Central Asian States Finalize Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, February 2005
Central Asian States Achieve Breakthrough on Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, September 2002
Progress Towards a Central Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, December 1997
1996 Draft UN Resolution
Almaty Declaration
Tashkent Conference
President Karimov's Address
Uzbek Foreign Minister's Address
Russian Statement
US Remarks
Tashkent Declaration
UN CANWFZ Resolution
US Statement
Bishkek Communiqué
(February 2005)
Taking an important step toward strengthening the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, diplomats from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan met on February 7-9, 2005, and finalized the text of a treaty establishing a Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone (CANWFZ).[1] The meeting, held in Tashkent, concluded talks on finalizing the treaty that had been under way since September 2002, when the five states initially agreed on a draft text.[2] Since September 2002, the Central Asian states have also conducted consultations on the draft treaty with the nuclear weapon states—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. One of the primary purposes of the Tashkent meeting, according to an Uzbek Foreign Ministry spokesman, was to address the comments on the original draft treaty made by the nuclear weapon states.[3]
The revised draft treaty that emerged from the Tashkent meeting contains only a few changes from the September 2002 text. The first change is that the revised draft will allow the import of low- and medium-level radioactive waste into the CANWFZ, as long as the imports are managed in accordance with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) standards. The previous draft had prohibited all imports of radioactive waste. This change was made at the request of Kazakhstan, which has been considering changing its domestic legislation to allow the commercial import of low- and medium-level radioactive waste for long-term storage. A second change is that the revised treaty does not specifically provide for neighboring states to join the CANWFZ, as did the original draft. Third, the new draft treaty establishes Kyrgyzstan as the depositary state for the treaty. The previous draft had provided that the United Nations would serve as the depositary. This last change is most likely a political gesture, intended to recognize the role that Kyrgyzstan played in negotiating the treaty. The other provisions of the draft treaty remain largely unchanged.[2]
The pending establishment of the CANWFZ is particularly significant because thousands of Soviet nuclear weapons were once based in Central Asia. The new zone also borders on regions of proliferation concern, such as the Middle East and South Asia. Further enhancing its importance, the CANWFZ will border on two nuclear weapon states, Russia and China, and it will be the first nuclear-weapon-free zone located entirely in the Northern Hemisphere. The terms of the treaty itself buttress the nonproliferation regime as they oblige the Central Asian states to accept enhanced IAEA safeguards on their nuclear material and require them to meet international recommendations regarding security of their nuclear facilities. Considering current concerns that Central Asia could become a source of terrorist activity or a transit corridor for terrorist smuggling of nuclear materials, these terms of the CANWFZ should be viewed as a positive step in the ongoing international struggle against terrorism. In a unique feature, the treaty also recognizes the environmental damage done to Central Asia by the Soviet nuclear weapons program and pledges to support environmental rehabilitation.
Following the meeting, the five Central Asian states issued a joint statement calling on all other states—especially the nuclear weapon states—to support the initiative to create a CANWFZ. They also declared their intent to sign the newly revised treaty “as soon as possible.”[4] The five states also announced after the session that the signing ceremony for the treaty would be held at the former Soviet nuclear test site in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan.[5] Although a date for the signing of the treaty was not announced, it may be as early as this summer. While Russia and China voiced support for the 2002 draft CANWFZ treaty, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States reportedly expressed reservations, and it remains to be seen whether the revisions agreed to at the Tashkent meeting will lead them to now support the agreement.
Sources: [1] “V Tashkente soglasovan tekst dorovora o zone svobodnoy ot yadernogo oruzhiya v Tsentralnoy Azii” [Text of the treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia agreed in Tashkent], ITAR-TASS, February 9, 2005. [2] For details of September 2002 draft treaty, see Scott Parrish, “Central Asian States Achieve Breakthrough on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty,” CNS Research Story of the Week, September 30, 2002, CNS website, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020930.htm>. [3] “V Tashkente sostoitsya zasedaniye regionalnoy gruppy ekspertov” [Regional experts group will meet in Tashkent], RIA Novosti, February 7, 2005. [4] “Tashkentskoye zayavleniye predstaviteley Tsentralno-Aziatskikh gosudarstv po sozdaniyu zony, svobodnoy ot yadernogo oruzhiya v Tsentralnoy Azii” [Tashkent declaration by representatives of the Central Asian states on the establishment of a Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone], February 9, 2005. [5] “Dogovor o bezyadernoy zone v Tsentralnoy Azii budet podpisan v Semipalatinske” [Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty will be signed in Semipalatinsk], ITAR-TASS, February 10, 2005.
(September 2002)
By Scott Parrish
In a major step strengthening the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, diplomats from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have agreed on the text of a treaty establishing a Central Asian nuclear weapon-free zone (CANWFZ). The agreement, announced in Samarkand, Uzbekistan on 27 September 2002, concludes five years of talks that began in 1997. It clears the way for the creation of the world’s fifth nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ), alongside those in Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, and Africa. The Central Asian states intend to sign the treaty as soon as possible, most likely at the former Soviet nuclear weapons test site at Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, during a visit to the region by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in mid-October.
The establishment of the CANWFZ is particularly significant because thousands of Soviet nuclear weapons were once based in Central Asia. The new zone also borders on regions of proliferation concern, such as the Middle East and South Asia. Further enhancing its importance, the CANWFZ will border on two nuclear weapon states, Russia and China, and it will be the first nuclear weapon-free zone located entirely in the northern hemisphere. The terms of the treaty itself buttress the nonproliferation regime as they oblige the Central Asian states to accept enhanced International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on their nuclear material, and require them to meet international recommendations regarding security of nuclear facilities. Considering current concerns that Central Asia could become a source or transit corridor for terrorist smuggling of nuclear materials, these terms of the CANWFZ should be viewed as a positive step in the ongoing international struggle against terrorism. In a unique feature, the treaty also recognizes the environmental damage done to Central Asia by the Soviet nuclear weapons program and pledges to support environmental rehabilitation.
The Origins and Development of the CANWFZ Concept
The agreement to establish a CANWFZ reflects the widespread support in the international community for NWFZs. Since the first NWFZ proposal in 1956, four NWFZs have been established in populated areas of the world, and NWFZs now cover the entire inhabited area of the southern hemisphere, while additional treaties ban nuclear weapons from outer space and the seabed.[1] NWFZs can be seen as both nonproliferation and disarmament measures. On the one hand, NWFZs aim to prevent the emergence of new nuclear weapon states by addressing regional security concerns. On the other hand, the slow expansion of NWFZs across the globe can also be seen as a step toward the ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons.
The idea of a CANWFZ traces its roots back to the 1992 initiative by Mongolia declaring itself a NWFZ, in which Mongolia also called for a regional NWFZ.[2] The first formal CANWFZ proposal was made by Uzbekistani President Islam Karimov at the 48th session of the UN General Assembly in 1993. Additional proposals by Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Mongolia followed in 1994-1996, but none made any headway owing to a lack of regional consensus on the issue.
