1990-1991
12-Frame bunkers (reinforced and compartmented bunkers, deriving their name due to their appearance) are found located in the al-Salman Pak BW facility and others, containing lighting arrestors and possible airlocks. These bunkers were also environmentally controlled and several contain refrigeration units. Bunkers of similar disposition have been found in other areas of Iraq and deemed possible BW agent or CW storage bunkers. Many bunkers were located in ammunition storage depots throughout Baghdad.
[Note: these storage facilities probably did not contain BW or CW agents or munitions when they were bombed, but their construction would have been suitable for CBW storage and possibly designed for just this purpose.]
--"Intelligence Related to the Possible Sources of Biological Agent Exposure During the Persian Gulf War", Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, <www.gulflink.osd.mil/library/43917.htm>, August 2000.

April 1990
Iraq flight-tests the al-Hussayn missile with a chemical warhead.
--Barbara Starr, "Iraq Reveals a Startling Range of Toxin Agents," Jane's Defense Weekly, Vol. 24, No. 19, 11 November 1995, p. 4.

1 April 1990
In a speech to his senior military commanders, Saddam Hussayn boasts that Iraq has developed a "binary" chemical weapon.
[Note: There is significant debate as to whether this resembled a true binary weapon or something else.]
--Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal" Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James J. Wirtz (Ed.), Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 58.

17 April 1990
In a meeting with a delegation of U.S. senators, Saddam Hussayn says, "If Israel uses atomic bombs, we will strike at it with the binary chemical weapon..."
--Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal" Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James J. Wirtz (Ed.), Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 58.

May 1990
Iraq conducts live firings of 122 mm rockets filled with CW agents.
--Barbara Starr, "Iraq Reveals a Startling Range of Toxin Agents," Jane's Defense Weekly, Vol. 24, No. 19, 11 November 1995, p. 4.

9 August 1990
The Iraqi ambassador to Greece announces that Baghdad would use chemical weapons if it is attacked by the United States or Israel.
--Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal" Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James J. Wirtz (Ed.), Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 67.

18 August 1990
Tariq Aziz says in an interview with an American television network, CBS, that Iraq will not use chemical weapons unless the U.S. uses nuclear weapons against it first.
--"INA Reports 'Aziz Remarks on Chemical Weapons," INA, 18 August 1990, in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-90-161, 20 August 1990.

25 September 1990
In an internal communication between the United States Consulate General in Jidda, Saudi Arabia and the State Department, it is reported that "Iraq had provided the Sudanese government with chemical weapons to use against the rebels in the south."
--"[Excised] Says Saddam Gave Sudan CW Against Rebels," United States Consulate General in Jidda, Saudi Arabia, 25 September 1990.

1991
Iraq claims to have destroyed the major part of its CW technical documentation.
--UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, 25 January 1999, Annex B: Status of Verification of Iraq's Chemical Weapons Programme, <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/990125/dis-chem.htm>

1991
Iraq acknowledges holding 11,000 chemical weapons.
--Agence France-Presse, "Team Was Close to Uncovering Iraqi Nerve Gas, Report Says," USA Today, 3 November 1997.

January 1991
Saddam gives orders to his commanders to launch chemical and biological weapons against enemy capitals and troops if Iraq is attacked by nuclear weapons. The decision is made to not use chemical or biological weapons against coalition troops and civilian populations due to the U.S. threat that, "any use of unconventional arms would provoke a devastating response." This quote was taken to mean nuclear retaliation.
--Anthony Goodman, "Iraq Targeted "Enemy Capitals" is Baghdad in Nuked," Reuters, 21 September 1995.

January 1991
Hussayn Kamil asks the Ministry of Defense to provide 31 trailers to forward-deploy munitions filled at the al-Muthanna State Establishment to the Ikhaidar and Nasiriyah depots in southern Iraq.
--Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal" Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James J. Wirtz (Ed.), Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000), p.70.

