This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

1920s
Although suspicions remain uncorroborated, Italian Dictator Benito Mussolini allegedly authorizes bombing in Libya using mustard gas.
--Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 267.

Mid-Late 1980s
Libya begins the construction of a large chemical weapons facility called Pharma 150 at Rabta, disguising it as a pharmaceuticals facility. Libya also begins construction of a second plant, called Rabta-II, 65 km south of Tripoli at Tarhuna, dedicated to producing chemical agents and ballistic missiles. The Libyans design the site at Tarhuna to withstand an air attack by building two 200-450 foot-long tunnels covered by 100 ft. sandstone shields and lined with reinforced concrete. These tunnels can resist the penetration capabilities of U.S. GBU-27B and GBU-28 penetration bombs. Libya also begins to build another chemical/biological plant at Sebha called Pharma-200. It is an underground site located on a military base that is almost identical to Rabta in design.
--Kenneth R. Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles, CA: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p.80; Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999), p. 17; "Sebha [Pharm-200]," GlobalSecurity.org, 2000-2004, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/libya/sebha.htm>.

Late 1980s
Libya begins the construction of an underground chemical plant 650 miles south of Tripoli at Sebha entitled Pharma 200.
--"Sebha [Pharma 200]," GlobalSecurity.org, 2000-2004, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/libya/sebha.htm>.

1984
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl declines to take action in preventing chemical weapons precursor, technology, or production equipment transfers to Libya, despite international suspicion that German firms are the primary suppliers to the Libyan chemical weapons program.

The German chemical company Imhausen-Chemie signs a contract with Libya to build the chemical plant at Rabta. According to Imhausen-Chemie President Jürgen Hippenstiel-Imhausen, the leader of IBI Engineering, Ihsan Barbouti, approached Imhausen to assist in the construction of a "multi-purpose" chemical plant at Rabta.
--Kenneth R. Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles, CA: Simon Wiesenthal Center, August 1992), p. 80; "Case Study Libya: Proliferation Techniques: Organization of the Supply Network for Rabta," VUB, SIPRI, and ISN, 1998-2001, <http://cbw.sipri.se/cbw/003040315.html>.

1984-1988
Imhausen-Chemie becomes the central actor in the supply network providing the Rabta project with equipment and materials for CW production.
--"Case Study Libya: Proliferation Techniques: Organization of the Supply Network for Rabta," VUB, SIPRI, and ISN, 1998-2001, <http://cbw.sipri.se/cbw/003040315.html>.

5 July 1985
Imhausen-Chemie becomes a potential supplier for the Rabta facility, as indicated in a 1989 report submitted to the Bundestag (the German national Parliament) by Federal Minister for Special Tasks and Chief of the Federal Chancellery Wolfgang Schauble.
--Kenneth R. Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 80; Kenneth R. Timmerman, The Poison Gas Connection: Western Suppliers of Unconventional Weapons and Technologies to Iraq and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1990), p. 31.

1986
British intelligence sources disclose that the Soviets have supplied nerve agent warheads for Scud-B missiles to Libya.
--J. P. Perry Robinson, "Chemical and Biological Warfare: Developments in 1986," SIPRI Yearbook 1987 (London: Taylor & Francis, 1987), p. 198.

7 February 1986
German intelligence (Bundesnachrichtendienst-- BND) reports the suspected involvement of a German shipping company in the potential shipping of 100 tons of sodium fluoride, a CW precursor, to Libya on a Panamanian freighter called "Capira" from Zeebrugge, Germany in early October 1985.
--Kenneth R. Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 35.

11 December 1986
Chad accuses Libya of using poison gas against Chadian forces in Northern Chad.
--J. P. Perry Robinson, "Chemical and Biological Warfare: Developments in 1986," SIPRI Yearbook 1987 (London: Taylor & Francis, 1987), p. 107.

22 December 1986
Libya allegedly initiates a second chemical attack on Chadian rebels using napalm and toxic gas. [Note: Evidence of the actual chemical substances used on this occasion remains uncorroborated.]
--Gordon M. Burck, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 269.

September 1987
Libya allegedly drops Iran-supplied chemical agents on Chadian troops at the "Maaten as-Sara air base." The chemical agents used could potentially be mustard dropped by aircraft. Following the attack, Chad hands over gas munitions called "granaten" to the French as proof of Libya's offensive; however, the chemical contents of the munitions never undergo analysis.
--Proliferation: Threat and Response, U.S. Department of Defense, November 1997, <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/meafrica.html#libya>; Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999), p. 16; Gordon M. Burck, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 269.

1988
Libya completes construction of the chemical facility at Rabta, approximately 120 km southwest of Tripoli. The facility proceeds to manufacture at least 100 metric tons of blister and nerve agents over the next three years.

Libya receives 19 metric tons of the dual use chemical dichlorethane legally shipped by the German pharmaceutical firm Merck.

