This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

Mid-April 1990
Colonel Qadhdhafi calls for the inclusion of a nuclear component in the development of a multifaceted deterrent force.
—Joshua Sinai, "Libya's Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction," The Nonproliferation Review (Spring-Summer 1997).

29 April 1990
Colonel Qadhdhafi calls for the production of nuclear weapons by Libya.
—Anthony Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 April 2003.

18 June 1990
Qadhdhafi urges Libyan students and scientists to accelerate the country's efforts to reach space and produce nuclear weapons.
—"Libyan Leader Urges Speed on Nation's Atom Bomb," Toronto Star, 18 June 1990.

3 July 1990
A Christian Science Monitor article reports that Brazil and Argentina may be willing to sell nuclear technology to Libya due to economic hardship.
—"Libya Shops for Nukes," Christian Science Monitor, 3 July 1990.

1991
German firm Leybold AG attempts to send Libya a furnace used for the production of super-hard metal alloys of the type used in guided missiles and nuclear weapons. Leybold tells German customs agents who seized the shipment that the furnace is for Libyan domestic aluminum smelting, but an internal memorandum circulated among Leybold's management reveals that the furnace was to be camouflaged and sent to Maktab el Buhut Attacknia, a front for Libya's ballistic missile research facility in Tripoli.
—William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).

17 February 1991
A USA Today report alleges that Libya is building underground bunkers to store nuclear and chemical weapons. The Independent of London reports that the bunker is located 25 miles outside Tripoli. Libya denies these reports that same day.
—"World Line," USA Today, 7 February 1991; "Crisis in the Gulf: Libya 'Building Nuclear Depot'," Independent (London), 7 February 1991; "Libya Denies Report," Financial Times, 7 February 1991.

July 1991
Media reports allege that the Bank of Credit and Commerce International helped finance the purchase of nuclear weapons components for Libya.
—"The BCCI Scandal: How the Money-Go-Round Finally Ground to a Halt," The Guardian (London), 27 July 1991.

September 1991
The US Customs Service investigates allegations that the US company Halliburton exported nuclear detonator devices to Libya.
—"Agency Probes Alleged Sale of Nuclear Devices: Informant Says Detonators Sent from Huston to Libya," Houston Chronicle, 22 September 1991.

October 1991
US and Israeli officials become increasingly concerned about the possibility of nations such as Libya attracting Soviet scientists to aid their nuclear programs.
—"Third World Dictators Woo Soviet Scientists," Sunday Times, 13 October 1991.

November 1991
According to a prosecutor in northern Italy, Swiss police confiscate 66 pounds of Soviet uranium allegedly destined for countries using East Bloc technology, such as Iraq or Libya.
— Harry Levins, "Worst-Case Scenarios... What If Nuclear Arms Leak From Old U.S.S.R.," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 1 January 1992.

22 November 1991
British Defense Secretary Tom King says that Libya is among a group of 20 countries that could soon possess nuclear weapons.
—"King Raises Fear of Arab Bomb," Times, 23 November 1991.

26 November 1991
The Washington Post reports that Libya is attempting to recruit Soviet scientists to bolster its nuclear weapons program.
—"Facing a 'Messy' Nuclear Scenario; U.S. Seeks to Avert Sale or Theft of Soviet Arms, Technology," The Washington Post, 26 November 1991.

13 December 1991
US Secretary of State James Baker voices his fears that Libya may be among nations trying to recruit unemployed Soviet scientists to work on nuclear weapons programs.
—"Western Intervention Vital, Warns Baker," Nationwide News Pty Limited, 14 December 1991.

8 January 1992
The top nuclear official in Moscow, Vyacheslav Rosanov of the I.V. Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, says Libya has twice offered jobs at its Tajura Nuclear Research Center to two Russian nuclear scientists. The first offer was made in the summer of 1991 and the second in late 1991. Both scientists were offered a salary of $2,000 a month, but both declined. Kurchatov officials confirmed the report, but Libya denies making the offers.
—Jack Kelley, "Russian Nuke Experts Wooed," USA Today, 8 January 1992; "Libya Denies Offers to Soviets," The Washington Post, 11 January 1992; Jack Kelley, "Russia Expects More N-Experts to Leave," USA Today, 23 January 1992; Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, August 1992), p. 90.

20 January 1992
Former Soviet nuclear scientist Igor Cherniyev claims that he has been working on a top secret Libyan nuclear research program since September 1991, earning more than $10,000 per month. He tells the newspaper that three other Russian nuclear scientists have been working with him and that Libya is using "the most modern Western technology at the site, deep in the Awabi desert." Cherniyev previously worked for the Institute of Nuclear Research near Moscow. Libya subsequently denies these charges. Libya has referred to these scientists as eye specialists; Libya's Health Ministry issued a communiqué saying a medical team of 11 eye specialists from Ukraine were working in Libya.
— Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, August 1992), p. 90; N. Mengel, Courier-Mail, 20 January 1992; Lee Michael Katz, "Nuclear Threat Different, Not Gone, Panel Warned," USA Today, 23 January 1992; "Soviet Scientists," USA Today, 23 January 1992.

