1990Iraq begins research into viruses and genetic engineering.
— Christian Seelos, "Lessons from Iraq on Bioweapons," Nature, Issue 398, 18 March 1999, p. 188.
1990
Iraq produces 200 R-400 biological bombs, 100 filled with botulinum toxin, 50 with anthrax, and 7 with aflatoxin.
— Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past As Future?" Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) Vol. 278, No. 5, 6 August 1997, p. 420.
1990
Iraq modifies a MIG-21 fighter plane to be a remotely piloted vehicle and equips it with a 2200-L tank and a spray mechanism.
— Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past As Future?" Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), Vol. 278, No. 5, 6 August 1997, p. 420.
1990
100 al-Hussayn missiles are shipped to the al-Muthanna State Establishment. Of these, 25 fitted with biological warheads: 13 filled with botulinum toxin, 10 with aflatoxin, and 2 with anthrax. All of them were reportedly deployed: 10 in a deep railway tunnel and 15 in holes dug along the Tigris River.
— Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past As Future?" Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), Vol. 278, No. 5, 6 August 1997, p. 420.
1990
340L of Clostridium perfringens solution is produced at al-Hakam.
— Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past as Future?" The Journal of the American Medical Association, 6 August 1997, pp. 418-424
1990
Iraqi scientists investigate the ability of certain fungi to produce tricothecene mycotoxins. They claim to have produced 20mL of a solution containing tricothecene, some of which was tested on animals.
[Note: the fungi used were Fusarium oxysporium and Fusarium granarium.]
— Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past as Future?" The Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 278, No. 5, 6 August 1997, pp. 418-424
1990
According to Iraqi claims, crops infected with wheat cover smut are burned at Fudaliyah.
— Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past As Future?" Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), Vol. 278, No. 5, 6 August 1997, p. 419.
1990
A total of 200 R-400 (400lb) biological bombs are produced. Deployed at two sites, the weapons are ready for immediate use. 100 are filled with botulinum toxin, 50 with B. anthracis and 7 with aflatoxin. The few 155-mm caliber artillery shells filled with ricin are designated for field testing.
[Note: "reportedly tests did not go well and no further attempts were made to develop artillery shells for biological warfare."]
— Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past as Future?" The Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 278, No. 5, 6 August 1997, pp. 418-424
1990
The al-Muthanna State Establishment receives a shipment of 100 al-Hussayn missiles, some of which may have been enhanced to double their 300km range but range enhancement would mean a reduced payload capacity (original capacity is 1 metric ton). 25 of the 100 are fitted with biological warheads – 13 with botulinum toxin, 10 with aflatoxin and 2 with anthrax. All 25 missiles are deployed – 10 in a railway tunnel and 15 along the Tigris River.
— Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past as Future?" The Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 278, No. 5, 6 August 1997, pp. 418-424.
1990
Project 144 (the unit in charge of production of the al-Hussayn missiles) is asked to create a "kinetic energy" warhead and "special warheads" capable of delivering chemical and biological payloads.
— Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James Wirtz (ed.), Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000).
1990
According to Iraqi declarations, alflatoxin is produced at al-Fudhaliyah (al-Safa`h). UNSCOM officials believe the start date to be September 1990 due to testimonials. The al-Hakam report states 2200L of alflatoxin are produced but does not provide a location.
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C.
Early – mid 1990
A crash program is developed under the order of Hussayn Kamil for Project 144 to produce 75 chemical and biological warheads.
— Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James Wirtz (ed.), Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 47-78.
Early 1990
Five viruses are investigated for their potential use as biological weapons at the Foot and Mouth Disease Center at al-Manal.
[Note: the 5 include: Congo-Crimean hemorrhagic virus, yellow fever virus, enterovirus 17, human rotavirus and camelpox virus. The first 2 were determined to be unsuitable as a biological weapon, but the final 3 were researched further.]
— Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past as Future?" The Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 278, No. 5, 6 August 1997, pp. 418-424.
Spring of 1990
Forty high performance aerosol generators are acquired. These have the capability of disseminating either liquid of dray material at 50 liters per minute.
—"Iraqi Biological Warfare Developments", October 1990. <http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/library/961031_950719_011045di_90.txt>
March 1990
Iraq starts genetic engineering program under Dr. Ali Nuria Abdal Hussayn.
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html>.
1 April 1990
Hussayn makes a speech to a delegation of U.S. Senators reiterating that if Israel were to attack Iraq with an nuclear weapon, Iraq will use a binary chemical weapon in response. While this speech does not make direct reference to biological weapons, and in fact, Saddam denies Iraq is pursuing them, he does emphasize Iraq's right to obtain any weapon already in the Israeli arsenal.
[Note: Iraqi "binary" weapons are not equivalent to U.S. binary chemical weapons.]
— Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James Wirtz (ed.), Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 47-78.
18 April 1990
Hussayn gives a speech to his General Command and the Revolutionary Command Council, where he boasts, "If any party...tries to attack any Arab that accepts out assistance, we will respond to the aggressor to the best of our ability.... If we can strike him with all our missiles, bombs and resources, then we will strike him [with these weapons]."
— Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James Wirtz (ed.), Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 47-78.
May 1990
Iraq carries out successful live firings of 122mm rockets and aerial bombs filled with BW agents.
— UNSCOM Eighth Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715, 1991, S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>.
July 1990
Dr. Hazim Ali, an Iraqi virologist, begins work on virus research for BW purposes.
[Note: UNSCOM finds this information consistent with Dr. Ali's work].
— Full, Final and Complete Disclosure of Iraq's Past Biological Programme, September 1997; UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C.
July 1990
Research on viruses for biological weapons purposes starts at al-Salman Pak by Dr. Hazim Ali.
—UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715, 1991, S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>; UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html>.
2 August 1990
Iraq invades Kuwait.
August-October 1990
Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, a large-scale production and weaponization of BW agents begins. During this time Iraq claims it produced 19,000L of concentrated botulinum toxin, 8,500L of a concentrated (1010 spores per mL) slurry of anthrax spores, and 2,200L of concentrated aflatoxin. UNSCOM is unable to confirm the claim of aflatoxin production but does find indications that Clostridium perfringens bacteria was cultivated on a large scale.
— Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James Wirtz (ed.), Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 47-78.
August 1990
Through a unilateral decision by Lt. Gen. Hussayn Kamil Hassan, Iraq decides to produce biological weapons for the Gulf War.
— Iraqi Declarations, September 1997.
August 1990
Following its invasion to Kuwait on 2 August, Iraq launches a crash program to speed biological weapons development. The program includes research into virology and genetic engineering. Iraq shifts its emphasis to production and later to weaponization of biological warfare agents. The Foot and Mouth Disease plant at Daura is converted to biological weapons production.
—William J. Broad and Judith Miller, "How Iraq's Biological Weapons Program Came to Light," New York Times, 26 February 1998; UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715, 1991, S/1995/864, 11 October 1995 found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>; "Does Iraq Have 1,000-Year Weapons?" MSNBC, date not identified; UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>.
August 1990
Iraq begins to produce Clostridium perfringens, a biological agent that causes gas gangrene, for biological weapons purposes at al-Hakam using the 150-liter fermenter, which has been relocated from al-Salman Pak.
—Barbara Starr, "Iraq Reveals a Startling Range of Toxin Agents," Jane's Defense Weekly, 11 November 1995; UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>.
August 1990
According to Iraq's declaration, it conducts a trial to determine the size of the "booster charge" required to disperse agent for R-400 bombs at al-Hakam. Iraq has failed to provide evidence for the trials. Iraq conducts trials of R-400 aerial bombs with Bacillus subtilis, to simulate an attack using B. anthracis in mid-August. Later in the month Iraq conducts trials of R-400 aerial bombs using B. subtilis, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin.
— Tim McCarthy, Iraq's Biological Weapon Sites and Facilities, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, July 1999, p.8. UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>.
September 1990
Iraq begins production of B. anthracis on an industrial scale at al-Hakam.
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html>.
September 1990
R-400s are tested at al-Muhammadiyat. It is likely that the tests are undertaken with weapons deployed [Note: Iraq included this statement in the first FFCD and later withdrew it. UNSCOM inspectors spoke with weapons staff and are confident the tests took place].
—UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C.
September 1990
Al-Manal facility is established at Maura in order to produce botulinum toxin for weapons. Additionally, B. anthracis spores are produced at al-Manal
[Note: The al-Hakam report confirms that B. anthracis was produced at al-Hakam but Iraq denies that al-Manal produced B. anthracis, despite spore genes being found on a fermenter and storage vessels. There is documentary evidence that 5000L of botulinum toxin were produced at al-Manal].
—UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C.
Late September – November 1990
Special warheads designed to deliver chemical and biological payloads are shipped by the director of Project 144 to al-Muthanna State Establishment, Iraq's main chemical weapon production facility. The director believes that all of the special warheads are intended for chemical fill. Due to the terminal velocity of this type of ballistic missile, developing the triggering device to release chemical or biological agents would be very difficult. In an effort to avoid using proximity fusing, Iraq launches a program using parachutes to slow the speed of the warheads in order to better disperse agent payload before impact.
— Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James Wirtz (ed.), Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 47-78.
28 September 1990
Les Aspin, chairman of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, tells reporters that the U.S. intelligence community projects that Iraq would be able to produce and stockpile a "military significant number" of biological weapons by early 1991.
— Jonathan Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Programme," Arms Control Today, Vol. 14, No. 3, December 1993, p. 241.
Fall 1990
According to an Iraqi defector, Hussayn personally orders "...plans be drawn up for airborne delivery of a biological agent using an SU-22 ground-attack aircraft equipped with an onboard spray tank."
[Note: the source states that aspects of this account are unconfirmed or inconsistent with other information.]
— Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James Wirtz (ed.), Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 47-78.
November 1990
Iraq declares the 10L of ricin it produced were used in a field trial using 155mm artillery shells.
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html>.
November 1990
Iraq modifies a drop tank to create a prototype of Mirage F-1 drop tank and conducts a series of trials.
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html>.
13 November 1990
British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, tells the House of Commons, "We believe that [Saddam Hussayn] also has biological weapons at his disposal."
— Jonathan Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Programme," Arms Control Today, Vol. 14, No. 3, December 1993, p. 242.
Late 1990
Iraq starts a crash program to harvest castor beans, from which to extract a large quantity of ricin.
— Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal" Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James J. Wirtz (Ed.), Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 54.
December 1990
Iraq develops an additional delivery means, by modifying a Mirage F-1 drop tank to create a biological weapons spray tank. The tank could spray up to 2,000L of B. anthracis. Two field trials are conducted in December 1990 at the Abu Obiydi Airbase, and an additional one on January 13, 1991. The trials are purportedly a failure. Nevertheless, three additional drop tanks are modified are stored, ready for use.
—UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>; Barbara Starr, "Iraq Reveals a Startling Range of Toxin Agents," Jane's Defense Weekly, 11 November 1995; U.S. Intelligence Community, Intelligence Related to Possible Sources of Biological Agent Exposure During the Persian Gulf War, August 2000, <http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/library/43917.htm>.
December 1990-Janauary 1991
Iraq weaponizes biological warfare agents on a large scale at al-Muthanna.
[Note: UNSCOM does not contest the weaponization; many details are left unconfirmed, but there is evidence from R-400 bombs and al-Hussein missiles the BW agents were used with the weapons].
—UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>; UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html>.
1990-1991
12-Frame bunkers are found located in the al-Salman Pak facility and containing lighting arrestors and possible airlocks. These bunkers were also environmentally controlled and several with refrigeration units. Bunkers of similar disposition are found in other areas of Iraq and deemed possible BW–agent or CW storage bunkers. Many bunkers were located in ammunition storage depots throughout Baghdad.
[Note: these storage facilities probably did not contain BW or CW agents or munitions when they were bombed, but their construction would have been suitable for CBW storage and possibly designed for just this purpose.]
—"Intelligence Related to the Possible Sources of Biological Agent Exposure During the Persian Gulf War", August 2000, <www.gulflink.osd.mil/library/43917.htm>
January 1991
Hussayn gives orders to his commanders to launch chemical and biological weapons against enemy capitals and troops if Iraq is attacked by nuclear weapons. The decision is made to not use chemical or biological weapons against coalition troops and civilian populations due to the U.S. threat that, "any use of unconventional arms would provoke a devastating response," which was taken to mean nuclear retaliation.
