Sept 1980
Iran-Iraq War begins.

1980s
Iraq buys about 10 tons of growth medium for growing bacteria from an unnamed British company.
— William J. Broad and Judith Miller, "How Iraq's Biological Weapons Program Came to Light," New York Times, 26 February 1998.

1980's
Iraq obtains 17 types of biological agents from supply houses in the United States and France, including B. anthracis and botulinum toxin.
— Philip Shenon, "Iraq Links Germs for Weapons to U.S. and France," The New York Times, 16 March, 2003; R. Jeffrey Smith, "Iraq's Drive for a Biological Arsenal; U.N. Pursuing 25 Germ Warheads It Believes Are Still Loaded With Deadly Toxin," The Washington Post, 21 November 1997.

1980s
Iraq receives T-2 toxin, HT-2 toxin (the hydrolyzed metabolite of T-2 toxin), diacetoxyscirpenol and verrucarol toxins from a West German representative of the firm Sigma-Chemie.
— Dany Shoham, "Iraq's Biological Warfare Agents: A Comprehensive Analysis," Critical Review in Microbiology, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2000, p. 192.

1980s
The U.S. Public Health Service's Center for Disease Control (CDC) ships a virus to an Iraqi microbiologist in Basra, ostensibly for public health research. The virus was an Israeli strain of West Nile encephalitis virus, an agent which had reportedly been subject to a vaccine development effort in Israel funded by the U.S. Army's Biological Defense Research Program.
— Jonathan Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Programme," Arms Control Today, Vol. 14, No. 3, December, 1993, p. 238.

Early 1980s
Iraq possesses Bacillus anthracis, installed on artillery shells.
— Dany Shoham, "Iraq's Biological Warfare Agents: A Comprehensive Analysis," Critical Review in Microbiology, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2000, p. 181.

1980
The Iraqi government contracts with the West German firm, Thyssen Rheinstahl Technik, for the construction of a biological research laboratory near al-Salman Pak. Another contract with the same company and for the same purpose is signed in 1981. The laboratory is completed in 1983 and becomes the focus of Iraq's biological weapons research and development efforts. The complex is highly secured.
— Jonathan Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Programme," Arms Control Today, Vol. 14, No. 3, December 1993, p. 237.

June 1981
Saddam Hussayn addresses his cabinet, arguing that Israel's reason for attacking the Iraqi Osirak (also spelled Osiraq) nuclear reactor was not because it was allegedly developing nuclear weapons but because Iraq is a front-line Arab nation showing progress and developing its technology base. Hussayn emphasizes that the key to victory in the Arab-Israeli conflict will be to develop its own scientific potential, economy and self-confidence. He argues that the attack on Osirak was an Israeli attempt to destroy Iraq's high-technology facility as well as to dictate the terms of the Arab-Israeli relationship. Hussayn continues his speech by calling upon any nation not wanting Arab nations subjugated to foreign forces to develop nuclear weapons.
[Note: The conclusion that can be drawn from this speech is that Iraq's acquisition of unconventional (specifically nuclear) weapons will create a deterrence between Israel and the Arabs similar to the Cold War deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union. While Hussayn refers specifically to "atomic weapons," it is important to remember that the main motivation of acquiring these weapons is to deter Israel and it is probable that any weapon that could achieve this goal would seem a viable option]
— Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James Wirtz (ed.), Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 57.

As early as 1983
Iraqi scientists, under Saddam Hussayn's orders, use strains of agents causing of botulism, anthrax, and salmonella in weapons tests, according to the Observer, quoting an Iraqi scientist who defected to Iran. He said: "I know they experimented on sheep with clostridium botulism (sic) type C." In 1983 Iraqi scientists also overcome the problem of ensuring the toxin was not destroyed at the time of detonation by the bomb or artillery shell.
—"Saddam Hides Germ Warfare Tests From UN Inspectors," The Observer, 9 August 1992, p.1; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-92-007-L, 10 September 1992); Jonathan Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Programme," Arms Control 14(3), December 1993, p. 237.

