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The overall executive and coordinating agency in charge of all Israel's activities in the non-conventional field--national policy, doctrine, R&D, production capabilities, preparedness, production, etc.--is the highly classified administration of Special Means (in Hebrew Emtzaim Myuchadim) at the Ministry of Defense. The head of that bureau also has the title of Assistant to the Minister of Defense for Special Means.
This Special Means Bureau at the Ministry of Defense was established in 1992, by then-Minister of Defense Moshe Arens, as a direct lesson of the first Gulf War. During that war, as Israel was attacked by some 40 Iraqi Scud missiles, it became evident that too many governmental agencies and organizations had some responsibility for CBW threats, but no one was really in charge of the overall national coordination at the Ministry of Defense. During the war it became evident that Israel was not well prepared for an Iraqi CBW attack, there was no adequate chain of responsibility and command at the MOD, and there was no single authority responsible for overall coordination and preparations. The establishment of the new bureau at MOD was a direct response to this lack.
The Special Means Bureau at the Israeli MOD coordinates the missions and activities of a number of organizations. The primary R&D organization in the area of BW is IIBR.
Israel Institute of Biological Research (IIBR) (In Hebrew: Ha-Machon Habiologi)
The principal organization for scientific R&D (and, to some extent, also over matters of policy as well) in the BW area is the IIBR, which is located in the town of Ness Ziona.
The primary mandate of the IIBR is to serve as the locus of Israel's commitment to maintain and preserve physical infrastructure and human expertise in the area of CBW in a manner that fits Israel's basic needs in this area. This mandate is consistent with Israel's basic commitment to maintain centers of national expertise and physical infrastructure in certain scientific areas with clear relevance to national security. Israel's commitment to a "knowledge base" implies advanced applied research in areas relevant to BW and bio-terrorism. Such a commitment constitutes the most basic mission of IIBR.
As noted earlier, the IIBR was founded in 1952 by Professor Ernest Bergmann--Ben Gurion's science adviser and the head of R&D at MOD--and Dr. Alexander Keynan. From its inception the IIBR was structured according to a "dual identity" system. For security and some other administrative/bureaucratic purposes, it was regarded as a highly classified defense research center ("Machon 2") operated and funded by the MOD's Division of Research (EMET). But for representative and civic-scientific functions, however, it was named the Israel Institute for Biological Research (IIBR), under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister's Office. Bergmann recognized the intrinsic civil-military ambiguity of CBW research and thought that giving the laboratory a broad research mandate would provide a legitimate cover for its scientists. By maintaining a legitimate structure and rationale for IIBR, Bergmann sought to attract first-rate scientists by offering them the kinds of intellectual and material benefits available at academic institutions: publishing research in scientific journals, attending conferences, taking sabbatical leaves, and so forth.[20]
Today, more than five decades later, much of Bergmann's founding concept has survived the passage of time, and the changes in both science and politics. It appears that Bergmann's outlook is embedded in the organizational concept that prevails in much of the operation of the IIBR today. On the organizational level, the IIBR, like the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, is still formally under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister's office. All its employees are considered employees of the Prime Minister's office. But IIBR is coordinated and budgeted by the Special Means Bureau at the MOD. On the doctrinal-policy level, the IIBR is the agency with the primary national responsibility to identify, analyze, articulate options, and ultimately implement Israel's response to all CBW threats.
The mission statement of IIBR—as it appears in its website—reflects its broad scientific mandate, built upon the ambiguity of dual use. In accordance with this philosophy IIBR's expertise are presented in the following vague way: "Backed by close to five decades of experience, the Israel Institute of Biological Research—IIBR—specializes in applied research, development and production in the fields of biology, chemistry, ecology and public health, in addition to basic research studies emanating from IIBR's applied projects."
According to its website, IIBR is organized into three scientific divisions—Biology, Medicinal Chemistry, and Environmental Sciences—which "cooperate in a synergistic relationship, enabling the formation of optimum interdisciplinary teams tailored to the needs of each individual project." The Institute's staff comprises approximately 300 employees, about 150 of them scientists holding Ph.D.s in biology, biochemistry, biotechnology, chemistry, mathematics, pharmacology, physics, and environmental sciences. IIBR's technical staff consists of 100 certified technicians, representing a broad spectrum of capabilities.
IIBR's capabilities and expertise are consistent with a full array of activities associated with a sophisticated BW program, both on the defensive and offensive sides. Yet the website carefully avoids the issues of policy motivations and intent for IIBR's research.
As long as Israel as a nation has no policy statement on the matter of BW, the objectives behind IIBR's capabilities remain obscure—even suspicious—as well.
[20] In those days, national CBW programs were not illegal or even at odds with international norms. The 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use in war of CBW, is silent about developing, producing, and stockpiling such weapons. Moreover, many countries that ratified the Geneva Protocol did so while reserving the right to employ CBW for retaliation in kind. (In any case, Israel signed the 1925 Geneva protocol only in February 1969). By the 1950s, all three major Western (and NATO) powers--the United States, the United Kingdom, and France--had offensive CBW capabilities. Bergmann was well aware of those activities.
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Updated April 2004 |
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