This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

Early 1990s
Production of the blister agent sulfur mustard and nerve agents such as sarin and tabun become known capabilities of the chemical facility at Rabta. The facility reportedly has a capacity to manufacture up 10,000 pounds of chemical agents per day. [Note: This represents a hypothetical capacity; actual production quantities are frequently significantly lower.]
--Bill Gertz, "Chinese Move Seen as Aiding Libya in Making Poison Gas," Washington Times, 12 July 1990.

Mid--1990s
According to an international trade expert, an east Japan chemical equipment maker ships to Iraq and Libya reactor vessels made of "Hastelloy," an anti-corrosive alloy composed of nickel, chromium and molybdenum used in the mass-production of sarin. The alloy resists the corrosive qualities of phosphoric acid and hydrogen fluoride (HF) that occur during sarin production.
--"Red Thread Linking North Korea, Iraq and Sarin--Export Network for Japanese-Made Sarin-Cooking Pot," AERA, 28 April 2003, cited in "Japanese Firm Reportedly Sold Nerve Gas Equipment to Iraq, Libya, North Korea," in FBIS Document JPP2030424000082, 28 April 2003.

13 May 1990
Lutz Stavenhagen, Chancellor Kohl's senior aide in charge of intelligence, informs reporters during a visit to Israel that Libya is planning the construction of another chemical plant to be built underground, hidden from satellite reconnaissance. The site for the new plant is supposedly 650 km south of Tripoli at Sebha, the "former Otrag missile proving grounds." The Libyan News Agency, JANA, denies the construction of such a plant at Sebha; however, British reporters uncover contractual evidence that Hans Joachim Rose, a German intermediary from Stuttgart, has been directly involved in attempting to purchase Siemens computer systems for the Sebha facility for use in controlling chemical weapons production.
--Kenneth R. Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 80.

14 May 1990
Press reports from Washington indicate that a major fire allegedly destroys the chemical facility at Rabta ceasing all production. The Libyan Government initially accuses the United States of sabotaging the facility, then detains two employees of the Otto Kay Company of West Germany. According to commercial satellite photographs taken during the blaze, piles of burning tires are shown to be the actual cause of the smoke screen over Rabta, rather than fires within the plant itself. The chemical facility at Rabta is undamaged by the fire. The U.S. Government deems the fire suspicious and concludes that the Libyan Government staged it in order to ward off a U.S. air strike on the facility.
--Kenneth R. Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 80.

July 1990
The United States accuses the Chinese Government of exporting approximately 10,000 tons of chemicals usable for chemical weapons development to the Libyan Pharma 200 chemical facility at Sebha, which has Lewisite and Sarin production capabilities.
--Bill Gertz, "Chinese Move Seen as Aiding Libya in Making Poison Gas," Washington Times, 12 July 1990, p. 6.

1991-1992
Middle East Defense News (Mednews) publishes a report detailing the various weapons suppliers to Iraq, Syria and Libya, including resources used for CW capacity building. For CW resources to Libya, the report names companies from Belgium, France, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia.

From Belgium, the Flaekt Company provides Libya with a cooling tower for the Rabta Plant and Philips Petroleum supplies Libya with thiodiglycol, a key sulfur mustard precursor. DISA, a Danish company, sells foundry equipment for CW bomb production at Rabta, while the French company, De Dietrich, supplies glass-lined cauldrons for the same facility. From Hungary's Lampart company, Rabta receives glass-lined reactor equipment, and from Italy's Peterlee company, the facility obtains other unspecified equipment for CW capability development. Japan's Marubeni and Japan Steel Works companies supply steel works for bomb-plant development at Rabta. Switzerland's Schweizerischen Kreditanstalt provides "banking services in Zurich for Rabta contracts," and Yugoslavia's Energoinvest assists with the development of Rabta's power sub-station. Companies from the United Kingdom such as Ironbridge, J.G. Trading, Tosalex Trading, and Ihsan Barbouti International (IBI) facilitate contracting and shipping for the Rabta plant.

Germany is the most prominent supplier of resources contributing to Libya's chemical weapons development according to Mednews. The report names 21 West German companies and one East German company as contributing financial, engineering, precursor chemical, computer, building material, contractor, transportation, and technological resources to be party to Libya's chemical weapons development. West German companies as such consist of Abacus, Alfred Teves GmbH, Bischoff, Deutsche Bank, Drebs und Kiefer, Merck, Gesellschaft fur Automation, Heberger Bau, Hunnebeck, Imhausen Chemie, J. Sartorius, Kone, Krebs and Kefier, Linde, Pawling and Harnishchfeger, Preussag, Raab Karcher, Rhenus, Rose GmbH, Salzgitter Indistriebau GmbH, Thyssen, Webac, and Zink. East Germany's VEB Stahibau provides assistance in steel production for the Rabta plant. Ihsan Barbouti International (IBI) is a British and German front company that plays a central role in brokering contracts for the construction of the Rabta site.
--Kenneth R. Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 80; Kenneth R. Timmerman, The Poison Gas Connection: Western Suppliers of Unconventional Weapons and Technologies to Iraq and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1990), p. 114-127.

October 1991
The director of Imhausen, accused of assisting the development of the chemical facility at Rabta (Pharma-150), receives five years in prison on charges of illegally supplying CW materials to Libya and tax evasion. Two other Imhausen company managers also undergo trial and are convicted for supplying Libya with equipment and materials assisting in the development of Rabta. [Note: All investigations looking into West German involvement with Libya's CW development ceases soon thereafter by order of the Bundestag.]
--Thomas Stock, "Chemical and Biological Weapons: Developments and Proliferation," SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1993); S. J. Lundin and Thomas Stock, "Chemical and Biological Weapons Development and Arms Control," SIPRI Yearbook 1991: World Armaments and Disarmament (New York: Oxford UP, 1991).

