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It is believed that in 1948 Israel began an offensive chemical warfare (CW) program, under which it developed, tested, produced, and possibly even deployed CW munitions. However, it is unlikely that this offensive CW program exists today. Israel signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on January 13, 1993, but has not ratified it. Given that Israel's Arab neighbors did not sign the CWC (and some of them do possess great quantities of CW), Israel probably maintains advanced know-how in the CW field.
Israel has revealed nothing about its CW capabilities, past or present. All information regarding CW—history, military doctrine, and capabilities—remains shrouded in secrecy. Inevitably, any effort to reconstruct Israel's CW history and status is bound to be incomplete, partial, and, to some extent, interpretative.
History
To understand why and how Israel committed itself so early on to pursuing non-conventional weaponry, one must understand fundamental Israeli attitudes on matters of security and survival at the time. It was the same ethos, rationale, and people who led Israel to pursue this weaponry. David Ben-Gurion, Israel's father-founder, was deeply convinced that small minorities that cannot protect themselves in a hostile environment face a real threat of genocide. The Holocaust only highlighted this conviction: genocidal catastrophe did happen to the Jewish people, the world did not intervene to save the Jews, and it could happen again. The lesson was that Israel must be strong enough to ensure that it will never happen again.
Imbued with these lessons of the Holocaust, Ben-Gurion was consumed by fears for Israel's security. While Israel's War of Independence concluded in 1949 with an impressive Israeli victory, Ben-Gurion was already convinced that the cessation of hostilities would not lead to a lasting peace, but would be only a temporary pause before the next round of Arab-Israeli military conflict.[1] He perceived Arab hostility towards Israel as deep and enduring.[2]
Israel's pursuit of CW and other non-conventional weaponry was a direct response to this security anxiety. Israel's quest for CW started as early as its War of Independence in 1948. It so happened that the few defense scientists who surrounded Ben-Gurion in 1948—especially Professor Ernst David Bergmann and the Katachalsky (Katzir) brothers—all came from the fields of chemistry and microbiology. Their outlook reinforced Ben-Gurion's conviction that Israel could gain an advantage over its enemies by investing in science and technology. These scientists were the founders of the Science Corps within the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), known by the acronym HEMED.[3]
As Israel's War of Independence ended in 1949, a period of reorganization began at both the IDF and the Ministry of Defense (MOD).[4] As part of this organizational overhaul, HEMED was converted into MOD-sponsored civilian research centers ("Machons"). The Israel Institute of Biological Research (IIBR) was founded in 1952, as a merger of two HEMED research centers, one for biology and the other chemistry. Bergmann, Ben-Gurion's science adviser, insisted that to further national security, Israel must set up a laboratory to be in charge of all biological and chemical R&D relevant to the national interest, in particular chemical and biological weapons (CBW) capabilities. Given the fact that the Arab states had no CBW programs in the early 1950s, one can only assume that Bergmann and his colleagues—like their contemporaries in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—thought primarily about "offensive" CW capabilities.[5]
All indications are that from early on, Ben-Gurion and his associates viewed the atomic bomb—and not CW or biological weapons—as the ultimate unconventional response to Israel's security anxiety. In the early to mid-1950s, however, an Israeli nuclear capability was still far in the future, so CBW capabilities were seen as a way to fill the gap in terms of weapons of last resort.
When Ben-Gurion returned to power in 1955, he launched a crash project to develop "a cheap non-conventional capability."[6] Convinced that war with Egypt was inevitable and imminent, Ben-Gurion decided to "set up another line of defense, beyond the conventional means of the IDF, in case the enemy [Egypt] would use non-conventional weapons on the battlefield or against the civilian population."[7] He ordered that this non-conventional capability be made operational, i.e., weaponized and stockpiled, as soon as possible and before a war with Egypt broke out. This "cheap non-conventional capability," which preceded the nuclear option, was CW.
In his book RAFAEL, Munya Mardor, the founder of Israel's Weapons Development Authority (RAFAEL), refers obliquely to that "crash project" (but he never refers to it as a CW project) and reveals that Ben-Gurion monitored its progress closely. He notes that Ben-Gurion asked detailed questions about the pace of production, "evidently concerned that we would not meet the deadline he had set, worrying that the enemy would have such capability and we would have nothing to deter or retaliate."[8] Mardor hints that the emergency transition from research to crash development and then production of the "final products" posed an extraordinary challenge for the project's managers. The Israeli CW program involved a crushing timetable, procurement of equipment and material from overseas, and the conversion of research facilities—as well as commercial industrial plants—to production.[9]
Reportedly, around 1960 Israel collaborated with France on CW matters. It was rumored that Israeli scientists visited the French CW testing range at Beni Ounif in the Algerian Sahara.[10] Those claims remain unconfirmed.
