry and the pyrotechnics of explosive systems.
—Bill Gertz, "Russia Conspiring with Iran on Missiles," Washington Times, 23 February 1998, pp. 1-4.

27 February 1998
The U.S. House of Representatives approves an ammendment to the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act to guarantee that foreigners selling missile technology to Iran and helping the United States do not get sanctioned. Representative Benjamin Gilman (Republican, New York), who sponsored a bill that would stop aid and exports to countries involved in Iran's missile program, is asked to revise it. Clinton will most likely veto the bill. The bill would affect the Russian Space Agency because it is said to have helped Iran build a missile. It became clear to the intelligence community, however, that this bill would threaten their work with foreign agencies regarding the issue of Iran's missiles, so Gilman was asked to amend it.
—Michael S. Lelyveld, "When Trade Meets Foreign Policy: A Collision on Iran Missile Sales Over Iran Arms Sales," Jounal of Commerce, 27 February 1998, p. 1A, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

March 1998
The Gore-Chernomyrdin commission speaks about Russia's relations with Iran, and Russia agrees to form a committee that would monitor technology exports.
—Ivan Safranchuk, ed. by Dmitriy Yevstafyev, "Scientific Notes No. 8: The Nuclear and Missile Programs of Iran and Russian Security – The Framework of Russian-Iranian Collaboration," Nauchnyye Zapiski (Moscow), 5 May 1999, vol. 8, pp. 1-36; in "Russia, Iran Nuclear Program Cooperation," FBIS Document FTS19990701001333, 1 July 1999.

March 1998
Azerbaijan's customs authority intercepts a 22-ton shipment of ballistic missile parts on its way to Iran. The parts are of Russian origin and are said to have been sent by MOSSO, a private Russian firm. Russia reportedly investigated the seizure and made several arrests of Tajikistani nationals. Vice President Al Gore asks Russian Prime Minister-designate Kiryenko about the affair. Kiryenko confronts the head of the Russian Space Agency Yuri Koptev, who denies that MOSSO had transferred any material to Iran. [Note: See entries for 25,26 March.]
—Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs," Study conducted for the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey, CA), October 1998, p. 32.

March 1998
In March 1998, Mazidi allegedly had three Tajikistanis purchase stainless steel from Moscow Metallosnabzheniye OAO (Public Joint-Stock Company) and illegally export it to Iran under the guise of galvanized sheet steel.
—"U.S. Claims on Iran Arms Projects Refuted," Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), 27 February 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990308000140, 27 February 1999.

March 1998
Twenty-two tons of missile-quality stainless steel used in Scud missile fuel tanks are shipped from Russia to Iran. A "routine border check" at the Azeri-Iranian border uncovers the shipment, which is then stopped. Russia and Iran also announce that they are cooperating in the development of a "civilian" Iranian satellite to be used for communications and imaging. [Note: See entries for 25,26 March.]
—Gerald M. Steinberg, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Developments in the Middle East: 1998-99 (Ramat Gan, Israel: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, September 2000), p. 17.

1 March 1998
The responsibility for the missile industry in Iran lies with its Defense Industry Organization (DIO) or Sasaja. Within this structure, there is Department 140, the Sanam Industrial Group, which is the main body that coordinates the research centers and production facilities. Under this department, there is the Department 140/14, the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, which is in charge of solid-fueled missile development; Department 140/15, the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group in charge of liquid-fueled missile development; Department 140/16, which plans the "manufacture of instrumentation/creation of control and guidance systems"; and Department 140/31, the Parchin Missile-Industrial Group.

Together with the Education and Research Institute (also known as the Scientific-Research Group), the DIO Departments are crucial players in Iran's missile procurement. Department 148/3, parts of the Mechanical Industrial Group, Department 142, 154, and 158, the Ministry of Defense Special Industrial Groups (MIDSPCIG), the University of Scientific and Defense Technologies (USDT, Department 149/d), the civilian Iranian Research Organization for Science and Technology (IROST), and the Shiraz and Mazandaran Universities are also involved in missile procurement. "The Mechanical Systems Production Group supplied components for domestic NUR [free-flight rockets] and, according to some assessments, its participation in the future production of a launcher is planned." Departments 140 (Sanam), 140/14, 140/15, and 140/16 are located in the Tehran area. Department 140/31 and 140/4 are associated with Parchin and are located 30km southwest of Tehran, where the DIO has its chemical industry. That location seems to be the main producer of the Oghab and Nazeat missiles. Another compound under construction seems to be connected to missile production and is located close to Isfahan. The Kuh-e-Barjamali facility received its name in conjunction with missile manufacturing; the Gostaresh Scientific Research Center, located northeast of Tehran, is involved in researching the building of missiles.

North Korea and China, especially the NORINCO military industrial complex, China's Northern Industrial Corporation, and the Chinese Precision Machinebuilding Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC), are the main organizations helping Iran in its missile procurement. A broad network helps Iran obtain materials and technology from around the world, such as milling machines, lathes, and ball bearings. It is assumed that Iran's military importing is not centrally controlled. The DIO has the authority and has contacts in the exporting countries. The Instrumentation Factories Plant (IFP), also known as Mojtame Santy Ajzae Dahgigh in Farsi or as Department 140/16, has contacts all over the world. The imported cargo is delivered to a place close to the Parchin Armory, where a site for guidance and control systems production is being built, 50km east of Tehran. This site is north of the Asiatic Highway, close to the Shargfabad community, and is built symmetrically to the Parchin military installation. In order to get the imports to their proper site, any mode of transportation is used. To be able to import the material, Iran misleads and falsifies customs information or brings the material through another country before bringing it to Iran. The Shahid Hemat Industrial Group (SHIG) and the Samak Industrial Group are acquiring weapons and materials for Iran. "Inasmuch as SHIG is participating in this, it can be assumed that the new missile is being equipped with a liquid-propellant motor." The article lists all the departments that are part of Iran's Department of Free-Flight Rockets and Guided Missiles. It further lists the places for research and development and production and testing sites.

Iran is in the process of making the Modjaher-II, which is for reconnaissance purposes, and the Savejeh unmanned airborne vehicle. Also under production are the CSA-1 (HQ-2) based on the Chinese surface-to-air missile SA-2; the CSS-8 (B610 or 8610), also based on the Chinese SA-2, and the SA-2 and SA-5 surface-to-air missiles.
—"Mikhail Kirillin: Several U.S. Firms Engaged in Developing Missile Equipment Have Links with Iranians," Yadernyy Kontrol Dossier in Yadernyy Kontrol (Moscow), March-April 1998, No. 2, Vol. 38, pp. 37-43; in "Iran's Missile Industry, U.S. Missile Development Firms with Iranian Links," FBIS Document FTS19980605000876, 5 June 1998.

1 March 1998
An officer in the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), offers statements regarding Iran's missiles and Russia's relations with Iran. He states that it is the job of the FSB to end all efforts of private and public enterprises of Iran from gaining access to military information, especially to technology to make dual-use items. Several attempts by the Iranian Industrial Group Sanam have been intercepted and stopped within the last year.
—"Mikhail Kirillin: Several U.S. Firms Engaged in Developing Missile Equipment Have Links with Iranians," Yadernyy Kontrol (Moscow), March-April 1998, No. 2, Vol. 38, pp. 37-43; in "Iran's Missile Industry, U.S. Missile Development Firms with Iranian Links"; in FBIS Document FTS19980605000876, 5 June 1998.

