This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.
Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.
Early 1980
The Swedish company Brown Boveri, a major magnet supplier to the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), is contracted to assist in the design of a calutron magnet under the guise of a peaceful research project.
—"Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz," <http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Iraq/IraqAtoZ.html>; Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (Scribner: New York: Scribner, 2000), pp. 133-134.
1980
Iraq places an order for 11,364kg of depleted-uranium metal fuel pins from the West German company NUKEM. The pins are already fabricated into irradiation pins sized for the Osirak reactor and could be irradiated to yield plutonium. The 11 metric tons of target material are enough to produce 11kg of plutonium after 150 days of irradiation in the Osirak reactor. The deal is aborted when NUKEM subcontractors in the United States and Canada are told that export licenses would not be issued for the material.
—"Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz," <http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Iraq/IraqAtoZ.html>; Frank Barnaby, How Nuclear Weapons Spread (Routledge, 1993), p. 91; Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p. 187.
1980
Brazil begins clandestinely providing Iraq with nuclear assistance. The effort begins with photogrammetry and prospecting work to locate uranium ore, and culminates in a five-year industrial project to supply a facility for converting yellowcake into uranium dioxide (UO2).
—Mark Hibbs, "Collor Moving To End Influence of Military in Nuclear Program," Nucleonics Week, 4 October 1990, pp. 6-7; Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb; the Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East (New York, NY: Times Books, 1981), p. 272.
1980
The French, nervous about the significant quantities of HEU that will be provided to Iraq under the Osirak deal, attempt to amend the contract by providing a reactor which utilizes a lower enriched uranium fuel known as "caramel" fuel (enriched to 8 percent). Iraq refuses the proliferation-resistant reactor but is willing to settle for any kind of reactor which utilizes HEU. [Note: Many analysts point to this as a clear indication of Iraq's intent to use the fuel for a nuclear weapons effort. Other analysts conclude that the fact the reactor is being built above ground proves that it is intended for peaceful purposes—although Israel's Dimona reactor is also built above ground.]
—"Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz," <http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Iraq/IraqAtoZ.html>; Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (Scribner: New York: Scribner, 2000), p. 133.
13 June 1980
Yehia al-Meshad, an Egyptian nuclear scientist working on Iraq's nuclear program, is murdered in a French hotel room. Al-Meshad is sent to Paris in order to resist French attempts at amending the Osirak contract to provide LEU proliferation-resistant-type reactors. It is widely presumed that the Israeli intelligence service, the Mossad, is responsible for the murder.
—"Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz," <http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Iraq/IraqAtoZ.html>; Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (Scribner: New York: Scribner, 2000), pp. 133-134.
20 June 1980
Iraq procures its first batch of yellowcake from Portugal—429 drums containing 138,098kg.
—Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996), S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, pp. 25-26, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>; Fact Sheet: Iraq's Nuclear Weapon Programme, IAEA Action Team, <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/nwp2.html>.
September 1980
Iran attempts an air raid on the Osirak reactor using F4 Phantom jets. The poorly trained Iranian pilots miss their target and no damage is inflicted on the reactor or its surrounding facilities.
—Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York, NY: Scribner Press, 2000), pp. 22, 128; "Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz," <http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Iraq/IraqAtoZ.html>.
8 February 1981
Niger ships yellowcake to Iraq in two batches. Batch one, which consists of 432 drums and 137,435kg of yellowcake, is received.
—Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996), S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, pp. 25-26, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>; Fact Sheet: Iraq's Nuclear Weapon Programme, IAEA Action Team, <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/nwp2.html>.
7 June 1981
Fourteen Israeli jets destroy the 70MWth Tammuz-1 (Osirak) research reactor located near Baghdad in a bombing mission known as Operation Babylon. The attack lasts 80 seconds and a total of 13 bombs are dropped. The smaller Tammuz-2 (Isis) reactor, the 600kwth critical assembly unit, and associated reprocessing laboratories escape damage. It also appears that the Israeli jets specifically target a 100 foot-long tunnel that runs between the Osirak reactor and a large laboratory believing the tunnel houses sensitive experiments crucial to the Iraqi nuclear effort. Approximately 8 or 9 men are killed in the attack, including a French technician. [Note: Although the Osirak reactor was loaded with fuel in September 1980, it was removed during the Iraq-Iran War and no nuclear fuel was found to be in the reactor when it was bombed. Israel bombed the reactor at this time in order to "avoid radiological contamination to residents in the area" believing that the core of the reactor would be supplied with nuclear fuel as early as 1 July.]