—Anthony Goodman, "Iraq Targeted "Enemy Capitals" if Baghdad is Nuked," Reuters, 21 September 1995.
1991-1995
Iraq categorically denies having a biological weapons program.
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C.
1991
According to U.N. inspectors, the so-called Special High Committee, chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, meets to plan a massive concealment of Iraq's nuclear, biological, chemical and missile programs.
— "The Inspector's Story," CNN/Time Impact, 1 March 1998.
1991
According to Iraqi claims, Iraq destroys all its weapons, agents and documents, but it provides no credible evidence.
— Christian Seelos, "Lessons from Iraq on Bioweapons," Nature, Issue 398, 18 March 1999, p. 188.
January 1991
Iraq deploys R-400 bombs and al-Hussayn warheads filled with biological warfare agents at four locations. 200 aerial bombs and about 80 missile warheads filled with B. anthracis are hidden near Tikrit.
—UNSCOM Eight Report Under Paragraph 8, Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, found at CNS web site, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/excerpt.htm>; Dany Shoham, "Iraq's Biological Warfare Agents: A Comprehensive Analysis," Critical Review in Microbiology, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2000, p. 182.
January 1991
Iraqi military command threatens to use a "secret weapon."
— Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James Wirtz (ed.), Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 47-78.
9 January 1991
U.S. Secretary of State James Baker tells Iraq's deputy foreign minister Tariq Aziz, "if there is any use of [chemical and biological weapons], our objectives won't just be the liberation of Kuwait, but the elimination of the current Iraqi regime, and anyone responsible for using those weapons would be held accountable" (emphasis added).
[Note: According to McCarthy, this threat was meant to hit Hussayn where it mattered most – his regime and his hold on power. It would appear that Iraq was deterred from using unconventional weapons by the knowledge that Coalition forces may respond with nuclear weapons. – see August and October 1995 entries for further details.]
— Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James Wirtz (ed.), Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 47-78.
10 January 1991
Iraq carries out a field test at the Air Force al-Rashid Airbase, in which a remotely piloted vehicle (a modified MIG-21 fighter plane) sprays a solution laden with a biological stimulant over a practice target range at the Air Force al-Rashid Airbase. The results of this test remain unknown.
— Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past As Future?" Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) Vol. 278, No. 5, 6 August 1997, p. 420.
13 January 1991
Trials of Iraqi Mirage spray tanks to disperse biological agents were held as late as this date.
—"Anthony Cordesman, "Iraq's Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction", The Military Balance in the Middle East, Part XIV, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 6 September, 1999, pp. 50-60.
18 January 1991
Iraq strikes at Israel with conventionally armed ballistic missiles.
— Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James Wirtz (ed.), Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 47-78.
22-23 January 1991
Iraq is relocating equipment from al-Hakam to the al-Asmaa School. Iraq declared that some growth media was lost during the relocation.
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html>.
March 1991
According to Professor Hussayn al-Shahristani, an Iraqi nuclear scientist, Iraq uses aflatoxin to suppress the uprising in Karbala.
— An interview with Iraqi nuclear scientist Professor Hussayn al-Shahristani by Mu'idd Fayyad in London, Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 19 March 2001, p.3; in "Iraqi Scientist on Iraq's Use of Poison Gases, Chemical Weapons," FBIS Document GMP20010319000087, 19 March 2001.
April 1991
Operation Desert Storm ends with a cease-fire and UNSCR 687.
3 April 1991
The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 687 which requires that Iraq unconditionally destroy all non-conventional weapons as well as 'undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire' such weapons. A special commission, UNSCOM, is created to dismantle Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
— U.N. Resolution 687
6 April 1991
Iraq accepts resolution 687.
— UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events, December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.
April 1991
After the ceasefire agreements are reached, 11 biological warfare program personnel are reportedly ordered to destroy the biological agents.
[Note: the 2-step process should have produced a residuum that was said to be poured on the bare ground near al-Hakam. In 1996 UNSCOM inspectors were unable to recover any residuum or its breakdown products. The destruction of the agents is therefore unverified].
— Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past as Future?" The Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 278, No. 5, 6 August 1997, pp. 418-424
1991
BW munitions are reportedly destroyed per the ceasefire agreements. Warheads are opened and formaldehyde and potassium permanganate are added to the solution. The munitions are then bulldozed, burned and concealed by detonating conventional bombs among the remains. Some test munitions are reportedly thrown in the Tigris without being destroyed.
[Note: UNSCOM has not been able to recover all of the R400s and therefore cannot verify that all of the biological bombs were destroyed].
— Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past as Future?" The Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 278, No. 5, 6 August 1997, pp. 418-424.
18 April 1991
Iraq ratifies the Biological Weapons Convention.
18 April 1991
Iraq provides its initial declaration under resolution 687. It declares it has no biological weapons program.
— UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events, December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.
May or June 1991
According to Iraq, it secretly destroys all its biological agents and weapons and documents. It provides no credible evidence to support these claims.
—William J. Broad and Judith Miller, "How Iraq's Biological Weapons Program Came to Light," New York Times, 26 February 1998; Christian Seelos, "Lessons from Iraq on Bioweapons," Nature, Vol. 398, 18 March 199, p. 188.
May 1991
According to Iraq, the al-Asmaa School is broken into and some growth media is stolen.
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html>.
June 1991
Bulk biological agent is destroyed.
[Note: although UNSCOM officials were able to hear interview testimony that bulk agent was destroyed there are inconsistencies in the account, and there is no physical or documentary evidence].
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C.
June 1991
According to Iraq, before the arrival of the first UNSCOM BW team, it transfers the growth media that remained at al-Hakam to the State Company for Drugs and Medical Appliances Marketing (known as Kimadia) within the Ministry of Health. The role of Kimadia was to provide a cover story for media that had been consumed in the weapons program.
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html>.
July 1991
Weapons carrying biological warfare agents are destroyed.