3 April 1991
U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), Section C, mandates that Iraq shall unconditionally accept, under international supervision, the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of its weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles with a range over 150 kilometers, and related production facilities and equipment. It also provides for establishment of a system of ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with the ban on these weapons and missiles. It requires Iraq to make a declaration, within 15 days, of the location, amounts and types of all such items.
--UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events, December 1999, <www.un.org/Depts/Chronology/chronology.htm>, Rolf Ekéus, "Chapter 13: The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq," SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament, (U.K.: Oxford University Press) 1992, p. 510.

6 April 1991
Iraq accepts resolution 687.
--UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events, December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.

18 April 1991
Iraq provides its initial declaration under resolution 687. It declares some chemical weapons and materials.
--UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events, December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.

May 1991
The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) is formally established to "carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities, to provide for the elimination of these capabilities and to perform other functions assigned to it in part C of the resolution." UNSCOM relies on several sources of intelligence to conduct its mission. To identify questionable chemical weapons sites, UNSCOM bases its information on Iraqi declarations, outside government's intelligence as well as data based on internal UNSCOM reports.
--Rolf Ekéus, "Chapter 13: The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq," SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 510-512.

16 May 1991
Iraq submits revised declarations to the U.N. These documents cover additional chemical weapons and a refinement of the missile declaration.
--UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events, December 1999, <www.un.org/Depts/Chronology/chronology.htm>

9 June 1991
"UNSCOM commences its first chemical weapons inspection."
[Note: No further details are given with regards to the inspection.]
--UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events, December 1999, <www.un.org/Depts/Chronology/chronology.htm>

End 1991
In late 1991, Iraq claims that it possessed 46,000 chemical-filled munitions. UNSCOM suspects the number is much higher, and by the end of the year Iraqi personnel (under UNSCOM supervision) were made to destroy almost 12,000 of an estimated 75,000 unfilled munitions. According to UNSCOM executive chairman Rolf Ekéus, Iraqi filled munitions included "different types of aerial bombs, artillery rockets and shells."
--Rolf Ekéus, "Chapter 13: The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq," SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 515-516.

1992
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) analysts conclude that information about Iraq's CW program is, at best, uncertain. There are strong doubts with regard to the "quality and quantity" of Iraqi CW agents, whether they were ever mounted on SCUD missiles, and whether missiles are a militarily-effective means of CW delivery. There is some information with regards to suspected CW production facilities. Most of the Iraqi CBW research and development is believed to have been conducted at the Saad 16 complex, at al Kasha and at Salman Pak. According to SIPRI, "CW precursor production was carried out at Baiji, al Fallujah and Musayyib, and CW production took place at Samarra, Badush and possibly al Qaim. A munition filling facility was located 2 km from Samarra, and artillery casing production took place at al Iskandriyah."
--S.J. Lundin and Thomas Stock," Chapter 6: Chemical and biological warfare and arms control developments in 1991," SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 149-150.

19 March 1992
Iraq declares the existence of previously undeclared chemical weapons and associated material. Iraq reveals that most of these undeclared items were unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991, in violation of resolution 687.
--UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events, December 1999, <www.un.org/Depts/Chronology/chronology.htm>

June 1992
Iraq provides the U.N. its first "Full, Final and Compete Disclosure" (FFCD) for its chemical weapons program.
--UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events, December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.

July 1992
UNSCOM begins the destruction of large quantities of Iraq's chemical weapons and production facilities.
--UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events, December 1999, <www.un.org/Depts/Chronology/chronology.htm>

May 1993
Iraq buries banned chemicals and biological material in al-Karkh Cemetery, 25 km from Baghdad. According to Muhammad Ibrahim al-A'zami, a former Iraqi police officer who fled to Germany, the materials are placed inside nine "well-built and tightly sealed coffins" and placed under guard. In February 2001, al-A'zami visited the cemetery and discovered that the nine graves had been leveled and the guards disappeared.
--Mu'idd Fayyad, "Escapee Iraqi Police Officer Reveals Secret of Bogus Funerals. Baghdad's Authorities Buried Chemical and Biological Material," Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 12 March 2001, p. 3, in "Iraqi Escapee Cited on Regime's Concealment of 'Chemical, Biological' Material," FBIS Document GMP20010312000143, 12 March 2001.

