12 January 2005
United States intelligence officials confirm the search for weapons of mass destruction has been brought to a halt. US chief investigator for the Iraq Survey Group, Charles Duelfer reported in 2004 that his team had found no stockpiles of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons at the time of the US-led invasion, and now asserts they have not found any since. The belief in the existence of such a stockpile had been the main reason cited for the war in Iraq.
--"US Gives up Search for Iraq WMDs," BBC, 12 January 2005.
12 January 2005
With the hunt for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq discontinued, the Iraq Survey Group's 30 September 2004 report, which maintains there are no stockpiles of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons in Iraq, is considered the definitive account of the CIA's findings. The search lasted until this date due to the administration's suspicion that weapons had been taken out of Iraq or hidden well within the country; however intelligence officials have come to the conclusion that such speculation is highly unlikely.
--Dafna Linzer, "Search for Banned Arms in Iraq Ended Last Month; Critical September Report to be Final Word," Washington Post, 12 January 2005.
27 January 2005
Jafar Dhia Jafar, commonly known as the father of Iraq's nuclear program, says his country's pursuit of nuclear weapons ended with the invasion of Kuwait in 1991. Jafar asserts he was three years away from achieving nuclear capabilities at the time, with a team of about 8,000 people involved in the nuclear program, but Operation Desert Storm prevented further developments.
--Doug Mellgren, "1991 Gulf War Stopped Baghdad's Atomic and Biological Weapons, Top Iraqi Scientist Says," Associated Press, 27 January 2005.
27 January 2005
Former United Nations senior weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1998, Scott Ritter, criticizes the invasion of Iraq and blames politicians, as well as media and the pubic for embarking upon an illegal war. He accuses the Bush administration of dismissing Iraqi declarations of WMD holdings as lies, as well as advertising fabricated information about such holdings, and "spinning" data found by the Iraq Survey Group in order to further the purposes of the White House.
--Scott Ritter, "Criminals the Lot of Us. The Invasion of Iraq Was a Crime of Gigantic Proportions, for Which Politicians, the Media and the Public Share Responsibility," The Guardian, 27 January 2005.
1 February 2005
The CIA releases an unusual report officially disavowing those assessments that it made prior to the invasion of Iraq due to subsequent findings that disprove such notions. The report, dated 18 January 2005, is titled "Iraq: No Large-Scale Chemical Warfare Efforts since Early 1990s" and claims Iraq gave up its chemical and nuclear weapons programs in 1991. The report is considered unusual by the intelligence community due to the fact that the CIA generally does not contradict prior intelligence estimates. The Iraq Survey Group provided the information for the report, and David Kay, former head of the team, asserts "we were almost all wrong."
--Greg Miller, "CIA Corrects Itself on Arms," Los Angeles Times, 1 February 2005.
13 February 2005
Recent findings by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency reveal that Dr. A. Q. Khan, the country's lead nuclear scientist currently under house arrest in Islamabad, at one time had approached Saddam Hussein's regime with an offer to sell Baghdad nuclear technology. One ISI official claims Baghdad seemed interested and agreed initially, only to back out later citing suspicion of possible US involvement in the solicitation, which would implicate the Iraqis of having the desire to develop nuclear weapons technology.
--Massoud Ansari, "Our Man Sold Secrets to Iran, Admits Pakistan," The Telegraph, 13 February 2005.
17 February 2005
Former head of Iraq’s nuclear program under the Saddam Hussein regime, Jafar Dhia Jafar, admonishes the International Atomic Energy Agency for failing to provide adequate resistance in the debate over Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction prior to the U.S.-led invasion. Jafar accuses the IAEA of bowing to U.S. pressure when the agency should have made stronger assurances to the U.N. Security Council on nuclear disarmament in Iraq.
––“IAEA Should Have Stood Up to U.S., Says Former Iraqi Official,” Deutsche Press-Agentur, 17 February 2005.
18 February 2005
Porter Goss, the new Director of the CIA, warns the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that the repercussions of the war in Iraq could possibly lead to increased risk in the U.S. due to terrorist acquisition of technology and weapons of mass destruction. He says “those jihadists who survive will leave Iraq experienced and focused on acts of urban terrorism. They represent a potential pool of contacts to build trans-national terrorist cells and networks.”
