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The Latvian Institute of Nuclear Physics at Salaspils, located 20 miles from Riga, houses a 5 megawatt (MW) research reactor, a zero power reactor—a reactor designed to operate at such a low power level that essentially no heat is produced—as well as spent (used) and fresh nuclear fuel, the last shipment of which was received from Russia in 1986.[2,3,4,5] One of the first research reactors in the Soviet Union, the 5MW reactor was built in 1959 and went critical in 1961.[6] It was permanently shut down in July 1998 owing to the lack of government funding and concerns for environmental safety in the event of an accident.[2,3]

On 25 May 2005, 2.5 kilograms of fresh HEU fuel were removed from the Salaspils reactor and returned to Russia. According to the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency, the fuel will be downblended at Russia’s Luch Institute into low-enriched nuclear fuel for power plants.[7]

The timeline for removing the spent fuel stored at Salaspils is less certain, however. In November 2007, the Latvian government endorsed an agreement to send used nuclear fuel from Salaspils to Russia. The agreement determines the institutions responsible for sending the nuclear fuel, the management of the nuclear waste after recycling, the provisions of third party liability, and the requirements for storage, protection and transport.[8] In the past, Riga indicated that it was willing to pay Moscow for the transport and repatriation of the spent fuel to Russia, but to date, Russia has not agreed to accept any shipments of Russian-origin spent research fuel.[9,10] [Spent fuel is considered less a proliferation threat than fresh fuel because of its highly radioactive nature. Nonetheless, spent fuel that has been only lightly irradiated in a reactor might not pose a major risk to human health and consequently might present a significant risk for theft or diversion.]

The United States and other members of the international community have long been involved in working to improve the security of HEU fuel and other materials stored at Salaspils. In the 1990s, the IAEA and a number of countries, including Finland, Sweden, and the United States, provided technical assistance and funding to Latvia to improve material control and accounting regulations and physical protection systems at Salaspils. The latter included the installation of electronic personal identification number (PIN) access controls, a hand-geometry biometric identification system, video surveillance, improved radio communications, motion detectors, and a central alarm system.[11,12]

The utilities of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania released a joint feasibility study in October 2006 calling for the construction of at least one new nuclear reactor of between 800 and 1,600 MW in Lithuania to replace Ignalina-2, which is scheduled to be closed in 2009.[13] In March 2007, Poland agreed to participate in the project, which is estimated to cost $5 billion.

Key Sources:
[1]
“United States and Latvian Governments Sign Agreement to Allow Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Cooperation,” U.S. Department of Energy press release, April 25, 2005, U.S. Department of Energy website, http://www.energy.gov.
[2] Diena, March 10, 1994, p. 4; in “Future For Salaspils Nuclear Reactor Viewed,” FBIS Document SOV-94-201.
[3] Radio Riga Network; in “Latvian Government Shuts Down Nuclear Research Reactor,” FBIS Document SOV-98-170, June 19, 1998.
[4] General Accounting Office, “Research Reactors in the Former Soviet Union,” GAO/RCED-96-4 Nuclear Safety, p. 23.
[5] CNS communication with U.S. DOE official, May 11, 2005.
[6] International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Research Reactors in the World, December 1992, p. 43.
[7] “O vyvoze is Latvii v Rossiyu ‘svezhego’ vysokoobogashchennogo yadernogo topliva” [On the transfer from Latvia to Russia of ‘fresh’ highly enriched nuclear fuel], May 26, 2005, Russian Federal Atomic Energy website, http://www.minatom.ru/News/Main/view?id=18698&idChannel=64.
[8] "Latvia, Russia to Conclude Nuclear Deal," 6 November 2007, Baltic Times online, http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/19211/.
[9] Ann MacLachlan, “Shipments of fresh HEU pending from Latvia, Czech Rep., Libya,” NuclearFuel, Vol. 30, No. 9, April 25, 2005.
[19] ITAR-TASS, October 12, 1999; in “Latvia May Ask Russia To Help Store Spent Fuel,” FBIS Document FTS19991015000388.
[11] Sandia National Laboratories, “Protection and Surveillance of Nuclear Materials in the Former Soviet Union,” Hearings before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, March 29, 1996.
[12] “Improving Nuclear Materials Security at the Latvian Academy of Sciences Nuclear Research Center,” brochure printed by the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation of the U.S. DOE.
[13] "Baltic utilities say new nuclear is best new capacity choice," Nucleonics Week, 26 October 2006.



 

Updated December 2007



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About This Section  CNS Experts 

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

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