1983
Biological warfare program is part of al-Muthanna objectives.
[Note: This is based on an interview of the director of al-Muthanna, Lt. General Nizar Attar and UNSCOM officials. Although not provided with documentation to support the claim, UNSCOM agrees the information is probably correct. Note also that al-Muthanna had only a chemical warfare program until this time.]
—Official Iraqi Document Full, Final and Complete Disclosure of Iraq's Past Biological Programme, September 1997

1983
Abdul Nassir Hindawi, an Iraqi microbiologist, writes a secret report for top officials in the Iraqi Ba`th (also cited as Baath) Party outlining how the biological program could be turned into a military asset with large-scale production. According to Iraqi officials, the report had a huge impact, and within a year the regime ordered creation of a separate biolotical weapons research complex at al-Muthanna. In 1997 Iraq told UNSCOM that "the perceived objectives [of the biological weapons program] were to produce a viable deterrent in answer to a possible attack by Israel using nuclear weapons."
—Judith Miller, "Baghdad Arrests A Germ Specialist," New York Times, 24 March 1998, pp.A1, A11; Jeffrey Smith, "Iraq's Drive for a Biological Arsenal," Washington Post, 21 November 1997.

1983
Iraq begins a project known as "presidential priority." The project allegedly is created after a secret paper is presented by Abdul Nassir al-Hindawi, to the Iraqi leadership explaining how large-scale biological agent production could serve as an antipersonnel weapon against Iran.
— Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James Wirtz (ed.), Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 47-78.

1984
Col. Sameem Jalal Abdul Latif, a member of the training department of the Chemical Corps Section of the Iraqi Armed Forces, publishes a military manual on "Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Operations." The manual includes a detailed analysis of biological warfare. Included in this manual is a discussion on how non-lethal doses of biological agents can overburden and destroy morale of enemy troops. Latif concludes that the Iraqi General Staff would have to study the possibilities of delivering biological agents with available weapons systems.
— Jonathan Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Programme," Arms Control Vol. 14, No. 3, December 1993, p. 238; Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James Wirtz (ed.), Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 47-78.

1984
Iraq acquires eight mobile laboratories from the German firm Iveco Magirus AG.
—Obtained from the "Iraq Watch" project of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, 24 April 2000, <http://www.iraqwatch.org/> .

1984
Iraq starts research on wheat cover smut at al-Salman Pak.
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html>.

1985
Iraq resurrects its BW program, initially under the umbrella of the chemical weapons program. The resurrection of the program is attributed to General Nizar Attar, who was the Director General of the al-Muthanna State Establishment (MSE), the State Organization for Technical Industries (SOTI) and the Ministry of Defense. Iraq also commences the final phase of military research on several strains of B. anthracis. In mid-1987, the group of biology researchers moves to al-Salman Pak, where it operates within an organization related to Iraq's security apparatus. Later, in 1988-89 the group moves to the al-Hakam factory.
—UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html; Christian Seelos, "Lessons from Iraq on Bioweapons," Nature, Vol. 398, 18 March 1999, p. 187; Dany Shoham, "Iraq's Biological Warfare Agents: A Comprehensive Analysis," Critical Review in Microbiology, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2000, p. 181.

1985
Dr. Rihab Taha is appointed to lead a small BW research team at al-Mathanna until 1987.
—Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government. 2002, p. 11-12.

1985
Iraq's biological warfare program accelerates. Research on anthrax is initiated at al-Muthanna State Establishment. Additional biological warfare staff is appointed to al-Muthanna.
— Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past as Future?" The Journal of the American Medical Association, 6 August 1997, Vol. 278, Issue. 5, pp. 418-424; Official Iraqi Document, September 1997.

1985
The al-Muthanna State Establishment (MSE), Iraq's main chemical weapons facility, recommends the commencement of a biological weapons program. In May or June it seeks and obtains an endorsement for the program from the Ministry of Defense. Al-Muthanna purchases one 150-liter fermenter and recruits personnel; and, by the end of the year, a staff of 10 people is working on BW research.
— UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm.

1985
According to one Iraqi defector about 50 prisoners are shipped al-Salman Pak for subjection to biological experiments.
— Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda, New York: Scribner, 2000, p. 199.