3 March 1998
Israel's Industry and Trade Minister Natan Sharansky asks Russian officials to aid in stopping Iran's missile program. He states that he would like Russia to abstain from involvement in the program and to keep its citizens from being involved as well. The head of the Russian Space Agency admits that some Russian companies had wanted to sell military material to Iran, but that the government had stopped them. However, Russia still has a contract with Iran to build a nuclear power plant. In a meeting with Al Gore, Sharansky expresses his hope that Gore, in an upcoming meeting with Russia's Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, would stress Russia's need to suppress helping Iran's nuclear and missile ambitions.
—Adam Tanner, "Sharansky Asks Russia to Help Halt Iran's Missile Program," Jerusalem Post, 3 March 1998, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 March 1998
According to Customs Officials in New York, Daniel Malloy, the owner and president of International Helicopter, a New Jersey company, wants to buy batteries that power AIM-54 air-to-air missiles and ship them to Iran via Singapore. These missiles are only carried on F-14As, which the United States sold to Iran before the hostage crisis in 1979. Malloy had ordered twenty of the batteries made by Eagle-Picher of Joplin, Missouri. He has been arrested by Customs officials and charged with violation of the Arms Export Control Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
—William K. Rashbaum, "N.J. Man Busted in Iran Arms Biz," Daily News (New York), 4 March 1998, p. 20, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 March 1998
Parviz Lavi, an Iranian who had been living in the United States for many years, is arrested and will be charged with violating arms export agreements, conspiracy, and money laundering. He helped in the F-14 deal between the United States and Iran before the hostage crisis in 1979 and now runs Omega Industries, an arms company with offices in Long Island, Los Angeles, and Rotterdam, the Netherlands. Six years ago, Lavi was put under surveillance after it was suspected that he was shipping parts to Iran. Officials set up an operation in Norfolk because the Oceana Naval Air Station has the most F-14 Tomcats in the United States. Lavi has been going there for the parts. Government cooperators sold him 500 metal blades for the TF-30 engines on the F-14s manufactured by Pratt & Whitney of United Technologies in North Haven, Connecticut, which are essential in keeping the F-14s functioning. While Lavi is trying to ship these items to the Netherlands, customs agents arrest him, and with the help of Dutch officials, the network that Lavi was operating in order to ship the prohibited parts to Iran will be uncovered.
Daniel Malloy of New Jersey, who was trying to sell batteries for the Phoenix missiles that are carried by the Tomcat fighters, is arrested the same day.
—Anthony DePalma, "L.I. Man is Seized in Scheme to Smuggle Jet Parts to Iran," New York Times, 5 March 1998, p. B6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 March 1998
The United States urges Russia to cut down its support to the Iranian missile program by offering a more lucrative space satellite launch business. Yuri N. Koptev, director of the Russian Space agency says, "The increase of the quota is an important and necessary issue for us." American experts are expecting Iran to fly-test a missile based on North Korean and Russian technologies.
—Michael R. Gordon, "US Is Pressing Moscow on Iran and Missile Aid," New York Times, 9 March 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 March 1998
U.S. Air Force Lt. General Lester L. Lyles, director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) asks the U.S. House Appropriations Committee to allocate $50 million to test the U.S. Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) system and Navy Lower-Tier theater missile defense systems against a surrogate Iranian Shahab-3.
—"A Wakeup Call from Iran," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 9 March 1998, p. 21.

9 March 1998
An official from the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology (CIST) reported that Iran is interested in purchasing Taiwan's Sky Sword-1 surface-to-surface missile (SSM). The official said that Taiwan would not sell the missile to Iran.
—Lu Chao-long, "No Sky Sword Missile Sales to Iran," Chung-Kuo Shih Pao (Taipei), 9 March 1998; in FBIS Document FBIS-CHI-98-069, 10 March 1998.

9 March 1998
A spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry states that military and technological cooperation exists between Russia and Iran, but accusations of Russia's alleged assistance with Iran's missile programs are false.
—"Moscow Acknowledges Military Cooperation with Iran," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 16 March 1998; in FBIS Document FTS19980316001646, 16 March 1998.

18 March 1998
The U.S .offers a secret deal to China in an effort to control China's missile exports to Iran and other countries. The secret offer, obtained by the Washington Times, explains that, "in essence, we would include expanded commercial and scientific cooperation with China if China meets conditions for joining the Missile Technology Control Regime and controls its exports to Iran, Pakistan...." The deal is offered to the State Science and Technology Commission of China (recently renamed the Ministry of Science and Technology), which concluded a 10-year agreement with Iran in 1990 to share military technology. The U.S. State Department denies that the United States is offering China access to U.S. missile technology.
—Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs," Study conducted for the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey, CA), October 1998, p. 37.

23 March 1998
Russian intelligence agents have for the past several years recruited scientists from Russian institutes and weapons factories to help Iran develop ballistic missiles. The Russian government insists that the cooperation is not official policy, and that Russia does not violate commitments to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
—Daniel Williams, "Russian Spy Agency Linked to Iran; Service Reportedly Recruited Missile Scientists to Work for Tehran," Washington Post, 23 March 1998, p. A14, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 March 1998
The U.S. Senate passes a bill that calls for sanctions on any "foreign entity" that helps Iran develop its missile program. Russia, however, seems to be the target of the bill.
—"Senate OKs Russian Sanctions; Overwhelming Vote Decries Missile Technology Assistance to Iran," Houston Chronicle, 23 May 1998, p. A31, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 March 1998
Russian intelligence services recruit Russian missile scientists to teach Iranians how to build missiles that can have a range of 1,200 miles. However, the scientists themselves negotiate their contracts with the Iranian authorities.
—"Russian Missile Scientists Recruited to Teach in Iran" Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 23 March 1998, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 March 1998
The Russian Intelligence Service (SVR) says that "it is stupid for them to offer nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles to countries with uncontrollable regimes," and that it is not in Russia's best interest to help Iran and other countries "build up their military might." According to officials, only one or two cases of arms control violations had been uncovered; thus the paper states, "Americans cannot actually boast so far that they caught Russian specialists red-handed working illegally for the defense sectors of countries such as Iran, North Korea, Iraq, or Libya."
—Aleksandr Korzun, "Virtual Missilemen and Secret Intelligence Agents," Novyye Izvestiya, (Moscow), 25 March 1998, p. 3; in "Arming Iran Said 'Stupid,' 'Disadvantageous'," FBIS Document FTS19980325000968, 25 March 1998.

25 March 1998
A shipment of stainless steel from Moscow Metallosnabzheniye OAO (Public Joint-Stock Company) being illegally exported to Iran under the guise of galvanized sheet steel is seized in Azerbaijan, en route from Moscow to Iran. The steel was later determined to be 08Kh189N10T quality, rather than the indicated 12Kh21N5T. The Baltic State Technical University imeni D. F. Ustinov (BGTU) in St. Petersburg ran a joint Iranian-Russian training center involving missile equipment between July 1996 and June 1998.
—"U.S. Claims on Iran Arms Projects Refuted," Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), 27 February 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990308000140, 27 February 1999.

26 March 1998
According to the Azerbaijani National Security Ministry, customs officers in that country detain an illegal shipment of supplies to produce liquid-fueled missiles, bound for Iran. The cargo includes stainless steel bars weighing 21.7 tons and is smuggled by Russia's Europalas-2000 company. According to an investigation by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), three foreigners are detained for illegally smuggling the alloyed steel out of Russia to Iran via Azerbaijan. The steel can be used in some weapons delivery systems. The FSB emphasizes that Russia is in compliance with its obligations under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and is not assisting Iran with their missile programs.
—"Azeri Customs Seize Iran-Bound Missile Materials," Interfax (Moscow), 22 April 1998; in FBIS Document FTS19980422000588, 22 April 1998; Dmitriy Borisov, "Vesti" newscast, Russian Television Network (Moscow), 7 April 1998; in "Further on Foiled Attempt To Smuggle Steel to Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980408001111, 8 April 1998.

27 March 1998
U.S. Department of Defense officials make the first public statements about Iran's Shahab missiles when Air Force Lt. General Lester L. Lyles says that Iran's Shahab-3 would have a range of approximately 1,200km and the Shahab-4s would have an approximate range of 2,000km.
—Bill Gertz, "DoD Confirms Details on Iranian Missiles," Washington Times, 27 March 1998, p. 6.

April 1998
Iran announces that it has successfully tested the Sayyad-1 surface-to-air missile, which was named after Lt. General Ali Sayyad Shirazi, who was assassinated days earlier by Iranian opposition followers in front of his house in Tehran.
—UPI, "Iran to complete missile testing," ExciteNews.com, 2 November 1998, <http://news.excite.com>.

7 April 1998
Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officials report that they prevented a "recent attempt to smuggle 22 tons of alloyed steel to Iran via Azerbaijan." [Note: See entries for 25,26 March.]
—David Makovksy, "Israel Wants Congress to Act on Russian Arms," Haaretz (Tel Aviv), 9 April 1998, <http://www3.haaretz.co.il>.

7 April 1998
Robert Galluci, U..S envoy, holds meetings with Israeli leaders. They have been concerned that Iran, with support from Russia, is about to finish developing a missile engine and will be able to produce a prototype by 1999. The Israelis believe that after the completion of the engine, the Iranians would be able to finish the missile themselves and test towards the end of 1999.
—Steve Rodan, "US Envoy Here to Discuss Teheran Threat. Iran Missile Said Near Completion," Jerusalem Post, 8 April 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 April 1998
The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is hiring missile scientists to teach Iranians missile technology. The contracts were discussed in Iran to eliminate any links of the Russian government and FSB to these contracts. Upon invitation of Iranian students in Russia, these missile experts traveled to Iran and held meetings in secret facilities near Tehran. The Russian experts were offered two-year contacts with salaries of $1,000/month.
—Daniel Williams, Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com>, 23 Marcy 1998; Washington Times, 8 April 1998, p. 15; Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, James Martin Center of Nonproliferation Studies, Fall 1998, p. 170.