The crucial step in the process of moving the CANWFZ from an abstract proposal to a concrete policy initiative was taken on 27 February 1997, when the five presidents of the Central Asian states issued the Almaty declaration endorsing the creation of a CANWFZ.[3] The declaration specifically placed the establishment of the CANWFZ in the context of the environmental challenges faced by all five Central Asian states. Each of these states housed parts of the former Soviet nuclear infrastructure, and they now confront common problems of environmental damage resulting from the production and testing of Soviet nuclear weapons.[4]
In the wake of the Almaty declaration, international support for the CANWFZ grew rapidly. At the 52nd session of the UN General Assembly, held in fall 1997, the five Central Asian states jointly submitted a draft resolution endorsing the CANWFZ initiative. Central Asian diplomats were initially uncertain how the nuclear powers would react to this draft resolution, especially since the proposed CANWFZ would border on Russia and China. The United States, Russia, China, France, and Great Britain, however, endorsed the resolution after the Central Asian states agreed to accept several amendments to its original text. The amended resolution was then adopted by consensus on 10 November 1997 by the First Main Committee of the General Assembly, and later endorsed by the full General Assembly on 9 December 1997.[5] A similar resolution endorsing the CANWFZ concept was adopted by the 55th session of UN General Assembly in fall 2000.[6]
Following this endorsement by the international community, the Central Asian states, with the assistance of the UN, the IAEA, and financial support from Japan, made rapid progress toward establishing a CANWFZ during 1998 and 1999. A working group of Central Asian diplomats began drafting a treaty establishing the zone. At a meeting in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan in July 1998, Central Asian experts discussed the basic principles of the proposed CANWFZ with representatives of the nuclear weapon states.[7] At subsequent meetings of the expert group, held in New York, Geneva, Switzerland, and Sapporo, Japan, almost all of the text of the draft treaty was agreed. Nevertheless, several significant points of disagreement remained, halting progress by mid-2000. By early 2001, some analysts had concluded that these points of disagreement were serious enough to block the establishment of a CANWFZ.[8] There were few signs of progress until mid-2002.
The Stumbling Blocks and their Resolution
The differences which threatened to block the treaty were fuelled by continuing regional rivalry among the five Central Asian states and different approaches to relations with Russia, the leading regional power. While Kazakhstan had retained fairly close ties to Russia, including on security issues, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan had taken a much more independent stance. The two principal stumbling blocks that emerged were (1) how the CANWFZ treaty would treat the possible transit of nuclear weapons through the CANWFZ; and (2) the relationship of the CANWFZ treaty to previous international agreements to which the Central Asian states are parties.
Both of these issues were apparently linked to Russian concerns about retaining future freedom of action in the Central Asian region, including the possibility of deploying nuclear weapons. In 1997 and 1998, these Russian concerns were muted, and Russian diplomats voiced support for the initiative to establish a CANWFZ.[9] This stance changed after April 1999, when the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo prompted Russia to place enhanced emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy.[10] It was at about this time that Kazakhstan stiffened its position in the negotiations on the two disputed issues.
With respect to transit, Kazakhstan argued that the treaty should allow each party to independently resolve issues related to transit of nuclear weapons through its territory by air, land, or water. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan sought to have more restrictive language placed in the treaty, with Turkmenistan taking an especially hard line on this issue.
The relationship of the CANWFZ to previous international agreements also divided the Central Asian states. Although not openly addressed, the 1992 Tashkent Collective Security Treaty, to which Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are signatories, motivated this dispute. Russia interprets the Tashkent Treaty as allowing the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on the territory of the other signatories if they reach a joint decision that it is necessary.[11] As a result, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan proposed that the CANWFZ treaty explicitly state that its provisions do not affect previous bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which are not parties to the Tashkent Treaty, refused to accept this language. Aside from these two substantive disagreements, meetings of the expert group in 2000 were further hampered by the absence of Turkmenistani diplomats.
A number of factors combined by mid-2002 to make possible the resolution of these disagreements. First, the geopolitical balance in the region changed dramatically following the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001. The United States became much more active in Central Asia, deploying military forces at bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in support of its ongoing operations in Afghanistan. Russia accepted this increased U.S. role in the region, and in turn the Central Asian states became less dependent on Russia and less subject to Russian pressure. Second, the new prominence of Central Asia as the “front line” in the struggle against terrorism transformed the CANWFZ concept from an abstract idea with only limited practical application to a much more practical mechanism that could help prevent the introduction of nuclear weapons into the region.
In addition to these geopolitical changes, a successful visit to the five Central Asian states in August 2002 by UN Undersecretary General for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala helped jump-start the negotiations. Dhanapala’s meetings with all the Central Asian foreign ministers and presidents of three of the Central Asian states gave a new impetus to efforts to find a compromise resolution to the disputed issues. Also helpful was the proposal to sign the CANWFZ treaty at the former Soviet nuclear test site in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan.
As a result of these factors, the five Central Asian states agreed at Samarkand on compromise wording of the articles in the CANWFZ treaty dealing with the previously disputed issues, clearing the way for its signature.
I am pleased to announce to this Committee that Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have just agreed -- at an expert group meeting in Samarkand -- on the text of a treaty to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. They also agreed that the signing of the treaty should take place as soon as possible. This is a significant achievement not just for the Central Asian states but also for the United Nations, which has been assisting this effort since 1997, pursuant to Resolution 52/38 S. It is all the more significant given that this region once reportedly hosted over 700 tactical nuclear weapons -- not to mention the over 1,400 former Soviet strategic nuclear weapons that Kazakhstan returned to Russia before joining the NPT in 1995.
Implications and Prospects
The establishment of a CANWFZ is a very important step forward for the global nonproliferation regime. Although none of the five states in the region has nuclear weapons, the treaty will prevent the reintroduction of nuclear weapons into this region by either the formerly dominant regional nuclear power Russia, or by the United States, which now has air bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The CANWFZ will also serve as an island of non-nuclear stability to the north and east of the Middle East and South Asia. The treaty marks an important step forward for the region as it requires the adoption of enhanced IAEA safeguards by the five Central Asian states, obligates them to adopt international recommendations for the security of their nuclear facilities, and provides for regional cooperation in the remediation of environmental damage caused by the Soviet nuclear weapons program.
One question that remains uncertain, however, is the attitude of the nuclear weapon states toward the CANWFZ. NWFZ treaties contain a protocol that is open for signature by the nuclear weapon states, in which those states pledge to respect the NWFZ and refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the states that are part of the NWFZ. In principle, the nuclear weapon states support the creation of new NWFZs. However, in practice, the nuclear weapons states have refused to sign the protocol to NWFZ treaties to which they object for various reasons. Because its terms can be interpreted as interfering with freedom of the seas, for example, none of the nuclear weapon states have signed the protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok, which established the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.
Russia has expressed reservations about the CANWFZ in the past, and may now exert pressure on the Central Asian states in an effort to either alter the terms of the treaty or block its signature. Such actions would be consistent with previous Russian efforts to prevent agreement on a CANWFZ treaty that would restrict the possibility of future Russian nuclear deployments.
The United States has not actively supported the CANWFZ in the past, saying it would wait to see the final treaty text. The United States is likely to be particularly concerned about the precedent that the CANWFZ treaty may set regarding issues of transit, negative security assurances, the relationship of the CANWFZ to other treaties, and the treaty’s possible extension to other states. Under these conditions, and given the attitude of the Bush administration toward multilateral arms control treaties, it is conceivable that the United States will withhold its support for the CANWFZ and may resist signing the protocol.
Among the other nuclear weapon states, the positions of Great Britain and France are likely to depend in large part on the position of the United States. China, which has openly supported the CANWFZ in the past, is the nuclear weapon state most likely to support the CANWFZ and sign the protocol.