May 1993
Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) obtains samples from clothing and sail at Birjinni, where Sarin-containing bombs were allegedly detonated against civilians. Samples (transferred under strict chain of custody guidelines) were able to detect Sarin degradation products, thereby verifying use of Sarin.
--Lois Ember, "Chemical Weapons Residues Verify Iraqi Use on Kurds," Chemical Engineering News,3 Mary 1993, Vol. 71, Issue 18, pp. 8-9.

1994-1995
A CW production facility is shipped to Iraq in 23 shipments under the guise of a pesticide production plant. The Baghdad-based al-Eman Establishment for Trade Investment is used as a front by the Iraqi intelligence service. Some of the shipments "may have transported toxic precursor chemicals."
--Scott Ritter, Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem – Once and for All, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), p.217.

1994-1995
According to Professor Hussayn al-Shahrastani, an Iraqi nuclear scientist Iraq dumps barrels containing biological weapons and banned chemicals in the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers and uses explosions to destroy chemical weapons in isolated wastelands. The purpose of this action was to prevent U.N. inspectors from discovering them.
--Mu'idd Fayyad, "Iraqi Nuclear Scientist Hussein al-Shahrastani: Baghdad Dumped Barrels of 'Chemical' Weapons in the Tigris and Euphrates," Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 26 February 2001, p. 5, in "Scientist Claims Iraq Dumped Chemical, Biological Weapons in Rivers," FBIS Document GMP20010227000063, 26 February 2001.

May 1994
UNSCOM declares that all known Iraqi chemical munitions, agents and precursors have been eliminated.
--Robert Burns, "Iraq-Chemical Weapons," Associated Press, 14 November 1997.

June 1994
UNSCOM completes the destruction of large quantities of chemical warfare agents and precursors and their production equipment.
--UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events, December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.

1995
General Wafiq al-Sammara'i, former head of Iraqi Military Intelligence defects and reveals that President Hussayn is concealing more chemical and biological weapons than was released to U.N. inspectors. This includes a possible "'255 containers' of biological materials- 230 with powder and 25 with liquid."
--Sean Boyne, "Iraq 'Unlikely' to Give Up Nuclear Option", Jane's Intelligence Review, September 1996, p. 6.

March 1995
Iraq provides the U.N. its second "Full, Final and Compete Disclosure" (FFCD) of its chemical weapons program.
--UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events, December 1999, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm>.

Summer 1995 (between June and August)
UNSCOM believes that a number of political prisoners had been transferred from the Abu Ghraib Prison to a secret site in western Iraq, where they were subjected to tests with chemical and biological agents under the supervision of a special unit from the Military Industrial Commission. According to a weapons inspector, there was "credible evidence" that prisoners were taken from the Abu Ghraib to al-Salman.
--Betsy Pisik, "Chemical Arms Tests on Inmates Suspected," Washington Times, 15 January 1998, p. 1, Scott Ritter, Saddam's Trap," New Republic, 21 December 1998, p. 18, "U.N. Looks into Reports That Iraq Used Humans in Weapons Tests," MSNBC, date is not identified, <www.msnbc.com>.

8 August 1995
General Hussayn Kamil, Minister of Industry and Minerals and former Director of Iraq's Military Industrialization Corporation, with responsibility for all of Iraq's weapons programs, leaves Iraq for Jordan. Iraq claims that Hussayn Kamil had hidden from UNSCOM and the IAEA important information on the prohibited weapons programs. Iraq withdraws its third biological "Full, Final and Complete Disclosure" and admits a far more extensive biological warfare program than previously admitted, including weaponization. Iraq provides UNSCOM and the IAEA with large amounts of documentation, hidden on a chicken farm ostensibly by Hussayn Kamil, related to its prohibited weapons programs which subsequently leads to further disclosures by Iraq concerning the production of the nerve agent VX and Iraq's development of a nuclear weapon. Iraq also informs UNSCOM that the deadline to halt its cooperation is withdrawn.
--UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events, December 1999, <www.un.org/Depts/Chronology/chronology.htm>

October 1995
Saddam's son-in-law Hussayn Kamil identifies U.N. envoy's interpreter as an Iraqi spy.
--"Hussein Kamil Identifies 'Spy' at UN," Der Spiegel, DATE, in FBIS Document No. 23 October 1995.