14 April 1998
Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu says that the Russian transfer of missile technology to Iran hampers the development of Russian-Israeli relations. Russia says that Iran had attempted to acquire missile technology but these attempts failed.
—"Netanyahu: Moscow Aid To Iran Could Hurt Ties," Jerusalem Post, 14 April 1998, in Lexis-Nexis <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 April 1998
The Iranian Embassy in Moscow issues a statement to the press saying that Iran has not, does not, and will not seek access to Russian missile technologies. The embassy denies allegations in some Russian media that Tehran has made several attempts, at times by illegal methods, to acquire such technologies.
—"Interfax: Iran Denies Seeking Russian Missile Technology," Interfax (Moscow), 15 April 1998; in FBIS Document FTS19980415001480, 15 April 1998.

15 April 1998
Kazakh Foreign Minister Qasymzhomart Kemeluly Toqayev refutes a report in the Jerusalem Post that Kazakhstan may have supplied four nuclear warheads to Iran.
—"Kazakhstan Denies Israeli Daily Report of Iran Warhead Sale," Interfax (Moscow), 15 April 1998; in FBIS Document FTS19980415000908, 15 April 1998.

15 April 1998
An official in the FSB, the Russian Intelligence Services, states that Russia arrested three individuals trying to smuggle, through Azerbaijan, 21.7 tons of an alloy used in missile production. [Note: See entries for 25,26 March.]
—"Three Foreigner Accused of Illegal Trade With Iran," Agence France Presse, 15 April 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>. [CNS translation]

16 April 1998
The U.S. State Department declares 20 Russian agencies and research facilities ineligible for millions of dollars in U.S. assistance because they were involved in providing Iran with missile technology. Among these institutions are TsAGI, Russia's Central Aerodynamic Institute, Baltic State Technical University, and Moscow Aviation Institute.
—Peter Eisler, "Russian Agencies Denied Aid 20 May Have Helped Iran with Missiles," USA Today, 16 April 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 April 1998
An Israel Defense Forces Senior Intelligence Officer tells the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that Iran would complete the prototype of a ground-to-ground missile by 2000.
—Liat Collins, "Iran Will Have Longer Range Missile by 2000-IDF," Jerusalem Post, 22 April 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 April 1998
According to CIA reports, Russian officials support and actively assist Iran's production of the Shahab-3 ballistic missile. Previous American assessments conclude that only private entities in Russia were assisting Iran's missile programs. Israeli and U.S. intelligence reports indicate that the Russian government supported the recent smuggling to Iran of special steel used for making missiles. [Note: See entries for 25, 26 March.]
—Ban Kaspit and Yoav Limor, Maariv (Tel Aviv), 23 April 1998, p. 9; in "IDF Worried by Egyptian Military Buildup, Iranian Missiles," FBIS Document FTS19980425000206, 25 April 1998.

24 April 1998
Tel Aviv's Yediot Aharonot publishes satellite photographs from 1997 revealing a missile base in western Iran. The base is highly camouflaged, located near the Zimkan River in the mountains in Bakhtaran District. This is the only location in Iran from which the Shahab-3 can reach any part of Israel, as well as parts of Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The photos reveal that the base is nearing completion, which indicates that the Shahab-3 could soon be deployed. Construction on the base began prior to 1994. The missiles will apparently be hidden in underground bunkers and deployed on mobile launchers to be launched within minutes if needed. North Korea allegedly assisted Iran with camouflaging the site so it cannot be seen from the air. The photos reveal the infrastructure is not fully ready, but the site can house the missiles and launchers once they are available.

The article also discusses details of Iran's missile programs of 1994, when Iran and North Korea were working on the Nodong missile. Dissatisfied with the Nodong's reliability and precision, Iran sought Russian assistance to obtain high-grade alloys to improve the strength of the missile while maintaining its light weight. Iran also obtained from Russia special metal foils to protect the missile's navigation system, a wind tunnel and other equipment to test the missile, technology to enable the warhead to withstand high speeds, and technology to create asymmetrical warheads that are more capable of evading antimissile defense systems. U.S. intelligence documents state that Iran's Shahid Amat Industrial Group (Shahid Hemat, SHIG) signed numerous contracts with Russian space firms to receive technical aid in designing the Shahab-3. A Russian missile engine manufacturer provided Iran with equipment to improve the Shahab-3 engine by increasing the pressure and temperature in the combustion chamber. The engine, consequently, was enabled to carry the missile farther without using more fuel. The report also states that 350 Iranians studied flight theory at missile research and development centers in Moscow. U.S. sources also reveal that the Russian firm Polyus, which deals mostly with developing missile guidance systems, is assisting Iran's missile programs.
—Harold Howe, Yediot Aharonot (Tel Aviv), 24 April 1998, pp. 2-3; in "Details of Missile Base in Western Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980424001174, 24 April 1998.

25 April 1998
A truck loaded with 22 tons of stainless steel that can be used for missile construction is intercepted on its way to Tehran. American officials warn Russian intelligence that a shipment of alloy that is used to make tanks for Scud missiles is about to leave Russia towards Iran. Azeri customs officials stop the truck. The transporting company carrying out the shipment is named Moso. [Note: article most likely refers to 25 March seizure.]
—Michael R Gordon and Eric Schmitt, "Iran Nearly Got a Missile Alloy From Russians," New York Times, 25 April 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 April 1998
Rep. Curt Weldon, a leading U.S. Congressman, says that Iran is less than a year away from building and deploying a medium-range ballistic missile. He adds that Russia violated the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) seven times during the last six years.
—Steve Rodan, "US Congressman: Iran's Israel's range Rockets Nearly Ready," Jerusalem Post, 26 April 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 April 1998
A spokesman for Iran's Foreign Ministry, Mahmud Mohammadi, says that the seizure of 22 tons of steel alloy at the Azerbaijan border is in no way connected to any military or civilian agencies of Iran. The Iranian government is currently investigating the incident, and believes a private company ordered the shipment. [Note: See entry for 26 March 1998.]
—"Iran Denies Military Linked to Steel Seized at Azeri Border," IRNA (Tehran), 28 April 1998; in FBIS Document FTS19980428001156, 28 April 1998.

May 1998
Bates Gill of the Monterey Institute of International Studies says the media most likely confused the M-11 missile with the M-7 missile when reporting about the transfer plans between China and Iran. China has assisted by building a "ballistic missile plant and test range east of Tehran, and may also be involved in producing solid-fuel rockets at Iran's Semnan facility." China also gave Iran guidance technology and precision machine tools for their ballistic missiles.
China is supposedly helping Iran make a 200km-range version of the Mushak-160, called the Mushak-200, that has a payload of 500kg. The two countries are also working on a short-range ballistic missile called the NP-110. It is solid fueled with 105km range. Iran's Zelzal-3 solid-fueled missile with a 1000-1500km range will use "gyroscopes, other advanced guidance system technology, solid fuel technology and computerized machine tools" imported from China.
—Bates Gill, "Chinese Arms Exports to Iran," MERIA Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, May 1998, 8 June 2001, <http://www.biu.ac.il>.

May 1998
Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji assures Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that China would not sell nuclear nor missile technology to Iran or other countries that might transfer it to Iran. This conflicts with Israel's Haaretz report in the same month that claimed China is providing Iran with 1,000 tons of a special steel alloy used in the construction of ballistic missiles.
—H. Asher Bolande, "Israeli Minister Urges Jiang to Stop Arms Exports to Iran," Agence France-Presse (Hong Kong), 2 September 1998; in "Israeli Minister Urges Jiang to Stop Arms Exports to Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980902000635, 2 September 1998.

1 May 1998
Iran attempts to develop liquid- and solid-fueled missiles using foreign components and technologies. Russia has been accused of providing such equipment to Iran, but the journal believes Moscow is in compliance with its obligations under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
—Petr Litavrin, Yadernyy Knotrol (Moscow), 1 May 1998, pp. 5-10; in "Problems of Missile Proliferation in Asia," FBIS Document FTS199808260000002, 26 August 1998.

4 May 1998
United Arab Emirates (UAE) authorities have recently cracked down on several technology shipments headed to Iran through the UAE. According to U.S. officials, the UAE has blocked shipments, which included advanced computers, dual-use chemicals, GPS systems, missile guidance components, and machine tools.
—"Shipments Blocked in UAE, Japan," Iran Brief, 4 May 1998, p. 4.

8 May 1998
Russian intelligence chief Nikolai Kovale accuses the United States of conducting covert sting operations aimed at identifying Russian enterprises and organizations supplying missile and nuclear technology to Iran. Kovale makes these accusations at a meeting with a group lead by U.S. National Security Advisor Samuel Berger. Berger's group presents new evidence of continuing Russian-Iranian cooperation regarding missiles. The point of the discussion is that positive results on the Russian side would help President Clinton sustain a veto of a bill seeking to impose sanctions on Russian enterprises and organizations willing to sell technology to Iran. The Russian intelligence chief criticizes the United States for not allowing the CIA and FBI to be more transparent with their information on Russian-Iranian missile technology. It seems that Russia had failed to stop a shipment from Nigrafit of carbon or graphite material that was bound for Iran and detained in Austria. Russia had recently announced the secession of all missile training being done at the Baltic State Technical Institute with Sanam, an institute used by Iran as part of its current missile program.
—Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs," Study conducted for the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey, CA), October 1998, p. 33.