Mid-1980s
Iraq's Education Ministry orders 70 packages of microbes and toxins from the American Type Culture Collection (ATCC), a non-profit in Rockville, Maryland. The organization had shipped up to 36 strains of 10 pathogens to Iraq, including B. anthracis, the organism that causes anthrax, and Clostridium botulinum, the organism that causes botulism. All of the shipments between 1985 and 1989 were approved by the Commerce Department. According to one analyst, an order from 1986 included Clostridium Perfringens, the causative agent for gas gangrene.
—Bruce W. Nelan, "Germ Warfare," Time, 1 December 1997, p.55; William J. Broad and Judith Miller, "How Iraq's Biological Weapons Program Came to Light," New York Times, 26 February 1998; Kevin Merida and John Mintz, "Rockville Firm Shipped Germ Agents to Iraq, Riegle Says," Washington Post, 10 February 1994, p. A8; Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iraq's Past and Future Biological Weapons Capabilities," CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment, 17 February 1998, p. 5.

1985
Research on a fungal strain causing wheat cover smut is conducted at al-Salman Pak. It is found to be lethal to the crop if spores are sprayed over immature wheat plants.
[Note: see 1988 for use of wheat cover smut].
— Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past as Future?" The Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol 278, No. 5, 6 August 1997, pp. 418-424

1986
Literature studies of various pathogens begin. Among the biological agents researched are B. anthracis, Clostridium perfringens, potent toxins (botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, ricin, and trichothecene mycotoxins), an anti-crop agent (wheat cover smut) and incapacitating animal diseases (hemorrhagic conjunctivitis, rota-virus and camel pox). Scientists ordered seed cultures from commercial laboratories in France and the United States.
— Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James Wirtz (ed.), Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 47-78.

1986
The State Enterprise and Pesticide Production (SEPP) purchases a 150L fermenter and installs it in al-Salman Pak.
— Jonathan Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Programme," Arms Control Today , Vol. 14, No. 3, December 1993, p. 238.

1986
The Iraqi government purchases samples of four trichothecene mycotoxins, ostensibly for "laboratory analyses." According to Der Spiegel the deal is brokered by Kosef Kuhn, the head of a West German export firm and a suspected Iraqi agent. He purchases the toxins from Sigma-Chemie in Munich, a subsidiary of a St. Louis-based U.S. company, that manufactures specialty biochemicals for research institutions.
— Jonathan Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Programme," Arms Control Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 14, No. 3, December 1993, p. 239.

1986
The Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology Research Center opens. It ostensibly focuses on civilian applications of recombinant-DNA technology.
— Jonathan Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Programme," Arms Control Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 14, No. 3, December 1993, p. 240.

1986
Iraq orders 24 pathogens including 13 bacteria designated as posing substantial risk to public health or crops. The shipment includes specific strains of bacteria causing anthrax, botulism, and gas gangrene. It is sent to the University of Baghdad and secretly paid for by the military.
— Jeffrey Smith, "Iraq's Drive for a Biological Arsenal," Washington Post, 21 November 1997; "A look at US Shipments of Pathogens to Iraq", USA Today, 30 September, 2002.

3 August 1986
According to an Iraqi government memorandum, General Dayya Abd-al-Wahab 'Izzat, commander of the Erbil Division, instructs all division units to take a semi-annual inventory of all "biological and chemical materials." U.S. intelligence analysts who examined the document concluded it was genuine.
—A document obtained by Middle East Watch from the Kurdistan Democratic Party. Human Rights Watch in a letter to Rolf Ekeus, Chairman of UNSCOM, 29 December 1992; Jonathan Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Programme," Arms Control Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 14, No. 3, December 1993, p. 239.

1987
Iraq imports 2.7 grams of mycotoxins from a German firm.
— Obtained from the "Iraq Watch" project of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, <www.iraqwatch.org>.

1987
Iraq conducts aerosol dissemination studies at al-Muthanna and al-Salman Pak with both dry and liquid forms of agents.
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html>.

1987
Iraq is thought to have unitiated work with trichothecene mycotoxins. Iraq declared that work started in March 1990.
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html>.

1987
Iraq initiates a full-scale production of biological weapons agents.
—Jane's Defense Weekly, 21 August 1996, citing ACDA's report; U.S. Intelligence Community, Intelligence Related to Possible Sources of Biological Agent Exposure During the Persian Gulf War, August 2000, <http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/library/43917.htm>. This report provides the conclusions of the Intelligence Community's Persian Gulf War Illness Task Force.