—"France Mulls Next Move in Wake of Israel Attack on Iraqi Reactor," Nucleonics Week, 11 June 1981, p. 1; cited in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superpowers in a Fragmented World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 275; Trudy Rubin, "That Israeli Raid on the Iraqi Reactor: The Facts – and Deeper Issues," Christian Science Monitor, 24 June 1981; cited in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
Week of 8 June 1981
The IAEA board of governors vote 29-2 to "strongly condemn" Israel for its "premeditated and unjustified attack on the Iraqi Nuclear Research Center, which is covered by agency safeguards," and suggests that IAEA members consider suspending Israel's membership in the organization.
—"Damage to Iraqi Reactor Still Unknown as Controversy Continues," Nucleonics Week, 18 June 1981, p. 2; cited in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
11 June 1981
French Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy calls the 7 June Israeli attack "a grave act that the French government judges unacceptable." The French government does not react immediately to the attack because it wants to discuss the issue in a high-level meeting with French President Francois Mitterand and his ministers.
—"France Mulls Next Move in Wake of Israel Attack on Iraqi Reactor," Nucleonics Week, 11 June 1981, p. 1; cited in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
18 June 1981
The Israeli government states that it based its 7 June attack in part on information supplied by US intelligence and that a "highly reliable resources," led them to conclude that the "Tammuz tunnel" located 13 feet under the surface housed a "secret chamber" containing equipment capable of processing plutonium and U-235 suitable for the fabrication of nuclear warheads.
—"Damage to Iraqi Reactor Still Unknown as Controversy Continues," Nucleonics Week, 18 June 1981, p. 2; cited in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
18 June 1981
Senator Alan Cranston (D-California) speaks to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the Israeli attack on the Iraqi research reactor. While citing documents from the IAEA, he claims that Iraq could have produced enough plutonium each year in the Osirak reactor to build a maximum of three nuclear weapons, and that IAEA inspectors would not have been able to detect the plutonium production. He asserts that plutonium production could go undetected because Iraq's IAEA agreement calls for three inspections per year. Thus, he says, "Iraq could load its reactor between inspections, but unload it before each pre-announced inspection."
—Sandy Cannon, "U.S. at Odds over Need for Osirak Strike," Nuclear Fuel, 22 June 1981; cited in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
19 June 1981
Former IAEA safeguards inspector Roger Richter testifies before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee stating that Iraq's intent to develop nuclear weapons is "obvious" and IAEA safeguards, as currently constituted, are "totally incapable of detecting the production of plutonium."
—Marsha McGraw, "No More Safeguards," Christian Science Monitor, 14 July 1981; cited in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
Week of 24 June 1981
Sources in the French nuclear industry insist that Iraq would not have been able to produce weapons-grade uranium or plutonium because of the nature of the reactor and the possibility of detection by on-site French technicians and IAEA inspectors. They disregard the Israeli government's concern that the "Tammuz tunnel" could breed plutonium through the use of a uranium blanket, and claim instead that plutonium production would be slow in the underground facility and would be detectable by IAEA inspectors.
—"France Sees Obligation to Supply Iraq with New Reactor," Nucleonics Week, 25 June 1981, p. 1; cited in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
24 June 1981
In a recorded speech broadcast on Iraqi radio on 24 June 1981, President Saddam Hussein declares, "Regardless of Iraq's intentions and capabilities at present and in the future, any country in the world that seeks peace and security, respects people, and does not wish those people to fall under the hegemony or the oppression of external foreign forces should assist the Arabs in one way or another to obtain the nuclear bomb in order to confront Israel's existing bombs. This will realize and achieve peace regardless of Arab aims and capabilities. No power can stop Iraq from acquiring technological and scientific know-how to serve its national objectives."