––Sridhar Krishnaswami, “Iraq War Fuelling Terrorism: CIA,” Global News Wire, 18 February 2005.
3 March 2005
The United States opposes Mohammed ElBaradei’s confirmation to a third term as director-general of the IAEA, citing such reasons as a two-term limitation, as well as not being strong enough on issues with Iran, and his failure to confirm U.S. claims of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq under the Saddam Hussein administration.
––“UN Nuclear Boss Talks Deadlocked,” BBC, 3 March 2005.
4 March 2005
Hans Blix, the former United Nations chief weapons inspector speaks of Iraq’s continued possession of nuclear weapons technical expertise in an epilogue to the new version of his book Disarming Iraq, which was originally published in 2004. The additional epilogue expresses Blix’s proposal for a less “nuclearized” world. He encourages the idea of a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone in the Middle East, and cites Iraq’s retention of nuclear know-how and possible nuclear future as reasons to push for such a zone.
––Charles J. Hanley, “Iraq Arms Controller Urges Nuke-Free Mideast, Raps ‘Misleading’ U.S. Leadership,” Associated Press, 4 March 2005.
9 March 2005
The interim Iraqi government appeals to the United Nations to end the presence of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency personnel responsible for disposing of the country’s alleged nuclear program. Iraq’s ambassador to the UN, Samir Sumaidai says UNMOVIC costs Iraq $12 million annually, and also claims the IAEA will cost them $12.3 million over the next two years. This money comes out of Iraq’s oil revenue, which the country wants to use for reconstruction purposes, rather than funding “irrelevant” UN bodies. UN Security Council members agree that they must begin to examine the future of these bodies in Iraq, but also are hesitant to do so until the permanent Iraqi government is in place.
––“UN Takes No Action on Iraq Inspections,” Al-Jazeera, 9 March 2005.
18 March 2005
Despite the findings of the Iraq Survey Group, David Kay, the former head of the organization, believes that there was intent in Iraq to continue production of WMD. Due to the continued presence of hundreds of Iraqi scientists known to be ‘luminaries’ within their fields of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and the return of expatriate Iraqi scientists, the possibility exists of renewed nuclear research. Most nuclear research facilities are not functioning currently, but are instead being maintained for use in the future following reconstruction. However, because such rejuvenated projects will require many resources and much funding, restarting these programs currently remains a remote possibility.
––“Weapons Expertise in Iraq and Iran,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 18 March 2005.
20 March 2005
Iraqi newspaper Al-Furat publishes a claim that an Israeli delegation has met with Kurdish political leader Jalal Talabani. The negotiations are said to have involved the Kurdish desire to establish a nuclear reactor in the north of Iraq for peaceful energy purposes. The members of the delegation from Israel are identified as technical consultants with European passports. The Kurds allegedly plan to begin work on the reactor in the middle of this year.
––“Iraq Kurdish Party Leader, ‘Israeli’ Nuclear Experts Said in Kurdistan Talks,” BBC, 20 March 2005.
25 March 2005
A presidential commission is preparing a review of 15 U.S. agencies that were involved in the collection and/or assessment of intelligence relating to weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and is not likely to be complimentary to any of the agencies. The report will assess the reasons why intelligence believed Saddam Hussein was reconstructing Iraq’s nuclear program.
––Katherine Shrader, “WMD Commission Prepares to Release Report,” Associated Press, 25 March 2005.
27 March 2005
Iraqi former nuclear scientist Hussein al-Shahristani is named by the United Iraqi Alliance as its candidate for deputy to the parliament speaker.
––“Developments in Iraq,” Associated Press, 27 March 2005.
29 March 2005
The Senate select committee on U.S. Intelligence releases an unclassified version of a report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, in which it summarizes the prewar assumptions of the U.S. government on Saddam Hussein's holdings of WMD and further asserts that many of the assumptions should not have been concluded from the available intelligence. The report blames spies in the Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency, as well as information gatherers in the National Security Agency and imagery experts in the Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Intelligence analysts were also pointed to for the shortcomings of the Intelligence agencies and accused of being too wedded to their assumptions about Saddam's WMD capacity and intentions. The National Intelligence Estimate produced in October 2002 by the National Intelligence Council is cited for false conclusions that Iraq was at the time reconstituting its nuclear weapons program and was actively in pursuit of obtaining nuclear weapons.