[Note: UNSCOM was able to confirm the destruction of some R-400 and missile warheads but the totality cannot be verified].
—UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C.
July 1991
According to Iraq's declaration, it unilaterally destroys 25 BW warheads at specific locations at al-Nibai desert.
2-7 August 1991
The first UNSCOM biological inspection team arrives at al-Salman Pak. U.N. inspectors say they had found "a capability to research, produce, test and store biological warfare agents" at al-Salman Pak but found "no evidence of biological weapons per se" and "no facility for filling weapons."
—Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past As Future?" Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 278, No. 5, 6 August 1997, p. 420; Paul Lewis, "UN Weapons Inspectors Renew Hunt in Iraq," New York Times, 17 November 1991, p. 12; "UN Inspection Team Reports on Iraq's Biological Weapons Capacity, Finds No Evidence of Current Stocks," Press Statement issued by the Special Commission, 14 August 1991.
2 August 1991
Iraq declares to the inspection team that it had conducted "biological research activities for defensive military purposes."
— UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events, December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.
2 August 1991
UNSCOM inspectors arrive at al-Salman Pak to discover that a few days before, part of the facility had been blown up and covered with dirt.
[Note: According to UNSCR 687, facilities and equipment used in support of any WMD program has to be destroyed by UNSCOM or IAEA officials].
— Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past as Future?" The Journal of the American Medical Association, 6 August 1997, pp. 418-424
September 1991
The first inspection at al-Hakam takes place.
— Christian Seelos, "Lessons from Iraq on Bioweapons," Nature, Vol. 398, 18 March 1999, p. 187.
20 September - 3 October 1991
The second team of U.N. biological experts does not find any biological weapons or facilities for filling weapons. The inspectors identify several sites for which they recommend future monitoring. The al-Hakam facility is inspected for the first time. U.N. inspectors accept Iraqi claim that its function is benign.
—"Several Iraqi Sites Recommended for Future Monitoring by Second U.N. Biological Weapons Inspections Team," Press Statement issued by the Special Commission, 31 October 1991; Christian Seelos, "Lessons from Iraq on Bioweapons," Nature, Vol. 398, 18 March 1999, p. 187.
25 October 1991
UNSCOM submits a report to the U.N. Security Council describing the findings from inspections thus far. The reports states, "conclusive evidence that Iraq was engaged in an advanced military biological research program has been collected. No evidence of actual weaponization has been found, but the inspections have provided a sound data base for future monitoring of biological capabilities in Iraq."
— Jonathan Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Programme," Arms Control Today, Vol. 14, No. 3, December 1993, p. 257.
18 November – 1 December 1991
The U.N. conducts its third biological inspection. The inspections are carried out by surprise. No evidence is found that the facilities were used for biological weapons purposes.
— Appendix V: U.N. Inspections in Iraq Suspected Biological Weapons Facilities, GAO/NSIAD-93-113 Arms Control, p. 56.
1992
According to Iraq, it installs a spray dryer, purchased from Denmark, at al-Hakam, for what it claims is benign use.
— Jeffrey Smith, "Iraq's Drive for a Biological Arsenal," Washington Post, 21 November 1997.
1992
Research and development is thought of to have ended on a "lethal virus (NFI)" at the al-Mana Al facility. Research includes work on small scale biological weapon dissemination including explosives and/or aerosols. The facility had been operational throughout the first Gulf War.
—"Al-Mana Al Biological Weapons Project". CIA 325352. October, 1993. <www.fas.org/irp/gulf/cia/960417/70490_01.htm>
May 1992
Iraq gives the U.N. its first "Full, Final and Compete Disclosure" (FFCD) for its biological program. Baghdad denies having ever experimented in any kind of biological arms, and states that al-Hakam, the FMD plant and VRL were not related to BW activities. Iraq admits to having only a "defensive" biological weapons program.
—William J. Broad and Judith Miller, "How Iraq's Biological Weapons Program Came to Light," New York Times, 26 February 1998; UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html>; UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events, December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.
26 June – 10 July 1992
A joint U.N. chemical/biological weapons inspection takes place in Iraq. The inspection fails to turn up any conclusive evidence.
— Jonathan Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Programme," Arms Control Today, Vol. 14, No. 3, December 1993, p. 278.
6-14 December 1992
A joint U.N. chemical/biological weapons inspection takes place in Iraq. The inspection fails to find any conclusive evidence.
— Jonathan Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Programme," Arms Control Today, Vol. 14, No. 3, December 1993, p. 278.
30 December 1992
The New York Times reports that a document, which has been circulated by a Kurdish group, "contains the first written indication that Baghdad has possessed biological weapons since 1986."
— "Document Says Iraq Has Biological Weapons," New York Times, 30 December 1992, p. A9.
24 February 1993
CIA Director James Woolsey, in his testimony before the Senate Government Affairs Committee, states that Iraq still possesses an "advanced" biological weapons program, despite the Gulf War bombings and the inspections.
— Jonathan Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Programme," Arms Control Today, Vol. 14, No. 3, December 1993, p. 259.
11-18 March 1993
A dedicated biological weapons inspection takes place in Iraq. The inspection fails to turn up any conclusive evidence.
— Jonathan Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Programme," Arms Control Today, Vol. 14, No. 3, December 1993, p. 278.
May 1993
In March 2001 it was reported that Muhammad Ibrahim al-A'zami, a former Iraqi police officer who fled to Germany recently, has revealed that in May, 1993, Iraq buried banned chemicals and biological material in al-Karkh Cemetery, 25 km from Baghdad. He said that the materials were placed inside nine "well-built and tightly sealed coffins" and placed under guard. In February 2001, al-A'zami visited the cemetery and discovered that the nine graves had been leveled and the guards disappeared.
— Mu'idd Fayyad, "Escapee Iraqi Police Officer Reveals Secret of Bogus Funerals. Baghdad's Authorities Buried Chemical and Biological Material," Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 12 March 2001, p. 3; in "Iraqi Escapee Cited on Regime's Concealment of 'Chemical, Biological' Material," FBIS Document GMP20010312000143, 12 March 2001.
