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Chemical Chronology

2000-2003

This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

6 May 2002
U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton accuses Tripoli of pursuing offensive chemical capabilities, maintaining that the Rabta facility produced 100 metric tons of various types of "chemical arms" before closing for the first time and continued producing chemical weapons in 1995 when it reopened under the pretense of a pharmaceuticals plant. He also remarked, "following the suspension of UN sanctions in April 1999, Libya has reestablished contacts with illicit foreign sources of expertise, parts and precursor chemicals in the Middle East, Asia and Western Europe."
--Francis Temman, "Washington Warns Cuba, Libya and Syria against Spreading Weapons of Mass Destruction," Agence France Presse, 7 May 2002.

8 May 2002
Libya refutes Under Secretary Bolton's allegations that it has been pursuing chemical, biological and nuclear weapons according to BBC reports.
--"Libya Denies Claims of Chemical Weapons," BBC News, 8 May 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1975365.stm>.

Late October 2002
Allegedly Iran and Libya secretly sign an agreement to develop chemical weapons in Tripoli. Iran pledges to supply Scud missile technology capable of carrying chemical agents and to provide Libya with equipment such as masks and outerwear to protect against chemical exposure. Libya and Iran are reported to have "exchanged a memorandum on cooperation in developing warheads for missiles that will carry nerve gas and technology to produce nerve gas using phosphorus trichloride."
--"'Informed Source': Iran, Libya Signed 'Secret' Chemical Weapon Pact in Oct '02," Tokyo Foresight, 18 October - 14 November 2003, pp. 28-29, in FBIS Document JPP20031029000041; "North Korea and Iran also Support Libya's Development of Weapons of Mass Destruction--The United States and the UK Will Analyze Their Technological Level," Sankei Shimbun, 6 January, 2004, in "Japanese Daily: DPRK, Iran Helped Libya Develop Weapons of Mass Destruction," in FBIS Document JPP20040106000017.

January 2003
Investigators from the Fiscal Police Regional Nucleus and the Customs Antifraud Department in Genoa, Italy impound 50 tons of chemical precursors docked in transit in the Genoa-Voltri harbor bound for Libya. The precursor chemicals necessary for the production of mustard gas are packaged in several hundred drums. It is revealed that a Belgian company has been dispatching the chemicals through a number of "intermediate staging posts" or triangulations before reaching the final destination in Libya. The Belgian and Libyan companies involved claim that the chemicals are "duly declared" and that their purpose is for pesticide manufacturing not WMD development. The Italian Public Prosecutor's Office and the United States administration, however, do not abandon suspicions that once the chemicals arrive in Libya, they could easily be used locally or diverted to other countries for terrorism sponsorship.
--"Italian Police Seize 50 metric tons Chemical on UN Weapons Blacklist," La Republica, 16 January 2003, in "Genoa Finance Police Impound Libya-Bound Cargo of Chemical Weapons Precursors," in FBIS Document EUP20030116000096, 16 January 2003.

28 April--9 May 2003
Libya attends the first CWC Review Conference (RevCon) as a non-state party.
--Alexander Kelle, "The First CWC Review Conference: Taking Stock and Paving the Way Ahead," Disarmament Forum, No. 4 (UNIDIR: 2002), p. 3, <http://www.opcw.org/html/db/members_ratifyer.html>.

12 September 2003
The United Nations Security Council lifts sanctions on Libya following the government's agreement to pay compensation to the families of victims of the 1988 Lockerbie terrorist attack.
--"How Khadafi Brought Libya Back Into the International Fold," Agence France Presse, 27 April 2004, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

October 2003
U.S. and British experts inspect laboratories and military facilities for three weeks with Libya's permission. The CIA experts allowed to explore the chemical and nuclear facilities remark that, "It wasn't the individual things we were shown that we were blown away by," but "the extent to which we were given access."
--Patrick E. Tyler and James Risen, "Libya Arms Talks Lasted Three Months," New York Times, 22 December, 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com>.

20-24 October 2003
During its eighth session, the Conference of the States Parties of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) extends observer status to Iraq and Libya, neither of which is a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
--OPCW Conference of the States Parties decision C-8/DEC.5, 23 October 2003.

19 December 2003
Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi pledges to rid Libya of all weapons of mass destruction, including biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.

Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation Abd-al-Rahman [Muhammad] Shalqam states the following in a news conference, "... we confirm that Libya will abide by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and the Biological Weapons convention, as well as accepting the Additional Protocol of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and the Biological and Chemical Weapons Treaty."
--Patrick E. Tyler, "Qaddafi's New Tune Confounds," New York Times, 30 December 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com>; "Libya to Eliminate Weapons of Mass Destruction," JANA, 19 December 2003, in FBIS Document GMP20031219000267.



 

Updated September 2005


1920-1989

1990-1999

2000-2003

2004

2005-2007



Maps
Companies Reported to Have Sold or Attempted to Sell Libya Centrifuge Components
Was Libyan Disarmament a Significant Success for Nonproliferation?
WMD in the Middle East
Treaties and Organizations
An Account Of Chemical And Biological Weapons In Some African Countries: Potential for Acquisition and Usage (2006)
GlobalSecurity: Libyan Nuclear Weapons
Libya is the Acid Test for Bolton Nomination (2005)
In Focus: IAEA and Libya
ISIS: Uncovering the Nuclear Black Market (2004)
CRS: Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction (2004)
RANSAC: Redirection of WMD Scientists in Iraq and Libya: A Status Report (2004)
ISIS: Libya's Gas Centrifuge Procurement: Much Remains Undiscovered (2004)
Press Release by Inspector General of Police in Relation to Investigation on the Alleged Production of Components for Libya’s Uranium Enrichment Programme (2004)
U.S. Government’s Assistance to Libya in the Elimination of its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) (2004)
VERTIC: Verifying Libya's Nuclear Disarmament (2004)
CNS: Libya and Nonproliferation (2003)
Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions (2003)
CNS: Libya’s Chemical Weapon Program (1998)
Libya’s Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction (1997)



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About This Section  CNS Experts 

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

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