Available documentation indicates that Libya was intent on developing the capability to launch ballistic missiles with CW agents to distant targets, and had made progress in developing chemical warheads. Two major Libyan ballistic-missile programs were reportedly under way in the 1990s: the al-Fatah ("Conqueror") and al-Fajer al-Jadid projects.[1] The al-Fatah project was a research and development effort to develop a ballistic missile with a medium range of 950 kilometers.[2] The al-Fajer al-Jadid project sought to upgrade Libya's Scud B surface-to-surface missiles, with a range of 190 miles, to deliver chemical weapons.[3] Another possibility would be to place chemical warheads on the Nodong-1 advanced ballistic missiles, with a range of 810 miles. Libya reportedly received the technology for the development of such missiles from North Korea.[4] In 2000, Libya acquired from North Korea some 50 No-Dong missiles and an unknown number of launchers.[5] By 2002, the al-Fatah missile project reportedly was "stalled, and the missile was never tested."[6]

Yet another delivery option would be to equip Libya's Su-24D "Fencer" advanced fighter aircraft with chemical bombs.[7] Libya was considered to have only a primitive capability to refuel such aircraft in mid-air, although it could potentially strike at Israel. Even so, Libyan aircraft would have difficulty penetrating Israel's sophisticated air-defense network.[8]

According to an unclassified CIA report, "the suspension of UN sanctions in 1999 allowed Libya to expand its efforts to obtain ballistic missile-related equipment, materials, technology and expertise from foreign sources. During the first half of 2003, Libya continued to depend on foreign assistance--particularly from Serbian, Indian, Iranian, North Korean, and Chinese entities--for its ballistic missile development programs. Libya's capability therefore may not be limited to its Soviet-origin Scud-B missiles. With continued foreign assistance, Libya will likely achieve an MRBM capability--a long desired goal--probably through direct purchase from North Korea or Iran."[9]

These estimates appeared to be on solid ground, as demonstrated by new revelations in early 2004 about the extent of Libya's development of chemical warheads. In March 2004, for example, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, based in The Hague, had monitored the destruction of more than 3,300 unfilled aerial bombs designed to disperse chemical warfare agents.[10]

[1] Breik A. Swessi, "Libya: Unconventional Weapons and Terrorism," paper presented to the "Post-Qadhafi Conference," Center for International and Strategies Studies, Washington, DC, November 29-30, 1993, p. 3.
[2] Leonard S. Spector, et. al., Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1995 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), p. 141.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Mahnaimi, "US Fury as Gadaffi Steps Up Work on Mustard Gas Factory."
[5] Yiftah Shapir, "Libyan Weapons of Mass Destruction: Qaddafi Redux?," Tel Aviv Notes, Mark A. Heller, editor, No. 49, September 12, 2002.
[6] Shapir, "Libyan Weapons of Mass Destruction: Qaddafi Redux?"
[7] Robert Waller, "Libyan Threat Perception," Jane's Intelligence Review (September 1995), p. 408.
[8] Ibid.
[9] CIA, "Attachment A: Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2003."
[10] "Libya Reveals Mustard Gas Stockpile," VOA News, March 5, 2004.

	Updated May 2004