Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

9 January 2003
IAEA Director General Mohammad El-Baradei says he finds credible Iraq’s claim that it sought high-strength aluminum tubes for use in building 81mm rockets, not for a centrifuge system to enrich uranium as the Bush administration has accused.
—Michael R. Gordon, "Threats and Responses: Nuclear Technology; Agency Challenges Evidence Against Iraq Cited by Bush," New York Times, 10 January 2003.

16 January 2003
UN inspectors discover documents related to Iraq’s nuclear program at the home of Iraqi physicist Faleh Hassan. The documents are discovered as the inspectors begin making unannounced visits to private homes of interest in Iraq. The documents at Dr. Hassan’s house appear to be related to laser enrichment, which could be used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. Experts disagree about the significance of the find, however, as it is unclear whether the documents are decades-old or part of an official research program conducted by the Iraqi nuclear regime. Dr. Hassan, who is the director of the Al-Razi military industrial facility, claims the documents reflect his private research work and the graduate work of students he supervised.
—George Jahn, "Countdown to War: Iraq: Nuclear Data Found in Scientist’s Home," Independent, 19 January 2003.

29 January 2003
US President George W. Bush delivers his annual State of the Union address. In the speech, Bush promises to lead a coalition to disarm Iraq if Saddam Hussein does not do so by his own accord. Bush also says the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein attempted recently to acquire substantial quantities of uranium from Africa. In addition, according to Bush, US intelligence sources have reported that Hussein has sought to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes that are suitable for nuclear weapons production.—"President’s State of the Union Address to Congress and the Nation," New York Times, 29 January 2003.

30 January 2003
The United States discloses some of the evidence it intends to present to the UN Security Council as proof that Iraq continues its nuclear weapons program. The evidence includes declassified intelligence relating to the controversial purchase of aluminum tubes, which the United States claims were to be used to build centrifuges to enrich uranium. Specifically, the materials offer details about the unusual strength and design specificity of the tubes that the Iraqis ordered, as well as the surprisingly high price the Iraqis paid for the shipment and the great lengths they went to avoid international detection of the shipment.
—Roland Watson and Elaine Monaghan, "US says aluminum tubes are evidence of Iraq’s nuclear goal," Times (London), 31 January 2003.

3 February 2003
A former high-ranking Iraqi nuclear scientist says the United States is purposely exaggerating the potential risk from Iraq’s alleged nuclear program. Downplaying the threat, scientist Imad Khadduri claims that the 1991 Gulf War effectively destroyed Iraq’s nuclear program and that the country has since lacked the qualified management team necessary to resurrect the dormant program. Khadduri is now living in Canada where he teaches computer science at a Toronto college.—Jeffrey Hodgson, "Iraq has no nuclear weapons, former top scientist says," Ottawa Citizen, 4 February 2003.

5 February 2003
Speaking at a meeting of the UN Security Council, Secretary of State Colin Powell charges that Saddam Hussein remains determined to acquire nuclear weapons. Powell says Hussein has made secretive attempts to procure highly specialized aluminum tubes that can be used in centrifuges for enriching uranium. He also points to Iraq’s efforts to acquire magnets and high-speed balancing machines, both of which can be used in a uranium enrichment gas centrifuge program. Powell says that he believes these procurement efforts reflect Iraq’s desire to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program, namely by creating an indigenous capability to produce fissile material. Powell also notes that Saddam Hussein has focused increased attention on Iraq’s scientific community during the past 18 months, a group that includes Iraq’s nuclear community.
—"Remarks to the United Nations Security Council," Secretary of State Colin Powell, 5 February 2003, http://www.state.gov.