November 1993
UNSCOM says in a report to the U.N. Security Council that Iraq had satisfied all its obligations in the biological sphere, and it was regarded closed. Later, under pressures, UNSCOM reopened the biological dossier.
— "INA Reviews Government Cooperation with UN," INA DATE; in FBIS Document NO, 18 June 1995.
1994
U.N. inspectors install remote cameras at Al-Hakam.
June 1994
U.N. inspectors find a mass grave near al-Salman Pak biological weapons center. Iraqi officials deny that the dead were human test subjects exposed to biological agents. An Iraqi representative tells the U.N. that the dead were "political agents" who had been executed.
— Bruce Auster, "In Iraq, Hints of Biological Atrocities," U.S. News & World Report, 26 January 1998, p. 46; Al J. Venter, "Biological Warfare Atrocities Revealed," Pointer, March 1998, p. 1.
December 1994
UNSCOM discovers that the Technical and Scientific Materials Import Division (TSMID) has imported quantities of culture media, used to grow microorganisms, on behalf of the Ministry of Health. The shipment totaled 39 tons packed in 25-100 kg drums, which created suspicion (usually it is supplied in packages weighing 100-500 grams). By 1997, only 22 of the 39 tons of biological growth media have been accounted.
[Note: By 1997, the growth media would be spoiled.]
— Al J. Venter, "New-Era Threat: Iraq's Biological Weapons," Middle East Policy, Vol. 6, No. 4, 4 June 1999, p. 107; James Hackett, "Saddam and the Risk of Germ Warfare," Washington Times, 27 May 1997, p. A17.
1994-1995
In February 2001 Professor Hussayn al-Shahrastani, an Iraqi nuclear scientist, has revealed that between 1994 and 1995 Iraq dumped barrels containing biological weapons and banned chemicals in the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers and exploded chemical weapons in isolated wastelands. The purpose of this action was to prevent the U.N. inspectors from discovering them.
— Mu'idd Fayyad, "Iraqi Nuclear Scientist Hussein al-Shahrastani: Baghdad Dumped Barrels of 'Chemical' Weapons in the Tigris and Euphrates," Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 26 February 2001, p. 5; in "Scientist Claims Iraq Dumped Chemical, Biological Weapons in Rivers," FBIS Document GMP20010227000063, 26 February 2001.
1995
General Wafiq al-Sammara`i, former head of Iraqi Military Intelligence, defects and reveals that Hussayn is concealing more chemical and biological weapons than was released to U.N. inspectors. This includes a possible "'255 containers' of biological materials - 230 with powder and 25 with liquid."
—Sean Boyne, "Iraq 'Unlikely' to Give Up Nuclear Option," Jane's Intelligence Review & Jane's Sentinal Pointer, September 1996, p. 6.
1995
An agreement between the Russian government and Iraq on the sale of sophisticated fermentation equipment that could be used to develop biological weapons is reached. The 5,000L fermentation vessel would ostensibly be used to make single-cell protein for animal feed. As of February 1998, the inspectors were not certain if Iraq received the equipment.
—R. Jeffrey Smith, "Did Russia Sell Iraq Germ Warfare Equipment? Document Seized by U.N. Inspectors Indicates Illicit Deal," Washington Post, 12 February 1998, p. A1; Mort Rosenblum, "'Poor Man's Bomb' Is a Biological Nightmare In Waiting," San Diego Union-Tribune, 26 December 1998.
January 1995
Two European companies acknowledge selling Iraq 39 tons of growth media. No more detail is given.
— John Barry, "Unearthing the Truth," Newsweek, 2 March 1998.
March 1995
Iraq submits its second FFCD of its biological weapons program. It contains no new significant information from the previous one.
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html>.
10 April 1995
In its report to the Security Council, UNSCOM reveals for the first time that Iraq had an undeclared biological weapons program.
— Laurie Mylroie, "The Method to Saddam's Madness," Washington Times, 13 January 1999, p. 17; Laurie Mylroie, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction and the 1997 Gulf Crisis," MERIA Journal, Vol. 4, December 1997.
June 1995
A meeting is held between Iraqi biologists from the Chemical Engineering Design Center (CEDC) and Russian government officials in Moscow. The purpose of the meeting is to gather information regarding assistance with production and research in biotechnology, as well as the possibility of Russia supplying Iraq with a complete factory for the production of single-cell protein, ostensibly for use in an animal feed factory. This includes a 5,000L fermentation vessel. Four of the Iraqis were senior officials at al-Hakam and worked with Dr. Taha. In July, Iraq accepts the Russian offer to supply the plant, which according to Ken Alibek was specially configured for BW applications.
— Scott Ritter, Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem – Once and for All, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), p. 220.
1 July 1995
Iraq admits for the first time that it had an offensive biological weapons program, and that it secretly manufactured botulinum toxin and B. anthracis before the Gulf War. Iraq denies agent weaponization and contends that it did not have the way to deliver biological weapons. The Iraqis also acknowledge that the factory at al-Hakam had produced thousands of gallons of B. anthracis and botulinum toxin.
—Edith M. Lederer, "Biological Weapons," The Associated Press, 24 April 1997; Christian Seelos, "Lessons from Iraq on Bioweapons," Nature, Vol. 398, 18 March 1999, p. 187; R. Jeffrey Smith, "Iraq Had Program for Germ Warfare," Washington Post, 6 July 1995, p. A1; UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html.>; William J. Broad and Judith Miller, "How Iraq's Biological Weapons Program Came to Light," New York Times, 26 February 1998; UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html>.
4 August 1995
Iraq submits its third "Full, Final and Complete Disclosure" (FFCD) of its biological weapons program, which was later declared null and void by Iraq itself.
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html>.
8 August 1995
Lt. General Hussayn Kamil Hassan, Sadam Hussayn's son-in-low and Iraq's WMD czar, defects to Jordan and provides information on the scope of the Iraqi BW program.
—William J. Broad and Judith Miller, "How Iraq's Biological Weapons Program Came to Light," New York Times, 26 February 1998; UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events, December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.
20 August 1995
Following the defection of Kamil, Iraq presents UNSCOM with new information on its past BW program, including details concerning weaponization, key personnel, types of agents and munitions, and sites. The information is presented in 150 boxes of documents at a chicken farm.