According to U.S. source allegations, Libya has developed a production site with nerve agent capabilities at Matan 100 km north of the Chad border.
--Proliferation: Threat and Response, U.S. Department of Defense, November 1997, <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif/me_na.html>; Joshua Sinai, "Libya's Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction," Nonproliferation Review, Spring/Summer 1997, p. 94; S. J. Lundin, "Chemical and Biological Warfare: developments in 1989," SIPRI Yearbook 1989 (New York: Oxford UP, 1989), pp. 110-111.

Mid-1988
The Rabta Plant, consisting of 30 buildings guarded by Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) batteries and special troops, begins test runs.
--Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999), p. 16.

May 1988
U.S. officials learn that Japan Steel Works has been aiding in the construction of a metalworking plant at Rabta capable of producing artillery shells and "corrosion-resistant containers for chemical agents." Japan Steel Works refutes the allegations, stating that it sold Libya "only general purpose metal-working tools, designed to make desalination equipment." Based on the inclusion (in the deliveries) of specialty steels used in bomb casing, U.S. and British intelligence remain convinced that Libya is using materials from the Japanese company to manufacture chemical weapons, however. [Note: Japan later assures the U.S. State Department that Japanese companies ceased all activity at Rabta by July 1998.]
--"Libya Has Trouble Building the Most Deadly Weapon," The Risk Report 1 (December 1995), <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/libya/trouble.html>.

14 September 1988
U.S. Department of State Spokesman Charles E. Redman announces during a State Department briefing that Libya has developed chemical weapons production capabilities and is on the verge of manufacturing chemical agents. Redman allegedly expresses a willingness to use force against Libya in hopes that the threat will convince suspected West German and Japanese suppliers to cease transactions with and activities in the country. Later that evening, NBC News reports that Libya plans to produce nerve and mustard agents at a plant 80 km south of Tripoli.
--Kenneth R. Timmerman, The Poison Gas Connection: Western Suppliers of Unconventional Weapons and Technologies to Iraq and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1990), p. 27-8.

November 1988
The United Nations Secretary General receives a letter from Libya denying any pursuit of offensive CW capabilities.
--Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 267.

December 1988
The Rabta facility obtains glass-lined vessels capable of withstanding corrosive chemical reactions from the French firm De Dietrich.
--Joshua Sinai, "Libya's Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction," Nonproliferation Review, Spring/Summer 1997, p. 94.

1988
Spain's Prime Minister Felipe González refuses to grant the United States permission to use Spanish bases for a bombing campaign to destroy the Rabta chemical factory in Libya.
--"Spain Plays a Key Role in Relations with Libya," El Mundo, 9 December 2003, in FBIS Document EUP20031209000187.

Late 1988 - Early 1989
The American news media publicly confronts Chancellor Kohl's refusal to prevent technology transfers contributing to the development of Libya's chemical weapons program. The Chancellor denies German firms' involvement in such transfers or any knowledge of the construction of the Rabta facility as such. A wave of criticism against West German export controls ensues after U.S. commentator William Safire dubs Rabta an "Auschwitz in the Sand" following the Chancellor's public denials.
--Kenneth R. Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 80.

1 January 1989
West German company Imhausen-Chemie's role as the "prime contractor of the 'Pharma-150 Pharmaceuticals' plant in Rabta, Libya" becomes public knowledge.

Libya's foreign minister remarks to a French interviewer at the Paris Conference that "[d]espite the fact that the production of chemical weapons is not banned by the Geneva agreement, Libya has decided of her own free will that it will not produce, and furthermore does not intend to produce, chemical weapons."
-- Kenneth R. Timmerman, The Poison Gas Connection: Western Suppliers of Unconventional Weapons and Technologies to Iraq and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1990), p. 268.

12 January 1989
West German authorities seize 12 boxes of documents from the offices of Iraqi-born Ihsan Barbouti of IBI Engineering. The documents include contracts proving IBI Engineering's orchestration of the "international procurement effort for the Rabta plant." After the raid of Barbouti's offices, Barbouti himself disappears.
--Kenneth R. Timmerman, The Poison Gas Connection: Western Suppliers of Unconventional Weapons and Technologies to Iraq and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1990), p. 29.

17 February 1989
West German Federal Minister for Special Tasks and Chief of the Federal Chancellery Wolfgang Schauble submits a report to the Bundestag (the German lower house of parliament) detailing West German intelligence's knowledge of Libya's chemical weapons development since April 1980. It names Imhausen-Chemie as a "potential supplier" and exposes the West German government's prior knowledge of Libya's development of CW capabilities and the possibility of West German firm involvement in such development. Although Schauble argues that the absence of conclusive evidence precludes the investigation of these firms by the West German government, he exposes the "shortcomings of West Germany's legal framework," opening West Germany to international scrutiny.
--Kenneth R. Timmerman, The Poison Gas Connection: Western Suppliers of Unconventional Weapons and Technologies to Iraq and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1990), p. 31.

	Updated September 2005