The findings of the Iraq Survey Group are also noted, which were published on 30 September 2004 after exhaustive inspections of Iraq's weapons facilities post-invasion and found no proof of the Intelligence Community's pre-war assumptions. These mistakes are attributed to the Intelligence Community's reaction to its underestimation of Iraq's nuclear program and chemical weapons holdings prior to the 1991 Gulf War. The report further claims that in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, intelligence analysts and gatherers were more wary of underestimating capabilities of the United States' adversaries than they were of hastening to conclusions. Saddam Hussein's actions were also said to be consistent with that of someone who possessed the alleged WMD. In other case studies within the report, intelligence gathered on Libya is commended for its accuracy, in which the state of Libya's nuclear arsenal was assessed correctly and led to a positive outcome.
In general, the Intelligence Assessment report pointed toward a lack of human intelligence as the main reason for the false pre-war assumptions. While too few human sources were utilized for evaluation of Iraq's nuclear capabilities and leadership intentions, the ones that were sought out turned out to be misleading and deceitful, such as the source dubbed "Curveball," whom the CIA relied upon heavily for inside intelligence and later proved to be fabricating his testimony. The concluding consensus of the report expresses the senate committee's dissatisfaction with the competence of the Intelligence Community.
--"Overview of the Report," Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, 29 March 2005, http://www.wmd.gov/report/report.html#overview.
1 April 2005
The Presidential Commission on WMD intelligence reports the CIA resisted acknowledgment of other government agencies such as the Energy Department that maintained evidence found in Iraq was not meant for nuclear activity. The aluminum tubes cited numerous times in the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate were considered to be proof that Saddam Hussein was working toward building a nuclear program. The Energy Department expressed doubt on the usage of such tubes, and instead determined they were meant for rocket use, copied from the designs of Italian rocket manufacturers. The Federal Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee reportedly requested to have access to the aluminum tubes in order to review their possible purpose; however the CIA denied their request on two separate occasions.
--Dafna Linzer, "CIA Resisted Doubts on Aluminum Tubes Thought to Be for Iraqi Nuke Program," Washington Post, 1 April 2005.
1 April 2005
In an address to a crowd at Tehran University in Iran, Ayatollah Emami-Kashani accuses the United States of using the issue of suspected nuclear arsenals and nuclear energy programs as a pretext in order to attack Islam. The Ayatollah mentions the war in Iraq as an example.
--"Friday Prayer Leader Says US has an Issue with Islam, Islamic Republic," BBC, 1 April 2005.
3 April 2005
Former top Iraqi nuclear chemist Dr. Hussein Shahristani is elected deputy speaker of the new Iraqi parliament. Hussein Shahristani, formerly worked under Saddam Hussein, but was imprisoned in 1979 for refusing to build a nuclear bomb.
--"Iraqi Parliament Elects Speaker," AFX News, 3 April 2005.
3 April 2005
UN inspectors who had been in pre-war Iraq accuse the United States of dismissing and ignoring the findings of these international bodies in the events leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom. The inspectors say that the evidence the Bush administration presented to justify the operation had been tested and disproved by the IAEA. The accusation includes reports of IAEA inspectors discovering that the documents presented to them showing an attempted purchase of uranium from Niger were actually forged; however the CIA maintained their position on the documents' authenticity.
--Dafna Lizner, "Panel: U.S. Ignored Work of U.N. Arms Inspectors," Washington Post, 3 April 2005.
8 April 2005
Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee releases its annual report, in which it admits that some of the main claims in the Iraq weapons dossier, Prime Minister Tony Blair's main justification for joining the coalition forces, were false. The statement made in the dossier that Iraq was believed to be pursuing a nuclear weapons program the report now concludes to be unsubstantiated. The JIC also retracted false statements made on Iraq's biological and chemical weapons arsenal as well.
--Kim Sengupta, "Intelligence Chiefs Admit Iraq Weapons Claims Were Untrue," Independent, 8 April 2005.