As Egypt had used CW in the Yemen war in the period 1963-67, Israeli military leaders were concerned on the eve of the 1967 Six-Day War about the possibility that Egypt might resort again to CW, either as battlefield weapons or as strategic weapons against Israeli civilians. In response to these concerns, Israel purchased tens of thousands of gas masks in Europe (primarily from West Germany) just days before the war. There are also clear indications that Israel deployed its own CW capability and made it operational. According to one Israeli analyst, "Egypt did not resort to chemical warfare because it feared Israeli retaliation in kind."[11]
No information is available about how Israel thought it would utilize chemical weapons in hostilities. However, there is some evidence that in this period senior Israeli military officers viewed CW as "nasty" but still proper for an in kind retaliatory response.[12] Israel did not sign the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the first use of chemical and biological weapons, but leaves open the possibility of a response in kind until February 1969.
In October 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel to regain territories lost in the Six-Day War of 1967; chemical weapons were not used in this war. In the period after the 1973 war, as Israel further expanded its conventional and nuclear superiority, Israelis came to view the policy of nuclear ambiguity as providing benefits of existential deterrence at a low political cost. In response, the Arabs started to promote the notion that CW and BW might become their own strategic weapons—the so-called "poor man's bombs"—to offset Israel's nuclear capability. While Israeli military planners saw the utility and value of CW as declining, they committed Israel to maintaining an R&D capacity in the CW field (for defense as well as for retaliation). Israel's high-profile participation in the Paris conference on CW in 1989 confirmed that even after Iraq employed CW during the Iran-Iraq War, Israel still did not view CW as posing an existential threat to its security.
On 1 April 1990, Saddam Hussein elevated the strategic role of CW when he threatened "to make fire burn half of Israel," using what he called "the binary chemical weapon," should Israel strike "at some Iraqi industrial installation."[13] Both before and during the 1991 Gulf War, Israeli military planners were concerned that Saddam would launch a limited CW strike against Israeli territory in a deliberate effort either to call the bluff of Israel's nuclear deterrent threat vis-à-vis CW or to provoke an Israeli nuclear response. Some Israeli strategists even worried that Saddam might attempt to trap Israel in some kind of nuclear demonstration. Worried that escalation could provoke Israel into a nuclear demonstration, Israeli Minister of Science Yuval Ne'eman publicly suggested in July 1990 that if Iraq used CW against Israel, Israel should retaliate "with the same merchandise."[14] Ne'eman proposed to the Israeli Cabinet that in facing Iraq's CW threat, Israel should issue a credible CW threat of its own. Thus, Israel would not be forced to cross the nuclear threshold in response to an Iraqi chemical attack. Ne'eman made his proposal public, but it was not endorsed officially. Apparently, there was no great desire to qualify or diminish the effect of Israel's nuclear deterrence by stating in advance that use of chemical weapons would not invoke an Israeli nuclear response.
The conclusion of the CWC in late 1992 posed a challenge for Israeli policy. The CWC includes the right to demand short-notice challenge inspections of any facility on the territory of a member-state, posing a potential threat to the off-limits status of the Dimona nuclear facility. Nevertheless, Israeli political decisionmakers thought that CW offered the best WMD issue on which Israel could demonstrate a more open-minded attitude towards arms control. In 1992-93, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin saw signing the CWC as a "net benefit" for Israel. Even if major Arab states refused to join the CWC, an Israeli decision to sign would probably improve its position in Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS), a multilateral group devoted exclusively to security issues formed shortly after the opening round of the Middle East Peace Process in Madrid in October 1991. Ultimately, the Rabin government recognized that signing a treaty, while an important symbolic act, is not the final word; only ratification makes the commitment final. Guided by these considerations and pressured by the United States, Israel signed the CWC on 13 January 1993, the first day it was open for signature.[15] As a signatory to the treaty, Israel could participate in the CWC Preparatory Commission, which devised the CWC's verification provisions before its entry into force. Given Israel's concerns about challenge inspections, Israeli representatives were actively involved in negotiating the verification procedures, particularly the issue of "managed access."
