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The overall executive and coordinating agency in charge of all Israel's activities in the CW and BW fields—national concept, doctrine, R&D, production capabilities, preparedness, production, etc.—is the highly classified administration of Special Means (in Hebrew Emtzaim Myuchadim) at the Ministry of Defense. The head of that bureau also has the title of Assistant to the Minister of Defense for Special Means.
This Special Means Bureau at the Ministry of Defense was established in 1992, under Minister of Defense Moshe Arens, as a direct lesson of the first Gulf War. During that war, as Israel was attacked by some 40 Iraqi Scud missiles, it became evident that too many governmental agencies and organizations had some responsibility for CW and BW threats but no one was really in charge of overall national coordination at the Ministry of Defense (MOD). There was a serious problem of coordination of the various agencies involved in this effort. During the war it became evident that Israel was not well prepared for an Iraqi CW attack, there was no adequate chain of responsibility and command at the Ministry of Defense, and there was no single authority responsible for overall coordination and preparations. The establishment of the new bureau at MOD was a direct response to this lack.
The principal organization for scientific R&D (and, to some extent, also over matters of policy as well) is the Israel Institute for Biological Research (IIBR) (in Hebrew: Ha-Machon Habiologi) in Ness Ziona. The IIBR functions as Israel's prime laboratory for defense-related chemical and biological research. As noted, the IIBR was founded in 1952 by Professor Ernest Bergmann (Ben-Gurion's science adviser and the head of R&D at MOD) and Dr. Alexander Keynan as the CW and BW component in the defense-related R&D system. From its inception, the IIBR was structured along the "dual identity" philosophy.
Bergmann's prevailing philosophy was that Israel must set up a national laboratory responsible for scientific areas relevant to national security. He was a great believer in the vision of national science: the role of the state in promoting and preserving scientific R&D with broad national implications (primarily for national security). The main areas in which he sought to establish his vision of "national science" were nuclear and chemical/biological research.
This philosophy underlined a long dispute between Bergmann and Keynan and some of the senior bureaucrats at the MOD and the Treasury. Bergmann and Keynan believed that, given Israel's poverty in national infrastructure, its investment must aim at building national infrastructure and capabilities. Their critics at the MOD insisted that, given Israel's limited financial resources, investment must be directed only at specific projects with clear military meaning. (Bergmann's counter argument was that only with national infrastructure would it be possible to move into specific projects.) It appears that both sides invoked the issue of CBW as a way to rationalize their positions.
With Ben-Gurion's approval, Bergmann set up IIBR as the scientific organization for government-sponsored research in the chemical and biological areas: it is funded by the MOD but under the official jurisdiction of the Prime Minister's Office. For security and other bureaucratic purposes, the IIBR was regarded as a highly classified defense research center operated and funded by the MOD's Division of Research (EMET). For representative and scientific functions, however, it was named the Israel Institute for Biological Research, under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister's Office.
Implicit in this approach was the view that, regardless of any specific and current military needs or doctrine, Israel must maintain a "leading edge" in certain scientific areas, and develop and preserve certain scientific know-how in areas with clear relevance for defense. Today, more than five decades later, it is clear that much of Bergmann's founding concept has survived the passage of time, and the changes in both science and politics. It appears that Bergmann's outlook is embedded in the organizational concept that prevails in the operation of the IIBR today.
Despite Bergmann's grand plans and ideas, there were major limitations to this philosophy. The IIBR has always been a relatively small research center. Some anecdotal historical data can illustrate this point. In the year 1964-65, for example, the total funding for IIBR was about $1 million, of which more than half came from the government and the rest from external sources (for outside, non-classified, projects). The authorized budget was much smaller, about $600,000. About 70% went for salaries, 20% for research proper, and the rest for administrative costs.[22] For comparative purposes, in 1966, Israel's total government budget was about $1.6 billion and the defense budget was nearly $400 million, of which about 10% ($41 million) went for defense R&D.[23] All in all, the actual budget of IIBR was approximately 2% of the entire R&D budget of the Ministry of Defense.
The current public mission statement of IIBR—as it appears on its website—reflects its broad scientific mandate, built upon the ambiguity of dual use. In accordance with this philosophy IIBR's specialties are broadly defined in the following way: "Backed by close to five decades of experience, the Israel Institute of Biological Research—IIBR—specializes in applied research, development and production in the fields of biology, chemistry, ecology and public health, in addition to basic research studies emanating from IIBR's applied projects." [24]
According to its website, IIBR is organized into three scientific divisions—Biology, Medicinal Chemistry, and Environmental Sciences—which "cooperate in a synergistic relationship, enabling the formation of optimum interdisciplinary teams tailored to the needs of each individual project." The Institute's staff comprises approximately 300 employees, about 150 of them scientists holding Ph.D.'s in biology, biochemistry, biotechnology, chemistry, mathematics, pharmacology, physics, and environmental sciences. IIBR's technical staff consists of 100 certified technicians, representing a broad spectrum of capabilities.
According to its website, IIBR's Division of Medicinal Chemistry conducts research on the synthesis of fine chemicals and drugs, environmental and biopharmaceutical analysis, pharmacology and behavior assessment, and Alzheimer's disease and related disorders. The Division of Environmental Sciences does research in the fields of atmospheric optics, air pollution meteorology and risk assessment, physical surface chemistry, and detectors and biosensors. With respect to biosensor development, IIBR has interdisciplinary capabilities including the chemistry of detectors (reagents, shelf life), air sampling, exposure experiments (sensitivity), mechanics, and electronics.
IIBR's capabilities and expertise are consistent with a full array of activities associated with a sophisticated CW program, both on the defensive and offensive sides. The website carefully avoids the issues of policy motivation and intent for IIBR's research. The IIBR website inescapably (but vaguely) indicates that Israel is scientifically advanced in terms of its CW capabilities, possibly even as a deliberate way to project deterrence.
Nevertheless, the specifics of the research projects undertaken in the IIBR facility, and intents behind them, are highly classified. Ever since the founding of IIBR, Israel has erected a thick wall of secrecy around it, reinforced by strict military censorship. As a matter of policy, IIBR employees, including the director-general, are strictly prohibited to speak with the media. IIBR has no official spokesman, and the spokesman for the Prime Minister's Office is the only individual who is authorized to respond to press queries about the institute. In the early days, secrecy was so pervasive that IIBR's existence was hardly acknowledged, but this situation changed in the early 1990s. The IIBR facility in Ness Ziona—like Israel's nuclear facility at Dimona—is one of the nation's most guarded and most secretive installations. The Ness Ziona facility is treated by the security establishment not as a civic laboratory but rather as a most sensitive defense installation.
Over the years the single building hidden in the orange grove at the outskirts of Ness Ziona has grown into many acres of a well-secured campus surrounded by a 6 foot-high concrete wall topped with electronic sensors that reveal the exact location of any intruder. For security reasons, the complex is even deleted from aerial survey photographs and maps of the town; orange groves are inserted instead.
[22] Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence and Arms Control."
[23] Ibid.
[24] IIBR website, <http://www.iibr.gov.il/profile.htm>.
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Updated April 2004 |
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