May 1987
Iraq transfers the biological weapons program, including research on anthrax, from the al-Muthanna State Establishment to al-Salman Pak. A biological weapons research group is established at al-Salman Pak.
—Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past As Future?" Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA),Vol. 278, No. 5, 6 August 1997, pp.418-419; UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm> (9/26/00).

June 1987
Tariq al-Zubaidy, a clinical scientist in the health area, is brought to al-Salman Pak to work on the development a dispersal device for BW agents, which turns to be the Zubaidy Device; a helicopter-borne aerosol generator.
— Based on a conversation with a former UNSCOM inspector, 26 February 2001.

August 1987
The Technical Research Center (TRC) takes over the former single-cell protein plant at al-Taji, which becomes operational in 1988.
— UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>.

End 1987
The Technical Research Center submits a report to the Military Industrial Commission (MIC) on the success of the biological weapons work. As a result, Iraq decides to enter a full-scale production phase.
— UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>.

End 1987
Iraq produces botulinum toxin for weapons tests.
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html>.

1987
The Iraqi Ministry of Defense publishes a second manual, Principles of Using Chemical and Biological Agents in Warfare. In the section on military use of biological agents, the manual provides instruction as to how small attacks and sabotage operations can be completed before a general offensive begins. This suggests that Iraqi military considers the possibility of covert biological weapons use behind enemy lines.
— Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James Wirtz (ed.), Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 47-78.

1987
Administratively the Iraqi BW program is placed under the control of the Technical Research Center, within the Special Security Organization (SSO). Lt. Gen. Hussayn Kamil Hassan, Director of the SSO, orders construction of biological research facilities complete with an aerosol test chamber used to study the affects of BW agents on sheep, donkeys, monkeys and dogs. In addition, BW research is transferred from al-Muthanna to al-Salman.
— Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James Wirtz (ed.), Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 47-78; Full, Final and Complete Disclosure of Iraq's Past Biological Programme, September 1997.

1987
Anthrax research is transferred from the principal Iraqi chemical weapons facility, al-Muthanna State Establishment, to al-Salman Pak.
[Note: al-Salman Pak became the center for biological warfare research and development.]
— Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past as Future?" The Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 278, No. 5, 6 August 1997, pp. 418-424.

1987
Pilot and industrial scale production of BW agents begins in Iraq. However, Iraq denies developing weapons capable of delivering the agents.
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C.

Late 1987
Botulinum toxin is produced for weapon testing
[Note: UNSCOM states that there is no documentation on the output of botulinum toxin but that the August acquisition of al-Taji indicates prior planning for weapons].
— Full, Final and Complete Disclosure of Iraq's Past Biological Programme, September 1997; UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C.

1987
Field trials begin using munitions containing anthrax stimulant and botulinum toxin [Note: the Iraqi declarations to the U.N. state that weapons test planning did not begin until 1988. UNSCOM officials disagree and believe planning began as early as 1986 with detailed planning beginning 1987].
— Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James Wirtz (ed.), Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 47-78; FFCD; UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C.

Late 1980s
Some Iraqi students, who became leading figures in Iraq's biological weapons program, attend British universities. Some students allegedly attempt to acquire materials that could be used in biological warfare.
—Lucy Johnson and Jonathan Calvert, "Iraqi Had Access to Toxins in Britain," Washington Times, 24 November 1997; Lucy Johnston, Jonathan Calvert and David Connett, "The Inquisitive Iraqi Student and Tutor with a Fridge Full of Anthrax and Plague," The Observer, 23 November 1997.

Late 1980s
Iraq weaponizes Clostridium perfringens.
— Scott Ritter, Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem – Once and for All, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), p. 163.

1988
Hussayn Kamil takes over the biological weapons program.
— According to Rod Barton, Former principal biological inspector with UNSCOM and
Former Director of Proliferation Studies, Australian Department of Defence, at a talk he gave at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Washington DC, 2 February 2001.

1988
An order of almost 40 tons of non-specified growth media is delivered by the Oxoid firm in Bedford, England, and the Swiss firm Fluka Chemie.
— Al J. Venter, "New-Era Threat: Iraq's Biological Weapons," Middle East Policy, Vol 6, No. 4, 4 June 1999, p. 111; Jeffrey Smith, "Iraq's Drive for a Biological Arsenal," Washington Post, 21 November 1997.