June 1996
Iraq provides third "Full, Final and Complete Disclosure" of its prohibited chemical weapons program. The progress achieved in verifying this disclosure, and subsequent attachments presented by Iraq, is described in the Commission's October 1997 report to the U.N. Security Council.
--UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events, December 1999, <www.un.org/Depts/Chronology/chronology.htm>

1 November 1996
The Washington Times, quoting U.S. intelligence documents that were placed on the Internet, reports that before and during the Gulf War, Iraq hid chemical and biological weapons in Iran using camouflaged trucks. Once in Iranian territory the trucks were turned over to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
--"Iraq Hid Bio Agents in Iran," Washington Times, 1 November 1996.

18 April 1997
Rolf Ekéus addresses the U.N. Security Council, reporting that Iraq is still not cooperating fully with the U.N. to dismantle its programs to produce biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.
--Edith M. Lederer, "Biological Weapons," Associated Press, 24 April 1997.

July 1997
U.S. Customs intercepts a shipment of 34 light, fast, and highly maneuverable military helicopters destined for Iraq. The helicopters were smuggled through Canada via a front company in the Philippines. 16 of helicopters these were modified to disperse chemicals.
--Lori Rozsa, "Plot to Sell Helicopters to Iraq Foiled," Miami Herald, 22 July 1997, Laurie Mylroie, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction and the 1997 Gulf Crisis," MERIA Journal 4, December 1997.

October 1997
UNSCOM completes the destruction of additional, large quantities of chemical weapons related equipment and precursors chemicals. Iraq had previously denied that part of the equipment had been used for CW production. Only in May 1997, on the basis of UNSCOM's investigations, did Iraq admit that some of the equipment had indeed been used in the production of VX.
--UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events, December 1999, <www.un.org/Depts/Chronology/chronology.htm>

11 October 1997
In his first report to the U.N. Security Council since taking office, Richard Butler concludes that Iraq is withholding some data on chemical weapons.
[Note: On 1 July 1997, Richard Butler, formerly Australia's Ambassador to the U.N., succeeded Rolf Ekéus of Sweden as Chair of UNSCOM.]
--Barbara Crossette, "New U.N. Monitor Says Iraq Is Still Hiding Data on Weapons," Christian Science Monitor, 8 October 1997.

27 October 1997
The Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, Richard Butler, sends a letter to Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, suggesting the agenda for forthcoming meetings in Baghdad. The letter proposes that Iraq address important outstanding issues, including warheads, VX and the biological weapons area.
--UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events, December 1999, <www.un.org/Depts/Chronology/chronology.htm>

29 October 1997
Iraq expels six American weapons inspectors working for the U.N.. Their fellow inspectors depart are withdrawn on November 13.
--Richard J. Newman and Kevin Whitelaw, "Saddam Ups the Ante," U.S. News & World Report, 24 November 1997, p. 44, "Could Iraq Spread Death Via Remote Crop Dusters?" Deseret News, 9 November 1997, <http://deseretnews.com/dn>.

November 1997
Iraqi soldiers receive treatment at the Hilla Hospital in southern Baghdad for severe injuries received while moving containers filled with unspecified chemicals out of Baghdad. Doctors treating the soldiers are convinced the injuries were consistent with being exposed to agents used to manufacture chemical weapons.
--Con Coughlin, "Elite Iraqi Troops Treated for Toxins," Washington Times, 16 November 1997, p. A7.