14 February 2003
IAEA Director General Mohammed El-Baradei issues an interim report to the UN Security Council on inspectors’ activities related to Iraq’s nuclear program. Among the developments since the IAEA’s last report three weeks ago, the IAEA has determined that Iraq’s procurement of the dual-use carbon-fiber material was not for use in a nuclear program. However, efforts to identify the intended purpose for high-strength aluminum tubes continue. The report also states that the IAEA has reviewed 2,000 pages found at the home of a nuclear scientist on 16 January and assessed these papers do not contain information that changes the IAEA’s past assessments of Iraq’s nuclear programs.
—“The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: 14 February 2003 Update,” IAEA Director General Dr. Mohammed El-Baradei, 14 February 2003, <http://www.un.org/>.

7 March 2003
In a report to the UN Security Council, the IAEA states that in recent weeks Iraq has provided it with considerable documentation related to issues of particular concern. The report also says IAEA inspectors have concluded that it is unlikely Iraq sought high-strength aluminum tubes for a centrifuge program, as the Bush administration claims. With regard to Iraq’s efforts to import high-strength permanent magnets or develop the capability to produce them indigenously, the IAEA concludes none of the magnets or magnet production plans that Iraq has declared could be used specifically in a centrifuge magnetic bearing. The report notes, however, that Iraq does possess the technical know-how and capability to manufacture magnets suitable for enrichment centrifuges, and therefore the IAEA plans to continue monitoring developments in this area. In terms of uranium acquisition, the IAEA has concluded that controversial documents purportedly proving Iraq tried to acquire enriched uranium from Niger are inauthentic. The IAEA report also states that there is no indication of resumed nuclear activities at Iraqi facilities identified in satellite imagery as having been reconstructed or newly built, and there is no sign of other proscribed nuclear-related activities at IAEA inspected sites.
—"The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: An Update," International Atomic Energy Agency at the Meeting of the United Nations Security Council, 7 March 2003.

19 March 2003
The onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom and subsequent invasion and occupation of Iraq by US-led coalition forces. One of the main rationales for this military operation is rooted in the belief that Saddam Hussein’s regime had been deceiving the international community and hiding its WMD arsenals and capabilities.

10 April 2003
A US Army unit arrives at Iraq’s main nuclear research center, the Tuwaitha facility 30km south of Baghdad, to measure radiation levels after a Marine engineering company discovered the site had been abandoned and infiltrated by looters following the recent fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The Army determines that the radiation levels exceed safety limits. Responding to this discovery, IAEA Director General sends the US government a letter noting the immediate need to secure the Tuwaitha site.
—Walter Pincus, “U.S., IAEA Negotiate Sending Teams to Iraq; Agency Concerned About Nuclear Sites,” Washington Post, 21 May 2003.

14 April 2003
A US official speaking on the condition of anonymity says top Iraqi nuclear scientist J’affar Dhia J’affar is in US custody. He reportedly turned himself in to coalition forces.
—"Nuclear scientist surrenders to US," Australian, 15 April 2003.

20 May 2003
According to a US State Department official, the United States has commenced discussions with the IAEA to facilitate the return of IAEA inspection teams to Iraq. The IAEA inspectors will be charged with ascertaining what may have been pilfered from nuclear-related sites. The discussions are taking place one day after IAEA Deputy General Mohammad El-Baradei issued a statement expressing concern about vulnerable nuclear and radioactive materials in Iraq, especially at the Tuwaitha nuclear research center. US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld states that the Pentagon has "no problem with" the return of UN inspectors to Iraq.
—Walter Pincus, "U.S., IAEA Negotiate Sending Teams to Iraq; Agency Concerned About Nuclear Sites," Washington Post, 21 May 2003; Julian Borger, "Iraq: after the war: US dirty bomb fears after nuclear looting," Guardian, 21 May 2003.

29 May 2003
US military officials in Iraq notify the IAEA that its inspectors will be barred from entering the Tuwaitha nuclear research center when they arrive in the country next week. Moreover, according to the IAEA, the inspectors will eventually be permitted to perform only the minimum extent of checks required by international law, which amounts to conducting an inventory of one small area at the center where radioactive material was stored before the war. The inspectors will not be permitted to conduct an investigation of public health claims linked to the looting of nuclear materials from the center, nor will they be involved in the hunt for weapons of mass destruction.
—Julian Borger, “Iraq: after the war: Looting inquiry ban on nuclear inspectors,” Guardian, 30 May 2003.