1988
Firial al-Saidi, an Iraqi scientist who had studied bacteriology at Birmingham University (U.K.) in the early 1980s, arrives on the day of her former tutor's funeral, claiming she has been collaborating with him on writing various papers. During her visit she attempts to obtain a number of pathogenic cultures from the British Public Health Science laboratory in London One of the requests was for botulinum toxin. These actions lead to a formal complaint by a former colleague. Saidi had already returned to Baghdad when the complaint is made.
—Lucy Johnson and Jonathan Calvert, "Iraqi Had Access to Toxins in Britain," Washington Times, 24 November 1997; Lucy Johnston, Jonathan Calvert and David Connett, "The Inquisitive Iraqi Student and Tutor with a Fridge Full of Anthrax and Plague," The Observer, 23 November 1997; Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iraq's Past and Future Biological Weapons Capabilities," CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment, 17 February 1998, p. 5.

1988
Iraq orders 1,325-gallon fermenter to grow culture from the Swiss company Chemap and arranges to buy several more. The U.S. and its allies persuade Switzerland to drop the sale.
— William J. Broad and Judith Miller, "How Iraq's Biological Weapons Program Came to Light," New York Times, 26 February 1998.

1988
Iraq allegedly unsuccessfully tries to order biological agents directly from Britain's military research center at Porton Down.
— Jeffrey Smith, "Iraq's Drive for a Biological Arsenal," Washington Post, 21 November 1997.

1988
Iraq starts research on ricin at al-Salman Pak at the request of an Internal Security Officer. Despite Iraqi claims that research on ricin did not begin until 1989, UNSCOM officials believe it began during 1988.
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C; UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm; UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html>.

1988
Iraq conducts static trials using LD-250 aerial bombs to disperse BW agents.
— Al J. Venter, "Missing in Iraq: The UN Charts Saddam's Lethal Inventory," Jane's International Defense Review, May 1999, p. 35.

1988
The CDC sent bacteria samples to Iraq's Sera and Vaccine Institute in Amiriyah. The Institute stored the samples as well as conducted genetic engineering research for the biological weapons program.
—"A Look at US Shipments of Pathogens to Iraq", USA Today, 30 September, 2002.

1988
Biological warfare activities are expanded. This is evident through the recruitment of personnel and documented activity.
— Official Iraqi Document; UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C

1988
Young wheat plants growing near the town Mosul are infected with wheat cover smut. Iraq harvests the infected wheat and moves it for storage at Fudaliyah.
— Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past As Future?" Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), Vol. 278, No. 5, 6 August 1997, p. 419.

Early 1988
Iraq's Special Security Organization (SSO) produces a report estimating Israel's non-conventional weapon capabilities. The report recommends that Iraq be prepared to retaliate, specifically with biological weapons. These recommendations lead to Iraq establishing its BW arsenal as a strategic deterrent and "prompted the so-called Thunderstrike option." The Thunderstirke option requires a massive retaliatory attack against Israeli cities using chemical and biological warheads mounted on long-range ballistic missiles.
— Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James Wirtz (ed.), Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 47-78.

Early 1988
Iraq begins weaponization of biological warfare agents. Senior scientists from the biological weapons program at the Technical Research Center are sent to munitions factories to familiarize themselves with this aspect. It is also agreed that the al-Muthanna State Establishment, due to its experience in the weaponization of chemical agents, will provide the necessary assistance for the selection of weapons types and the conduct of field trials.
— UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>.

Early 1988
Al-Hazen Institute is first identified and linked to al-Salman Pak biological warfare facility.
—Iraq's Biological Weapon Sites and Facilities, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, July 1999, pp. 10-11.

February or March to September/October 1988
The production of botulinum toxin commences at al-Taji with a workforce of eight people, using one 450-liter fermenter.
— UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>.

24 March 1988
Al-Hakam is acquired as a new biological weapons production site. The project is given the designator of "324."
—UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site,<http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>; Official Iraqi Document, September 1997.