1998
Iraq is further developing its aerial delivery platforms to include remotely piloted vehicles, modified L29 trainers (tandem seat, single engine primary jet trainer), and Polish M-18 Dromader agricultural crop-sprayers. It is asserted that Saddam Hussayn's eldest son, Udai, has developed a front "cloud seeding" program. [Note: cloud seeding is the method of dispersing silver iodide particles into clouds from aircraft, which stimulates rain.]
--Alan George, "New Iraqi Covert Weapons Projects Discovered", The Middle East, January 1999, p. 11., Damian Kemp, "Iraq's UAVs Will Advance 'Anthrax Air Force'", Jane's Defense Weekly, 6 January, 1999, p.3.

January 1998
Saddam Hussayn calls for a freeze on all weapons inspections.
--Barbara Crossette, "Iraq Orders Freeze on Arms Inspections," New York Times, 22 January 1998.

January 1998
UNSCOM investigates suspicions that Iraq had tested chemical and biological weapons on prisoners. Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi deputy Prime Minister, calls the allegation "a sheer lie." He says, "it is a pretext used to enter a site." No conclusive evidence has been found concerning the prisoner issue.
--Laura Silber, "Iraq Suspected of Testing Weapons on Prisoners," Financial Times, 15 January 1998, p. 14, Hugh Davies, "Iraqis May Have Tested Weapons on Humans," Daily Telegraph, 15 January 1998, Betsy Pisik, "Chemical Arms Tests on Inmates Suspected," Washington Times, 15 January 1998, p.1, "Iraq Denies Using Humans in Biological Weapons Tests," CNN, 14 January 1998.

February 1998
At the request of the Iraqi government, experts hold technical evaluation meetings (TEMS) in Baghdad to assess Iraqi claims to have eliminated all its chemical arms and ballistic missile warheads. Two panels of experts from nine countries conclude that Iraq could have a clandestine stockpile of chemical weapons and has not met the requirements for disclosing all information on its weapons of mass destruction.
--Jeffrey Smith, "2 Panels Reject Iraqi Claims on Arms After Hearings in Baghdad, Experts Call Data Unreliable," Washington Post, 20 February 1998, p. A19, UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events, December 1999, <www.un.org/Depts/Chronology/chronology.htm>

9 February 1998
Britain's Defence Secretary George Robertson tells MPs that Iraq has built up stocks of the nerve agent "Agent 15".
[Note: Agent 15 is thought to be an analogue of BZ, an incapacitating agent.]
--Philip Webster, "Saddam 'Has Big Stockpile of Agent 15 Nerve Gas'", London Times, 10 February 1998, p. 1.

26 March 1998
A 70-member team of U.N. weapons inspectors, accompanied by 20 diplomats, conducts the first inspection of eight palaces of Saddam Hussayn at Radwaniyah Palace. No inspections have previously been permitted at these sites. Each of the 1,058 buildings inside Hussien's eight presidential compounds are inspected in eight days, but no new evidence of banned materials is found.
--Vijay Joshi, "U.N. Search of 8 Iraqi Palace Sites Turns Up Mostly Unfurnished Rooms," Washington Times, 4 April 1998, p. A6, Leon Barkho, "Inspectors Find Nothing at Saddam's Palaces," Washington Times, 5 April 1998, p. A9, "Touring Iraq's Presidential Sites," New York Times, 30 March 1996, Vijay Joshi, "U.N. Team Inspects Saddam Compound," Washington Times, 27 March 1998, p. A15, Barbara Crossette, "Inspection of 8 Presidential Sites Starts Today, U.N. tells Iraq," New York Times, 26 March 1999, p. A9, "U.N. Teams Find Nothing at Iraqi Sites," New York Times, 4 April 1998, p. A4.

April 1998
An Iraqi opposition group states that Iraq is hiding chemical and biological weapons in farms located 30 km outside of Baghdad. Reportedly, the weapons are hidden underground in order to escape satellites and ground penetrating radar.
--"Opposition Groups Claim Iraq Hiding Weapons in Farms," Pointer 5(4), April 1998, p.7.

29 April 1998
Richard Butler says today that experts discovered active mustard agent the prior month in artillery shells found at an Iraqi ammunitions depot in 1996.
--Barbara Crossette, "U.N. Experts Report Finding Mustard in Iraqi Shells," New York Times, 29 April 1998, p. A10.