26 April 2005
The Iraq Survey Group that was in charge of the search for WMDs in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein releases a report declaring it has found no evidence supporting the claim that Iraqi arms are hidden in Syria. The findings of the report contradict the previous sentiment of U.S. officials that had believed some WMD from Iraq had been moved to Syria prior to 2003.
--"Inspectors Find No Proof Iraq Hid Weapons in Syria," Reuters, 26 April 2005.
27 April 2005
Charles Duelfer, U.S. chief weapons inspector, declares the inquiries into Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are exhausted and have gone as far as feasibly possible. He issued an addendum to the Iraq Survey Group's paper published in October, which officially closes the investigation.
--"US Closes Book on Iraq WMD Hunt," BBC News, 27 April 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
28 April 2005
In a speech at Kutztown University in Pennsylvania, former CIA Director George Tenet says he regrets telling President Bush in 2002 that finding WMDs in Iraq was a "slam dunk." Tenet reports general apathy in the government toward terrorism in the decade prior to 11 September accounted for the lapse in accurate intelligence produced by the CIA.
--"Tenet Says he Regrets 'Slam Dunk' Comment," Associated Press, 28 April 2005.
1 May 2005
The "Downing Street Memo," a classified document dated July 23, 2002, is recently leaked to the public and reveals top British officials warning Prime Minister Tony Blair that there is sparse evidence of weapons of mass destruction programs in Iraq eight months before the invasion occurs. The memo indicates that Blair supported the U.S. policy of Iraqi regime change by means of a military invasion, but was advised by other British government officials that there was no legal evidence for such actions. Blair says "regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime producing WMD...If the political context were right, people would support regime change." Subsequently, it is alleged by U.K. newspapers that in the following months Blair intentionally produced faulty information that supported the presence of Iraqi nuclear weapons in an effort to gain British support for a military invasion.
-- "Leaked No 10 Memo Shows Blair Committed to Iraq Eight Months Before Invasion," Sunday Times, 1 May 2005.
5 May 2005
Mohammed ElBaradei, director general of the IAEA, reports that it is not surprising that no substantial evidence of an Iraqi nuclear weapons program has been found. He says the absence of evidence supports previous conclusions reached by the IAEA before the war began. ElBaradei advises that the case of Iraq offers a "basic lesson" that countries must bare caution whey they "say that a nuclear program in a country is for military purposes."
-- "IAEA Chief ElBaradei Explains Position on Nuclear Proliferation," Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 5 May 2005, in FBIS Document GMP2005050702001.
24 May 2005
Charles Duelfer, U.S. Chief Weapons Inspector, claims that personal narcissism and fear of an Iranian invasion caused Saddam Hussein to intentionally mislead international authorities about Iraq's nuclear capabilities.
-- "Inspector says Saddam wanted to bluff Iran on arms," Reuters, 25 May 2005.
31 May 2005
Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, announces that Iraq has joined the Proliferation Security Initiative program in an effort to halt global black market trafficking of nuclear related materials and technologies.
-- "U.S. to Detail Interception of Weapons Materials," Global Security Newswire, 31 May 2005; Stefan Nicola, "WMD trafficking hard to stop without China," Washington Times, 10 June, 2005.
31 May 2005
A recent report claims that U.S. government analysts responsible for faulty intelligence on Iraq's pre-war nuclear capabilities have been awarded job performance awards. False intelligence findings that linked aluminum tubes with uranium enrichment in Iraq has been attributed to the same analysts that received job performance awards. Some officials argue that this demonstrates that the current administration is not holding officials accountable for false intelligence.
-- "Analysts Behind Faulty Iraq Intelligence Rewarded," Global Security Newswire, 31 May, 2005.
8 June 2005
U.S. President George Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair deny claims in the previously released Downing Street Memo that pre-war WMD intelligence was "fixed" around a policy of military invasion and regime change. President Bush claims that the memo was made public in an effort to hinder Prime Minister Blair's re-election process.
-- "Blair, Bush Deny Manipulating WMD Intelligence," Global Security Newswire, 8 June 2005.
8 June 2005
The U.S. abandons its campaign to keep Mohamed ElBaradei from winning re-election to a third term as director general of the IAEA. The U.S. is suspected of trying to force ElBaradei out of office after he challenged U.S. allegations of nuclear weapons programs in Iraq before the invasion.