March 1988
Iraq is said to conduct its first and second biological weapons field trials at al-Muthanna's weapons test range, Muhammadiyat. The agents tested included Bacillus subtilis, a simulant for Bacillus anthracis, and botulinum toxin. The munitions included LD-250 bombs.
— UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm; U.S. Intelligence Community, Intelligence Related to Possible Sources of Biological Agent Exposure During the Persian Gulf War, August 2000, <http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/library/43917.htm>. This report provides the conclusions of the Intelligence Community's Persian Gulf War Illness Task Force.

April 1988
Iraq adds new agents to the bacterial research work at al-Salman Pak in addition to anthrax and botulinum toxin. This includes Clostridium perfringens, the bacteria responsible for gas gangrene.
—UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm; Rolf Ekeus, "Beware Iraq's Biowar legacy," Jane's International Defense Review, June 1996, p. 104.

22 May 1988
Iraq starts studies on aflatoxin at al-Salman Pak with the appointment of Dr. Emad.
— UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>; UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html>.

20 August 1988
Cease-fire in Iran-Iraq war comes into fruition, to be monitored by the U.N. Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG).

August 1988
Iraq successfully field-tests the Zubaidy devices and other aerosol generators to spray Bacillus subtilis spores at Khan Bani Saad.
—UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html>; U.S. Intelligence Community, Intelligence Related to Possible Sources of Biological Agent Exposure During the Persian Gulf War, August 2000, <http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/library/43917.htm>. This report provides the conclusions of the Intelligence Community's Persian Gulf War Illness Task Force.

September 1988
Construction of the production buildings at al-Hakam are completed and work commences on erection of the laboratory buildings.
— UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>.

September 1988
Dlawir Ala'Aldiin, a Kurdish microbiologist and a doctor at the University of Nottingham Hospital and medical School in England, accuses Iraq of starting an outbreak of typhoid fever in the Kurdish city of Sulaimaniya.
[Note: substantiation of claim is not known.]
— Judith Miller, "Iraq Accused: A Case of Genocide," New York Times Magazine, 3 January 1993, p. 33.

September 1988
The ATCC, of Manassas, VA, ships four Bacillus anthracis strains, one strain of Clostridium botulinum, and three strains of Clostridium perfringens to Iraq.
—"A Look at US Shipments of Pathogens to Iraq," USA Today, 30 September, 2002.

October 1988
The 450L fermenter line in al-Taji, which is used for the production of botulinum toxin, is transferred to al-Hakam.
— UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>.

November 1988
Two 1,850L, and seven 1,480L fermenters are transferred from Veterinary Research Laboratories to al-Hakam.
— UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>.

End 1988
Iraq conducts initial production fermentation studies with anthrax at al-Salman Pak using 7 and 14L laboratory-scale fermenters.
— UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>.

1988-1989
Iraq tests bombs and rocket shells loaded with botulinum toxin, the carcinogen aflatoxin and Bacillus subtilis.
— Louis Meixler, "U.N. Report: Iraq Misled Weapons Monitors," Associated Press, 11 October 1995.

1989
Iraq uses the 150L fermenter, which was transferred from al-Muthanna to al-Salman Pak to produce Bacillus subtilis.
— UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>.

1989
Research into Clostridium perfringens is transferred to al-Hakam.
— Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iraq's Past and Future Biological Weapons Capabilities," CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment, 17 February 1998, p. 7.

1989
Aflatoxin production for biological weapons purposes is moved to a facility at Fudaliyah. The facility is used for aflatoxin production in flasks from April/May 1990 to December 1990. Iraq declared the production of about 1,850L of toxin in solution at Fudaliyah.
— UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>.

1989
Iraq buys standard spray dryers (which turn germ-laden slurries into dry powder) from the Niro Atomiser Company of Denmark. Later Iraq admits that one dryer was installed at al-Hakam in 1992. The other was found in 1997 at a warehouse at a town in northern Iraq^.
—Al J. Venter, "New-Era Threat: Iraq's Biological Weapons," Middle East Policy, Vol. 6, No. 4, 4 June 1999, p. 111; Jeffrey Smith, "Iraq's Drive for a Biological Arsenal," Washington Post, 21 November 1997.

