Iraqi authorities have stated that domestic production of missiles was always a strategic goal of the missile program. Thus, they contend, as Project 144 began its work to modify Scud missiles into the Al-Hussein version, it was tasked at the same time with indigenously manufacturing the system. It should be noted that some information indicates that Iraq actually began its attempts to reverse-engineer missiles (Scuds) well before Project 144 was formed in 1987.

Engine Reverse-Engineering

While the goal was naturally to build the entire missile, considerable efforts focused on the attempt to reverse-engineer and produce the Scud's liquid propellant engine (LPE), especially during the first phases of the undertaking. Iraq declared that Project 144/3—the workshop assigned with engine matters under the Scud modification/Al-Hussein project—was assigned a temporary site at Nasser State Establishment to begin reverse-engineering in August 1987. Initially, the Iraqi military provided two Scud engines for study; these were supplemented in the following months by several training engines and one sectioned engine. The LPEs were dismantled to produce, among other objectives, design diagrams, undertake materials testing, and to study possible production processes. Engineers also began to query foreign suppliers for the machine tools and other technologies required for engine manufacture.

By the end of 1987, most engine design drawings were complete and a draft production plan had been adopted. The Iraqis recognized that establishing a production base and a repeatable production process would take a considerable amount of time. Therefore, along with a procurement agenda for the technology infrastructure, engineers also pursued a parallel strategy of procuring a large number of components/assemblies that could not, in their view, be readily mastered in Iraq.

With metal-working set to begin in late 1987, the project relocated from Nasser to a site in the Ameriyah district, where work began on an LPE production plant (this location was later called "Al-Rafah" site). At this point, the once small workshop formed under the Scud modification program became a project of its own, given the name Project 1728.

In December 1987, Fao State Establishment began civil construction and, four months later, most of the buildings and utility hook-ups were complete. Machinery and equipment were installed in May 1988. However, engineers discovered that dusty conditions in Ameriyah prevented proper functioning of some of this equipment and, by the end of 1988, the enterprise was again re-located, this time to a site at the Taji camp. It should be stressed, however, that certain Project 1728 functions remained at the Rafah site, including what was considered at the time to be a "temporary" static test facility, as well as a variety of other metal-working activities. Later in the process, Project 1728 took the name "Al-Mutawakel" project.

Despite all of the moves and associated work disruptions, Project 1728 engineers continued to pursue their reverse-engineering objective. Remarkably, the first sample combustion chamber was produced in mid-1989 and in August, this Iraqi-produced chamber was tested with a Soviet turbo pump. From that point through January 1991, Project 1728 conducted some 20 static tests, using different engine configurations and several different burn times. Iraq also conducted four flight-tests: these engines comprised domestically-produced combustion chamber/nozzle assemblies and foreign-produced turbo pumps and other parts. The tests, beginning in May 1990 and continuing through the rest of the year, were all failures except for a successful 62-second test in December 1990.

Engine Production Plans

Iraq's engine production plans went through a variety of iterations, depending on variants such as experience, availability of imported components and materials. At the beginning of 1988, Hussein Kamil instructed Project 1728 to produce 1000 engines, but it was soon realized that this could not be achieved in a short time frame. Nevertheless, and as noted above, procurement of sub-systems and parts—turbo pumps, valves, corrugated rings, reducers, injectors, squibs—proceeded with the 1000 figure in mind. Meanwhile, engineers took a step-by-step approach in their indigenous production plans starting with, for example, the production of 10 sets of combustion chambers.

The last of some six production plans (before Desert Storm) called for the manufacture of 250 sets of indigenous assemblies and parts. These would then be combined with imported components for final engine assembly. The thinking at the time was that, ultimately, Iraq could have a material base to support production of 250 LPE per year. By January 1991, Iraq had produced about 80 chamber/nozzle assemblies with about 20 percent of these considered "acceptable" by engineers in terms of performance characteristics.

There are still a number of open questions about the progress of Iraqi work on the Scud engine. From their own declarations, however, it appears that several summary notes might be made based on currently available information:

• Iraq was never able to produce a completely indigenous engine.
• Even those combustion chambers that were "accepted" performed consistently below original Soviet models.
• A very large percentage of assemblies and components for the engine were imported.

Other Project 1728 Tasks

Like many other missile teams in Iraq, Project 1728 was tasked to work on a variety of other subjects that did not appear germane to the complicated, priority matters that engineers were struggling with. A few illustrative examples demonstrate the tremendous project workload:

In late 1998, MIC Director Hussein Kamil ordered Project 1728 to reverse-engineer the HY-2 engine. Design drawings were completed at the end of 1989, but no production plan was ever adopted.

In June 1989, again in the midst of the attempt to produce the Scud engine, MIC also ordered the project to produce the first stage of the Volga/SA-2 air defense missile. Iraq approached one country for what was effectively a "turn-key" production capability, but the offer was rejected as being too costly. Some design work was done, and procurement of components made (injectors, castings, etc.) but the Volga work always remained a second priority and was never completed before Desert Storm.

Additional projects included the attempt to design and manufacture the Scud inertial instruments (in competition with Project 144/4); efforts to design and manufacture a 30-ton thrust engine; and design work on a turbo-pump design for four Scud combustion chambers.

	Updated October 2003