14 May 1998
Iranian arms dealer Reza Akrami and an unidentified associate are arrested in Vancouver, Canada, for attempting to smuggle "sophisticated military parts" to Iran. [Note: See 16 May entry.]
—Anthony DePalma and Lowell Bergman, "US Arms Embargo on Iran has Loophole: Canada," New York Times, 14 May 1998.

15 May 1998
Reza Akrami is arrested in Vancouver this week, now facing charges of conspiring to smuggle American-made jets and military parts to Iran, including electronics to guide anti-aircraft missiles. A large portion of the American-made weapons and parts that Iran buys illicitly move through Canada, taking advantage of regulatory loopholes and the Canadian government's decision not to support the American embargo.
—Anthony DePalma with Lowell Bergman, "Sneaking U.S. Jets to Iran: The Canadian Route," New York Times, 15 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 May 1998
Russian Ambassador Mikhail Bogdanov reports that his government has given Israel evidence refuting accusations by Jerusalem and Washington that Russia allows the transfer of missile and nuclear weapons technology to Iran. The evidence is a direct response which addresses in detail a list of companies that the IDF intelligence chief Maj.-Gen Moshe Yaalon said were providing missile technology to Iran. Bogdanov suggests that Russia's ties with Iran are being unfairly singled out and distorted.
—Steve Rodan, "Russian envoy: My government has proved it's not helping Iran," Jerusalem Post, 15 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 May 1998
Reza Akrami and Mosheen Lesan, two Iranians arrested in Canada, put up their bail for release. The U.S. wants to extradite them because they were trying to buy klystron tubes which Jeffrey Cole, Assistant U.S. Attorney, says "help operate the radar of the Hawk ground-to-air missile system."
—"U.S. Seeking Extradition of 2 Iranians," San Francisco Chronicle, 16 May 1998, p. A17, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 May 1998
Two Iranian men arrested last week on charges of conspiring to smuggle American-made weapons and military parts are released on bail despite the efforts of Michael Owens, a crown prosecutor representing American interests. Mr. Owens says the two men produced a list of items that the Iranian government wanted to buy, including hydraulic parts for fighter planes and computers that were to be bought in the name of Iranian universities, but whose real destinations were nuclear plants in Iran.
—Anthony DePalma, "Canada Sets Bail for Iranians Held in Weapons Smuggling," New York Times, 16 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 May 1998
The Changgwang Sinyong Corporation (also known as the North Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation/Bureau) is the organization responsible for supplying Iran with DPRK missile technologies, components, and Hwasong-6 missiles during the mid-1990s.
—Joseph Bermudez, "A Silent Partner," Jane's Defense Weekly, 20 May 1998.

21 May 1998
After attending a meeting in Moscow, Israeli Minister of Trade and Industry Natan Sharansky says "there is no evidence that the Russian government is supplying Iran with such missile technology." Sharansky also states, "that unless Russia prevents Russian firms from aiding Iranian military programs, Israel will seek the adoption of sanctions against those companies by the US Congress." Sharansky met with Russian Security Council Secretary Andrei Kokoshin earlier this month to discuss leakage of Russian technology to Iran. A few days later, Sharansky met with former Russian Prime Minister Sergey Kiriyenko and urged Israel's demands that Russia stop all missile technology transfers to Iran. He also stated that Israeli intelligence will be monitoring Russian measures used to check technology transfers. Sharansky met with Kokoshin again, along with his senior aide, Grigory Raputa, in August. Also on the trip was General Nikolai Kovaloyov, head of the Russian security services (since removed). Raputa visited Israel in the past to discuss the Iranian missile issue. During that meeting, Kokoshin was told "that two of the seven Russian enterprises investigated by Moscow last month for transferring missile technology to Iran are still involved in supplying that country with weapons knowledge." Sharansky states, "there is no doubt that in the last months Russians made a number of steps to combat the problem. Nevertheless, we will be satisfied not by the steps that are taken but by the results in the field. We believe that in a year, if the assistance from the companies of Russia and all other countries will not stop, [Iran] can have its own missile."
—Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs," Study conducted for the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey, CA), October 1998, p. 50.

21-27 May 1998
Serguey Yasterjhembsky, press secretary for the Russian Presidency, says that Russia, "had not and will not" export ballistic and missiles technology to Iran.
—Safa Haeri, "The G8 Agenda," Al Ahram Weekly (Cairo), 21-27 May 1998, Issue No. 378, <http://www.ahram.org.eg>.

21 May 1998
Israel's Industry and Trade Minister Natan Sharansky meets with Russian Prime Minister Sergey Kiriyenko. Sharansky emphasizes Israel's demand that all missile technology transfers to Iran from Russia must cease. Kiriyenko says Russia would not take any action in the Middle East that would affect Israel's security.
—Ada Kohen, "Sharansky-Russian Aid to Iran Must Stop within Weeks," Maariv (Tel Aviv), 22 May 1998; in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-98-142, 22 May 1998.

22 May 1998
The U.S. Senate approves the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act.
—"Senate Approves Sanctions Law," Jamestown Monitor, 26 May 1998.

23 May 1998
The Senate votes overwhelmingly to impose sanctions on Russian entities accused of exporting missile technology to Iran. A Senate Republican source says the bill would levy sanctions against any foreign entity that provides support for Iran's efforts to develop ballistic missiles, although the Russian entities are the primary targets of the legislation.
—"Senate OKs Russian sanctions; Overwhelming vote decries missile technology assistance to Iran," Houston Chronicle, 23 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 May 1998
Iranian Brigadier General Mohammad Ali Jaafari says that Iran has produced various surface-to-surface missiles with a range between 50 to 150 kilometers.
—"On the eve of 24 May the Guards Corps Ground Forces Commander Announced: The 'Towsan' [Mustang] rapid reaction tank was produced by the Guards Corps," Iran (Tehran), 24 May 1998, p. 3; in "Towsan Rapid Reaction Tank Produced by Guards Corps" FBIS Document FTS19980602000710, 2 June 1998.

26 May 1998
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu receives a pledge from China that it would withhold nuclear and ballistic missile technology from Iran.
—Rena Miller, "Israeli Source on Netanyahu Meetings," Agence France-Presse (Beijing), 26 May 1998; in FBIS Document FBIS-CHI-98-146, 26 May 1998.

28 May 1998
According to U.S. officials, China has transferred about 1,000 tons of specialty steel to Iran within the last six weeks. Officials report that the steel could be used for Iran's missile program.
—David Makovsky, "Missiles feared as China sends steel to Tehran," Haaretz (Tel Aviv), 29 May 1998.

June 1998
The MAZ 543 transporter-erector launcher vehicle, which the Soviet Union used for the SS-1, is seen in Iran. However, the Iranians use other Russian launch vehicles and several different German Mercedes-Benz Vehicles for their unguided rockets. These vehicles can also be modified to carry the "Scud-B" or "Scud-C" ballistic missiles. It is difficult to guess how many "Scud-B/C" transporter-erector launchers (TELs) are available to the Iranians, but considering their engineering skills, it is likely that around 100 TELs could be made available in a relatively small amount of time.
—Duncan Lennox, "Iran's ballistic missile projects: uncovering the evidence," Jane's Intelligence Review, June 1998, p. 25.

June 1998
The Iranian National Council of Resistance (NCR) reports that Iran has successfully test-fired the Shahab-3 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). The NCR states that the Shahab-3 is moving into the production stage. U.S. intelligence estimates that the Shahab-3 has a range of 800km, making it a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) rather than an IRBM (defined as having a range of 1,400km). Commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Mohsen Rezai reports, "Iran has not been able to produce intercontinental ranges but has completed the production process for its short- and long-range missiles."
—"Iran's Shahab-3 IRBM 'Ready for Production'," Jane's Missiles & Rockets, June 1998, p. 4.

6 June 1998
According to "informed sources," all Iranian ambassadors working in the former Soviet Union have specific orders to recruit missile experts in Iran, regardless of the cost. The specialists must be capable of developing and modernizing intermediate-range missiles. Most likely, Iran wishes to modernize their Scud missiles by increasing their range by 300 kilometers and developing new engines and airframes.
—Andrey Apostolov, "Iran Hurriedly Hunts For Specialists in Missile Technologies. Particularly in Former USSR," Russkiy Telegraf (Moscow), 6 June 1998, p. 12; in "Iran Using FSU as Recruiting Ground for Missile Experts," FBIS Document FTS19980609000346, 9 June 1998.