1989
Iraq scales up B. anthracis development to production. According to Iraq, it uses 185kg of yeast extract for the production.
— Dany Shoham, "Iraq's Biological Warfare Agents: A Comprehensive Analysis," Critical Review in Microbiology, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2000, p. 182.

1989
Iraq begins mass production of anthrax at the al-Hakam Single Cell Protein Production Plant.
—Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past As Future?" Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), Vol. 278, No. 5, 6 August 1997, p. 419; Bruce W. Nelan, "Germ Warfare," Time, 1 December 1997, p. 55.

1989
Iraq begins to produce aflatoxin at al-Salman Pak. Eventually 2200L of solution will be manufactured here.
— Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past as Future?" The Journal of the American Medical Association, 6 August 1997, pp. 418-424

1989
The Iraqi Ministry of Defense buys more than 100 items from German biotechnology supply firms, including culture media, heating equipment, and systems for freeze-drying bacteria and toxins.
— Jonathan Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Programme," Arms Control Today, Vol. 14, No. 3, December 1993, p. 240.

1989
The Iraqi State Enterprise for Pesticide Production (SEPP) purchases microbiological fermenters and fluid culture media from a Hamburg firm, Water Engineering Trading.
— Jonathan Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Programme," Arms Control Today, Vol. 14, No. 3, December 1993, p. 240.

1989
Research findings from al-Salman Pak are applied at the al-Hakam Single Cell Protein Production Plant in order to begin mass production of anthrax.
[Note: al-Hakam Single Cell Protein Production Plant was Iraq's major production facility for biological warfare agents. Eventually 8000L of anthrax solution was produced. 6000L were used to fill weapons the rest remained in storage at al-Hakam].
— Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past as Future?" The Journal of the American Medical Association, 6 August 1997, pp. 418-424

1989
At al-Salman Pak, 10L of concentrated ricin solution is manufactured.
[Note: the majority of the toxin is unaccounted for - some was used for testing and some as payload in artillery shells but the rest is unknown.]
[Note: Iraqi declarations claim that research on ricin began in 1989 – UNSCOM officials believe the research started in 1988]
— Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past as Future?" The Journal of the American Medical Association, 6 August 1997, pp. 418-424 (8); UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C

January 1989
According to unnamed U.S. and Israeli sources, Iraq has been engaged for more than a year in producing and stockpiling typhoid, cholera and anthrax causing agents in the secret laboratory at al-Salman Pak.
— Jonathan Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Programme," Arms Control, Vol. 14, No. 3, December 1993, p. 240.

Around March 1989
Iraq begins to produce Bacillus anthracis at al-Salman Pak.
— UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>.

April 1989
Iraq begins to produce botulinum toxin for weapons purposes on an industrial scale at al-Hakam.
— UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>.

May 1989
Iraq begins to produce B. anthracis for weapons purposes begins at al-Hakam.
— UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>.

August 1989
Work on Clostridium perfringens is transferred from al-Salman Pak to al-Hakam.
— UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>.

September 1989
Iraq conducts open air testing at Jurf al-Sakr Firing Range using 155mm artillery shell filled with ricin.
— U.S. Intelligence Community, Intelligence Related to Possible Sources of Biological Agent Exposure During the Persian Gulf War, August 2000, <http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/library/43917.htm>. This report provides the conclusions of the Intelligence Community's Persian Gulf War Illness Task Force.

November-December 1989
Iraq carries out static and dynamic field trials using a B. anthracis simulant, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin in Sakr-18 122mm rockets and R400 bombs at Muhammadiyat.
—UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>; Jane's Defense Weekly, 21 August 1996; U.S. Intelligence Community, Intelligence Related to Possible Sources of Biological Agent Exposure During the Persian Gulf War, August 2000, <http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/library/43917.htm>. This report provides the conclusions of the Intelligence Community's Persian Gulf War Illness Task Force.

1989-1990
Iraq claims in its declaration to the U.N. that botulinum toxin is produced on an industrial scale. 20,000L of solution containing botulinum toxin is manufactured at al-Hakam and al-Manal. 12,000L is used to fill warheads or for testing while the remaining 8000L is stored at al-Hakam.
[Note: the Clostridium botulinum strain was imported from the United States. The strength of the solution is unknown.]
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C.