—U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence To and Compliance With Arms Control Agreement, 1997 Annual Report. <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/reports/annual/chpt7.htm>; UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html>; William J. Broad and Judith Miller, "How Iraq's Biological Weapons Program Came to Light," New York Times, 26 February 1998.
June – August 1995
UNSCOM contends that during this time a number of political prisoners had been transferred from the Abu Gharib Prison to a secret site in western Iraq, where they were tested with chemical and biological agents under the supervision of a special unit from the Military Industrial Commission. According to a weapons inspector, there is "credible evidence" that prisoners were taken from the Abu Gharib to al-Salman.
—Betsy Pisik, "Chemical Arms Tests on Inmates Suspected," Washington Times, 15 January 1998, p. 1; Scott Ritter, Saddam's Trap," New Republic, 21 December 1998, p. 18; "U.N. Looks Into Reports That Iraq Used Humans in Weapons Tests," MSNBC, date is not identified.
September 1995
Tariq Aziz says that if Iraq had come under nuclear attack in the Gulf War, it would have retaliated with biological weapons.
— "U.N. Reports Iraq Getting Rid of Its Chemical Weapons," Nando Times, 9 September 1997.
October 1995
Saddam Hussayn's son-in-law Hussayn Kamil identifies a U.N. envoy's interpreter as an Iraqi spy.
— "Hussein Kamil Identifies 'Spy' at UN," Der Spiegel, 23 October 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-205, 23 October 1995.
October 1995
Iraqi Oil Minister Amir Rashid says that "Iraq had no intention of using biological weapons unless the allies or Israel attacked Baghdad with nuclear weapons."
— Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal" Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James J. Wirtz (Ed.), Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 69.
Late 1995
Iraq acknowledges weapons testing with ricin but does not provide details on the amount produced.
— Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, U.S. Government White Paper, 13 February 1998.
August 1995
Tariq Aziz tells UNSCOM Director Rolf Ekeus that Iraqi officials believed during the Gulf War that the United States would retaliate with nuclear weapons against any chemical or biological weapon attack made by Iraq.
— Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James Wirtz (ed.), Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 47-78.
October 1995
Tariq Aziz, Iraq's deputy foreign minister, announces that during the Gulf War, military strategy had been such that as long as Coalition forces utilized conventional weapons Iraq would do the same. If nuclear weapons were used, then Iraq's military was to respond with all weapons available to them, including biological and chemical weapons.
— Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James Wirtz (ed.), Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 47-78.
Mid-1990s
U.N. inspectors find a freeze drier labeled "smallpox vaccine" at the maintenance shop of the State Establishment for Medical Appliances Marketing, an arm of the Ministry of Health, which was involved in biological warfare. Freeze driers are dual use equipment that could be used to prepare germs for dissemination. The freeze driers that were found by UNSCOM were supplied to Iraq by the WHO and were very old machines.
—William J. Broad and Judith Miller, "Government Report Says 3 Nations Hide Stocks of Smallpox," New York Times, 13 June 1999, p. 1.
20 March 1996
In a testimony before a Senate sub-committee, Rolf Ekeus says that Iraq may have up to 16 missiles armed with biological warheads hidden on trucks that could be moved quickly.
— "Weapons Inspector: Iraq May be Hiding Biological-Warhead Missiles," Washington Times, 21 March 1996, p. A15.
May-June 1996
The Iraqis, under UNSCOM's supervision, destroy the extensive buildings, equipment and materials at the facilities al-Hakam and Daura and al-Manal.
—William J. Broad and Judith Miller, "How Iraq's Biological Weapons Program Came to Light," New York Times, 26 February 1998; Tim McCarthy, Iraq's Biological Weapon Sites and Facilities, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, July 1999, p. 8.
22 June 1996
Iraq submits its forth "Full, Final and Complete Disclosure" (FFCD) of its biological weapons program. After intensive efforts to verify its accuracy, the Commission rejects it for reasons of a lack of accuracy and credibility.
— William J. Broad and Judith Miller, "How Iraq's Biological Weapons Program Came to Light," New York Times, 26 February 1998; UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html>.
1 November 1996
The Washington Times, quoting U.S. intelligence documents that were placed on the Internet, reports that before and during the Gulf War Iraq hid chemical and biological weapons in Iran, using camouflaged trucks. Once in Iranian territory the trucks were turned over to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).
— "Iraq Hid Bio Agents in Iran," Washington Times, 1 November 1996.
Early 1997
UNSCOM discovers documents that show Iraq had produced ricin.
— Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, U.S. Government White Paper, 13 February 1998.
14-15 February 1997
UNSCOM 173 supervises excavations of the pits at al-Aziziyah, where Iraq declared it destroyed the R-400A bombs.
— U.S. Intelligence Community, Intelligence Related to Possible Sources of Biological Agent Exposure During the Persian Gulf War, August 2000, <http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/library/43917.htm>.
March 1997
A biological Technical Evaluation Meeting (TEM) between UNSCOM international experts and Iraq is convened in Vienna to discuss Iraq's FFCD. The TEM concludes that the FFCD has substantial deficiencies.
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C.
April 1997
U.N. inspectors decide to interview Shakir-Akidi, a biology professor at Baghdad University who had been linked to work on toxins. As they arrive at the site, an unidentified man, who later turned to be Shakir, was rushing out of the building with a stack of papers under his arm, which he claims were owned by his wife. The papers included evidence that the government had harvested castor beans round-the-clock in late 1990, from which ricin is isolated.
— "Chasing Iraq's Deadly Arsenal U.N. Is Seeking 25 Warheads With Some of the World's Most Virulent Germs, Outgrowth of Toxin Sent from U.S.," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 25 November 1997.
18 April 1997
Rolf Ekeus presents to the U.N. Security Council on the progress of inspections and states that Iraq is still not cooperating fully with the U.N. to dismantle its programs to produce biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.
— Edith M. Lederer, "Biological Weapons," The Associated Press, 24 April 1997.
May 1997
UNSCOM offers Iraq the opportunity to clarify the deficiencies in the biological FFCD. It is expected that the concerns raised by the Commission will be addressed in detail in the next FFCD.