-- Dafna Linzer, "U.S. Drops Opposition to IAEA Chief," Washington Post, 8 June 2005.
8 June 2005
Reports indicate that there is growing support among countries in the United Nations Security Council to dismantle UNMOVIC programs in Iraq. The Security Council is under pressure from the new Iraqi leadership to shut down UNMOVIC because its $12 million operating budget is provided by oil revenue which could alternatively be used towards reconstruction expenses.
-- "UN eyes shutting down Iraq arms inspection agency," Reuters, 8 June 2005.
24 June 2005
The United Nations Security Council approves a transfer of $200 million dollars from the Iraqi Oil for Food program to the Development Fund for Iraq. Money generated from the Oil for Food program has most recently been used to finance UNMOVIC activities in Iraq in order to dismantle weapons of mass destruction programs. A transfer of funds from Oil for Food Accounts to the Development Fund for Iraq results in a reduction of the UNMOVIC budget from $345.9 million to $125 million. Samir Sumaidaie, Iraq's acting ambassador to the United Nations argues that spending more than $10 million per year for UNMOVIC in Iraq is no longer a useful allocation of government funds because Iraq does not possess any weapons of mass destruction and therefore is no longer a threat.
-- "U.N. approves transfer of $200 million in oil-for-food revenue to Iraq Development Fund," Associated Press, 24 June 2005.
30 June 2004
British Prime Minister Tony Blair asserts that the previously classified Downing Street memos released to the public in May 2005 have been misinterpreted. In response to accusations, resulting from the release of the memos, that there was a U.S. initiative coupled with U.K. support to invade Iraq shortly after September 11th 2001, Prime Minister Blair says that "people say the decision was already taken. The decision was not already taken."
-- "Downing Street Memos Misinterpreted, Blair Says," Global Security Newswire, 30 June 2005.
4 July 2005
Mogens Lykketoft, former foreign minister of Denmark, writes an open letter to President George Bush that claims the United States falsely accused Saddam Hussein of harboring "dangerous weapons of mass destruction" as an "original and official justification for the Iraq war."
-- "Danish SDP's Lykketoft Writes Open Letter to Bush Criticizing US Foreign Policy," Copenhagen Politiken, 4 July 2005, in FBIS document EUP20050704364006.
14 July 2005
U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith says that U.S. policy makers relied too heavily on information regarding the suspected WMD stockpiles believed to exist in Iraq prior to the 2003 invasion. Feith argues that the U.S. led war in Iraq is necessary, but claims that "we as an administration, instead of giving proper emphasis to all major elements of the rationale for war, overemphasized the WMD aspect."
-- "AP Interview: Departing Pentagon policy chief says administration overemphasized WMD as war rationale," Associated Press, 14 July 2005. June 2005
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released the final report of its investigation concerning Iraq’s suspected weapons of mass destruction programs. The report provides supplementary information to the September 2004 report written by Charles Duelfer, special advisor of the Iraq Survey Group. The CIA supplementary report asserts that although there is a risk that Iraqi officials with knowledge of weapons of mass destruction programs could be recruited to work for other governments, terrorist groups, or insurgents thus far there is “only very limited reporting” that other governments have made attempts to recruit Iraqis and there are “no reports” that any successful attempts have occurred.
–– “Final Iraq Report Downplays Brain Drain,” Arms Control Today, June 2005.
27 July 2005
The investigation led by the U.S. Senate Select Committee to determine whether or not the Bush administration misconstrued intelligence in order to justify the war in Iraq has come to a halt. Senator John Kerry says that as a result of the stalled proceedings “a year and a half later, there’s still no report, no conclusions, no accountability for the mistakes, and no way to be sure they won’t be repeated.”
— “Prewar Iraq Intelligence Inquiry in Senate,” Global Security Newswire, 27 July 2005.
28 July 2005
In a testimony before a House Intelligence subcommittee the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, General Michael Hayden, announces that future National Intelligence Estimates will be subjected to a new set of strict safeguards in order to ensure a high level of accuracy for assessing national intelligence. The procedural changes, which General Hayden called “a major breakthrough,” are a direct response to the National Intelligence Estimate of October 2002 which asserted that Iraq was harboring weapons of mass destruction programs, but later proven to be incorrect.