23 January 1992
German customs officials at Frankfurt airport seize US-made atomic program equipment on a plane bound for Libya. The equipment was confiscated in December of 1991, but the announcement was withheld pending enquiries in the United States. The shipment included laser equipment and a range of dual-use equipment. The intended recipient was an office in Libya that German experts say is a known procurement agency for the Libyan missile program. The items had been obtained from an US manufacturer by a Dutch company.
— Ian Murray, "Atom Cargo for Libya is Seized," The Times, 23 January 1992.

3 February 1992
Libya has opened all its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspectors to prove it has no secret nuclear weapons production project. IAEA Director General Hans Blix said Libya had expressed willingness to implement safeguards against diversion of nuclear technology to military uses.
— "Libya Set to Allow Nuclear Inspections," Toronto Star, 3 February 1992.

Spring 1992
German firm Leybold AG is again caught attempting to send Libya a furnace used for the production of super-hard metal alloys of the type used in guided missiles and nuclear weapons. The furnace seized in Rotterdam was allegedly for use in Libya's al-Fatah ballistic missile program. [Note: See 1991 entry.]
—William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).

27 March 1992
Russian President Boris Yeltsin prepares to sell Libya an air defense missile system armed with SA-10 missiles; one version of the missile is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, although it is unclear whether this is the version being sent to Libya. The SA-10 is the equivalent of the US Patriot missile and can engage six targets simultaneously up to 100 km away at a height of between 25 and 18,000 meters.
—Ian Mather, "Arms Trade; Russia Ready to Sell Missiles to Libyans," Ottawa Citizen, 27 March 1993.

28 April 1992
A RAND report prepared for the Department of Defense says China has sold lithium hydride, a chemical that can be used in manufacturing nerve agents, missile fuel, and nuclear weapons, to Libya.
— R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Complains to China About Libyan Arms Shipment," The Washington Post, 28 April 1992.

17 September 1992
The Jerusalem Post says China is in the process of selling nuclear reactors to Libya and Iran.
—Dan Izenberg, Jon Immanuel, and Bill Hutman, "Qian: Reactor for Iran is Not a Nuclear Weapon," Jerusalem Post, 17 September 1992.

11 December 1992
Iraqi nuclear engineer Moayyad Hassan Naji al-Janabi, who fled Iraq for Jordan in 1992, was shot and killed in Amman as he went to collect visas for a teaching post in Libya. The nature of the teaching post is unclear.
—"Jordan to Try Iraqis Over Killing," The Independent (London), 11 December 1992.

14 April 1993
Ukraine's deputy foreign minister Boris Tarasyuk announces that chemicals for nuclear fuel bound for Libya were seized by customs officers. Tarasyuk says a Western embassy had told authorities that the final destination was Libya. Chemicals in the shipment were ammonium chloride from the Moscow firm Paveks, and they were to be loaded on a ship at the Black Sea port of Ilichevsk for transport to Varna in Bulgaria.
—Hobart Mercury, 14 April 1993.

16 May 1993
Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi says in an interview that Libya would never develop or seek to purchase nuclear weapons and that it would never use weapons of mass destruction against Israel.
— Judith Miller, "Moammar Dearest," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 16 May 1993.

19 July 1993
The United States is concerned about potential sales of North Korea's long-range Nodong 1 missile and nuclear-capable Scud-B and Scud-C missiles to Libya, Iran, and Syria. In congressional testimony, CIA Director James Woolsey states that if such sales were to take place, Libya would be able to reach US bases and allied capitals in the Mediterranean. The Nodong is of prime concern because it can be fitted with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in addition to conventional warheads.

US officials and missile experts are also troubled by North Korea's export of missile technology and managerial know-how, which would allow these countries to produce the missiles indigenously. Some analysts say North Korea is already selling complete production plants to the three countries via Lyongaksan Import Corp., but other experts indicate that North Korea, up to this point, has only assisted in setting up assembly facilities. North Korea is reportedly helping Libya construct a Scud production line at a facility near Tripoli called the Central Repair Workshop, which may begin pilot production of the Nodong 1 missile by next year.
—Associated Press, "U.S. Officials Welcome Delay in North Korean Missile Sale," Christian Science Monitor, 27 December 1993; Robert S. Greenberger, "Washington Insight: North Korea's Missile Sales in Mideast, Along with Nuclear Issue, Raise Concern," The Wall Street Journal, 19 July 1993, p. A6.