By contrast, other members of the international community are already expressing support for the CANWFZ treaty. In a statement to the First Main Committee (Disarmament and International Security) of the UN General Assembly on 30 September 2002, the New Agenda Coalition, a group of states that includes Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden, welcomed the conclusion of the treaty.[12] Many other states are likely to follow their example. In his statement to the same committee, UN Undersecretary General for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala also noted that the conclusion of the treaty was a major accomplishment not just for the Central Asian states, “but also for the United Nations, which has been assisting this effort since 1997.”[13]
Although the effectiveness of the CANWFZ will be reduced if the nuclear weapon states do not sign the protocol, many positive effects will still follow if the five states of the region sign and ratify it. Regardless of the position of the nuclear weapon states, the CANWFZ enhances the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. When signed and ratified, the CANWFZ will continue the trend toward establishing NWFZs in various parts of the world that has accelerated in the last decade. At a time when disarmament and nonproliferation achievements are few and far between, the Central Asian states, the United Nations, and other organizations that played a role in achieving the CANWFZ treaty have made a significant contribution to international peace and security.
Sources:
[1] For a discussion of the development of the NWFZ concept and the negotiations that produced the existing NWFZ treaties, see Jozef Goldblat, “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: A History and Assessment,” Nonproliferation Review 4 (Spring-Summer 1997), pp. 18-31, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol04/43/goldbl43.pdf, and Jan Prawitz, “Existing NWFZs: History and Principles,” Paper Presented at the International Seminar Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones: Crucial Steps Towards A Nuclear-Free World, Uppsala, Sweden, September1-4, 2000.
[2] For more information on the Mongolian initiative, see Tariq Rauf, “Mongolia's International Security and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status,” CANCAPS Bulletin/Bulletin de CONCSAP No. 27 (November 2000), http://www.iir.ubc.ca/cancaps/cbul27.html#mongolia.
[3] “Text of Almaty Declaration on Aral Sea Pollution,” Narodnoye slovo (Tashkent), March 4, 1997, in FBIS Document FTS19970530002474.
[4] Largely because it does not share a common border with the former Soviet Central Asian states, Mongolia has not been included in the CANWFZ initiative, even though the Central Asian states generally support Mongolia's nuclear weapon-free status, and they acknowledge that they have drawn inspiration from Mongolia's example.
[5]“Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia,” United Nations General Assembly, 51st Session, Resolution 52/38 S, December 7, 1997.
[6] United Nations General Assembly, 55th Session, A/RES/55/33W, “Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia,” November 20, 2000.
[7] “Central Asian Foreign Ministers Meet on Nuclear-Free Zone,” Interfax, July 9, 1998, in FBIS Document FTS19980709000486.
[8] Scott Parrish, “Prospects for a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia,” Nonproliferation Review 8 (Spring 2001), pp. 141-148.
[9] See for example, “Moscow Welcomes Karimov's Initiative on Nuclear Weapons,” Interfax, September 16, 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970916000227; “Central Asian Foreign Ministers Meet on Nuclear-Free Zone,” Interfax, July 9, 1998; in FBIS Document FTS19980709000486.
[10] For a discussion of this issue, see Nikolai Sokov, “Russia's Nuclear Doctrine: The End Of The Period Of Transition?” paper presented at Presentation at a UN Symposium on Nuclear Doctrines, New York, October 18, 1999.
[11] CIS Collective Security Treaty, Rossiyskaya gazeta, May 23, 1992. Article 4 of the treaty states that signatories will render each other “all necessary assistance, including military assistance,” in response to aggression. It is this article that Russian officials have interpreted as allowing transit and deployment of nuclear weapons.
[12] “Statement to the First Committee on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden),” delivered by Ambassador Mary Whelan, Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations in Geneva, United Nations, New York, NY, September 30, 2002.
[13] “Statement to the First Committee of the General Assembly by UN Undersecretary General for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala,” United Nations, New York, NY, September 30, 2002.
(December 1997)
by Scott Parrish
Although it appeared unrealistic when first proposed in 1993, the establishment of a Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) now looks increasingly likely. As demonstrated by the February 1997 Almaty Declaration of the presidents of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, the five states of the region have reached consensus on the establishment of such a zone, and a working group of diplomats from the five countries has already begun preliminary work to draft a treaty which would formally create it. On the international level, the idea of establishing a Central Asian NWFZ received a strong endorsement on 10 November 1997, when the First Main Committee of the UN General Assembly passed by consensus a resolution endorsing the initiative of the five Central Asian states aimed at establishing such a zone. Particularly significant was the support of the five nuclear weapon states, some of which had in the past expressed reservations about the proposed zone. Although the process of negotiating the text of the treaty creating the proposed Central Asian NWFZ still faces obstacles and will undoubtedly take some time, it now seems probable that the fifth nuclear-weapon-free zone established in the world--following the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, and Pelindaba--will be in Central Asia. (For a general overview of the issues involved in creating nuclear-weapon-free zones, please see the Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone Question and Answer Guide (in Adobe Acrobat PDF format) by Tariq Rauf of the CNS International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program.)
Regional Consensus Takes Shape
One of the internationally recognized criteria regarding NWFZs is that they should be established "on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned," meaning that a regional consensus is necessary before a regional treaty creating such a zone can be negotiated.[1] The concept of a Central Asian NWFZ was first voiced by Uzbek President Islam Karimov at the 48th session of the UN General Assembly in 1993. It was later the subject of a proposal by the Kyrgyz and Uzbek delegations at the 1995 Review and Extension conference of the state parties to the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).[2] At the 51st session of the UN General Assembly in October 1996,š Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia submitted a draft resolution on the issue, although it was subsequently withdrawn when it did not gain the support of the other states in the region.[3] None of these proposals made much headway, however, since regional consensus on the issue did not emerge until early 1997. On 28 February 1997, the five Central Asian presidents issued the Almaty Declaration , which endorsed the creation of a Central Asian NWFZ. The declaration placed the establishment of the NWFZ in the context of the environmental challenges faced by all five Central Asian states. Each of the Central Asian states housed parts of the former Soviet nuclear infrastructure, and they now confront common problems of environmental damage resulting from the production and testing of Soviet nuclear weapons.
This regional consensus was further emphasized at the April 1997 session of the NPT Prepcom, when the states of the region agreed to form a working group of foreign ministry officials to coordinate activities related to creating a Central Asian NWFZ. The five Central Asian states also collaborated in holding an international conference on the issue in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, from 14-16 September 1997. At the Tashkent conference, experts from the four existing NWFZs discussed lessons learned during the creation of their zones which might be of use to the Central Asians as they undertake the drafting of their own regional NWFZ treaty. Following the meeting, the foreign ministers of the five Central Asian states issued the Tashkent Statement , reaffirming their commitment to establish a NWFZ and calling on the UN and other interested states to lend all possible assistance during the drafting of a treaty establishing the Central Asian NWFZ.
International Support Demonstrated at UN
In the wake of the Almaty Declaration, at the April 1997 NPT Prepcom, a number of non-nuclear weapon states endorsed the proposed Central Asian NWFZ, including a statement of support by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and individual endorsements from Australia, Canada, Egypt, Indonesia, Mongolia, New Zealand, and Poland. This international support has grown in recent months to include the nuclear powers as well. In 1994 and 1995, both Russia and China had expressed some reservations about the proposed Central Asian NWFZ. In November 1997, at the 52nd session of the UN General Assembly, the five Central Asian states jointly submitted a draft resolution endorsing their initiative aimed at establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Diplomats from the five Central Asian states were initially uncertain how the nuclear powers would react to this resolution. The United States, Russia, China, France, and Great Britain, however, endorsed the resolution after the Central Asian states agreed to accept several amendments that the nuclear powers had proposed. The revised resolution was then adopted by consensus on 10 November 1997 in the First Main Committee of the UN General Assembly, which deals with international security and disarmament issues. Following the adoption of the resolution, the United States made a statement in which it again reiterated its support in principle for the proposed Central Asian zone, but noted that "the devil is in the details," adding that final American support would be contingent on the detailed provisions of the treaty establishing the zone.[4]
Future Plans
The UN resolution also welcomed the proposal of the Kyrgyz Republic to hold an experts' meeting in Bishkek in 1998 to begin hammering out the details of the treaty establishing the zone. With regional consensus achieved and international support robust, the prospects for progress toward the conclusion of a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia appear solid. Supporters of the treaty, both in Central Asia and outside the region, believe that the proposed zone will not only strengthen regional security and the global nonproliferation regime, but also hope that it will foster broader cooperation among the Central Asian states.