11 June 1998
The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) releases a list of foreign companies believed to be involved in developing weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems. The Iranian company Sanam is noted as having "tried to obtain data on the latest Russian development work in missile, space, aviation, nuclear and laser technologies and vigorously established contacts with people in the defense industry." Sanam's operations in Russia were terminated in January 1998. Likewise, Sanam's practice of sending Iranian students to study at the Baltic State Technical University has been suspended.
—"FSB Adds to List of Companies Involved in Weapons Programs," Interfax (Moscow), 11 June 1998; in FBIS Document FTS19980612000415, 12 June 1998.

16 June 1998
U.S. intelligence sources believe that Iran is trying to purchase telemetry equipment for missile testing from China's Great Wall Industries. Great Wall Industries is reportedly negotiating to sell an "entire telemetry infrastructure" for Iran's Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 missile programs. Russia recently informed the United States that Chinese and North Korean officials were spotted in Iran for a missile-test.
—Bill Gertz, "China Assists Iran, Libya on Missiles," Washington Times, 16 June 1998, p. 1.

16 June 1998
U.S. intelligence believes that China is cooperating with Iran in missile technology. Iran tried to purchase telemetry equipment for missile testing from China's Great Wall Industries. Russian authorities also informed the United States that Chinese and North Korean missile experts were spotted at the missile testing facilities in Iran. China is said to be assisting Iran develop the 110km-range NP-110 (this likely will be the Fateh-110 missile).
—Bill Gertz, Washington Times, 16 June 1998, p. 1; in Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, Center of Nonproliferation Studies, Fall 1998, p. 170.

17 June 1998
North Korea admits that it is selling missiles to other countries because it needs foreign currency. Officials state that they have known for a long time that North Korea was providing Iran and Syria with Scud missiles. North Korea's Korean Central News Agency notes that they will "continue developing, testing and deploying missiles." Pyongyang's missile program is based on Scud technology provided by the former Soviet Union or Egypt, American officials say.
—"N. Korea Admits Missile Sales, Vows to Continue," Baltimore Sun, 17 June 1998, p. 12A, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 June 1998
U.S. intelligence reports state that China is sending missile technology to Iran and Libya. China and Iran had been negotiating about telemetry equipment, which is necessary for missile testing. The intelligence reports show that both China and Russia have been involved in Iran's ambition to produce two medium-range ballistic missile systems. Israeli intelligence had already discovered last year that China's Great Wall Industries and Iran were speaking about a sale of telemetry equipment for the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 missiles. These weapons are based on North Korea's Nodong missile, which has a 620-mile range.
—Tom Rhodes, "China 'helping Libya and Iran to Build Missiles'," Times (London), 17 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 June 1998
China is assisting Iran and Libya with missile technology despite claims that Beijing has improved its record on weapons proliferation, according to U.S. intelligence reports. Reports show that last summer, Iran held discussions with China about the acquisition of telemetry equipment, a vital component for missile-testing. Chinese experts are also believed to have been working with Libyan technicians to help create missiles for Colonel Qaddhafi. The data provide fresh evidence that China, as well as Russia, is playing a key role in Iran's drive to build two medium-range ballistic missile systems.
—Tom Rhodes, "China helping Libya and Iran to build missiles,'' Times (Washington, DC), 17 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 June 1998
Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai says Iran is continuing to advance its Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 missile programs with intensive assistance from Russia. Mordechai said that Israel had information that Iran was keeping up the production rate of its missiles.
—Gideon Alon, "Syria, Iran 'stocking up arms'," Haaretz (Tel Aviv), 23 June 1998.

22 June 1998
The Russian Ministry of General and Vocational Education stops the teaching of Iranian students at the Ustinov Military Mechanics (Voenmekh) State Technical University at Baltiysk. Furthermore, any contact between Voenmekh and Iran's Sanam industrial group will also be terminated, as Sanam has been connected with violating Russia's export control requirements regarding missile technologies. The decision is in accordance with Russia's decree "on strengthening control over the export of dual purpose goods and services related to weapons of mass destruction and missile means of their delivery."
—Anna Bakina, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 22 June 1998; in "Russia to Stop Military Technical Training for Iranians," FBIS Document FTS19980623000281, 23 June 1998.

23 June 1998
According to Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, Iran continues to advance its missile programs to manufacture the 1,300km-range Shahab-3 and the 2,000km-range Shahab-4. Referring to the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, Mordechai said, "what happened in India and in Pakistan can only accelerate Iran's desire to have strategic stability."
—Gidon Alon, Haaretz (Tel Aviv), 23 June 1998, p. 2; in "Mordekhay - Iran 'Keeping Up' Missile Production Rate," FBIS Document FTS19980623000758, 23 June 1998.

July 1998
There are nine Russian companies and organizations that U.S. President Clinton contemplates sanctioning for supplying military material to Iran. Glavkosmos is the "commercial intermediary for the RKA (Russia's Space Agency) in international projects." The Baltic State University supposedly trains Iranian students in missile technology. The INOR Scientific Production Center supposedly sold "620kg of alloy, blanks of high-strength steel, and three types of foil 0.2 and 0.4mm" thick. Yevropalas-2000, MOSO Company is said to have been shipping steel to Iran via Cyprus. Grafit NII provided Iran with graphite composite materials. Polyus NII is said to have provided Iran with laser gyroscopes. The gyroscopes produced by the company are made for passenger airplanes; using them on ballistic missiles would take a lot of effort and money, if such a use were at all possible. There were I-42-1S gyroscope deliveries from Polyus to Iran in 1995-1997. [Note: See 16 July entry.]
—Aleksey Rey, "The Iranian Affair: The Enterprises and Organizations Suspected of Deliveries of Missile Technologies to Iran," The Doklady PIR-Tsentra Series, No. 7, (Moscow), PIR-Center, 15 September 1998; in Ivan Safranchuk, ed. by Dmitriy Yevstafyev, "Scientific Notes No. 8: The Nuclear and Missile Programs of Iran and Russian Security – The Framework of Russian-Iranian Collaboration," Nauchnyye Zapiski (Moscow), 5 May 1999, vol. 8, pp. 1-36; in "Russia, Iran Nuclear Program Cooperation," FBIS Document FTS19990701001333, 1 July 1999.

July 1998
A high-level report issued by the U.S. government's Rumsfeld Commission concludes that the threat from Iran is increasing and that "Russia poses a threat to the U.S. as a major exporter of enabling technologies, including ballistic missile technologies, to countries hostile to the United States."
—Gerald M. Steinberg, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Developments in the Middle East: 1998-99 (Ramat Gan, Israel: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, September 2000), p. 17.

1 July 1998
Major General Aleksandr Zdanovich, chief of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Public Relations Center, denies that Russia violated any export control laws in the recent smuggling case of steel alloy from Russia to Iran via Azerbaijan. [Note: See entry for 26 March 1998.] "Expert examination showed that there was no basis for the accusation of illegal export of dual-purpose goods. The metal was sheets of stainless steel of the grade 08X 18H 10T, which is used everywhere for household needs. No special export license was needed for this consignment," Zdanovich states. He also maintains that the main perpetrator is an Iranian citizen, and that the FSB is active in halting the illicit transfer of missile technology. "This is just one instance of monitoring work by the security organs to prevent the spread of missile technology," he says.
—Anatoliy Yelizarov, "We Do Not Trade in Missiles in Circumvention of the Law...," Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Moscow), 1 July 1998, p. 8; in "FSB Aide Denies Dual-Use Export Charges," FBIS Document FTS19980701001010, 1 July 1998.

5 July 1998
The United States and Israel are the strongest opponents of Russia's arms deals with Iran and other countries. Russia is supposedly supplying missile technology to India, Iran, and Iraq. They are also building a nuclear plant in Iran. The reason for the arms sales is Russia's dire need for money. It feels that the United States is fostering double standards and thinks it should be allowed to sell to anyone. The Russian government has stopped a sale of long-range missile technology to Iran.
—Leslie Shepherd, "Russia Continues to Sell Arms Despite U.S., Israeli; Protests," Buffalo News, 5 July 1998, p. 2A, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 July 1998
Director of the Russian Federation Federal Security Service (FSB), Nikolay Kovalev, states that the FSB is committed to halting the illicit transfer of military technologies, citing the 26 March smuggling of steel alloys from Russia to Iran via Azerbaijan. "We are continuing to investigate a criminal case of contraband delivery to Iran of a large consignment of enriched steel [as received] which was intercepted in Azerbaijan." Kovalev also mentions that attempts by certain Russian businessmen and officials to violate the restrictions are inadmissible. "We have uncovered and put a stop to unsanctioned activity by a group of specialists from the Moscow Aviation Institute working on missile technology," he said. Kovalev also reports that Iran's Sanam Company has been banned as being a threat to Russia's national security, and the scientific exchange program between Sanam and the Baltic State Technical University (the St. Petersburg VoyenMekh), has been cancelled.
—Olga Semenova, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 13 July 1998; in "Security Service Cracks Down on Weapons Technology Exports," FBIS Document FTS19980713001516, 13 July 1998.