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C.
12 June 1997
U.N. officials attempt a surprise inspection of the headquarters for the 2nd Battalion of Iraq's Special Republican Guard. The inspectors expect to find records of a transfer of biological agents in refrigerated coolers from a military training center and al-Bakr University. When they arrive, the inspectors are not allowed to enter. According to one inspector, the team witnessed a series of "items being passed over a wall" from the guard headquarters into the presidential villa nearby.
— "Chasing Iraq's Deadly Arsenal U.N. Is Seeking 25 Warheads With Some of the World's Most Virulent Germs, Outgrowth of Toxin Sent from U.S.," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 25 November 1997.
September 1997
The Iraqi government submits to the U.N. its fifth FFCD, a 639-page document, which contains no new significant information from the previous one. A panel of international experts reviews the FFCD and concludes that it is deficient in all areas.
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html>; "Iraq Gives Biological Weapons Statement to U.N.," CNN, 11 September 1997; "Iraq Gives U.N. Statement on Biological Weapons," Reuters, 11 September 1997; Jeffrey Smith, "Iraq's Drive for a Biological Arsenal," Washington Post, 21 November 1997.
October 1997
In his first report to the U.N. Security Council since taking over leadership of UNSCOM from Rolf Ekeus, Richard Butler concludes that Iraq is continuing to hide information on biological arms and says that "there has been no progress" in dismantling Iraq's biological weapons.
—Barbara Crossette, "New U.N. Monitor Says Iraq Is Still Hiding Data on Weapons," Christian Science Monitor, 8 October 1997; "UN: Iraq Did Not Destroy Its Biological Weapons," Globes, 8 October 1997, <www.globes.co.il>.
November 1997
The German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) has information that Iraq is developing an "economic biological weapons," said to be a fungus that affects cereals and could be used to destroy crops.
— Michael J. Inacker, "Bacteria—Saddam Is Building Missiles That Go As Far As Europe," Welt am Sonntag, 30 November 1997; in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-97-335, 1 December 1997.
November 1997
The Sunday Times reports that, according to Iraqi and Western intelligence sources, Iraqi scientists had adopted Polish M-18 crop duster aircrafts to conduct biological warfare by remote control. The modified aircrafts could carry up to a ton of B. anthracis. The British paper also reports that up to 16 al-Hussayn long-range missiles also have been adapted to carry B. anthracis with the help of privately hired Russian scientists.
— "Could Iraq Spread Death Via Remote Crop Dusters?" Deseret News, 9 November 1997, <http://deseretnews.com/dn>; "Anthrax: Iraq's Doomsday Option?" Washington Times, 9 November 1997.
13 November 1997
Iraqi President Saddam Hussayn gives orders to expel the Americans inspectors. The next day Richard Butler pulls out all other inspectors.
— Barbara Crossette, "U.N. Council Gets Evidence of Iraqi Illicit Arms Buildup," New York Times, 20 November 1997.
November 1997
The Emergency Session of UNSC concludes that the biological weapons file was the most serious area in which Iraq had disregarded its obligations under Security Council Resolution 687. The Commission members defend this point of view by citing that FFCD of September 1997 was not different than previous unacceptable versions and that it remains unsupported by documentation and evidence.
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C.
1998
Iraq is further developing its aerial delivery platforms to include remotely piloted vehicles, modified L29 trainers, and Polish M-18 Dromader agricultural crop-sprayers. It is asserted that Hussayn's eldest son Udai has developed a front "cloud seeding" program (cloud seeding is the method of dispersing silver iodide particles into clouds from aircraft, which stimulates rain.)
—Alan George, "New Iraqi Covert Weapons Projects Discovered," The Middle East, January 1999, p. 11; Damian Kemp, "Iraq's UAVs Will Advance 'Anthrax Air Force,'" Jane's Defense Weekly, 6 January 1999, p. 3.
January 1998
Saddam Hussayn calls for a freeze on all weapons inspections, including at sensitive "presidential sites," until weapons experts evaluate Iraq's disarmament efforts in a series of planned "technical evaluation meetings" next month.
— Barbara Crossette, "Iraq Orders Freeze on Arms Inspections," New York Times, 22 January 1998; Dominic Evans, "Arms Inspector Rejects Call by Iraq for Freeze on Probe," Washington Times, 22 January 1998, p. A11.
January 1998
The London Times and the Guardian quote Western intelligence sources as saying that Libya is receiving "extensive help" from Iraqi scientists in a covert program, believed to be code-named Ibn Hayan, to develop biological weapons. According to the reports, up to a dozen Iraqi scientists who had been involved in Iraq's biological weapons program have transferred to Libya under a special arrangement between Iraq and Libya about 7 months prior. The scientists joined other Iraqi researchers who have been Libya since 1991. Intelligence sources believe that the Iraqi scientists have been employed to assist Libya in developing "an extensive complex called General Health Laboratories," located near Tripoli. Iraq and Libya deny the reports, saying they are a part of a hostile American campaign.
—Michael Evans, "Iraqi Scientists 'Helping Libyan Germ Warfare'," Times, 6 January 1998; Michael Georgy, "Iraq, Libya Deny Collaborating on Bacterial Weapons," Washington Times, 11 January 1998, p. 10.
February 1998
Equipment which could be used to produce B. anthracis was exported from Britain to Iraq as recently as 1994.
— "Report: Germans Sold Weapons to Iraq," United Press International, 17 February 1998.
March 1998
The Iraqi government announces that Nassir al-Hindawi, the former director of Iraq's biological weapons program, was arrested trying to fly out of Baghdad with sensitive documents of the Iraqi program. White House aides reportedly suspect that the arrest was staged in order to persuade the U.N. that Iraq is serious about dismantling its weapons of mass destruction. The documents, which were handed over to UNSCOM, included many that UNSCOM had previously known.
—Douglas Waller, "Iraq: Chemical Bothers," Time Daily, 30 March 1998; "Weapons Inspectors Get Iraqi Documents," Washington Times, 25 March 1998, p. A13; R. Jeffrey Smith, "Iraq Jails Germ Warfare Scientists It Says Wanted to Leave With Documents," Washington Post, 25 March 1998, p. A27; Judith Miller, "Iraq Arrests Scientist Viewed as Father of Its Germ War Effort," New York Times, 24 March 1998, p. 1.
