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LOCATION: City of Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan
SUBORDINATION: Previously subordinate to the Soviet
Biopreparat. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the SNOPB was converted
into the Joint Stock Company Biomedpreparat, and was put under the control of
the National Center for Biotechnology (NCB).
ACTIVITIES: During the Soviet
period the SNOPB was engaged in production of various offensive BW agents
(particularly anthrax). Today, the facility is involved in civilian research and
production.
STATUS: In operation as a Joint Stock Company Biomedpreparat.
HISTORY:
Founded in 1982, the SNOPB tested and certified pilot-scale
and large-scale methods of producing BW agents developed in the laboratories of
Biopreparat and the MOD, and issued technical documentation and recommendations.
Although formerly under the control of the civilian Main Administration of
Microbiological Industry (Glavmikrobioprom), the SNOPB was a military-run BW
organization reporting to the Biopreparat authorities. Western and Russian
experts have referred to the SNOPB as the Soviet Union's main facility for the
manufacture of biological weapons and one of the largest installations ever
created for this purpose. According to estimates by Western experts, the SNOPB
facility had the capability to produce 300 metric tons of weapons-grade anthrax
over a ten-month period. However, full production never took place.
After
its establishment, the SNOPB continued research and development work on anthrax
that previously had been conducted at the MOD institute in Sverdlovsk, Russia
but was curtailed after the 1979 accidental deadly release of anthrax spores
from the facility. From 1984 to 1987, core specialists and equipment from
Sverdlovsk were transferred to the SNOPB. By 1988, the SNOPB developed the
Soviet Union's most deadly weapons-grade anthrax agent. The other activities of
Stepnogorsk facility included production of staphylococcus toxin and also the
development and experimental production of several civilian products such as
vaccines, diagnostic tools, herbicides, and medicines. In addition to staff from
Sverdlovsk, specialists from the MOD research center in Kirov, Russia, also
worked at the SNOPB.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow
stopped providing financial support for the SNOPB, resulting in a large exodus
of biotechnology specialists. After work had ceased at the SNOPB, special
decontamination measures were undertaken, and some military-related equipment
was dismantled and destroyed. In 1993, a Presidential Edict founded the National
Center for Biotechnology (NCB), which brought together most of the former Soviet
military and civilian biotechnology facilities in Kazakhstan, including the
SNOPB. At the same time, the SNOPB was reorganized into a joint stock company
called AO Biomedpreparat for which initial funding was provided by the
Kazakhstani State Program on Conversion. The facility started the production of
various civilian products. However, Biomedpreparat encountered difficulties
associated with the high cost of maintaining and amortizing the buildings, high
energy consumption, large workforce, and management and transportation costs. As
a result, the company's products were overpriced and noncompetitive. The
financial support by the Kazakhstani government in 1993-1994, totaling $1
million, was not sufficient to fully reconstruct the facility for civilian needs
or to provide all the former BW specialists with civilian jobs.
In 1994,
US-Kazakhstani cooperation began under the US Department of Defense's
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. Under this program, the US
government and US partner firms provided investments to Biomedpreparat, totaling
$5.8 million, for joint US-Kazakhstani production of civilian products. However,
the deal failed because of mismanagement and lack of infrastructure at the
facility. In March 1996, US-Kazakhstani intergovernmental negotiations
continued, but this time focusing on dismantlement and destruction of remaining
military equipment and systems at the Stepnogorsk facility, which still could
pose a proliferation risk. The two sides also discussed a possibility of
converting the remaining infrastructure and scientific expertise to civilian
research and production. On the basis of these negotiations, on 5 December 1996,
Kazakhstan and the United States signed a contract that provided funds for
dismantling the main and auxiliary equipment at Biomedpreparat designed for
military microbiological production.
The CTR program was implemented in
four phases. Phase one (completed in May 1998) included the elaboration of
management plan, initial sampling and analysis, inventory of equipment and
facilities, setting up of a safety monitoring laboratory, and creation of a
dismantlement plan. The second phase (completed in September 2000) resulted in
the dismantlement of three buildings at the facility. The third phase (completed
in December 2000) was designed to prepare documentation for the fourth, and the
final phase included the removal of ancillary equipment from the buildings of
the facility.
In 2006, as part of the Biological Weapons
Infrastructure Elimination and Biosecurity and Biosafety (BS&S)/Threat Agent
Detection and Response (TADR) project, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
dismantled two former production buildings 221 and 600 at the anthrax production
plant at Stepnogorsk and constructed an epidemiological monitoring station at
the National Veterinary Center in Astana. DoD also provided training in
epidemiology and diagnostics, biosafety and bioethics, as well as vehicles and
computer technology for approximately 450 personnel. In addition, the third
Cooperative Biological Research (CBR) project of the CTR Biological Threat
Reduction Program mapped the occurrence of anthrax throughout Kazakhstan.
At present, Biomedpreparat produces ferment preparations and disposable
syringes. On 3 May 2006, the Kazakh government approved Conception of the
Republic of Kazakhstan National Center for Biotechnology Development in
2006-2008. According to this conception Biomedpreparat facilities might be used
for producing of 50 types of items (antibiotics, ferment preparations, proteins
and vitamins) and it is planning to put into operation second production line
for disposable, sterile syringes.
Key Sources: Gulbarshyn
Bozheyeva, Yerlan Kunakbayev, and Dastan Yeleukenov, "Former Soviet Biological
Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan: Past, Present and Future," Occasional Paper,
No. 1, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, June 1999; Jonathan B. Tucker and
Raymond A. Zilinskas, "The 1971 Smallpox Epidemic in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, and the
Soviet Biological Warfare Program," Occasional Paper No. 9, Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, June 2002; Jonathan B. Tucker's speech during the
briefing on "Biological Decontamination of Vozrozhdeniye Island: The US-Uzbek
Agreement"; BW Materials Security and Transparency, Cooperative Threat Reduction
(CTR) webpage at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Website,
<http://www.dtra.mil/ctr/ctr_kazakhstan.html>; Gennadiy Lepeshkin,
"Byvshiye obyekty po razrabotke BO v Tsentralnoy Azii," Problemy
Nerasprastraneniya, Special Edition, April 2001; Yevgeniy Troitskiy,
"Fizicheskaya zashita, uchet i kontrol biomaterialov v NISKhI MON RK," Problemy
Nerasprastraneniya, Special Edition, April 2001; "Cooperative Threat Reduction
Annual Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2008," 31 December 2006, Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, <http://www.dtra.mil>; "Conception of the Republic of
Kazakhstan National Center for Biotechnology Development in 2006-2008,"
Government Decree No.363, 3 May 2006, Kazakhstan government official website,
<http://ru.government.kz/docs/p060363~2.htm>.
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Updated March 2008 |
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