In the wake of the Gulf War in 1991, Iraq agreed to abide by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 authorizing the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to implement on-site inspections of those facilities in Iraq believed to be related to WMD production. The Resolution also required Iraq to declare and render harmless, by destruction or other means, all biological weapons. Teams of UNSCOM and IAEA personnel began inspections in August of 1991, at which time, Iraq declared that although it had a biological weapons R&D program for defense purposes, it had no offensive BW program whatsoever.[1]

It was not until the defection and testimony of former director of the Iraqi military industries Husayn Kamil in 1995, however, that prompted Iraqi officials to admit to producing and weaponizing biological agents for offensive purposes. They specifically acknowledged having conducted open-air testing of biological agents including Bacillus anthracis, Bacillus subtilis, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and ricin between March 1988 and January 1991 at facilities such as al-Muhammadiyat, Khan Bani Saad, Jurf al-Sakr Firing Range, and Abu Obeydi Airfield.[2] Iraq declared that coalition forces during the Gulf War in 1991 had destroyed the laboratory of the Technical Research Center at Salman Pak, but did not destroy biological weapons or bulk BW agents. It also declared to have unilaterally destroyed 157 R-400 aerial bombs, 25 al-Hussein missile warheads filled with BW agent, 12,500 liters of bulk BW agents and mobile storage tanks during the UNSCOM inspections, figures that UNSCOM inspectors suspected to be significantly underreported.[3]

By 1998, Iraq refused to cooperate further with UNSCOM, forcing inspectors to pull out of Iraq. The inspectors claimed that due to Iraq's tactics of deception, underreporting, concealment and unilateral destruction of biological weapons during the eight years of inspections, it was difficult to estimate the true magnitude of BW weapons remaining in Iraq, although they suspected that the Iraqis actually produced two-to-four times as much agent than they declared.[4]

Following the removal of UNSCOM from Iraq, the United Nations passed Security Council resolution 1284 in December 1999 commissioning the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to continue UNSCOM's mandate of monitoring and dismantling Iraq's WMD proliferation activities, including activities regarding BW.[5] With an exception of some findings implicating remnants of either chemically inactivated biological agents or unweaponizable strains of biological agents, as of February 2004, UNMOVIC has been unable to discover substantial evidence proving the presence of clandestine biological weapons activities in Iraq.

Satellite imagery depicting truck convoys believed to be transporting BW equipment contributed to the U.S. intelligence community's conclusion that Iraq still had biological weapons. In March 2003, the United States responded to these alleged proscribed activities in biological weapon development and other national security concerns by invading Iraq and overthrowing Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's regime. Soon after, the U.S. established the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), headed by former UN inspector David Kay, to locate WMD stockpiles and equipment suspected to be hidden in Iraq. However, the ISG has not found any evidence of mobile BW units, nor has it found clear evidence that Iraq has engaged in proscribed biological weapons activities since UNSCOM destroyed BW stocks in the 1990s.[6] The ISG continues to search for biological weapons and other WMD under the supervision of former UNSCOM member Charles A. Duelfer.

Key Sources:
[1] UNSCOM, "UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events," December 1999, http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm.
[2] U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," October 2002., 15
[3] United Nations Security Council, "Sixteenth Quarterly Report on the Activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in accordance with Paragraph 12 of Security Council Resolution 1284. S/2004/160," 1999, 17.
[4] U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 15.
[5] UNMOVIC, "Basic Facts," http://www.unmovic.org/.
[6] "Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee," Verbatim report of former ISG head David Kay's testimony at the hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee in Washington D.C., Federal News Service, 28 January 2004, Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com.

	Updated February 2006