14 December 1993
North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung has plans to sell a long-range, nuclear-capable missile, and the production facilities to manufacture it, to states like Libya, Iran, and possibly Pakistan.
—Lally Weymouth, "North Korea: Talk Means Nothing to Gangsters," The Washington Post, 14 December 1993.

23 February 1994
In response to a British report that said Libya would have a workable atomic option within 10 years, Libya announces that it does not possess, and is not pursuing, the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
—Michael Widlanski, "Libya: We Are Not After Nuclear Arms," Jerusalem Post, 23 February 1994.

18 June 1994
Robert Gates, former director of the CIA, expresses concern in an editorial that Libya is likely to be a recipient of any North Korean nuclear technology and weapons proliferation.
—Robert Gates, "Too Hot to Handle; Sweet Talking Won't Work with Rogue North Korea," Gazette (Montreal), 18 June 1994.

20 June 1994
The Sunday Times reports that countries such as Libya, Iran, and Iraq were using British universities to develop knowledge for nuclear weapons production.
—Courier-Mail, 20 June 1994.

28 June 1994
In testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, CIA Director James Woolsey expresses his concern that Libya, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea may try to acquire nuclear warheads or material from Russian organized crime gangs.
—"Crime Gangs 'Nuke Threat'," Courier-Mail, 29 June 1994.

17 July 1994
A report in The Independent (London) alleges that Iraqi-born arms dealer and British citizen Ishan Barbouti faked his own death to escape German and US investigations into his activities as an intermediary in Libyan efforts to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons.
—"After-Life of an Arms Dealer; a Key Figure in Passing Western Nuclear Technology to Libya May Have Faked His Death," The Independent (London), 17 July 1994.

14 August 1994
German police seize a large shipment of weapons-grade nuclear material apparently smuggled from the former Soviet Union and headed to terrorists or the governments of Libya, Iran, Iraq, or North Korea.
—"Germans Find 3rd Shipment of Smuggled Plutonium," Toronto Star, 14 August 1994.

24 April 1995
A Libyan radio report announces that, during a summit held with Algeria, the two sides called for ways to enable non-nuclear countries to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
—"Libya and Algeria Call for the Possession of Nuclear Technology for Peaceful Purposes," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 April 1995.

July 1995
Libya makes "a strategic decision to reinvigorate its nuclear activities, including gas centrifuge uranium enrichment."
—Report by the General Director, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2004/12, 20 February 2004, p. 5.

Later in 1995
At the NPT Review and Extension Conference, Libya eventually supports an indefinite extension of the treaty, despite Israel's continued refusal to sign it.
—Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 307.

10 August 1995
Libya announces it will buy an unspecified amount of uranium from Kazakhstan. It is unclear whether the material is weapons grade. Kazakhstan denies the deal.
—"Libya to Buy Uranium from Kazakhstan," The New York Times, 10 August 1995; "Kazakhs Deny Reported Sale of Uranium to Libya," Agence France Presse, 14 August 1995.

30 August 1995
Ra'ad Id Aldafi, from Libyan military industries, allegedly visits Baghdad and begins an era of Iraq-Libya military cooperation. Supposedly, Iraq hopes to shift its nuclear program to Libyan territory.
— Tom O'Dwyer, "Libya Helps Iraq Dodge Weapons Supervision," Jerusalem Post, 1 November 1995.

2 October 1995
A Pakistani nuclear physicist claims to have created a cheap and simple uranium enrichment process that Pakistan used to make nuclear material, and that countries including Libya approached him for the technology. Mohammad Qadeer Husayn, a professor of nuclear physics at the Federal Government Urdu Science College in Karachi, Pakistan, says his method involves a liquid rather than gaseous form of uranium that can be separated in an ultra-centrifuge, a piece of equipment that is found in many types of laboratories and that costs about $50,000. US experts said the design was not feasible.
—Teresa Riordan, "Patents; A Method of Uranium Enrichment that Might be Used for Bombs is Questioned by Some Experts," The New York Times, 2 October 1995.

1 November 1995
According to the Jerusalem Post, Iraqi nuclear scientist Ja'afar Dhia Ja'afar arrived in Libya to lead a group of experts and engineers from Iraqi military industries in installing a small nuclear enrichment kiln in the area of Sidi Abu Zarik, approximately 380 kilometers south of Tripoli. The Iraq-Libya cooperation allegedly began with a secret visit by Ra'ad Id Aldafi, from Libyan military industries, to Baghdad on August 30, 1995. The Jerusalem Post goes on to say that contracts for Iraqi scientists to work in Libya were passed off as contracts for these scientists to lecture in Libyan universities and institutions. Unnamed experts suggest that Iraqi nuclear fuel could reach Libya by sea within weeks, and that Iraqi experts in Libya could begin enriching it after installing more small or medium-sized kilns.
—Tom O'Dwyer, "Libya Helps Iraq Dodge Weapons Supervision," The Jerusalem Post, 1 November 1995.