18 March 1998
A British intelligence report reveals an Iraqi plot to smuggle large quantities of B. anthracis into "hostile countries." The intelligence warning leads to tightened security in all British ports and airports. On 24 March the Iraqi government denies the claim that Baghdad had planned to smuggle B. anthracis into Britain as "silly and baseless."
—Bill Gertz, "Officials Discount Threat of Iraq Smuggling Anthrax to U.S.," Washington Times, 25 March 1998, p. A3; "Baghdad Denies British Reports That Iraq Plotted to Smuggle Anthrax," Chicago Tribune, 25 March 1998; Richard Norton-Taylor and Ian Black, "Ministers Sound Retreat on Anthrax Warning," The Guardian, 25 March 1998, p. 4.
20-27 March 1998
At Iraq's request, a Technical Evaluation Meeting (TEM) between Iraq and a panel of international experts assembled by UNSCOM is convened in Vienna to allow Iraq to present its case regarding its September 1997 FFCD.
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C: Status of Verification of Iraq's Biological Warfare Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/index.html>.
8 April 1998
The report of the biological weapons TEM is submitted to the U.N. Security Council. The experts concluded that Iraq's full, final and complete disclosure is "incomplete and inadequate." The report says that it "contains major mistakes, inconsistencies and gaps in information." Regarding Iraqi claims that missile warheads containing biological weapons had been destroyed, the report says that the Iraqi account "cannot be reconciled with physical evidence."
—UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events, December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>; Barbara Crossette, "Experts Deny Iraq Has Ended Its Germ Warfare Program," New York Times, 10 April 1998; Barbara Crossette, "Experts Dispute Iraq's Claim It Ended Germ War Effort," New York Times, 10 April 1998; John M. Goshko, "Iraq Continued to Hide Arms Data, Experts Say," Washington Post, 10 April 1998, p. A20; Judy Aita, "Expert Panel Says Iraqi Data on Biological Weapons Is 'Inadequate'," USIA, 4 April 1998; "UN Report: Iraq Continues to Hide Scope of Biological Weapons," CNN, 10 April 1998.
April 1998
Jane's reports that an Iraqi opposition group has stated that Iraq is hiding chemical and biological weapons in farms located 30km outside of Baghdad. Reportedly, the weapons had been hidden underground in order to escape satellites.
— "Opposition Groups Claim Iraq Hiding Weapons in Farms," Pointer, Vol. 5, No. 4, April 1998, p. 7.
June 1998
A new book by Seymour Hersh, Against All Enemies: Gulf War Syndrome: The War Between America's Ailing Veterans and Their Government, reveals that just before the Gulf War, the American military discovered that Iraqi soldiers had been inoculated against anthrax. This increased fears in the U.S. that Iraq was preparing to wage biological warfare.
— William J. Broad, "Iraqi's Immunity to Anthrax Raised U.S. Fears, Book Says," New York Times, 7 June 1998.
3-4 June 1998
UNSCOM provides a technical briefing to the U.N. Security Council outlining the material balance and major outstanding disarmament issues in each category. The briefing in the biological area emphasizes the lack of verifiable details on nearly the entire program. The Commission also seeks to create a program to resolve the outstanding issues. For the biological program the priority concerns include: the production of materials and equipment, agents, munitions, and their possible destruction.
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C.
June 1998
UNSCOM officials meet with Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister where they determine a schedule of work for the next two months. Included in the schedule is Iraq's request for the team of international experts to reconvene and discuss, along with Iraqi experts, the overall problems with the biological section of the FFCD. [Note: see July 1998 entry for results].
— UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex C.
14 July 1998
At Iraq's request, UNSCOM holds a third international expert meeting in Baghdad to examine Iraq's biological weapons FFCD of September 1997. The team concludes that "Iraq's full, final and complete disclosure, in its totality, could not be verified."
—United Nations, UNSCOM report to the Security Council, s/1998/920 (1998), 6 October 1998, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/>; For more conclusions see: Al J. Venter, "Missing in Iraq: The UN Charts Saddam's Lethal Inventory," Jane's International Defense Review, May 1999, p. 39; United Nations, UNSCOM report to the Security Council, s/1998/920 (1998), 6 October 1998, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/>.
5 August 1998
Iraq officially suspends all inspections by UNSCOM.
November 1998
Iraq agrees to allow inspectors to return after the U.S. threatens to use military action against it.
December 1998
The last inspection by UNSCOM takes place. In total, 74 BW (6 combined CBW) inspections occurred.
16 December 1998
Saddam Hussayn cuts off all cooperation with U.N. inspectors. U.N. inspectors withdraw from Iraq.
10 January 1999
Ahmed Murtada Ahmed Khalil, Iraq's Transport and Communications Minister, visits Moscow with representatives of Iraq. During his visit, he signs a number of arms contracts. Murtada is the former director (1987-1990) of the Technical Research Center at al-Salman Pak, which was a part of Iraq's biological weapons program.
—Con Coughlin, "Revealed: Russia's Secret Deal to Re-arm Saddam," Sunday Telegraph, 14 February 1999, p. 1; Con Coughlin, "Focus the Re-arming of Saddam: Russia and Iraq – The Deadly Friends," Sunday Telegraph, 14 February 1999, p. 22; Con Coughlin, "International: Russian Weapons Experts Confirm Baghdad Connection," Sunday Telegraph, 21 February 1999, p. 30.
4 April 1999
The South African paper Sunday Independent reports that, according to an unconfirmed report by Jane's Foreign Report, a secret Iraqi plan to buy equipment from South Africa for its biological weapons program was foiled. The equipment included stainless steel that could be used to make fermenters, cartridge air filers and mechanical seals.
— Jonathan Rosenthal, "Iraqi Attempt to Buy RSA Equipment Reportedly Foiled," The Sunday Independent, 4 April 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990404000630, 4 April 1999.
17 December 1999
The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1284, which replaces UNSCOM with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).