—"Iraq Asserts Arabs Must Acquire Atoms Arms as a Balance to Israel," New York Times, 24 June 1981.
26 June 1981
French External Relations Minister Claude Cheysson says that nuclear cooperation with Iraq would resume contingent upon tougher safeguards.
—"Nuclear Supplies to Iraq Dependent on Tougher Sanctions, France Asserts," Nucleonics Week, 2 July 1981, p. 1; cited in
<http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
Week of 29 June 1981
In an interview with Nucleonics Week, Comitato Nazionale per L'Energia Nucleare (CNEN) President Umberto Colombo responds to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's statement mobilizing support for an Arab nuclear weapon saying, "If this statement is confirmed, I would recommend that Italy disassociate itself entirely from any further nuclear cooperation with Iraq."
—"Reacting to a Statement Attributed to Iraq President Saddam Hussein," Nucleonics Week, 9 July 1981, p. 3; cited in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
Early July 1981
IAEA inspectors attempt to inspect the Iraqi Osirak complex, but are unable to reach critical areas of the complex because of unexploded bombs and damaged radioactive resources.
—"An IAEA Inspection of the Iraqi Nuclear Complex ‘Revealed No Compliance," Nucleonics Week, 26 November 1981, p. 3; cited in
<http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
19 July 1981
Saddam Hussein says that Iraq would build its next nuclear reactor underground and it could consist of "five, indeed 10, nuclear reactors if our possibilities permit it."
—"Iraq Will Soon Ask France Officially to Rebuild Its Destroyed Nuclear," Nucleonics Week, 23 July 1981, p. 5; cited in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
August 1981
Iraq receives 7,914kg of UO2 (in 120 drums) from Brazil.
—Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996), S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, pp. 25-26, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>.
17 August 1981
French President Francois Mitterand and Iraqi Vice Prime Minister Tariq Aziz meet in Paris in the first direct contact since the Israeli bomb raid to discuss conditions under which France would rebuild the destroyed Osirak reactor.
—"France Has Told Iraq it is Fully Willing to Rebuild," Nucleonics Week, 27 August 1981, p. 2.
Fall 1981
With the Osiraq reactor destroyed, Iraqi physicist Humama al-Ghafour suggests enriching uranium using centrifuge technology as an alternative to the plutonium route. [Note: Hamza is initially against this idea because it would require sophisticated foreign technology, the acquisition of which risked exposure of the program.]
—Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 130.
September 1981
Jaffar is released from prison after two years of detention and quickly returns to work on Iraq's nuclear weapon program. He subsequently decides on two routes for uranium enrichment for the Iraqi nuclear weapon program. He would work on electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) and with some help from Hamza, a gaseous diffusion route as well. Hamza would be responsible for the overall bomb design. [Hamza surmises that Jaffar has decided on this strategy to cull favor with Saddam Hussein by demonstrating that he was "pulling out all the stops" in pursuit of a workable bomb. The team assesses that EMIS is the preferable route and gaseous diffusion will be the secondary opetion to produce LEU as feedstock for EMIS. If EMIS was unsuccessful, the gaseous diffusion facility would be expanded to produce HEU directly. Jaffar's preference for EMIS also owed to his training in high energy physics.]
—Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York: Scribner Press, 2000), pp. 138-139; "EMIS Procurement," ISIS,
<http://www.exportcontrols.org>.
Late 1981
Iraq finalizes its strategy for acquiring weapons-grade nuclear material. Using EMIS as the primary technology, Iraq would develop industrial-scale plants with a production capacity of 15kg per year of 93 percent HEU, based initially on natural uranium feed. Gaseous diffusion would be the subsidiary technology with the objective of building a plant to produce 5 metric tons per year of LEU to be used as feed material for the EMIS plant. The EMIS development program is organized into three phases with the first phase concentrating on research and development activities using "R40" magnet/separation chambers. Phase one is established in Tuwaitha. It involves the construction and operation of an electromagnet (Project 101) and two different magnet/separator systems (Projects 102 and 103).
—"Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996)," S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, p. 35, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>.