7 June 2003
UN nuclear inspectors arrive in Iraq for the first time in three months to evaluate the damage caused by looting at the Tuwaitha nuclear research center.
— "Nuclear Agency Returns to Iraq; U.N. Team’s Task Is at Looted Plant," Washington Post, 7 June 2003.

25 June 2003
An American official says that the former head of Iraq’s centrifuge uranium-enrichment program, Mahdi Shukur Ubaydi, has given the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) documents and parts related to Iraq’s nuclear program, which Ubaydi had concealed for 12 years. The documents were reportedly hidden beneath a rose bush in a garden next to Ubaydi’s home. According to Ubaydi, Iraq’s senior leadership ordered that the documents be concealed so as to preserve the regime’s ability to restart efforts to build a centrifuge enrichment capability sometime in the future.
—"After the War; Old Nuclear Parts Are Turned Over in Iraq," New York Times, 26 June 2003.

6 July 2003
Former American ambassador Joseph C. Wilson publishes an editorial in the New York Times in which he states that some of the information used by the Bush administration to build support for the invasion of Iraq was exaggerated. Specifically, Wilson refers to the administration’s claims about Iraq’s purported attempt to buy uranium yellowcake in Africa. Wilson identifies himself as the individual that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sent to Niger in early 2002 to investigate an intelligence report related to this allegation. The CIA informed him that the intelligence report referred to a memorandum of agreement from the late 1990s, although Wilson never saw the report itself. He also writes that the CIA told him Vice President Dick Cheney’s office had questioned the intelligence report and were awaiting further details about it. Wilson’s investigation ultimately found it unlikely that any such agreement existed or transfer took place. He, in turn, filed a report detailing these findings upon his return from Niger. He says he was dismayed in subsequent months, however, when the Bush administration joined a British report in citing Iraq’s attempts to procure uranium yellowcake from Niger as evidence of Saddam Hussein’s ongoing nuclear ambitions.
—Joseph Wilson, "What I Didn’t Find in Africa," New York Times, 6 July 2003.

2 October 2003
In his testimony on the interim progress of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) given to members of the US House of Representatives, chief inspector David Kay says the ISG has determined from the testimony of Iraqi scientists and senior government officials that Saddam Hussein remained firmly committed to acquiring nuclear weapons. In addition, Kay reports that Iraq took action to preserve some technological capability from its pre-1991 nuclear weapons program. Kay also says that inspectors have not yet uncovered evidence demonstrating Iraq took significant post-1998 steps towards building nuclear weapons or producing fissile material.
—"Statement by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence," Central Intelligence Agency, 2 October 2003, <http://www.cia.gov/
cia/public_affairs/speeches/2003/david_kay_10022003.html/>.

30 March 2004
Iraq Survey Group (ISG) chief inspector Charles Duelfer testifies before the US Congress. He says that the ISG has developed information which suggests Iraq maintained an interest in both preserving and expanding its knowledge base related to the development of nuclear weapons. According to Duelfer, one indicator of this interest is a high-speed rail gun program conducted under the direction of two senior scientists who were associated with Iraq’s nuclear weapons program before the first Gulf War. Documents obtained from the scientists’ office demonstrate an important incongruity between the ostensible purpose of this research and the actual speeds of the rail gun being developed. Other documents discovered in the office also describe diagnostic techniques which are important for nuclear weapons experiments. These include x-ray radiography, high-speed photography, and laser velocimetry. In addition, Duelfer notes that the ISG has expanded its areas of focus to include an investigation of the regime’s intent.
—"Testimony to the US Congress by Mr. Charles Duelfer," Central Intelligence Agency, 30 March 2004, http://www.cia.gov/.