Notes
[1] UNSSOD1, Resolution S-10/2.
[2] 1995 Review and Extension Conference of Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, "Report of Main Committee II," NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/1, 5 May 1995, p. 16, in International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/474.
[3] "Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia: Draft Resolution on the Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Central Asian Region," A/C.1/51/L.29, 29 October 1996.
[4] UN Press Release, GA/DIS/3095, 10 November 1997.
1996 DRAFT UN RESOLUTION
A/C.1/51/L/29
19 October 1996
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
General Assembly
Fifty-First Session
FIRST COMMITTEE
Agenda Item 71
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT
Kyrgystan and Mongolia: draft resolution
Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Central Asian region
The General Assembly,
Bearing in mind paragraph 60 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, [1] which states that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure and thus enhances regional and global peace and security,
Recalling article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, [2] which acknowledges the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,
Recognizing the importance of the Antarctic Treaty and the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangok and Pelindaba, establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in the various regions of the world, as well as of unilateral measures of States to declare their territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone,
Takinq note with appreciation of the declarations made at the highest level by the Governments of the States of the Central Asian region of their interest in and willingness to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region,
Believing that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Central Asian region, as in other regions, will promote strengthening of the security of the States concerned, as well as stability of the region,
1. Welcomes the intention of the States of the Central Asian region to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region;
2. Also welcomes with satisfaction the declarations of the States of the Central Asian region of their interest in and willingness to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region;
3. Commends the concrete steps taken so far by the States of the Central Asian region to eliminate the arsenals and infrastructure of nuclear weapons, as well as to declare their territories nuclear-weapon-free zones;
4. Calls upon the five nuclear-weapon States and other States to support the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Central Asian region, to extend necessary cooperation in the efforts to establish the zone as well as to refrain, pending the establishment of the zone, from any action contrary to the spirit of that objective;
5. Invites the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, as well as other relevant United Nations organs and bodies, to render all appropriate assistance, which the States of the Central Asian region may seek, in undertaking studies on the modalities of creating such a zone;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to communicate with the States of the region and other concerned States in order to ascertain their views on the issue and to promote consultations among them, with a view to exploring the possibilities of undertaking and furthering the objectives of the establishment of the zone;
7. Also requests the Secretary-General to report on the subject to the General Assembly at its fifty-second session;
8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-second session the item entitled ''Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Central Asian region".
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[1] Resolution S-10/2
[2] United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 729, No. 10485.
ALMATY DECLARATION
Almaty Declaration
adopted by the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
28 February 1997
We, the Presidents of the fraternal States of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan,
Moved by the desire to strengthen the independence and sovereignty of our countries and raise the living standards of our peoples,
Considering that environmental security is one of the strategic components of national security a vital factor in protecting the interests and priorities of the Central Asian States
Bearing in mind that the problem of the environmental disaster in the Aral Sea basin is global in nature and that its solution brooks no delay,
Considering that the extreme environmental situation in the Aral region has a negative impact on the natural habitat and living conditions of millions of residents not only of the Aral Sea basin but also of other regions of our planet,
Confirming our adherence to the provisions of the United Nations worldwide programme on the environment (Agenda 21), and fully supporting the effort to draw up and implement a single strategy for the sustainable development of the countries of central Asia,
Acknowledging that management of the water resources of transboundary rivers must follow an ecosystem approach and be conducted justly and reasonably without causing reciprocal damage, and confirming the obligations already entered into with respect to full-scale cooperation on the international and inter-State levels,
Expressing the united view of our countries, which have signed the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, on the need to proclaim Central Asia a nuclear-weapon-free zone,
Proceeding on the basis of the steadfast aspiration to take joint action to overcome the consequences to the environmental crisis in the Aral Sea basin,
Have decided, at a meeting held in Almaty on 28 February 1997:
To declare 1998 as Environmental Protection Year in the Central Asia Region under the auspices of the United Nations
To call on all States concerned, on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the Semipalatinsk test site, to support the idea of proclaiming central Asia a nuclear-free zone open to accession by other States of the region;
To note the efforts of the Central Asian States, which despite serious economic difficulties are making considerable efforts to improve the environmental situation in the Aral Sea basin, the regions of the Semipalatinsk test site and other areas affected by the impact of nuclear tests;
To acknowledge the need to develop a comprehensive programme of environmental security including the Aral problem, establish a nuclear-free zone in central Asia and combat the leakage of nuclear technologies and raw materials;
To call on the United Nations and its specialized agencies to pay the closest attention to the crisis situation that has arisen in the Aral Sea basin and to take effective measures to protect the environment in that region, paying particular attention to measures to assist the poverty-stricken population of the Aral region;
To confirm our readiness to cooperate as necessary with international organizations and institutes in their activities in the implementation of the Programme of concrete actions and other regional projects;
To complete jointly with international organizations the preparation of a draft convention on the sustainable development of the Aral Sea basin.
For the Republic of Kazakhstan (Signed) N.A. NAZARBAEV
For the Kyrgyz Republic (Signed) A. A. AKAYEV
For the Republic of Tajikistan (Signed) E.S. RAKHMONOV
For the Republic of Turkmenistan (Signed) S. A. NIYASOV
For the Republic of Uzbekistan (Signed) I. A. KARIMOV
PRESIDENT KARIMOV'S ADDRESS
ADDRESS
by Islam Karimov, President of the Republic
of Uzbekistan, in the International Conference
Central Asia -
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
Tashkent, September 15, 1997
Distinguished Heads of delegations,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I cordially welcome you on the Uzbek land and express a sincere appreciation for your participation at the Tashkent Conference
The present conference is the first result of joint efforts taken by the Central Asian states to counter the external threats and challenges. The initiative to declare Central Asia a nuclear weapon free zone is another manifestation of community of interests and objectives of the Central Asian states in providing security, stability and peace to all people living here, as well as creating appropriate, I would say, essential conditions for sustainable development and prosperity of the region.
Allow me to express the gratitude to the international organizations and, first of all, to the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization of Islamic Conference, the authorized representatives of snore than 50 nations and international structures present here, for support extended to the Central Asian initiative, for assistance rendered in preparing of the Tashkent Conference.
We are rather optimistic about participation of representatives of P5 - the permanent member-states of the UN's Security Council at the forum.
I welcome the official representatives of countries neighbouring the Central Asian region, those who considered it as their duty to support the idea of creating the Central Asian nuclear weapon free zone and came to Tashkent to take part at the Conference.
We are pleased to see among the participants of the Tashkent Forum delegations from the European Union member states, which experience in integration and building a more secure world is of special value to the young Central Asian democracies.
I would like to note with satisfaction that the number of international partners on the Central Asian security issues has been steadily increasing. I am firstly confident that participation of Latin American and South African diplomats further up-grades the profile and content of our Conference.
It is appropriate to emphasize a high scientific level of our meeting achieved thanks to involvement of leading international experts on nuclear non-proliferation. Many of the experts have visited Tashkent in the course of preparing our Conference.