16 July 1998
The Clinton administration announces trade sanctions on nine Russian entities that have been helping Iran develop its missile program. Seven of the nine entities have already lost their U.S. assistance in the form of grants or partnership programs that were meant to give the Russian scientists work so that they would not need to go to countries like Iran. The White House named the nine Russian companies and institutions that would be sanctioned: the INOR scientific center and the Grafit research institute, which provided steel for missile production; the Ployus research institute, which provided guidance units; Glavkosmos, the Russian counterpart of NASA; Baltic State University in St. Petersburg, which provided help with rocket-motor technology and training; Europalace 2000 and MOSO company, which provided 22 tons of steel that the U.S. government suspects was used to make Iranian missiles; and the Tikhomirov institute and the Komintern plant in Novosibirsk. The Russian Export Control Commission originally listed all of the organizations in an investigative report. The organizations are denying any wrongdoing. [Note: See July entry.]
—Steven Erlanger, "U.S. Imposes Curbs on 9 Russian Concerns," New York Times, 16 July 1998, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Leonid Gankin, "Washington Will Punish Russian Organizations. At Moscow's Prompting," Kommersant-Daily (Moscow), 17 July 1998, p. 2; in "US May Impose Sanctions Against Nine Russian Companies," FBIS Document FTS19980717000564, 17 July 1998.

22 July 1998
According to U.S. sources, Iran carried out a missile-test of its Shahab-3 surface-to-surface missile, firing it from southern Tehran. It has a range of 1,300km. This missile was reportedly produced with the help of North Korea. This missile could hit Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and parts of Russia. Iran confirms the missile test, but states that no country was targeted with the development of this missile. They also state that the missile was produced entirely by Iranians. The missile, according to Western sources, is still under development and it will take some time for it to be operational. Nevertheless, the Shahab-3 was put on display at a parade during Holy Defense Week in 1998.
—Staff Colonel Yaqub Aslan, "'World Strategic Rockets and Missiles': Iran's Surface to Surface Missiles," Saff (Tehran), No. 229, 22 May- 21 June 1999; in "Saff on Iran's Surface-to-Surface Missiles," FBIS Document FTS19990904000330, 4 September 1999.

22 July 1998
Iran test-fires the Shahab-3 medium-range surface-to-surface ballistic missile. U.S. and Israeli officials agree that the test is unsuccessful; the missile fails to complete its flight path and falls short of its target. The test is conducted approximately 160km south of Tehran. U.S. experts also identify the Shahab-3 as a variant of North Korea's Nodong missile. [Note: the missile test being unsuccessful due to the explosion is questioned by many sources who feel the explosion was intentional.]
—"US: Iranian Missile Test Missed Target," CNN, 23 July 1998, <http://www.cnn.com>.

22 July 1998
According to Israeli government sources, Iran tests a medium-range missile in the northern part of the country. The missile flies 800km, and defense experts say that Iran will likely be capable of firing the missile its full range of 1,300km in a few months. Israeli sources say the missile is fired from a site 150km south of Tehran. The missile flies for about 100 seconds, reaching a peak altitude of 60km before exploding. Whether the explosion was intentional or a failure in the system is unclear. However, Israeli officials believe that overall the test is successful, and it proves that Iran is well on its way to developing the 1,300km-range Shahab-3 missile. Israel believes the Shahab-3 is based on North Korea's Nodong, aided by Russian technology. Without Russian assistance, Iran would be unlikely to complete the project. Both the United States and Israel believe that Iran will have completed the prototype of the Shahab-3 within one year. The missile is launched at 6:00 a.m., and is detected by two or three U.S. satellites, traveling on a southeasterly orbit before exploding.
—David Makovsky and Amos Harel, Haaretz (Tel Aviv), 24 July 1998; in "Israeli, U.S. Sources Assess Iranian Missile Danger," FBIS Document FTS19980724000447, 24 July 1998; Alon Ben-David, Israel Television Channel 1 Network (Jerusalem), 24 July 1998; in "Iranian Missile 'Explodes' During 22 Jul Test," FBIS Document FTS19980724001182, 24 July 1998; Zeev Schiff, "In the Wake of Iranian Test," Haaretz (Tel Aviv), 29 July 1998, p. B1; in "Iran Missile Test Aimed at Becoming 'Fait Accompli'," FBIS Document FTS19980804001188, 4 August 1998.

22 July 1998
United States Vice President Al Gore says he would push Russian officials to fulfill commitments to investigate the nine Russian organizations suspected of supplying ballistic missile technology to Iran. Gore reports that the Iranian missile issue is a central point of his trip to Moscow, scheduled later in the week.
—David Makovsky, Haaretz (Tel Aviv), 22 July 1998; in "Gore Pledges to Press Moscow on Missile Technology to Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980722000978, 22 July 1998.

22 July 1998
A CIA report says that China, North Korea, and Russia sold missile technology to Iran in 1997.
—Gertz, Bill Washington Times, 22 July 1998, p. 1; in Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, James Martin Center of Nonproliferation Studies, Winter 1999, p. 161.

22 July 1998
A senior U.S. administration official says the Shahab-3 missile test is a demonstration of Iran's "perceived need to have the capability to threaten targets outside the immediate Persian Gulf area." Furthermore, Iran's primary goal is "not to strike its enemies, but to be seen as a political and military force to be reckoned with in the Middle East."
—Tim Weiner, "Iran Said to Test Missile Able to Hit Israel and Saudis," New York Times, 23 July 1998, <http://www.nytimes.com>.

22 July 1998
The Shahab-3 missile-test site is supposedly located about 100km southeast of Tehran. The test-launch is supposedly moved up by a week. A mid-level U.S. defense officer failed to inform the crew of the RS-135C (Cobra Bell) spy plane stationed in Turkey of the change. As a result, only U.S. spy satellites detected the launch.
—Yossi Melman, "US 'kept Israel in dark' on Iran missile," Haaretz (Tel Aviv), 18 August 1998, <http://www3.haaretz.co.il>.

23 July 1998
Iran successfully tests a medium-range missile, says a senior administration official. The weapon has a range of approximately 800 miles and is capable of hitting Israel and Saudi Arabia, thus having the potential to alter the political and military balance of power in the Middle East. A U.S. spy satellite detects the test in the morning. Intelligence experts believe Iran bought the missile from North Korea. Iran is working on a nuclear warhead but is believed to be years away from building and testing such a weapon, although the United States is not certain of the sophistication of Iran's programs. "This test shows Iran is bent on acquiring nuclear weapons, because no one builds an 800-mile missile to deliver conventional explosives," states Gary Milhollin, a leading expert on the spread of weaponry. It is not clear whether the missile test follows an Iranian internal political debate or whether it is ordered by Mr. Khamenei to embarrass Mr. Khatami and undermine any rapprochement with the United States. The Iranian test tells the world something about Iran's military ability, but not its intentions, officials said. A former intelligence official is quoted saying, "My guess is they purchased a very small number of these missiles, and that is as much a political statement as anything, and that the statement is to Israel, and that statement is, 'You are now vulnerable. You have to take us seriously'." Present and former intelligence officials say the missile came from North Korea, which has vowed to continue selling its weapons to any nation that can provide it with hard currency. Government experts had expected a test by Iran, although not this soon. An independent commission headed by former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld reported to Congress last week that Iran could develop an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), theoretically capable of striking the United States, within five years, but the CIA estimates that no such threat will emerge until 2010 at the earliest. The Iranians have purchased technology for numerous ballistic missile programs. "But the important point here is that they have very little indigenous internal capability to make a real missile, and they've required extensive outside technical support," the former official states. Today's test employs a missile similar or identical to the North Korean Nodong missile. "Whether they fired a Nodong missile themselves or whether they assemble a missile by reverse-engineering a Nodong—either way, this is a North Korean missile with another name," said the senior official. Iran has named the missile Shahab-3.
—Tim Weiner, "Iran Said To Test Missile Able to Hit Israel and Saudis," New York Times, 23 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 July 1998
Iran's missile deployment is dependent on whether Iran will build the Shahab-3 indigenously or import a complete missile system from North Korea. It is speculated that it will take between one or two years. Officials state that Iran's missile program couldn't be stopped, even if countries like Russia and China are continuously urged not to support Iran. Iran flight-tested the Shahab-3 earlier in the week and it is unclear whether it was a North Korean missile that was painted over, or if it was an Iranian missile based on the North Korean Nodong missile. The flight-test is described as one "for technical purposes in which the dummy warhead explodes before hitting the ground well down [the test] range." The Russian and Chinese governments have entities within their countries that are selling technology, knowledge, and parts needed in missile production to Iran. The United States hopes the Russian and Chinese governments will bring this to a halt. It is also debated whether Iran can create its own missile after having purchased a Nodong missile from North Korea. The case in which Israel bought a French medium-range missile, and then worked on their own Jericho missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads, was noted in regard to this possibility.
—Walter Pincus, "Iran May Soon Gain Missile Capability; Teheran Could Build, Deploy Medium-Range Weapon in 2 Years, U.S. Officials Say," Washington Post, 24 July 1998, p. A28, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 July 1998
Israeli officials and government analysts report that Iran is now prepared to begin testing the Shahab-3's missile guidance and warhead separation systems.
—Steve Rodan and Arieh O'Sullivan, "Iran Test-Fires Shihab-3 Missile," Jerusalem Post, 24 July 1998.

