Well before Iraq attempted to extend the range of its Scud-B/8K-14 missiles, Baghdad entered into a series of agreements with the government of Egypt—and thereafter with companies headquartered in Austria and Switzerland—to procure the two-stage Badr-2000 missile, and to provide the technological infrastructure to build the missile indigenously. The story of the Badr program is exceedingly complicated, as it involves design and development work undertaken by a European consortium in Argentina, followed by Egyptian and Iraqi participation in the work. Space constraints limit a complete rendering of this story, but it is important to note two consistent declarations from Iraqis about the Badr program: first, that they were always unclear as to the specific design of the missile's second stage (thought they knew it would be a liquid stage) and, second, that the strategic objective of the program was to create an infrastructure for solid propellant motor manufacturing.

The Badr-2000 has its roots in the Argentine Condor missile and the European contractors responsible for both the missile's design and the supply of facilities and equipment. (See the Argentina Missile Profile for more details). The Consen Group of 16 companies—with registries in Argentina, Austria, Germany, Monaco, and Switzerland—effectively initiated and managed the entire missile project. Consen was itself an outgrowth of a Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blöhm subsidiary.

The date and circumstances surrounding Iraq's initial involvement in the project remain unclear, despite considerable attempts on the part of UN inspectors to obtain a complete picture of events. What is known is that on 15 February 1984, Egypt signed a contract with IFAT—a Swiss-based, Consen subsidiary established in August 1983—for its part in the Condor project. Shortly thereafter, on 21 February 1984, Iraq in turn signed a contract with Egypt for the Iraqi system, known in that contract as the Badr-2000. Clearly, then, negotiations and discussions must have begun in 1983, at the very latest.

The Egyptian-Iraqi contract, valued at nearly $1 billion ($1.76 billion in 2003 dollars), called for several items, including delivery of:

• Complete missiles and high-explosive warheads;
• Mobile twin launchers, fire control systems, and related support vehicles and equipment;
• Training for maintenance, operation, and testing of the missiles;
• Final assembly and testing equipment;
• Equipment for first-stage, solid motor production; and
• Fuel-air and sub-munition warheads (if and when available).

Responsible Iraqi officials stated that, at the start of the discussions with Egypt, they were under the impression that the design and missile project itself was much further along than was actually the case. However, it soon became clear that the system was still in the research and development phase.

The missile had a diameter of 0.8m with a 10m length (which varied according to the version). Range was stated as 620-750km, with a payload of 320kg and a warhead weight of 175kg. The CEP for the system was expected to be 1 percent of range initially, followed by 0.1 percent of range in the final version.

Three amendments followed this initial contract. The first, in July 1985, fixed certain provisional prices in the original contract (based on new prices provided by the supplier) and changed the launcher section to include supply of 12 single launchers rather than 6 dual launchers. The second amendment, agreed to in October 1985, changed some of the equipment deliveries. Around this time, it appears that the suppliers (MBB/Consen) began to have or anticipate difficulties in deliveries. These amendments may have reflected these difficulties.

Still a third amendment was made to the contract in January 1987. This amendment decreased the number of missiles and launchers in order to make room in the overall contract price for the Sakr-200 project.

As indicated in the terms of the original contract, equipment for testing and manufacture began to flow via Egypt to Iraq in August 1985.

In the fall of 1987, the Technical Corps for Special Projects directed Al-Fao State Establishment to begin construction on three solid motor-related facilities.

The Swiss-registered Conchem—a Consen subsidiary—supervised civil construction work, with payments going directly from Iraq to the company (rather than through Egypt).

Iraq states that around the fall of 1987, Egypt was clearly having difficulties supplying equipment and other materials as per the 1985 contract, owing perhaps to difficulties the Consen group itself was having. This is reinforced by the fact that at this same time, Abdelkader Helmy—acting at the behest of Egyptian government officials—began a sustained effort to purchase materials and technology for the project in the United States. By the summer of 1988, Egypt had halted all equipment deliveries and, at the beginning of 1989, the relationship was officially terminated by Iraq.

Despite the setback with Egypt, Iraq continued to pursue the project. In late 1988, it began to contract directly with Conchem and its Austrian partner Taurus—as well as with other firms in Europe and Asia—for missing equipment, materials, technological documentation, and training.

By 1989, civil construction and equipment installation had progressed far enough such that the Military Industrialization Commission (MIC) officially established the Bulat Al Shuhada' Factory, which was comprised of its headquarters and associated plants.

Throughout that year, civil construction at the various sites was completed and available equipment (both through Egypt and elsewhere) was installed and certified. Given the lack of external support for missile design and development, MIC and Bulat Al Shuhada' contacted Iraq's missile establishments to determine their ability to produce the second stage engine, launchers, guidance and control system, and warheads; the designator "Salam" was used for the missile in these internal communications, as "Badr" was the name for the Egypt-Iraq cooperative missile. In any event, the various establishments stated they were not in a position to assist.

During 1990, Iraqi engineers continued with electrical and equipment installation and they were ultimately able to operate some of the facilities on "cold" runs (non-production). In the middle of 1990, the Taurus company terminated its contracts and withdrew from Iraq.

All Balat Al Shuhada' facilities were bombed heavily during Desert Storm, and considerable equipment was damaged or destroyed. UNSCOM inspectors later destroyed or rendered harmless specific-purpose equipment at the sites.

Thus, despite some six years of efforts, and significant outlays of resources, the Badr program had not produced a single solid-propellant motor, let alone a complete missile. The price tag for this work, including transfers from Egypt, construction of the various facilities, and equipment imports from around the world: approximately $400 million.

	Updated October 2003