— “Top Spy’s No. 2 Tells of Changes to Avoid Error,” The New York Times, 28 July 2005.
31 July 2005
A former Central Intelligence Agency officer claims that he received information from a significant source in 2001 proving that the Iraqi government had already ceased its uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapons. The officer claims that although he filed a report in the C.I.A. Counter Proliferation Division, standard procedure was abandoned when the report failed to be addressed in important government analyses pertaining to Iraqi pre-war intelligence and reach other American intelligence agencies and policy makers.
— “Spy’s Notes on Iraqi Arms Aims Were Shelved, Suit Says,” New York Times, 31 July 2005.
19 August 2005
American Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, chief of staff to former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell from 2002 to 2005, alleges that the speech made by Secretary of State Powell to the United Nations on February 14, 2003 was based on intelligence from the White House that resembled a “sort of Chinese menu” and appeared to be “anything but an intelligence document.” Colonel Wilkerson asserts that allegations in the speech ,which were intended to prove the presence of weapons of mass destruction programs in Iraq, were later proven to be incorrect by David Kay, former C.I.A. chief weapons inspector, after he completed several months of extensive searches of Iraqi facilities for the suspected WMD stockpiles after the fall of Saddam Hussein.
–– “Former aide: Powell WMD speech ‘lowest point in my life,” CNN, 19 August 2005.
22 August 2005
Due to the recent and impending releases of several nuclear scientists known to work under Saddam Hussein, the United Nations and the White House are pushing for special inspections in order to monitor potential WMD programs being restarted in Iraq. Iraqi politicians refuse to accept extra constraints and demand to be given fair treatment.
--John Barry, "U.N. Considers Monitoring Iraqi Weapons Efforts," Newsweek, 22 August 2005.
24 August 2005
A draft of the Iraqi constitution contains language addressing the issues of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The draft asserts the Iraqi government's commitment to preventing the spread and production of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
--"Iraq draft Constitution Addresses WMD Proliferation," Reuters, 24 August 2005.
7 September 2005
The US Government Accountability Office releases a report to Congressional Committees regarding the removal of radiological materials from Iraq by the Department of Defense. The study suggests improvements of DOD methods after a review of its performance in Iraq while attempting to secure and remove nuclear materials such as processed uranium and radiological sources. The report concludes that the DOD and US Department of Energy should ensure that more advanced planning occur prior to any similar circumstances in the future. Looting of radiological areas is cited as one of the most complicating factors behind securing and collecting facilities and items that could potentially be used in a "dirty bomb." The report asserts that the DOD was not adequately prepared for securing the facilities by March of 2003, and military personnel had insufficient guidance and equipment in the ensuing six months following the initial invasion.
--US Government Accountability Office, "Radiological Sources in Iraq; DOD Should Evaluate Its Source Recovery Effort and Apply Lessons Learned to Future Recovery Missions," Report to Congressional Committees, September 2005.
9 September 2005
Former Secretary of State Colin Powell describes in a television interview his 2003 speech to the United Nations about Iraq's weapons programs as a "blot" on his record.
--"Powell Tells of Blot on Record," New York Times, 9 September 2005.
16 September 2005
John Wolfe, former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, speaks out against a potential DOD policy of pre-emptive nuclear strikes against states possessing WMD. He uses the case of mistaken WMD in Iraq as a reason why adopting such a policy would be a mistake.
--Joe Fiorill, "Former US State Department Nonproliferation Chief Opposes Nuclear Pre-Emption Policy," Global Security Newswire, 16 September 2005.
23 September 2005
The IAEA issues a statement claiming their inspections in Iraq have found no evidence of nuclear matter being used, smuggled, or diverted into undeclared activity. The agency reports that the natural or low-enriched uranium is securely stored near the Tuwaitha complex, a facility south of Baghdad. The inspection is part of an NPT policy of annual Physical Inventory Verification of declared nuclear material.
--"No Diversion of Nuclear Material Found in Iraq: IAEA," Agency France Presse, 23 September 2005.