Israel has not ratified the CWC, despite the U.S. ratification in April 1997, and the treaty's entry into force a few days later. When the issue of Israeli ratification resurfaced as a priority policy issue in 1997, a high-level ad hoc ministerial committee, headed by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, was formed to re-examine the Israeli position on the CWC. This committee included Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, Commerce Minister Natan Sharansky, and National Infrastructure Minister Ariel Sharon.[16] After a series of meetings, the committee quietly decided to take a "wait and see" attitude, that is, not to submit the CWC to the Israeli parliament for ratification in the immediate future, but to keep the issue open pending a future review. As Minister Mordechai put it: "I think that we have to wait and see how things develop. The problem is that some of the states in the region are not signing, and there is no way of inspecting those who are [not signing]. We had discussion in the cabinet, and we decided to postpone a decision for a certain period. We will discuss it again."[17]
Status
It is believed that Israel had an offensive CW program, but the present status of this program is unknown. It is also believed that Israel produced and deployed CW munitions, but the current status of this stockpile is unknown. Israel probably still maintains some sort of CW retaliatory capability, but its exact status is unknown. Israel signed but did not ratify the CWC and thus to what extent Israel considers itself committed to the spirit of the CWC is also unknown.
Given that Israel's Arab neighbors did not sign the CWC, and some of them do possess great quantities of CW, it is widely believed that Israel maintains advanced know-how in the CW field, including weaponization and environmental effects on targets. There is little doubt that Israel's chemical infrastructure can easily be diverted to quickly produce great quantities.
Israel's interest in keeping its infrastructure strong and updated is motivated by the general Israeli philosophy that the nation must maintain a technological edge in terms of know-how in any area of defense R&D. It is also motivated by the view that Israel should "hedge" against the unknown future, including the possibility of being attacked by CW.
Key Sources and Notes:
[1] David Ben Gurion, War Diaries, 1948-1949, Vol. 3 (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Misrad Habitachon, 1982), pp. 852-53.
[2] DBGD, 26 April 1949; DBGD, 23 October 1950; Zaki Shalom, David Ben-Gurion: The State of Israel and the Arab World 1949-1956 (in Hebrew) (Sdeh Boker: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 1995).
[3] Ephraim Katzir, "The Beginning of Defense Research: Ben Gurion and the HEMED" (in Hebrew), in David Ben-Gurion and the Development of Science in Israel (Jerusalem: Israel National Academy of Science, 1989), p. 37.
[4] Munya Mardor, RAFAEL (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publication, 1981), pp. 53-66, 78-79, 104-06.
[5] At that time, it was not illegal for states to develop such capabilities; establishing national CBW programs was not at odds with international norms. All three major Western (and NATO) powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—had significant CBW programs. Bergmann was well aware of the activities of those programs. While the Geneva protocol of 1925 prohibited first use of CBW, it said nothing about developing, producing, or even using of those weapons in strict retaliatory fashion.
[6] Aluf Benn, "The Project that Preceded the Nuclear Project," Haaretz, 2 March 1995.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Mardor, RAFAEL, p. 39.
[9] Ibid., pp. 128-129.
[10] Seymour Hersh, The Samson Option (New York: Random House), pp. 63-64.
[11] Danny Shoham, "Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt," The Nonproliferation Review 5 (Spring Summer 1998), p. 49.
[12] Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review 8 (Fall-Winter 2001).
[13] Alan Cowell, "Iraqi Chief, Boasting of Poison Gas, Warns of Destruction if Israel Strikes," New York Times, 3 April 1990.
[14] "Israeli See Chemical Option Against Iraq," New York Times, 28 July 1990.
[15] Gerald Steinberg, "Israeli Policy on the CWC," OPCW Synthesis, November 2000, pp. 9-13.
[16] Steve Rodan, "Bitter Choices: Israel's Chemical Dilemma," Jerusalem Post, 15 August 1997, p. 10; David Makovsky, "Israel Must Ratify Chemical Treaty," Ha'aretz, January 8, 1998; Aluf Benn, "Chemical Weapons Convention: Israel's Decision Time," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57 (March-April 2001), pp. 22-24.
[17] Ze'ev Schiff, "An interview with Yitzhak Mordechai," Ha'aretz, 16 April 1998, p. 10. See also Steinberg, "Israeli Policy on the CWC."
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Updated February 2006 |
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