I would like to express special thanks to representatives of mass media who have done much to cover an extensive job accomplished in process of this Conference organization
Thanks to all who responded to and takes part in promoting our initiative to declare Central Asia a non-nuclear zone.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
In the life of nations and entire humanity the 20th century is coming to its end. I am convinced that each intelligent human being living nowadays in the world wonders how we intend to step to the 21st century, as well as how to provide peace and stability in his hone, country, region. How we can counter the real threats that may lead to tragic disasters, enormous human casualties, irreparable cataclysms.
And, of course, a particular place among these threats takes the threat posed by nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.
Today people got used to speak about the fact that there are thousands of warheads in nuclear stockpiles worldwide. Unfortunately, it has become an everyday phenomenon to learn information and facts, regularly revealed by democratic press, about huge stocks of fissile materials, accidents caused by nuclear weapons, nuclear smuggling, danger of nuclear blackmail and terrorism which subsequently pose an actual threat to survival of humanity.
We are getting accustomed to terrible pictures that we see on TV screens about many thousands, and in some cases millions, of hectares of ones fertile soil, flora and fauna destroyed forever as a result of nuclear weapon tests.
The people in the territory of Central Asia now continue suffering and probably several coming generations will continue to suffer the irreparable consequences of: such inhuman, I would say, anti-human tests of weapons of mass destruction.
Urgency and significance of the set task on declaring our region as a nuclear free zone are dictated by the fact that not all the states in our planet have joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
One still can find certain states located just near us which at present openly announce their claims to obtain nuclear weapon.
That is the very reason why all the actions to remind of this threat, initiatives and measures aimed to prevent this threat must be in our opinion, in the focus of the world community and enjoy its full support.
We should always remember that Central Asia is one of the most densely populated regions of the world, the region where people live in easily effected, vulnerable oasis that are in their own way susceptible to various natural cataclysms.
On the other hand, significance of this initiative is determined by an increasing geostrategic stand of Central Asia, with its vast natural, mineral, energy, human and other resources, which is the crossroads of geopolitical and strategic interests of many biggest states of the word. Due to these factors one cannot allow the situation when the region with its further growing importance turns into the zone of struggle for some new spheres of influence and domination.
It is our firm conviction that only an active integration of the Central Asian region into the world economic systemic, international information environment, strengthening its political cooperation with the leading nations of the world and international institutions and, in the first instance, integration of these states into the global system of international security may become a reliable guarantee for stability and sustainable growth.
The second point. It is essential to admit that technology of the nuclear weapon free zone establishment will not separately resolve the task of providing security for the region. There must be such a mechanism which could reinforce all functional capacities of the zone to prevent the threat of proliferation. Setting this goal the participating states should base on international experience which has developed several basic principles, namely:
--the zone must be totally free of nuclear weapons;
--obligations regarding its functioning may be taken not only by the participating states, but also by all interested countries;
--agreements on establishment of nuclear weapon free zone must include formation of an efficient system of control which is to ensure fulfillment of the agreed obligations;
--such control must be carried out on the basis of the IAEA's and UN Security Council's
guarantees.
The third point. Establishment and operating of the Central Asian nuclear weapon free zone is an integral part of global system of nuclear security provided for by the frameworks of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In practice it means that the participating states of the Central Asian zone are actively joining the comprehensive regime of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
Meanwhile, alongside with nuclear disarmament arrangements, additional efforts aimed at preventing proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction should be taken. Those efforts should include arrangement of consultations, collaboration in information exchange and notification about the existing stockpiles of weapons, as well as the measures related to setting up mechanisms of strict control over arms supply to the areas of local conflicts.
The fourth point. Any political decision, any inter-state Act is worthwhile only when it is closely linked with the social problems, providing decent living standards for person and society. The nuclear weapon free zone in Central Asia is not an exception. What concrete benefits can it give to people? Primarily, it is a contribution to safeguarding security and sustainable development. The problems of overcoming the gravest nuclear heritage of the former Soviet Union also require immediate solution as well as attention of international community.
This also refers to the consequences of nuclear tests in Semipalatinsk area. This also
refers to the tens of temporarily closed down uranium mines, as well as dumps and wastes, dangerous for the lives of people, left after many years of intensive mining, At the lates
last, this refers to ecological situation, public health, living conditions of people.
The fifth point. The assessments of our Conference's experts have proved that the idea of the nuclear weapon free zone in Central Asia is in full conformity with the arrangements related to safeguarding regional security. This is a logical continuation of efforts undertaken earlier.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Summarizing the said above I would like to draw your attention to the matter of principle importance. We are well aware that formation of the Central Asian zone is not to turn into some sort of a symbolic action. Arrangements related to it's establishment must be carried out in accordance with the norms of international law in the field of disarmament and arms control, within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The functioning of the nuclear weapon free zone must be taken rather in a broader, then in traditionally accepted sense.
What do I mean?
In the first instance, we should work out a precise and efficient mechanism of physical protection from fissile materials available in the countries of the r region and bordering areas.
We are not also guaranteed against any forms of terrorism and provocation.
We are not guaranteed against penetration of dangerous raw materials our territory, I mean the materials which threatens at any moment to be converted to a nuclear warhead. On inter-state level we need a coordination of activities of diplomats, state and law enforcement agencies. It is necessary to take concrete measures aimed at activating and deepening our cooperation in storage, control and inventory of nuclear materials, ensuring their safety.
At last, despite bearing the functions in the sphere of non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, control and protection of environment, the nuclear weapon free zone should promote cooperation of the Central Asian states in research of atom for peace. In the region there are all necessary conditions for such a cooperation.
Dear participants of the Conference,
Our meeting in Tashkent is being held in the year of 30th anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the 1st year anniversary of Pelindaba Treaty and 40th anniversary of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Along with congratulations to the OPANAL, participants of the African nuclear weapon free zone and the IAEA which representatives honoured our Conference with their presence, I would like to assure you that activities of these authoritative organizations and states are taken in Uzbekistan as sincere aspiration to build a more secure world.
Stressing upon a symbolic linkage of these events, I want to say with satisfaction that the states of Central Asia, fully realizing responsibility, are carrying on s.o.'s work for world free of nuclear weapons which initially started its forward movement in Latin America from one to another region.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Each nation of Central Asia is conscious of its own degree of responsibility for the region's destiny. And we consider all those present here as the envoys delegated by the world community, as those who do understand and share our concerns, as those who are keen to help us in our wish for secure world, mutual understanding and cooperation.
We are not cut off developments which are going on beyond Central Asia. We are the part of mankind, and the world is inter-related and indivisible. We want to take part in constructive process of world building as equal partners of other nations, so that to hasten the time of guaranteed security for people in all the corners of the world.
I hope that our forum will become an important milestone in achieving this blessed goal, comprehending the model of global security for the 21st century.
I wish to all the participants of the Conference a fruitful work and success.
Thank you for your attention.
UZBEK FOREIGN MINISTER'S ADDRESS
ADDRESS
by Mr. Abdulaziz Kamilov
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan
at the International Conference
Central Asia--a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
September 15, 1997
(Second Session)
Distinguished Heads of delegations, participants and guests of the Tashkent Conference,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I welcome you and express a deep gratitude for your participation in the work of the Conference.
The idea of establishing a nuclear weapon free zone in Central Asia is a new step of the region's states along the road of achieving security in the world, as well as a stable and sustainable development of the regional community.
We are proceeding from the fact that non-proliferation process and nuclear disarmament is one of the most acute problems of a global scale. At the same time, threats and challenges which carry the conflict bearing factors, at present are being shifted to the regional level, and the regional problems taken together is a new global reality.