9 November 1981
The IAEA issues a statement saying that is has been "informed by the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission that after the removal of bombs and of partially damaged radioactive resources from the Tamuz reactor building, it is now more safe to approach the building and that they are prepared to receive IAEA inspectors at any time."
—"An IAEA Inspection of the Iraqi Nuclear Complex ‘Revealed No Compliance," Nucleonics Week, 26 November 1981, p. 3; cited in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
15-17 November 1981
IAEA safeguards inspectors G. Rabot and V. Seleznev tour the bombed facilities of the Tuwaitha complex. They establish an inventory of 39 fuel assemblies of French origin containing about 12.5kg of highly enriched uranium, and inspect the presence of fuel assemblies of the small research reactor (IRT-200).
—"An IAEA Inspection of the Iraqi Nuclear Complex ‘Revealed No Compliance," Nucleonics Week, 26 November 1981, p. 3.
3 December 1981
A Congressional Research Service report for the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Arms Control indicates that Iraq is dependent upon outside help for its nuclear program, including: Brazil, for nuclear technology and training; Italy, for hot cell insulation units of the nuclear reactor; and Portugal for the supply of uranium (120 tons in 1980).
—David K. Willis, "How South Africa and Israel are Maneuvering for the Bomb," Christian Science Monitor, 3 December 1981, p. 14; cited in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
1982
Iraq creates the new Office of Studies and Development (OSD, later renamed PC-3) to pursue secret uranium enrichment and weapons activities, appointing Jaffar Dhia Jaffar as its head. Jaffar, motivated by his extensive experience working on accelerators in Europe, recommends that Iraq pursue an EMIS program as its primary means of enriching uranium. This decision leads to a major expansion of Tuwaitha.
—David Albright, Corey Gay, and Khidhir Hamza, "Development of the Al-Tuwaitha Site: What If the Public or the IAEA had Overhead Imagery?" Institute for Science and International Security, 26 April 1999, <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/tuwaitha.html>; David Albright, Kate Buehler, and Corey Hinderstien, "Roadmap to Responsible Export Controls: Learning from the Past" Institute for Science and International Security, 2003, <http://www.exportcontrols.org/print/emisprocurement.html>.
1982
Phase one of the EMIS development program begins at Tuwaitha. It involves the construction and operation of an electromagnet (Project 101) and two different magnet/separator systems (Projects 102 and 103).
—"Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996)," S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, p. 35, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>.
1982
Iraq begins exploratory work on gaseous diffusion technology.
—"Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996)," S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, p. 36, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>.
1982
Iraq begins efforts to produce U-235 through EMIS at the Tuwaitha facility. Iraq builds the first separator unit (with a 400mm radius of beam curvature) to test its concept for the unit's insulator and liner. [Iraq would subsequently use larger units to test larger ion sources, multiple ion sources and a hexagonal liner design, as well as concepts for the control system and collectors. According to Iraq's declarations to UN inspectors, it managed to produce 640 grams of enriched uranium with an average enrichment of 7.2 percent at Tuwaitha and some 685 grams at an average enrichment of 3 percent at Al Tarmiya.]
—"WMD Profiles: Nuclear," Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Iraq Watch, <http://www.iraqwatch.org/wmd/nuclear.html>.
1982
Iraq begins exploratory work on gaseous diffusion technology.
—Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996), S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, pp. 36-37, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>.
1982
Research and development begins on UCl4 production at Tuwaitha. [Laboratory-scale projects continue through January 1991.] Fifteen laboratory-scale research projects and pilot-scale production and purification projects are implemented during a nine year period. Many different feed materials, including, UO2, UO3, U3O8, and UO4:2H2O are tried as are different reaction techniques such as fluid bed, static bed (boat type) and rotary reactors with liquid, vapor and gas phase chlorination.
—Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996), S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, p.31, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>.
1982
Building 63 at the Tuwaitha Site is completed. The materials science section is moved from building 73 to this building.
—David Albright, Corey Gay, and Khidhir Hamza, "Development of the Al-Tuwaitha Site:
What If the Public or the IAEA had Overhead Imagery?" Institute for Science and International Security, 26 April 1999, <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/tuwaitha.html>.
1982
New buildings are added in the northwest section of the Tuwaitha Site. Building 80 is finished and houses the EMIS program.