Early November 1995
US firm Halliburton agrees to pay $2.61 million in civil penalties and $1.2 million to the US government for violating a US trade embargo by shipping oilfield equipment to Libya. Federal officials were concerned that some of the well servicing equipment sent to Libya between late 1987 and early 1990 could have been used to help develop nuclear weapons. It is unclear whether this equipment would have been used in missile development or strictly nuclear development.
—Bill Miller, "McDonnell Douglas to Pay $2.1 Million Fine in Export Case," The Washington Post, 15 November 2001; Jason Leopold, "Halliburton Won't Back Off Doing Biz in Iran, Despite NTC Pension Funds Concerns of Terrorism," Centre for Research on Globalisation, 5 November 2003, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/LEO311A.html>.

Late 1995
According to a US intelligence report, Ukraine and Libya established strategic cooperation that involves the transfer of nuclear, missile, and other weapons technology from Ukraine to Libya. The report says Ukraine's president, Leonid Kuchma, created a committee of top Ukrainian officials, including the minister in charge of nuclear technology, to establish comprehensive strategic cooperation with Libya.
—Barbara G.B. Ferguson, "Libya, Ukraine Sign Deal on Nuclear Technology Transfer," Saudi Gazette, 12 June 1996.

27 January 1996
Libya urges Arab countries to use every means possible to obtain nuclear weapons after Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel's Likud party would never relinquish the country's nuclear capability.
— "Libya Urges Arabs to get Nuclear Arms," Agence France Presse, 27 January 1996.

27 January 1996
Libya's official news agency restates Colonel Qadhdhafi's position that Arab states would be justified in possessing chemical and biological weapons in order to counter Israel's nuclear arsenal.
— Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 307.

April 1996
Libya is among 43 African nations to sign the African Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone Treaty.
—Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 307.

17 April 1996
Libya denies US allegations that its manmade river project is actually a nuclear weapons plant.
—"Libya Again Denies US Allegation on Nuclear Weapon Plant," Xinhua News Agency, 17 April 1996.

September 1996
Libya, along with Bhutan and India, votes against the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at the United Nations General Assembly, on the grounds that it should provide for nuclear disarmament within a specified time.
—Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 307.

25 November 1996
A NATO secret report leaked to Spain's El Mundo newspaper says the organization believes Libya could be equipped to launch a nuclear attack on southern Europe by the year 2006. The document, "MC 161/96, The General Intelligence Estimate," reports that Libya planned to develop medium-range missiles capable of delivering nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads over the coming decade.
—"Report Says Libya Nuclear Threat to EU," United Press International, 25 November 1996.

29 November 1996
NATO comes out with a security document to prevent weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from reaching Libya, Iraq, and Iran. Unnamed sources say the US spearheaded the approach, as it had in the past, to prevent China, North Korea, Russia, and Pakistan from supplying Libya, Iraq, and Iran with WMD.
—"Paper Reports NATO Measures to Stop Nuclear Weapons Reaching Libya, Iran, Iraq," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 29 November 1996.

1997
Foreign manufacturers provide 20 pre-assembled L-1 centrifuges [an old version of European-designed centrifuges also known as G-1 or P-1] and components for an additional 200 L-1 centrifuges to Libya. Libya uses the pre-assembled centrifuges to begin installing a completed single centrifuge at Al Hashan. [This centrifuge was successfully tested in October 2000.]
—Report by the General Director, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2004/12, 20 February 2004, p. 5.

Mid-1997
Libya reportedly seeks to purchase weapons-grade fissile material on the black market in order to restart or accelerate its nuclear weapons program.
—Sinai, Joshua, "Libya's Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction," The Nonproliferation Review (Spring-Summer 1997).

October 1997
Russia reopens nuclear cooperation talks with Libya.
—Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Miriam, Deadly Arsenals, Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 307.

24 October 1997
Russia and Libya sign an accord which includes rehabilitation of the Tajura nuclear research center, built with USSR assistance in the late 1970s.
—Andrei Ivanov, "Sergei Shoighu to Help Libya," Russian Press Digest, 24 October 1997.

March 1998
The Russian Atomenergoeksport company signs an $8 million contract with Libya for the partial overhaul of the Tajura nuclear research center.
—Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 307.

26 May 1999
A congressional report charges that China has proliferated missile technology and nuclear secrets to Libya, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.
—Ben Fenton, "China Gave U.S. Secrets to Unstable Regimes: 700-page Report Calls China a Nuclear Threat after Stealing Data for 40 Years," Ottawa Citizen, 26 May 1999.

Later half of 1999
Tripoli and Moscow resume discussions on cooperation regarding the Tajura nuclear research center and on a potential power reactor deal. The completion of this civil sector project might allow Libya to conduct weapons-related research and development.
—Anthony Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 April 2003.

	Updated September 2005