24 July 1998
According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, Iran's recent missile-test "has not delighted" Russian diplomats. Moscow does not officially comment on the test, but does not indicate that the launch is a potential threat to national security.
—Elza Dober, "Iranian Missiles Can Reach Russia. Tehran Hastens Introduction of Anti-Russian Sanctions," Russkiy Telegraf (Moscow), 25 July 1998, p. 2; in "Iranian Missile Not Seen as Potential Threat," FBIS Document FTS19980728001098, 28 July 1998.

24 July 1998
Kuwait's First Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir says that Iran's missile test should not be seen as a threat to regional security. "I am hoping that this development is not taken as a threat to the security of Kuwait or the region," he states. "We are hoping for stability in the region and the absence of an arms race."
—"Sabah al-Ahmad: The Iranian Missile Does Not Threaten Kuwait or the Region," Al-Qabas (Kuwait), 26 July 1998; in "Kuwaiti Foreign Minister: Iranian Missile Not a 'Threat'," FBIS Document FTS19980726000064, 26 July 1998.

25 July 1998
Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani announced that Iran successfully tested a 1,300km-range surface-to-surface missile. He said that the test reflects Iran's defense policy, which is based on improving Iran's deterrent ability. The missile test should not be viewed as a security threat to other nations, nor should it be interpreted as a disruption to regional stability and power balance.
—"Iran Radio on Iran's Missile Test, Defense Minister Comment," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 26 July 1998; in FBIS Document FTS19980726000408, 26 July 1998.

26 July 1998
Defense Minister Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani was quoted by Iranian state-television saying "the missile with a range of 1,300 kilometers was tested on Wednesday by Iranian experts without any foreign support." The Shahab-3 is capable of reaching Israel, parts of Russia and Turkey, Iraq, and U.S. troops stationed in Saudi Arabia.
—Afshin Valinejad, "Iran: Missile Test a Success," Jerusalem Post, 26 July 1998, p. 2, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 July 1998
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mahmoud Mohammadi fully rejects "irresponsible statements" in the international media that allege Iran will equip its medium-range missiles with non-conventional warheads. "Iran reiterates its commitment to the conventions and international treaties regarding weapons of mass destruction," he states. Mohammadi reiterates Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani's claims that Iran's missile capability is intended strictly for defensive purposes.
—"Xinhua Cites Iran on Missile Technology for 'Defense'," Xinhua (Beijing), 26 July 1998; in FBIS Document FTS19980726000620, 26 July 1998.

27 July 1998
Pakistan's Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan defends Iran's recent missile-test, saying that Iran, like any other country, has a right to take steps to strengthen its defense. When asked about the launch, he states, "Everyone knows that the highly advanced Iranian missile program had been in progress for some time. Iran had every right to do so." Pakistan's Religious Affairs Minister Zarfarul Haq congratulates Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani on the successful test.
—"Pakistani Foreign Minister Defends Iranian Missile Test," IRNA (Tehran), 27 July 1998; in FBIS Document FTS19980727000179, 27 July 1998.

27 July 1998
Iran's Kar Va Kargar writes that the Shahab-3 missile "can be a strong source of reliance for other Islamic countries and the Islamic nation. The Islamic bomb has provided them with a source of spiritual and psychological reliance in a tumultuous world...The only thing which should be listened to, if the time comes, is our national interest or the necessity of defending Muslim countries in the region and the Islamic world."
—"Islamic missile!" Kar Va Kargar (Tehran), 27 July 1998, p. 2; in "Iranian Daily: Shahab Missile To Defend Islamic World," FBIS Document FTS19980727001220, 27 July 1998.

28 July 1998
The U.S. Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs estimates that Iran's Shahab-4 missile still relies on foreign expertise to improve its engine and guidance system. The Shahab-4 will reportedly have a range of up to 2,000km.
—Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000), p. 40.

28 July 1998
Israel Defense Forces intelligence chief Major General Amos Malka tells the Knesset Foreign affairs and Defense Committee that Iran's Shahab-3 ballistic missile program has not yet reached the point of no return; halting Russian aid to the program could set back Iran's efforts to deploy the Shahab-3 by several years.
—"Iran Expected to Complete Shihab-3 Prototype Next Year," Jerusalem Post, 29 July 1998, <http://www.jpost.com>.

28 July 1998
A senior Israeli security source says that Iran is developing a long-range strategic branch that would be capable of using ballistic missiles to conduct a first-strike attack against Israel. The source said the Shahab-3 is not intended as a defensive missile and that Israel is one of its intended targets.
—Amos Harel and Gideon Alon, "Iran's Missile Launch Was a Success—But Rockets Won't Fly Without Russian Help," Haaretz (Tel Aviv), 29 July 1999, <http://www3.haaretz.co.il>.

28 July 1998
According to a senior Israeli defense source, the Iranian Shahab-3 missile-test was not a failure. The source asserts that the Iranians had conducted a test-flight of the Shahab-3 and deliberately destroyed the missile in mid-air.
—"Defense Source: Iran Missile Test 'Not a Failure'," Israel Television Channel 1 Network, 28 July 1998.

29 July 1998
Iran's missile programs include the 1,300km-range, liquid-fueled Nodong medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) capable of carrying a 1,000kg warhead; the 1,300-1,500km, liquid-fueled Shahab-3 MRBM capable of carrying a 750kg warhead; the 2,000km-range, liquid-fueled Shahab-4 MRBM capable of carrying a 1,000kg warhead; the 100-150km-range, solid-fueled Zelzal-1 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM); the 350-400km-range, solid-fueled Zelzal-2 SRBM; the 1,000-1,500km-range Zelzal-3 MRBM; and two unconfirmed projects to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a 5,500-10,000km range. CRS bases this information on recent press reports.
—Stuart D. Goldman, Kenneth Katzman, Robert D. Shuey, and Carl E. Behrens, "Russian Missile Technology and Nuclear Reactor Transfers to Iran," in CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC, 29 July 1998), p. 8.

29 July 1998
A senior security source states that Iran will complete the prototype of its Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile by next year and will start producing them by the end of the century. The Shahab-3 is a 53-foot-long ballistic missile that can travel 4,300mph and carry a 1-ton warhead, says Gen. Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps' air wing. Continued development poses a direct threat to Israel. However, the project could be halted if the United States puts more pressure on Russia to stop Russian companies from selling missile knowledge to Tehran. Intelligence sources report that the Shahab-3 is to be followed by the Shahab-4 with a range of between 2,000 and 2,500km, putting southern and central Europe within striking distance.
—"Iran Says New Missile Can Travel 4,300 mph With Great Accuracy," Baltimore Sun, 3 August 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Arieh O'Sullivan and Liat Collins, "Iran Expected to Complete Shihab-3 Prototype Next Year," Jerusalem Post, 29 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 July 1998
Iran works on a long-range missile, the Shahab-4, which may be deployed in two to five years. Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk says the United States would redouble the efforts to curb the transfer of technology to Iran, while an Iranian spokesman states that the missile is designed for defensive purposes only. The Shahab-4, which Western intelligence assesses is based on the Soviet SS-4 missile, is entirely a product of Russian missile technology, and can carry biological, chemical, or nuclear warheads.
—"U.S. Official Says Iran is Developing a Long-Range Missile," Buffalo News, 29 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Steve Rodan, "Shihab-4 missile 'will have nonconventional warhead capability'," Jerusalem Post, 31 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 July 1998
Members of a bipartisan commission that determines the threat posed to the United States by ballistic missiles report that North Korea, Iran, and others conceal their ballistic missile programs from U.S. spy satellites by using underground laboratories and factories to build and test weapons. The panel describes the underground construction as one factor contributing to the "erosion" of U.S. intelligence agencies' ability to monitor weapons proliferation. William Graham, a panel member and former science adviser to Ronald Reagan, says "ample evidence" exists that the North Koreans "created a sizable missile production infrastructure and therefore it is highly likely that considerable numbers of Nodongs have been produced."
—Walter Pincus, "Buried Missile Labs Foil U.S. Satellites," Washington Post, 29 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 July 1998
U.S. missile experts believe that the failure of the Shahab-3 missile-test on 22 July indicates a possible malfunction of the missile's liquid-fueled engine.
—Bryan Bender, "Shahab-3 only partial success," Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 July 1998.