—David Albright, Corey Gay, and Khidhir Hamza, "Development of the Al-Tuwaitha Site:
What If the Public or the IAEA had Overhead Imagery?" Institute for Science and International Security, 26 April 1999, <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/tuwaitha.html>.
1982
Smugglers in Italy offer to sell plutonium and highly-enriched uranium to Iraq. Italian smugglers receive a $60 million down payment from Iraq. [It is unknown whether the delivery of the plutonium or highly-enriched uranium occurs. Khadhir Hamza later writes in his book that every offer of black market plutonium or uranium that he was aware of was bogus.]
—R. Nordland, T. M. Defrank, And P. Hinckle, "How Soon Will Saddam Have The Bomb?" Newsweek, 3 December 1990, pp. 22-23.
1982
Iraq imports 1,767kg of low enriched uranium (LEU) from Italy.
—Fact Sheet: Iraq's Nuclear Weapon Programme, IAEA Action Team, <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/nwp2.html>.
1982
Iraq obtains 426 drums containing 139,409kg of yellowcake from Niger and 487 drums containing 148,348kg yellowcake from Portugal.
—Fact Sheet: Iraq's Nuclear Weapon Programme, IAEA Action Team, <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/nwp2.html>.
1982
Iraq imports from Italy 1,767kg of uranium enriched to 2.6 percent in U-235 in the form of UO2 powder.
—Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996), S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, p. 25, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>.
18 March 1982
Iraq receives is second shipment of yellowcake from Niger. It consists of 426 drums containing 139,409kg yellowcake.
—Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996), S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, pp. 25-26, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>.
17 May 1982-20 June 1982
Iraq receives yellowcake from Portugal in two batches. The second batch is received as three shipments from 17 May through 20 June. It consists of 487 drums containing 148,348kg yellow cake.
—Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996), S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, pp. 25-26, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>.
1982-1989
Initial UCl4 production and purification experiments commence in Buildings 9 and 15 at Tuwaitha. The experiments are later transferred to Building 85, the Chemical Engineering Research Laboratories where activities continue until January 1991. Fifteen laboratory-scale research projects and pilot-scale production and purification projects are implemented during the nine-year period. Many different feed materials, including, UO2, UO3, U3O8, and UO4:2H2O are tried as are different reaction techniques such as fluid bed, static bed (boat type) and rotary reactors with liquid, vapor and gas phase chlorination. The extensive experimentation culminates in the design and construction of a pilot scale production unit, Project 242, in Building 85, which uses UO2 as the feed material and gas phase chlorination.
—The components of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme, Attachment 1 to the 4th Consolidated Report under UNSCR1051(S/1997/779), <http://www.iraqwatchorg/un/IAEA/s-1997-779-att-1.htm>.
1982
Iraq begins the design and construction of electromagnets and different magnet separators systems at Tuwaitha.
—Fact Sheet: Iraq's Nuclear Weapon Programme, IAEA Action Team, <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/nwp2.html>.
1982-1988
Iraq separates 2.26 grams of plutonium at a laboratory at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center.
—David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "News the Front Page Missed," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 1991, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1991/o91/o91reports.html>.
Early 1982-Mid-1984
Iraq constructs a uranium recovery plant at the Al Qaim (aka Al Kaim) fertilizer complex in western Iraq.
—Gulf link, Construction of Uranium Plant, <http://www.fas.org/irp/gulf/cia/960506/62626_01.htm>.
1983
The second phase of the EMIS program commences. Phase two focuses on development of R50 and R100 pre-production-scale units (Project 104), as well as 1:5 scale model units (Project 105), which are used to research multi-magnet series operation as an analytical tool for the production phase configuration.
—Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996), S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, p. 35, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>.
Early 1984
Khidhir Hamza travels to the United States to purchase additional equipment for the weapons program. On his shopping list are an electron microscope, advanced computers for "nuclear calculations and controls," and specialized air filters to protect electronic equipment in laboratories. Additionally, under the cover of attending a space conference at the University of Michigan, he and an assistant photocopy hundreds of technical documents related to uranium enrichment.
—Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 153.