September 1993
The United States puts pressure on Thailand to remove 200 Thai workers helping in the construction of the Pharma-300 chemical facility at Tarhuna. The Thai Government closes two job placement firms supplying workers to Libya and arrests the owner of a Thai company involved in the construction of the Tarhuna plant under allegations that he employed Thai workers abroad in Libya without the Thai Government's consent. Libya pledges to deport 25,000 Thai construction workers living and working in Libya in retaliation but later rescinds the threat. [Note: As many as three Thai companies are known to have provided workers and equipment to the development of the Tarhuna and Rabta plants.]
--Thomas Stock and Anna De Geer, "Chemical and Biological Weapons Development and Arms Control," SIPRI Yearbook 1994 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994).

September 1995
According to U.S. and European intelligence sources, a $20 million CW facility near Rabta opens. It is allegedly capable of producing mustard gas and has 13 automated production lines. [Note: Libya rebuts these allegations claiming that the facility is a pharmaceuticals plant.]
--Thomas Stock, Maria Haug, and Patricia Radler, "Chemical and Biological Weapon Development and Arms Control," SIPRI Yearbook 1996: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford, UK: Oxford UP, 1996).

1996
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) names the chemical facilities at Rabta and Tarhuna in its publication, Proliferation: Threat and Response. Tarhuna is an underground plant designed to subvert satellite reconnaissance.
--Department of Defense, the United States of America, Proliferation: Threat and Response, November 1997, <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif/me_na.html>.

April 1996
U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry announces during a visit to Cairo that Libya is building a chemical weapons production facility at Tarhuna and states that the United States will do whatever it takes to halt the development of this plant. Libya's Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi claims in response that the facility is part of the Great Man-Made River Project that aims to irrigate the country through diverting water from aquifers in the south to the Mediterranean coast. In order to forestall a potential U.S. attack on the Tarhuna facility, Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak sends investigators to the facility to assess the level of development. They conclude that although they witness tunnels leading into the facility, they find no equipment indicating current activity at the site.
--Jean Pascal Zanders, Susanna Eckstein, and John Hart, "Chemical and Biological Weapons Development and Arms Control," SIPRI Yearbook 1997: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997).

9 August 1996
German authorities arrest two German businessmen under allegations that they assisted Libya with the development of its chemical weapons program by exporting equipment for chemical weapons between 1990 and 1993. Allegedly, the two men purchased an estimated $2.07 million worth of Siemens chemical process control equipment and modified it to produce nerve agents. They then shipped the equipment to Libya through a Belgian front company in Antwerp owned by Lebanese-born Berge Balanian, a former informant for the German intelligence service. [Note: During the investigation of this case, two other German companies come under suspicion for involvement in the development of Libya's CW capabilities.]
--Jean Pascal Zanders, Susanna Eckstein, and John Hart, "Chemical and Biological Weapons Development and Arms Control," SIPRI Yearbook 1997: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997).

October 1996
German courts convict a German national charged with facilitating Libya's acquisition of computer technology used for chemical weapons development and importing into Libya equipment from India designed to clean the residual emissions left behind by poison gas production. The convicted national allegedly used an Irish company as a dummy company to divert attention from the final destination of the equipment.
--Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999), p. 17.

11 February 1997
South African President Nelson Mandela vows to initiate an investigation regarding allegations implicating South African Defense Force members in the sale of chemical precursors and expertise to Libya soon after the 1994 South African elections.
--Joshua Sinai, "Ghadaffi's Libya: The Patient Proliferator," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 010/012, 1 December 1998, <http://www.janes.com>.

March 1997
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Director John Holum reports U.S. intelligence has found that Libya has halted construction of the Tarhuna underground chemical plant following threats that the United States would resort to "the whole range of American weapons" to stop the construction.
--"Libya Halts Chemical Arms Plant," United Press International, 19 March 1997, <http://www.brook.edu/fp/projects/nucqcost/tarhunah.htm>.

29 April 1997
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) enters into force. Libya participates in negotiations but does not sign prior to entry into force.
--Jean Pascal Zanders and Maria Wahlberg, "Chemical and Biological Weapons and Arms Control," SIPRI Yearbook 2000: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000), p. 510.

January 1999
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports that Libya continues to pursue independent CW production capabilities through the foreign supply of chemical precursors and other CW equipment. UN sanctions have, however, hindered the progress of this pursuit since their enactment, especially during the early part of 1998.
-- Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999), p. 17.

November 1999
The trial of Brigadier Wouter Basson, leader of Project Coast, exposes Project Coast as the coordinating organization responsible for the South African apartheid regime's chemical and biological warfare program. During the trial, Basson testifies that a Libyan named Abdul Razuk sold Project Coast five tons of BZ (3-Quinuclidinyl Benzinate) from Hong Kong, all of which, minus 980 kg, were eventually weaponized by the South African Defense Force (SADF) between June and December 1992. He also testifies that Libya was a "potential buyer" for the Roodeplaat Research Laboratory (RRL) in Europe, a laboratory known to have expanded its animal research and testing facilities to accommodate research on chemical and biological warfare agents.
--Jean Pascal Zanders, John Hart, and Frida Kuhlau, "Chemical and biological weapon developments and arms control," SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000), p. 510; "Roodeplaat Research Laboratories," UNIDIR, p. 69, <http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art1847.pdf>.

	Updated September 2005