In this regard the necessity of establishing a nuclear weapon free zone in Central Asia, dictated by specific peculiarities of the region, character and conditions of its development, reflects the universal tendency of movement from regionalism to globalism.
An aspiration to declare Central Asia a nuclear weapon free zone has in its essence some crucial prerequisites.
In the first instance, this refers to a geopolitical and geostrategic location of the region. Central Asia is an area located in the very heart of the Asian continent, as well as crossroads between East and West This is a territory where political and economic interests of many countries are concentrated.
Secondly, it is necessary to take in account threats to the region which derive from existing huge stockpiles of weapons, increasing drug trafficking, ecological crises, uncontrolled migration, organized crime.
And the last, there are stocks of nuclear material, as well as a number of nuclear facilities in the region.
This gives all grounds to say that in case of unfavourable developments, the Central Asian region is able to become a detonator of spreading the threats capable to grow up to the global scale.
The political consent on the idea of a nuclear weapon free zone expressed by the Heads of all five states of the region is an important evidence of the fact that Central Asia will enter the XXI century united by the common regional objectives aimed at achieving security and stability.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
The process of establishing a nuclear weapon free zone in Central Asia is not one time political act. And we do understand it. This process is to be carried out in accordance with an available international experience on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, along with essential and sufficient consideration of basic norms of the international security system. The international agreements on non-proliferation and, first of all, the Non-Proliferation Treaty play the key role in this process.
Nuclear weapons' non-proliferation regime on the territory of the region cannot and should not be accompanied by any sort of concern regarding some political consequences for security of the participating states. On the contrary, non-nuclear choice can stimulate potential benefits from further, deeper integration into the world market, international political and economic structures.
At the same time a reliable system of collective efforts of the participating states should be worked out, namely:
-efficient measures ensuring non_proliferation regime;
-reliable system of arms control;
-ensuring ecological safety of contaminating industries using nuclear raw_materials;
-the measures aimed at preventing the leakage of nuclear technologies and materials.
In the process of creating a nuclear weapon free zone the problem of international assurances takes a particular place. The UN's Security Council and IAEA are the two major international institutions called to safeguard this.
Meanwhile, the practice proves that neither of currently available international nuclear assurances prevents the possibility of theft of fissile materials for illegal purposes.
Besides, one should take into account that it is impossible to artificially provide a comprehensive nuclear security, taking it apart from transnational problems, i.e. the threats deriving from the local conflicts, conventional arms supply, drug trafficking and organized crime. In our opinion, it is essential to establish a more reliable
system of international assurances which could combine the non- proliferation efforts and global nuclear security arrangements with settlement of the regional problems. And we welcome the efforts of the IAEA which has recently adopted the measures able to ensure the more efficient control.
To this end:
-on international level we are to assure the priority of regional problems' settlement, as a mechanism providing a phased advancement of international community from secure and stable regions to the global security;
-fundamental review of security assurances for non_nuclear states, and, primarily, for the participants of the nuclear weapon free zones is required;
-non_proliferation has to be considered in close linkage with a significant reduction of other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.
The Republic of Uzbekistan highly appreciates the role of the United Nations in resolving the most acute issues of entire international community. And we are grateful for the support has already given to the Central Asian initiative.
In our view, in order to create an instrument for its implementation, we should set up a group of UN experts. This group could focus on elaborating the forms and elements required in preparing and implementing the regional Agreement on Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Central Asia.
The representatives of states participating in existing treaties on establishment of nuclear weapon free zones could be invited to the above mentioned group of experts, alongside with the regional expert group which made a positive contribution to the present Conference.
We place the great hope on the role the nuclear states due to play in the matters related to implementing the Central Asian initiative. We consider those states as reliable guarantors of non-proliferation regime on the regional level.
Distinguished participants of the Conference,
Dynamically advancing integration process is the basis for collective countering the external threats and challenges, achieving secure and sustainable development in the Central Asian region. The establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in Central Asia sufficiently enriches our cooperation.
It is of a vital importance that all the five Central Asian states will become the participants of an international regional Agreement legalizing establishment of the zone. In practice, it will mean that we have realized another set of positive measures addressing the regional security and re-affirming commitment of the participating states to the principles of disarmament and nuclear weapon non-proliferation.
At the same time establishing of a nuclear weapon free zone is a long and diversify process. It will have a phased development involving all the means which are in disposal of the regional community. This process will be maintained through constructive cooperation, atmosphere of mutual understanding and goodwill. And, one wants to believe it will find a strong support from the UN, IAEA, OSCE, OIC and the world community as a whole.
I express the confidence that urgency and significance of the issues raised in the agenda of the Conference will find a full understanding both amongst its participants and the world community.
I hope that the results of our Conference will make a concrete contribution to the noble mission of safeguarding a secure and stable development of entire international community along the road towards the world without wars and conflicts.
Thank you for your attention.
RUSSIAN STATEMENT
Unofficial translation
Statement at International Conference <<Central Asia
Nuclear Weapons Free zone>>
Tashkent, September 14-16, 1997
Distinguished Mister Chairman!
Dear guests!
Russia appreciates highly the initiative of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Islam Abduganievich Karimov to convene such a representative international forum here in Tashkent in connection with the initiative of the leaders of the five Central Asian states to transform Central Asia into a zone free of nuclear weapons. The representatives of nuclear powers as well as influential international organizations such as United Nations, OSCE, IAEA and OIC have gathered in Tashkent. In one word, a quorum is present so that to ensure a comprehensive and constructive work on the idea of establishing a nuclear-free zone in the most important region of our planet in all prospective.
The world's positive reaction to the initiative of Central Asian States is yet another evidence of their growing influence in the world. It is also symbolic that precisely Tashkent has become the venue of this conference. In a relatively short period of time of its existence independent Uzbekistan under the leadership of President Islam Karimov has energetically moved into the world arena to assert its positions with confidence. This country's constructive foreign policy has been widely recognized. Uzbekistan enjoys respect and its opinion bears weight on all topical issues of international politics particularly those relating to problems of Central Asian region.
Russia views the initiative launched by the Presidents of the five Central Asian states to create here a nuclear-free zone as yet another proof their desire to promote the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime, to nuclear disarmament and to raise the level of confidence and stability not only in Central Asia but throughout the world. Russia has been constantly deploying its efforts in the same direction. Suffice to the mention the agreements on enhancing confidence along our common borders that we have reached with our partners from Central Asia and China. As a result, we have been able to create a qualitatively new situation of mutual trust, predictability and stability which, according to President Boris Eltsin of the Russia Federation, is necessary prerequisite and condition not only to transform our frontiers into an area of peace and cooperation but also the kernel of enhanced ties of friendship and partnership among our countries.
Central Asia is a region which has common history and numerous political, economic and cultural ties and agreements with Russia which are aimed at ensuring the security of our countries. In other words, it is an area of of our common preoccupation's and our common interests among which the most important are the stability, peace and prosperity for Central Asian nations and their neighbours, naturally, including Russia.
The efforts of the five States to rid their territories forever of nuclear weapons reflect their search for most efficient ways to rid mankind of threat of nuclear conflict. Russia is open to comprehensive cooperation with them toward this goal on the basis of a common understanding of the contours of the new world order which will replace on block confrontation. This coincides with the main vector of Russians foreign policy of moving towards a multi-polar world.