14 April 2004
IAEA Director General Mohammed El-Baradei circulates a letter to the UN Security Council that says equipment, contaminated scrap, and even buildings where radioactive materials were monitored prior to the war in Iraq, have disappeared. He also states in the letter that it remains unclear whether the disappearance of these items was the result of a systematic effort or looting. Meanwhile, visits to other countries and satellite imagery have together shown that scrap, some of it contaminated from sites previously monitored by the IAEA, was transported out of Iraq.
—"Contaminated Scrap Missing From Iraq," Los Angeles Times, 15 April 2004; Mark Turner, "IAEA raises fears on Iraq nuclear sites," Financial Times, 15 April 2004.

6 July 2004
The US Department of Energy announces that US authorities have seized approximately 1,000 sources of radioactivity and two tons of low-enriched uranium from the Tuwaitha nuclear research center in Iraq. These items are being shipped to an unidentified location in the United States. Officials also say that some of the "less sensitive" materials at the center were left there.
—Matthew L. Wald, "Radioactive Material Seized From a Nuclear Plant in Iraq," New York Times, 7 July 2004.

30 September 2004
The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) releases a comprehensive report detailing its findings related to Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs. In it, the ISG reports that Saddam Hussein wanted to recreate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities after sanctions were removed. Inspectors also believe that while Hussein aspired to develop a nuclear weapons capability, his post-sanction planning was more geared toward the development of ballistic missiles and tactical chemical warfare capabilities. Among its other findings, the ISG says Saddam Hussein ended Iraq’s nuclear program following the first Gulf War in 1991. No evidence suggests a coordinated effort to restart that program thereafter. Hussein did, however, express his intent to maintain the intellectual capital that had developed within the nuclear program prior to 1991, but the ISG found that this was in a process of decay in successive years. Iraq also sought to conceal elements of its program from inspectors following the 1991 war. The regime’s secretive efforts included concealing and preserving documents related to the nuclear program, hiding technology, and transferring many nuclear scientists to jobs in Iraq’s Military Industrial Commission (MIC) where they would maintain their weapons knowledge and gain ongoing hands-on experience. In addition, the ISG report states that specific projects, including efforts to build a rail gun and copper vapor laser, might have been useful in future activities aimed at restarting a nuclear weapons program, but they did not uncover evidence of such a purpose. The report also concludes that Saddam Hussein purposefully sought to spread ambiguity about his weapons of mass destruction capabilities. According to interviews conducted by the ISG, he privately told his aides that he sought to deceive the world about his weapons capabilities in order to avoid appearing weak as well as to deter aggression from Iraq’s neighbors, especially Iran. However, the inspectors’ analysis concludes that the regime never reconciled the inherent contradiction between international demands for disarmament and this desire to maintain a strategic deterrent.
—"Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD," Central Intelligence Agency, 30 September 2004, http://www.cia.gov/.

11 October 2004
The IAEA expresses concern that missing Iraqi nuclear-related equipment and materials may be sold to groups or countries interested in producing nuclear weapons. The IAEA says US-led coalition forces failed to notice that equipment and materials have been disappearing from Iraq since the start of the 2003 war. An IAEA spokesman says that dual-use items were "systematically removed" from facilities the IAEA monitored prior to the war.
—Louis Charbonneau, "U.N. fears bombmakers may get Iraq nuke items - diplomats," Reuters, 12 October 2004.

13 October 2004
The BBC reports that former chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix and former chief Iraq Survey Group (ISG) inspector David Kay both believe the coalition’s loss of control over Iraq’s nuclear facilities following the 2003 invasion is scandalous. Kay reportedly added, however, that the loss of nuclear-related equipment and material is not by itself dangerous, because such items are often legally available outside of Iraq.
—"Iraq nuclear losses ‘a scandal’," BBC News, 13 October 2003, http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/.