April-May 1998
U.N. weapons inspectors excavate warhead fragments from a weapons dump in Nibai, the site where Iraq claimed it unilaterally destroyed its missiles and send the recovered munition pieces to a U.S. Army laboratory at Aberdeen, Maryland for analysis. The purpose is "to verify Iraq's declarations on the filling of the special warheads."
--United Nations, UNSCOM Report to the Security Council, s/1998/920 (1998), 6 October 1998, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/>, Christopher S. Wren, "Lab Reports of Iraq Poison Bolster Case for Sanction," New York Times, 24 June 1998, p.9.

10 June 1998
U.S. Army laboratory at Aberdeen completes an analysis of warhead fragments recovered from a destruction pit at al-Taji in March. According to the analysis, "significant amounts" of "VX disulfide...and stabilizer" were found in the samples.
--John M. Goshko, "Iraqi Nerve Gas Tests Confirmed," Washington Post, 25 June 1998, p.A30.

June-July 1998
"VX disulfide...and stabilizer" are discovered on Iraqi missile warhead fragments. Chemical tests are performed at the U.S. Army's Aberdeen Proving Ground lab in Maryland on missile fragments recovered from Al-Nibai, the site where Iraq unilaterally claimed to destroy and bury its special warheads in 1991. While Iraq admitted producing VX, weaponization was denied. Following these reports, Iraq's U.N. Ambassador Nizar Hamdun denies the accusation, suggesting inherent flaws in the U.S. tests, and demands more tests at labs in different countries. Iraq's U.N. mission says in a statement that the results "cannot be accurate since VX was not used in any kind of munitions in Iraq due to continuous production failure." Although Richard Butler describes the original findings as "utterly unambiguous," the U.N. agrees to send the parts to laboratories in France and Switzerland for further testing.
[Note: The tests at Aberdeen were conducted specifically at Edgewood Chemical Biological Forensic Analytical Center]
--Betsy Pisik, "U.S. Verifies Iraqi Weapons Violations," Washington Times, 24 June 1998; Christopher S. Wren, "Evidence Revealed of Iraqi Warhead Loaded With Nerve Gas," New York Times, 24 June 1998, p. A8; "Iraq Wants Nerve Gas Tests Repeated," CNN, 27 June 1998; "U.N. Experts Check for VX Gas," Washington Times, 14 July 1998, p. 17; "Iraqi Missile Parts Will be Tested For VX in France and Switzerland," Wall Street Journal, Interactive edition, 11 July 1998; Christopher S. Wren, "Iraq Making Chemical Weapons, U.N. Official Says," New York Times, 25 June 1998, p. A8; "U.N. Hears Evidence of Iraqi Nerve Gas Weapons," CNN, 24 June 1998; Christopher S. Wren, "Lab Reports of Iraq Poison Bolster Case for Sanction," New York Times, 24 June 1998, p. 9; Christopher S. Wren, "U.N. Arms Inspector Firm on Iraq Nerve Gas but Accepts New Tests," New York Times, 25 June 1998, p. A10; John M. Goshko, "Iraqi Nerve Gas Tests Confirmed," Washington Post, 25 June 1998, p. A30.

June-July 1998
UNSCOM collects additional samples from other missile warhead remnants in order to collect more data on the filling of the warheads. Samples are sent to laboratories in the U.S., France and Switzerland.
--United Nations, UNSCOM report to the Security Council, s/1998/920 (1998), 6 October 1998, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/>.

July 1998
General Wafiq al-Sammarai, former head of Iraqi Military Intelligence, tells the Independent newspaper that Iraq used VX against Iranians during the Iran-Iraq war. According to al-Sammarai Iraqi engineers aided by German scientists succeeded in producing VX in late 1987, which was stored at al-Tharthar, a facility northwest of Baghdad.
--Patrick Cockburn, "Iraq Used Deadly Gas on Iranians," Independent, 3 July 1998, "Iraq Reportedly Used VX Gas in Iran-Iraq War," CNN, 3 July 1998.