29 July 1998
The head of Iran's Expediency Council, Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, says that Iran's missile technology is for defensive purposes only and is developed domestically. "At present we feel no need to use expertise [sic] of others," he states. Rafsanjani also reports that, "Iran produces missiles using domestic technology and design, and Shahab-3 is a thoroughly Iranian missile. Although inspiration may have been taken, it nevertheless is not like foreign models." He also adds, "Those who harbor ill intentions against Islamic Iran should know that Iran's defense capabilities are strong."
—"Rafsanjani: Iran's Missile Technology for Defensive Purpose," IRNA (Tehran), 29 July 1998; in FBIS Document FTS19980804000523, 4 August 1998; "Iran's Rafsanjani Comments on Shahab-3 Missile Test," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network (Tehran), 29 July 1998; in FBIS Document FTS19980804001136, 4 August 1998.

29 July 1998
Russia's embassy in Kazakhstan denies allegations that Russia has provided Iran with missile technology.
—"IRNA: Russia Again Denies Missile Cooperation With Iran," IRNA (Tehran), 29 July 1998; in FBIS Document FTS19980804000539, 4 August 1998.

29 July 1998
According to an Israeli intelligence officer, Major-General Amos Malka, Iran will complete a prototype of its Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile within one year, and will start producing them by the end of 1999. Malka tells the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that Iran's missile program could be stopped if Russian companies stop selling missile technology to Tehran. According to a senior security source, Iran's 22 July 1998 missile-test was not a prototype of the 1300km-range Shahab-3 but was a preliminary test of the single-stage rocket engine. Israeli experts believe Iran intentionally detonated the rocket before it reached its full range, and that the test was for political and strategic motives rather than technical ones. Israel believes the Shahab-3 is an Iranian-built and assembled missile based on North Korea's Nodong missile and redesigned by Russian experts. The Shahab-3 will likely be followed by the Shahab-4, which will have a range of 2,000-2,500km. The source also says that Iran is establishing production lines and training units to operate the missiles.
—Arye O'Sullivan and Liat Collins, Jerusalem Post, 29 July 1998, p. 2; in "Source—Iran to Complete Shihab-3 Prototype 'Next Year'," FBIS Document FTS19980804000817, 4 August 1998.

30 July 1998
During an interview, Iran's Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani states that Iran had successfully tested its Shahab-3 missile. He states that Iran has "achieved some capabilities in so far as ground-to-air, ground-to-ground, and shore-to-sea missiles." He reports that Iran's missile production is positively related to necessity. He also mentions that although Iran does not currently have intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in its plans, the country does have the technology to make them. Shamkhani maintains that ICBMs are a part of the space technology necessary for security. He states that Iran's policy regarding research and development of military equipment is one with "very transparent and clear principles."
He states that the Shahab-3 was tested in order "to maintain security equilibrium in the region, ensure lasting peace, speed up the process of cohesion and unity, and deter any kind of regional aggression against our country.... It was merely a natural progression in the Islamic Republic of Iran's defense industries." He adds that "the domestic production of the Shahab-3 is less dependent on foreign resources than the production of the Paykan cars is dependent on foreign sources. The technology is truly domestic. We are able to produce them on the basis of our domestic capacities."
—Studio Interview with Iranian Defense Minister Admiral Ali Shamkhani, "World of Politics" program, IRIB Television Second Program Network (Tehran), 30 July 1998; in "Iran's Defense Minister on Shahab-3 Missile," FBIS Document FTS19980805002669, 30 July 1998; IRIB Television (Tehran), "The World of Politics," 30 July 1998, in FBIS Document ID: FTS19980805000854, 5 August 1998.

30 July 1998
Iran's ambassador to Moscow denies knowledge of Russian companies alleged to have sold weapons technology, prompting a U.S. aid ban.
—"Iran denies missile connection," Financial Times (London), 30 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 July 1998
According to Gennadiy Khromov, representative for Russia's Glavkosmos (Main Administration for the Development and Use of Space Technology for the National Economy and Scientific Research), the organization "does not at present participate in any activities connected with the transfer of dual-purpose goods and technologies to Iran." Khromov acknowledges that Glavkosmos does have general industrial and scientific contracts with Iran, but they are in the non-restricted category. He also indicates the possibility of private contact between Russian individuals and Iranian entities. "Glavkosmos only works on contract and cannot be held responsible for illegal actions of individual citizens," he says. A Russian commission is investigating nine Russian companies the United States plans to impose sanctions against, in violation of export control regulations. [Note: See July entry.]
—Veronika Romanenkova, ITAR-TASS World Service (Moscow), 30 July 1998; in "Russia's Glavkosmos Denies Supplying Technology to Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980805000773, 5 August 1998.

31 July 1998
Iran's Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Mohammad Reza Nouri, states that "Iran's missile capabilities are at the disposal of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. We believe that Iran's power is the kingdom's power and the kingdom's power is Iran's power. Our relations with Saudi Arabia have reached a historical stage where we are complementing one another, and if we have a missile or non-missile capability, it is at the kingdom's disposal." Kuwait also announces that it does not consider Iran's new missile to be a threat to the region.
—Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs," Study conducted for the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey, CA), October 1998, p. 47.

31 July 1998
The United States has been monitoring Iranian missile tests as well as technology transfers between Iran and Russia, according to public testimony given before Congress by CIA Director George Tenet. Tenet testifies that Iran would have the capability to launch long-range missiles in less than ten years, the time given in his earlier estimates. Yet, the test of the Shahab missile did not receive full U.S. intelligence coverage due to a misunderstanding between the Air Force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff planners. The CIA has been monitoring Iran's missile programs and had predicted that it would test a long-range missile this year. The Israeli press stated, "that a CIA satellite has been steadily tracking Iranian activity and that last Wednesday (24 July), it spotted traces of this experiment." Both the Israeli government and the U.S. State Department had believed that the test would not take place for at least another year.
—Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs," Study conducted for the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey, CA), October 1998, p. 42.

31 July 1998
According to Israeli military sources, Iran will be able to deploy its Shahab-4 missile within two to five years. The new missile will have a range of over 2,000km and will be capable of carrying non-conventional warheads. The Shahab-4 is being developed with Russian technology, and is allegedly based on the Soviet SS-4 missile. The United States also indicates that the Shahab-4 could be completed within two to five years. The Shahab-3 is based on the North Korean Nodong missile, with Russian assistance in a "fast track program" that will shorten the development stages. Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani has said that the Shahab-3 "is absolutely domestically produced and has no assistance from any foreign country." The Israeli sources note that Russia has not significantly slowed the transfer of missile technology to Iran, despite commitments to do so.
—"Israeli Sources: Shahab-4 To Have Nonconventional Warhead," Jerusalem Post, 31 July 1998; in FBIS Document FTS19980805000977, 5 August 1998.

1 August 1998
Russia's Ambassador to Iran, Konstantin Shuvalov, reports that his country has not offered assistance to Iran's missile development programs and will not do so in the future. Iranian President Mohammad Khatami states that Iran has been able to successfully test its 1,300km-range Shahab-3 missile, despite the numerous sanctions imposed on his country. This, he says, indicates that Iran relies on its own experts to develop its missile systems. In a speech at the Iranian Ministry of Defense, Khatami says, "I have to say that today we rely on the ideas and abilities of our own forces in many areas of defense, even in some very modern areas which include the successful test that was conducted recently for the Shahab-3 missile."
—"Russian Envoy in Tehran: No Russian Help for Iran's Missile," IRNA (Tehran), 1 August 1998; in FBIS Document FTS19980805002929, 5 August 1998; "Iran Denies Foreigners Role in Missile Program," Xinhua (Beijing), 1 August 1998; in FBIS Document FTS19980805003284, 5 August 1998; "Iran's Khatami on Military Issues, Missiles," IRIB Television First Program Network (Tehran), 1 August 1998; in FBIS Document FTS19980805003649, 5 August 1998.

1 August 1998
Iranian President Mohammad Khatami warns against the "growing Israeli nuclear threat to the region" and defends Iran's defense program, including its recent missile-tests. Khatami says the Shahab-3 missile "is completely of Iranian manufacture." Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, head of the Iranian judiciary, says, "This missile [Shahab-3] has not been produced in order to attack any country. We are not planning to attack anyone. However, we will not let anyone provoke us, no matter how strong he is."
—Daniel Sobelman, "Khatami calls Israel 'nuclear threat' to region," Haaretz (Tel Aviv), 2 August 1998.

1 August 1998
Khatami says, "Iran will not seek permission from anyone for strengthening its defense capability."
—Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000), pp. 39-40, <http://www.csis.org>.

2 August 1998
Iran's Ambassador to Pakistan Medhi Akhounzadeh says that no nuclear or missile cooperation exists between Iran and Pakistan. Shai Feldman, director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Research, agrees that it is unlikely that Pakistan will transfer sensitive nuclear material or technology to Iran or any other Arab state.
—Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs," Study conducted for the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey, CA), October 1998, p. 40.

2 August 1998
Iranian Defense Minister Al