1984
Buildings 60 and 85 at the Tuwaitha Site are completed. Building 85 is originally designed for the development of the gaseous diffusion separating stages and EMIS chemistry. Building 60 houses engineering offices and labs for the electronics department, particularly control and high voltage engineering for the EMIS program.
—David Albright, Corey Gay, and Khidhir Hamza, "Development of the Al-Tuwaitha Site: What If the Public or the IAEA had Overhead Imagery?," Institute for Science and International Security, 26 April 1999, <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/tuwaitha.html>.
March 1984
A March 1984 report submitted by the FRG's Federal Intelligence Service (BND) to the Chancellor's Office, the Foreign Ministry, and other ministries documents secret nuclear transactions between Brazil and Iraq, including the supply by Brazil of enriched uranium.
—"Involvement in Brazil-Iraq Nuclear Deal Reported," Nuclear Developments, 14 September 1990, pp. 17-18. Original Source: Helmut Loelhoeffe. Frankfurter Rundschau (Frankfurt/Main). 5 September 1990, p. 1.
1984
Iraq contracts with Serbian entities for a chemical processing plant to leech uranium from ore, and another plant for fabricating rocket fuel.
—Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 194.
Mid-1984
Iraq's uranium recovery plant is in full operation. The al-Qaim fertilizer facility produces 1,200 metric tons of phosphoric acid per day.
—Gulf link, Construction of Uranium Plant, <http://www.fas.org/irp/gulf/cia/960506/62626_01.htm>.
Late November-Early December 1984
According to a Washington Post article, the war between Iran and Iraq enabled France to delay the reconstruction of the Osirak reactor bombed by Israel in June 1981. In order to expedite an agreement to rebuild the reactor, Iraq agrees to accept a French precondition of using a "low-grade uranium" fuel. The "caramel" fuel functions at 10 percent enrichment compared to 80 percent for the fuel in the original reactor. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz tells the Post that France and Iraq are "almost finalizing" replacement of the reactor.
—Michael Dobbs, "France Delays on Iraqi Reactor; Gulf War Holds Up Reconstruction of Facility Bombed By Israel," Washington Post, 3 December 1984.
Late 1984
By this time, Iraq is self-sufficient in uranium ore.
—"Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government," 24 September 2002, <http://www.pm.gov.uk/files/pdf/iraqdossier.pdf>.
Late 1984
Realizing that France will not rebuild the destroyed Osirak reactor, Project 182 is established with the objective of designing and constructing a natural uranium fueled, heavy water moderated and cooled reactor with a 40MWt capacity modeled on the Canadian NRX research reactor. [This development is confirmed by Iraqi documentation, although it contradicts Tariq Aziz's assertions in December to the Washington Post that France and Iraq are very near a deal to rebuild the Osirak reactor. There are however, no indications that the design of the natural uranium reactor progressed beyond theoretical studies.]
—"Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996)," S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, p. 53, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>.
1984
The Al Qaim facility begins producing yellowcake. [All of the yellowcake used by Iraq's nuclear program allegedly is produced at this site. Ore is supplied to the facility by both Iraqi and foreign sources.]
—"Major Sites Associated with Iraq's Past WMD Programs," UNSCOM, 3 December 1997, <http://fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/971203_sites.htm>.
1985
By this time, some progress is made in producing barrier material for the gaseous diffusion process and an emphasis is placed on compressor, diffuser, and heat exchange design. [However, it soon becomes apparent that the infrastructure to continue is beyond the indigenous capabilities of Iraq.]
—"Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996)," S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, p. 36, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>.
1986
The Iraqi Auqba bin Nafi General Establishment (ABN) contracts the Yugoslavian state company Federal Directorate of Supply and Procurement (FDSP) to build the Tarmiya electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) facility. The effort is designated project 946. The contract is valued at over $100 million.
—David Albright, Kate Buehler, and Corey Hinderstien, "Roadmap to Responsible Export Controls: Learning from the Past" Institute for Science and International Security, 2003, <http://www.exportcontrols.org/print/emisprocurement.html>.