10-15 July 1998
At Iraq's request, UNSCOM holds an international expert meeting in Baghdad regarding the results of the tests in the U.S. laboratory. Iraq continues to insist that VX has never been weaponized.
--United Nations, UNSCOM report to the Security Council, s/1998/920 (1998), 6 October 1998, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/>.

5 August 1998
Iraq officially suspends all inspections by UNSCOM.

29 September 1998
The Washington Post reports that tests preformed in Swiss and French laboratories on Iraqi missile warheads have found no evidence of VX.
--John M. Goshko, "New Tests of Iraqi Warheads Don't Find Nerve Gas," Washington Post, 29 September 1998, p. A12.

7-8 October 1998
According to weapons experts and diplomats, tests preformed in French laboratories on Iraqi missile warheads appear to have found traces of chemicals related to VX. According to diplomats, France is delaying the disclosure of the information.
--Evelyn Leopold, "French Find VX-Linked Chemical on Iraqi Weapons," Washington Times, 8 October 1998, p.A19, Barbara Crossette, "France Detects Iraqi Nerve Gas, Experts Assert," New York Times, 7 October 1998, p. A13.

26 October 1998
Both U.S. and French scientists confirm that samples taken from an Iraqi weapons demolition site near Nabai show traces of VX agents. This is a challenge to the declarations made by Iraq that it had never filled these warheads with agents.
--Michael Littlejohns, "Scientists Confirm Traces of Deadly Iraqi Nerve Gas," Financial Times, 27 October 1998, p. 2.

26 October 1998
A U.N. report, prepared by an international panel of arms experts and submitted to the Security Council, confirms that fragments of shells uncovered at a weapons demolition site in Iraq had traces of the nerve agent VX. In an accompanying letter, Richard Butler noted that "the existence of VX degradation products conflicts with Iraqi declaration that the unilaterally destroyed special warheads had never been filled with chemical warfare agents." According to the report, the second sets of test performed at U.S. labs found no chemical warfare products. In the third series, the Swiss laboratory found nothing and the French laboratory detected the presence of a decomposing nerve agent product in one sample.
--John M. Goshko, "Tests Don't Back Iraq's Denials," Washington Post, 27 October 1998, p.A17, Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Panel Studying Iraq Missiles Is of 2 Minds on Nerve Gas," New York Times, 27 October 1998, p. A12.

June 1999
According to an unconfirmed report cited by Foreign Report, twelve senior Iraqi chemical weapons scientists arrive in Sudan to check the quality and conditions of storage of Iraqi CW arsenal hidden in Sudan. According to the report, the CW materials were smuggled from Iraq to Sudan in recent years in order to prevent UNSCOM from detecting and destroying it. Yugoslav equipment for early warning and protection is used.
--"Foreign Report: Transport of Iraqi CW From Sudan Planned," Foreign Report, 5 October 1999, in FBIS Document FTS19991006001559, 5 October 1999.

August 1999
Saddam Hussayn deploys troops wearing gas masks and special white uniforms, designed as personal protection equipment against chemical weapons, around Najaf. Following the deployment, fears rise that the government will use chemical weapons in case of local uprising.
--Patrick Cockburn, "Iraq: Iraq Villagers Braced for Germ Attack," Independent, 4 August 1999, p.16.

25 October 1999
U.S. News & World Report reports that intelligence sources are concerned about the presence of two Russians at a pesticide plant in the al-Saklawiyah region in the western al-Anbar province in Iraq. The Russians, who identify themselves as civilian agricultural advisers, are reportedly former subordinates of retired Gen. Anatoly Kuntsevich, the former deputy commander of the Russian Army Chemical Corps, and are experts in third generation nerve agents, "the Novichoks".
--Richard Z. Chesnoff with Douglas Pasternak, "A Mystery At a Pesticide Plant," U.S. News & World Report, 25 October 1999, p. 42.

September 1999
U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control, John Holum, reports that, "since the end of the Gulf War, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of its chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial use."
--John D. Holum, "The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Challenges and Responses," USIA Electronic Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2, September 1999.

17 December 1999
The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1284, which replaces UNSCOM with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).