Our position of principle regarding nuclear weapons free zones remains unchanged. We support the desire of states to contribute to the strengthening of nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime in their regions through additional measures which would safely guarantee their genuine non-nuclear status. In this line we approach the idea of a zone in Central Asia free from nuclear weapons. We also take into account the important fact that all the five countries, that initiated this idea, have already taken upon themselves strict and unambiguous obligations never to acquire or develop nuclear weapons by joining NPT. Thus to a certain extent the key components of a non-nuclear zone here have been taking shape through the responsible and far-sighted policy of the leadership of the five Central Asian States.
The world has acquired a non-negligible experience in establishing areas free from nuclear weapons. They were established in Latin America, Africa and the Southern Pacific. All required procedures have been completed there and the arrangements worked out both among the participants in the zones themselves and the nuclear powers concerning respect for the non-nuclear status of those areas and providing them with additional guarantees of the non-use of nuclear weapons.
Indeed the process of achieving the goal was not simple: it involved a long and at times difficult dialogue at different levels to take into account all elements of the established zones, including their geographical limits, specific restrictions and the character of relations of participating States with other countries. What matters most is that in the final analyses, an understanding was reached on all these issues.
In South East Asia this process still goes on and many questions still exists whose joint solution by the countries of the non-nuclear zone and the nuclear powers will eventually determine whether the declared and formally effective agreement of South East Asian States could become a solid instrument of non-proliferation respected and observed by other States.
In the context of a non-nuclear zone the Central Asian States are still to go a long way to agree on specific objectives and additional obligations which they would be prepared to assume in this connection. There are many other questions awaiting response. This is not a simple task but the goal set is noble and we are certain that both nuclear States and international organizations will actively promote the attainment of agreed solutions.
I would stress again that Central Asia and issues related to the region are among the priorities of Russia's foreign policy. It is no exaggeration to say that the hopes and aspirations of the peoples and governments of Central Asian States are very close to our hearts thus ensuring the continuity of Russia's fundamental policy line at strengthening of friendship, mutual understanding and interaction with these States.
This approach is in full compliance with Russia's strategic course to develop in every way possible friendship and mutually advantageous partnership with all members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Not so little has been achieved along this road, political dialogue has been evolving, trade and economic relations have been growing. We regard the Treaty of collective security as one of the most important accomplishments and intend to comply in full with all obligations assumed. In our view joint efforts in the area of strengthening international peace and security which, as we understand it, is the main idea of establishing a nuclear-free zone in Central Asia, will also contribute to a greater cohesion of the Commonwealth.
Finally, allow me to congratulate the organisers of the Forum for their warm hospitality, the renowned Uzbek tradition which we were able to appreciate once again as well as for the happy opportunity to get better to know Uzbekistan and its beautiful capital.
Thank you.
US REMARKS
Remarks of U. S. Delegation to the
Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Conference
Tashkent, Uzbekistan
September 15-16, [1997]
It is a pleasure to address this Conference on a possible Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.
The United States looks forward to consultations with states of the region on their proposal for a Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. Indeed, we believe the willingness of the Central Asian states to consult early and frequently with the United States, as well as the other Nuclear Weapon States, to address any concerns is crucial. A zone arrangement that reflects the views of all affected parties could make a useful contribution to regional and global nonproliferation goals.
The U.S. supports in principle the creation of nuclear weapon free zones, consistent with our longstanding criteria for such zones and with the Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). As that document stated, and as I wish to underscore, the support of the nuclear weapon states is necessary for the maximum effectiveness of such zones.
Nuclear weapon free zones can give greater institutionalization in their regions of the global norms and commitments of nuclear nonproliferation, and compel states of a region to take responsibility among themselves to ensure the non-nuclear status of their region. However, nuclear weapon free zones also raise a host of complex issues for us and for our allies. The specific legal and security implications of the text of a proposed NWFZ for regional and international security and international legal regimes can be far-reaching, and can even affect international legal and security arrangements that at first glance seem unrelated to the goals and intentions of the zone's drafters. Therefore, the United States examines each proposed nuclear weapon free zone carefully and on its own merits, but also giving due weight to toward its larger global legal and security responsibilities.
The United States has developed seven long-standing and public criteria that any proposed nuclear weapons free zone treaty or convention would have to meet before receiving U.S. support. These criteria reflect the basic characteristics that the U.S. has determined a nuclear weapon free zone must possess to be an effective nonproliferation tool without impinging on vital national security and foreign policy interests.
First, the initiative for the creation of the zone should come from the states in the region concerned. The primary responsibility for the conception, negotiation, and drafting of a nuclear weapon free zone lies with the states of the region who would be asked to assume its commitments and responsibilities.
Second, all states whose participation is deemed important should participate in the zone. Nuclear weapon free zone treaties can only be meaningful and potentially successful when all regional states of political and/or military significance regarding the production, acquisition, or deployment of nuclear weapons participate both in the negotiation in the zone and become Members of the final treaty.
Third, the zone arrangement should provide for adequate verification of compliance with its provisions. No treaty that mandates the complete absence of nuclear weapons can be successful without a strong and independent verification mechanism. Existing nuclear weapon free zones take advantage of the independent expertise of the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify that Member states use nuclear energy purely for peaceful civil purposes. To this end, the IAEA should be consulted frequently, and its concerns satisfied, during the negotiation of any such treaty.
Fourth, the establishment of the zone should not disturb existing security arrangements to the detriment of regional and international security or otherwise abridge the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense guaranteed in the U.N. charter. Nuclear weapon free zone treaties are meant to enhance regional and international security. They cannot undermine or conflict with bilateral, regional and international arrangements, alliances, and institutions which support, and in some instances underlie, international security and stability.
Fifth, the zone arrangement should effectively prohibit its parties from developing or otherwise possessing any nuclear device for whatever purpose. The very definition of a nuclear weapon free zone requires this. It is important that the Treaty prohibit all devices which are capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled fashion, regardless of the announced intent or purpose for such devices. For this reason, the recent nuclear weapon free zones prohibit "nuclear explosive devices" generally, rather than just "nuclear weapons."
Sixth, the establishment of the zone should not affect the existing rightsof its parties under international law to grant or deny other states transit privileges within their respective land territory, internal waters and airspace to nuclear powered and nuclear capable ships and aircraft of non-party nations, including port calls and overflights.
A nuclear weapon free zone should not seek to impede or prohibit the exercise of the basic sovereign rights of the Central Asian states -- rights they already possess -- to decide according to their own policies whether to allow or deny innocent passage of territorial waters and airspace by foreign vessels or aircraft, or visitation by such vessels and aircraft to airfields and ports. Such passage and visitations should not be construed as a deployment or stationing of nuclear explosive devices. Such transit, however, should not be equated to the transport of nuclear explosive devices on land territory or inland waters, which other NWFZ treaties have appropriately prohibited.
Seventh, the zone arrangement should not seek to impose restrictions on the exercise of rights recognized under international law, particularly the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight. the right of innocent passage of territorial and archipelagic seas. the right of transit passage of international straits. and the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage of archipelagic waters. As a general rule, a proposed nuclear weapon free zone treaty should not conflict with existing international regimes concerning the general rights and privileges of states under international law. The zone should not seek to impose obligations and commitments over those areas, such as international waters, over which no treaty party exercises sovereign control.
These criteria have guided U.S. policy toward nuclear weapon free zones for nearly thirty years. They are intended to ensure that any new nuclear weapon free zone treaty meets not only U.S. security requirements, but also promote regional and international security. They are meant to ensure that any nuclear weapon free zone that the U.S. considers supporting is one which fully serves regional nuclear nonproliferation and security goals while not infringing on certain rights under international law.