30 September 2005
An article is published in a science magazine citing examples of the current prosecution of Iraqi scientists. At least 58 professors, 150 medical doctors, and dozens of various scientists, including nuclear scientists, working in institutes and ministries have been murdered. Due to the pattern of kidnapping and methods of killing, the assassins are believed to be members of the insurgency. Many scientists are leaving the country due to the present danger, as well as the inability to work because of looting of scientific institutes and universities. The State Department's Iraqi International Center for Science and Industry is creating a job-placement initiative in order to reinstate scientists who worked on Saddam's weapons programs in new jobs within Iraqi ministries. The article states that scientists are being targeted by the insurgency due to the perception that they are helping the American army.
--Richard Stone, "In the Line of Fire," Science, Vol. 309, 30 September 2005.
October 2005
A report released by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) states that for six months after the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, radiological sources were left unsecured by the coalition forces. Because of this vulnerability, the report further implies that some of the materials could possibly have gone missing during that time period. The purpose of the GAO report is to advise the Pentagon of mistakes and suggest improvements for future policy toward securing radiological sources post-invasion. While none of these sources found in Iraq had been in the form of a weapon, it is possible that they can be used in conjunction with conventional explosives which would result in a "dirty bomb." The GAO's report details the amount of materials located and transported by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Department of Energy. Of the radioactive sources that were collected, 1,100 of them were transferred to the United States, and another 700 were left in Iraq after being secured. The report clarifies that the U.S. or Iraqi ownership status of the sources kept in the United States are still being determined. The total number of sources remains unknown, though the GAO believes it is likely sources remain yet to be secured in Iraq.
--Paul Kerr, "US Failed to Secure Iraq Materials," Arms Control Today, October 2005.
3 October 2005
A resolution passes unanimously at the general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency which calls for a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East.
--"IAEA Calls for Nuclear Weapon-Free Middle East," Global Security Newswire, 3 October 2005.
20 October 2005
Former State Department official, Army Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson states that while U.S. and foreign officials were justified prior to the 2003 invasion in believing Iraq had possession of chemical and biological weapons, there was no agreement on whether or not Saddam had attempted to reconstruct a nuclear weapons program. Wilkerson served as chief of staff to Colin Powell while Powell was Secretary of State. He goes on to say that while there was no consensus in the Bush administration on determining if Iraq posed an imminent threat to the United States, a small faction of senior officials dominated by Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld made the decision to pursue invasion.
--David Ruppe, "Saddam 'Spoofed' US on Chemical, Biological Weapons, Former State Department Official Says," Global Security Newswire, 20 October 2005.
25 October 2005
IAEA inspectors verify nuclear material in Iraq held near the al-Tuwaythah complex. The United Nations Resolution 1051 had requested that the Director-General of the IAEA submit progress reports on Iraq nuclear verification semi-annually to the Security Council. For the first time since March 17, 2003, the IAEA inspectors are able to verify all nuclear material subject to safeguards.
--"IAEA Inspectors Verify Iraqi Nuclear Material Remains Subject to Safeguards," 25 October 2005, in FBIS document EUP20051026001011.
3 November 2005
A hearing is held in Rome concerning forged documents given to the United States and Britain by Italy detailing a deal between Iraq and Niger in which Iraq attempted to purchase 500 tons of uranium concentrate. The parliamentary commission overseeing secret services questions Nicolo Pollari, director of Italy's SISMI intelligence agency, and Gianni Letta, cabinet undersecretary and one of Premier Silvio Berlusconi's top aides, in regards to the documents. General Pollari identifies a spy named Rocco Martino as the origin of the forgery. The false documents stating a relationship between Iraq and Niger and the acquisition of yellowcake were one of the justifications given by the Bush administration for the war in Iraq.
--Ariel David, "Italian Officials Questioned on Disputed Claim of Iraq Uranium Deal," Associated Press, 3 November 2005; Elaine Sciolino, "Source of Forged Niger-Iraq Uranium Documents Identified," The New York Times, 4 November 2005.
5 November 2005
The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation concludes that financial gain, not desire to influence foreign policy, was the motivation underlying the forgery of documents regarding Nigerian uranium ore sought by Iraq.
--"FBI: Financial Gain Drove Uranium Forgery," Associated Press, 5 November 2005.
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Updated May 2006 |
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