1987
When the achievements of the Laser Section are evaluated, it is decided that the project should be downgraded to a "watching brief" and that a number of key personnel should be transferred to other projects, notably the EMIS effort.
—"Iraqi Nuclear Weapons," Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/nuke/program.htm>.
1987
The design work for the third phase of the EMIS program, the production phase, is finalized. The design calls for two identically equipped industrial scale plants, Tarmiya and Al Sharqat, each with 70 R120 separators for the production of uranium enriched to around 20 percent and with 20 R60 separators for the production of 93 percent HEU.
—"Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996)," S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, p. 36, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>.
1987
Control of the bomb program is transferred to the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI) by Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law.
—Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 130.
1987
Iraq signs a $600 million deal with Yugoslavian Serbs to build a magnetic uranium enrichment factory.
—Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 194.
1987-1989
Priority on the gaseous diffusion effort is reduced after efforts do not progress beyond the qualification of a single type of barrier.
—"Iraqi Nuclear Weapons," Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/nuke/program.htm>; "Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996)," S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, p. 38, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>.
August 1987
Khidhir Hamza travels to Germany to purchase a foundry capable of manufacturing high-precision bomb components. Hamza and his assistants attempt to pass off the purchase as a commercial project to purify tungsten. Representatives of Degussa and Leybold see through the ruse immediately but are still eager to make the sale. A deal is eventually signed for $120 million. Also on Hamza's procurement list are cameras for photographing explosive sequences including a flash X-ray camera powerful enough to penetrate the explosive plume of compression charges, and desktop computers. [Hamza also attempts to buy uranium of any degree of enrichment, but finds the task almost impossible because of export controls. He also contends that the notion of a black market awash in bomb-grade uranium and plutonium is grossly exaggerated.]
—Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York: Scribner Press, 2000), pp. 205, 209-210.
August 1987
Faced with limited capability to manufacture several items needed for the gaseous diffusion effort, Iraq revises the mission of the team assigned to the task and gives priority to gas centrifuge technology for uranium enrichment (although some work on research and development of the barrier material and tests of compressors continues). The goal of the centrifuge project is a production capacity of 10kg of 93 percent HEU per year by 1994. Work begins with an attempt to develop an oil-bearing gas centrifuge (for which extensive design information was available in open literature).
—"Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996)," S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, p. 39, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>.
Late 1987
Facing difficulties achieving rotational speeds greater than 30,000 rpm in its first oil centrifuge, Iraq seeks assistance from the German firm H&H METALFORM, which puts the Iraqis in contact with two ex-MAN Technologie employees. [By mid-1989 rotational speeds of 50,000 rpm are achieved in a vacuum.]
—"Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996)," S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, p. 39, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>.
1988
Iraq is successful in manufacturing a barrier tube suitable for operation in UF6.
—"Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996)," S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, p. 36, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>; "Iraqi Nuclear Weapons," Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/nuke/program.htm>.
1988
Iraq begins research into uranium enrichment through solvent extraction and ion exchange processes. The objective is to provide an alternative supply of LEU as feed for the EMIS facilities. Most research is conducted at Tuwaitha, except for the production of tri-butyl phosphate which, together with some theoretical work on crown ethers, is done at Muthanna.
—"Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996)," S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, p. 43, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf>; "Iraqi Nuclear Weapons," Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/nuke/program.htm>.
1988
Iraq begins construction of a foundry designed for production of soft iron, necessary for the fabrication of magnets used in the EMIS process. The foundry is built at the Nasser General Establishment.
—David Albright, Kate Buehler, and Corey Hinderstien, "Roadmap to Responsible Export Controls: Learning from the Past" Institute for Science and International Security, 2003, <http://www.exportcontrols.org/print/emisprocurement.html>.
1988
Iraq's attempts to produce graphite domestically result in failure. However acquiring graphite from foreign sources proves to be easy and Iraq halts further efforts to produce graphite for use in EMIS collectors.
—David Albright, Kate Buehler, and Corey Hinderstien, "Roadmap to Responsible Export Controls: Learning from the Past" Institute for Science and International Security, 2003, <http://www.exportcontrols.org/print/emisprocurement.html>.
July 1988
A UN-mandated cease-fire ends the Iran-Iraq War.