The U.S. welcomes the desire of the states of Central Asia to undertake steps toward regional cooperation and security. Careful, deliberate actions that foster regional security will benefit Central Asian states and the international community as a whole. A Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, which can make an important contribution to enhancing regional security, is one element of a regional security system. Other measures, such as confidence and security building measures, can increase openness, trust, and transparency about the intentions of neighbors, especially their military forces and activities, thus increasing the predictability of other states' actions and behavior. Another area vital to regional and global security is preventing the spread of nuclear material and equipment across borders; enhanced export control regimes and increased security and protection of nuclear materials, especially in the Newly Independent States of Asia and Europe, can greatly enhance regional and global nonproliferation regimes. We are encouraged by these regional developments and seek to encourage them when appropriate by sharing our arms control experiences and providing technical assistance when asked.
TASHKENT DECLARATION
Statement by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrghyz Republic, Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Republic of Uzbekistan
Proliferation of nuclear weapons on the planet is the major threat to the survival of humanity. Nuclear weapons are able to destroy not only what has been created by mankind over the centuries, but life on earth itself.
In the epoch of nuclear disarmament it is necessary to work out a new world conception based on the principles of refraining from the threat or use of force, respecting each nation's rights to social, political and ideological self-determination, and rejecting a policy aimed at the domination of one over others.
The Tashkent International Conference, "Central Asia--A Nuclear Weapon Free Zone" (September 15 - 16, 1997), acknowledging the indivisibility of regional and global security, has reaffirmed the necessity of a collective contribution to the progressive development of the world community.
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, inspired by an awareness of common responsibility, proceeding from the persistent desire to act jointly, and expressing the unanimous opinion of their peoples, states which have joined the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Almaty Declaration:
—announce the necessity of declaring Central Asia a nuclear weapon free zone as an essential element of strengthening regional security;
—welcome the objectives and principles set forth in the documents of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference of 1995;
—welcome the adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty opened for signature on September 24, 1996, and urge all states which have not yet joined it, to sign this Treaty;
—express satisfaction that countries which have voluntarily assumed commitments under agreements establishing nuclear weapon-free zones, constitute a considerable part of the world, and are creating a new culture of nuclear security;
—believe that establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in Central Asia meets the interests of national, regional and global security;
—call upon the five permanent members of the United Nations' Security Council, as well as other states, to support the initiative for the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia, and to provide every possible assistance in its creation;
—urge other states to provide assistance in the rehabilitation of areas, especially those polluted by radioactive wastes, considering it essential to ensure ecological safety in their region;
—confirm their readiness to expand and strengthen cooperation in the field of utilizing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes;
— request the specialized agencies of the United Nations to establish a United Nations group of experts, with the participation of experts from the region, to elaborate the forms and elements of preparation and implementation of an agreement on the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia.
For the Republic of Kazakhstan
Erlan Idrisov, Deputy Foreign Minister
For the Kyrghyz Republic
Muratbek Imanaliev, Foreign Minister
For the Republic of Taiikistan
Erkin Rakhmatullaev, Deputy Foreign Minister
For Turkmenistan
E. Kepbanov, Deputy Foreign Minister of Turkmenistan
For the Republic of Uzbekistan
Abdulaziz Kamilov, Foreign Minister
Tashkent, September 15, 1997
Unofficial Translation
UN CANWFZ RESOLUTION
A/C.1/52/L.44/Rev.1
6 November 1997
ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN
General Assembly
Fifty-Second Session
FIRST COMMITTEE
Agenda item 71
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan: draft resolution
Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone
in Central Asia
The General Assembly,
Emphasizing the importance of internationally recognized agreements on the establishment of nuclear-weapon free zones in various regions of the world,
Recalling paragraphs 60, 61, 62, and 64 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,[1] the provisions of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons[2] and paragraphs 5 and 6 of the decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" in the Final Document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons[3], concerning the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones,
Recalling the Almaty Declaration of the Heads of State of the Central Asisan Sates of 28 February 1997[4] and the statement by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia,[5] signed at Tashkent on 15 September 1997,
Reaffirming the generally recognized role of the United Nations in promoting the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones,
Convinced that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world can contribute to the achievement of general and complete disarmement,
Believing that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions, including Central Asia, will help strengthen peace and stability atboth the regional and global levels and is in the interests of the security of the States in the Central Asian region,
Welcoming the offer of the Kyrgyz Republic to hold a consultative meeting of experts on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia in Bishkek in 1998,
1. Calls upon all States to support the initiative aimed at the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia;
2. Requests the Secretary-General, within existing resources, to provide assistance to the Central Asian countries in the preparation of the form and elements of an agreement on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia;
3. Decides to consider the question of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia at its fifty-third session under the agenda item, "General and complete disarmament."
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[1] Resolution S-10/2.
[2] United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 729, No. 10485
[3] NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), annex, decision 2.
[4] A/52/112, annex.
[5] A/52/390, annex.
US STATEMENT
Unofficial Version of the United States Statement on UN First Committee Agenda Item 71, L.44, Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia
EXPLANATION OF VOTE (EOV) for L.44, ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN CENTRAL ASIA
Mr. Chairman,
The United States is pleased to have been able to vote yes (join consensus] on L.44 on the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in Central Asia. My delegation believes this resolution represents a valuable initiative on the part of the cosponsors. Among other things, the resolution calls attention to the decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. That document, to which the United States attaches a great deal of importance, called for the establishment of additional Nuclear Weapon Free Zones as well as for the cooperation, respect and support of all nuclear weapon states for the relevant protocols necessary to make such zones effective.
However, I would be remiss if I did not point out that in matters such as these, the devil is always in the details. So while the United States wishes the cosponsors well in their efforts to elaborate a draft treaty, at the same time we would urge them to learn from both the successes of, and the difficulties experienced in, the development of other Nuclear Weapon Free Zone treaties, In this context I should point out that U.S. support for this resolution follows not only from our commitment to the NPT, but from our long-standing policy of support in principle for Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, provided they are consistent with seven well-established U.S. criteria. I summarize them briefly as follows: 1) The initiative must come from the states in the region; 2.) All important states must participate in the zone; 3) Compliance provisions must be adequately verified; 4) No existing security arrangements should be disturbed; 5) Zones should effectively prohibit the development or possession of any nuclear device; 6) Zones should not affect existing rights under international law and 7) Zones should not impose restrictions on the high seas freedoms of navigation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Bishkek Communiqué
UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION
COMMUNIQUE
of the Consultative Meeting of Experts
of the Central Asian Countries, the Nuclear-Weapon States and the United Nations (5+5+UN),
held in Bishkek on 9 and 10 July 1998
On 9 and 10 July 1998, the Consultative Meeting of Experts of the Central Asian Countries, the Nuclear-Weapon States and the United Nations was held in Bishkek with a view to elaborate acceptable ways and means for the practical implementation of the initiative on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. At the Meeting, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan submitted document, entitled "Basic elements [draft] of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia", which reflects the intention of the States of the region to prepare the legal groundwork for the Central Asian initiative. During the discussion,experts from the United Nations, the People's Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America made preliminary comments and recommendations on the document entitled «Basic elements [draft] of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia». In an informal discussion, the participants of the Consultative Meeting exchanged opinions on the document that had been submitted and considered further steps to betaken with a view to preparing the document and, on the whole, establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.
On the basis of the outcome of the Consultative Meeting, the participants noted the following:
1. The Central Asian States have made some progress in drafting of the legal document on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.
2. It is necessary to continue working consultations on basic elements of the future Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, taking into consideration the proposalsand observations made at the Consultative Meeting of Experts.
The Central Asian States acknowledge that consultations of experts from the nuclear-weapon States on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asiawould be very useful.
Bishkek, 9 July 1998
